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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is a cultural and historical analysis of the history of popular music 
funding in Canada, from 1949 to 2013.  Canada has an extensive public subsidy 
system for popular music, deriving from the implementation of content quotas for 
publicly licensed airwaves and the need to supply these airwaves with appropriate 
content.  This thesis evaluates and analyses the history that engendered these 
policies to reveal their impact on the concept of Canadian identity as a whole, and 
the impact of Canadian identity formation on the popular music industries.  Through 
six decades of policy interventionism, Canada’s popular music structure has grown 
into a set of structures within structures, combining direct federal subsidies, 
regionally specific support and private initiatives mandated by public policy.  
However, in this history, never has the total system been conceptually audited as a 
whole, nor has its underlying cultural and economic impact been analysed.  Some 
see this support as a lifeline while others a tax, resulting in a set of structures 
framed on policy to simultaneously develop national cultural unity and economic 
prosperity.  These policies have shifted from supporting Canadian cultural policy to 
more business driven, economic objectives, despite being mandated, legislated and 
ultimately beholden to Canadian cultural polices, nationalism and protectionism.  By 
dissecting the history, this thesis aims to unravel an extensive and unique case study 
between the popular music industries and government as a whole.
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Introduction  
 
 The Canadian music industry, no matter which way you look at it, has arrived at a 
 sort of crossroads.  The path of experience we have trodden has not always led us 
 where we hoped it might go (Yorke 1971, 4). 
 
This dissertation examines the history of popular music funding in Canada.  The 
period that will be examined begins in 1949 and concludes at the beginning of 2013. 
These discussions began with the government publishing a report on arts 
intervention in 1949, leading to the legislating of a content quota for private 
television operators in 1962.  Policies concerning popular music were influenced by 
these debates, leading to a quota system installed for musical works on Canadian 
commercial radio in 1971.  This history is framed on a series of concepts surrounding 
what Canadian culture, in this case popular music culture in Canada, represents.  As 
a whole, Canadian cultural identity and the concept of being Canadian is influenced 
by a series of realities, including the close proximity to the United States, sparse 
population density and promoting federalism in a country with two official languages 
(and multiple secondary languages) and myriad popular cultures.  Defining what 
Canadian culture is, and subsequently how to protect, enrich and promote it is the 
core challenge in analysing this history.  Popular music is often seen as operating 
outside of state intervention.  In Canada, however, state involvement in popular 
music through policy and financial support is extensive and complex, and one that is 
looked at by other nations as a model in how to support their sectors.  This thesis 
will aim to uncover, expand on and extrapolate this history, to reveal the 
complexities and structural challenges in combining national identity, economic 
development and state intervention.   
 
There are a few key points to introduce to contextualize popular music funding in 
Canada.  Firstly, this thesis is concerned with popular music.  In this dissertation, I 
define this as music such as pop, rock, alternative and folk music, excluding music 
that is normally supported through Arts Council initiatives such as jazz, ballet, opera 
and classical.  Secondly, the Canadian popular music funding structure, if taken as a 
whole, infiltrates every level of the Canadian music business, from a new band 
recording a demo to a major music conference recruiting international buyers.  It is, 
to some extent, a musical welfare state, not unlike other subsidised sectors in 
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Canada including film and television, periodicals, agribusiness and energy.1  In 
popular music, not only do artists receive funding, but also festivals, managers, 
publishers, merchandisers and promoters are eligible for grants and loans under an 
extensive set of programs administered by a number of national and regional public 
and private outfits.  It is difficult to come across an artist or company who has not 
received support at some point in their career, including the most well known 
Canadian acts such as Nickelback, k.d. lang, Celine Dion, Avril Lavigne and Arcade 
Fire.  
 
Thirdly, it is critical to define who I refer to when using the terms ‘state’ and 
‘government’ in the context of popular music funding in Canada, as they differ 
considerably depending on each party described.  Mainly, these terms describe 
Canada’s federal government.  Each of Canada’s three main parties, the left-leaning 
Liberals, further-left New Democratic Party and right-leaning Conservatives, have 
governed at one point in the time period covered by this thesis, either nationally or 
provincially.2  In Quebec, the separatist Parti Québécois has governed in this time 
period, in addition to the Liberals.  It was the Liberal government in 1949 that 
contracted the Chancellor of the University of Toronto at the time, Vincent Massey, 
to produce The Royal Commission on the National Development of the Arts, Letters 
and Sciences, better known as The Massey Commission.  This was the document 
that first argued for the introduction of the Canadian Council for the Arts and the 
state support of Canada’s emerging film and television businesses, which can be 
regarded as a crucial turning point in the history of state intervention in the arts in 
Canada.  In addition, Canada’s Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in the late 
1960s and 1970s set up the Canadian Radio, Television and Telecommunications 
Commission (CRTC), the official regulatory agency for licensing airwaves that 
introduced Canadian Content regulations on publicly owned airwaves, now generally 
known as CANCON.  When the Conservative party governed Canada in 1985 under 
Brian Mulroney, it introduced the first government-supported program specifically for 
sound recording, the Sound Recording Development Program (SRDP).  While the 
NDP has never governed Canada federally, their regional policies in Nova Scotia and 
Saskatchewan, for example, have initiated funding programs for regional Music 
                                                 
1 For an in-depth analysis of film funding, see Dorland (1998) and Nash (1994).  For 
periodicals, see Zwicker (1974).  
2 The NDP (New Democratic Party) has never governed Canada nationally.  
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Industry Associations (MIA), including SaskMusic and Music Nova Scotia.  
 
In addition to the federal government, each province has operated independent 
funding mechanisms for popular music since the early 1980s.  Quebec, British 
Columbia and Saskatchewan were first to introduce provincial music industry 
organisations, while Quebec and Ontario have operated crown corporation cultural 
business banks since the mid 1980s.  For the purpose of this dissertation, Canada’s 
provincial polices will focus on Quebec, as collectively the system is too extensive to 
outline in full, in terms of program availability.  However, each province operates 
independent talent development and music business strategies, funded through 
public and private mechanisms.  Furthermore, support in Canada is provided by 
private radio broadcasters through legislated requirements introduced alongside the 
policing of Canadian content regulations.  In this case, this support will be referred 
to on occasion as public, even if it does not derive from Canada’s government 
resources.  
 
This dissertation analyses how the state, the music sector and Canada’s broadcasters 
have interacted with each other to shape how Canada – both its businesses and 
government - supports, identifies and assesses popular music output.  These 
questions go beyond the popular music sector to question the very concept of 
nationhood and the use of content quotas and funding to perpetuate a sense of 
collectivity and national heritage in this young, bilingual and multicultural nation.  
This dissertation is not intended to recommend policy change or amendment.  
Instead, it explores the history and structure of Canadian popular music funding – 
both in English and French Canada - by unravelling the history of intervention, how it 
emerged and who and how much of the industry these structures support.  By doing 
so, it will reveal three limitations of the system:  Firstly, if popular music is utilized as 
a tool to promote national identity, this cannot be effectively achieved through public 
funding initiatives.  Secondly, by installing cultural policy aimed at increasing content 
production – in this case a quota – the economic ecosystem of the sector the quota 
is meant to protect, in this case popular music, is impacted.  Thirdly, the 
measurement and definition of success in this interventionist model is, by its very 
design, inconclusive.   
 
These three challenges have led to a growing separation between the reason the 
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system was first initiated and why it remains important and necessary to uphold to 
this present day, for both the funding bodies and their recipients.  In Canada, 
popular culture defines and asserts fluctuating ideas of national culture.  However, 
Canada’s popular music funding history reveals that through quota regulations and 
subsequent actions taken in support of the quota, top-down policies have defined 
what popular culture is and consequently, how it fluctuates through state funding 
and regulation and how it impacts the concept of national identity, which I call being 
Canadian in this dissertation.  Such realities, when compared to Canada’s 
competitiveness in the global music market and how its system is viewed abroad, 
complicate the core objectives of why these policies exist.   
 
To capture this history and highlight these three challenges, this dissertation will 
follow a framework based on the relationship between cultural and economic policy 
objectives in the context of Canada’s popular music industries.  Within this 
relationship the concept of Canadian national identity formation (culture) has 
produced complications throughout the history and development of Canada’s popular 
music industries (economic).  This is not to ignore nor downplay the development of 
Canadian cultural policy and, separately, Canada’s popular music sector.  By the end 
of 2013, Canada has a definable popular music sector, one that did not exist with the 
same capacity in 1971, with a number of internationally successful artists that have 
benefitted from public support, including those mentioned above.  Furthermore, 
Canada has a definable, albeit fluctuating, national identity, even if this complex 
sense of identity is challenged internally by competing ideologies.  Being Canadian, 
both within its borders and abroad, is an accepted, national identity.  However, the 
concept and development of Canadian national identity, the internal and external 
influences on it and its impact on the development of Canada’s popular music 
businesses, has produced fundamental challenges.  The result is one of world’s most 
publicly subsidized popular music sectors, for both better and worse, which began 
with the initiation of a requirement that a certain amount of content of Canadian 
radio be Canadian.  This was called CANCON.   
 
The quota and its four-decade old history is at the core of popular music funding in 
Canada, as its existence ultimately creates a need to support content development to 
meet the quota.  Created in 1971 by Canada’s Liberal government, it took from 
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previous rulings on television to state that a certain amount of music on publicly 
licensed airwaves must be Canadian.  It was based on four parameters, the person 
or people who wrote the music, the artists’ origin, place of production and the 
person or people who wrote the lyrics, two of whom must be Canadian for a track to 
qualify.  This is called MAPL, an acronym of the four requirements developed by John 
Mills, executive director of PROCAN, the precursor to collection society SOCAN. 
Beginning at 25%, the quota has steadily increased; now it is 35% in English Canada 
and 65% for French-language content in Quebec.  Yet, its impact on Canadian 
popular music has not been comprehensively analysed.  Often, CANCON is seen in 
black and white, and most debates concerning it are based on whether it should be 
increased or decreased, rather than the theoretical and empirical questions that its 
history posits.  
CANCON supposes that Canadian content is, in and of itself, a unique and 
independent product that can be defined and protected.  While the CRTC employs a 
set of guidelines to assess CANCON, which will be analysed in chapter one, one must 
suppose that in order to protect Canadian content, one must understand what, 
exactly, comprises such content.  Within popular music, this is a complex and 
contested debate.  The domestic Canadian music industry, in its modern framework, 
emerged in the 1960s, at the same time as the ‘British invasion’.  At the time, British 
acts were hugely popular in Canada.  As a result, developing Canadian music 
businesses began to sign and promote copycat acts that replicated foreign content at 
the time, such as The Beatles and The Kinks.  From these beginnings, defining 
specific, national characteristics in Canadian music has been fraught with challenges.  
As Sutherland discusses in Making Music Industry Policy, attempts to do so by 
Canadian authors are few and far between.  He mentions two studies, Elaine Keillor’s 
Music in Canada (2006) and Michael Barclay, Ian A.D. Jack and Jason Schneider’s 
Have Not Been The Same (2006).  Both authors rely more on specific artists and 
songs, rather than positing a specific definition of Canadian music (Sutherland 2008, 
9).  This leads Sutherland to argue, “in musical terms there is no way, apart from the 
tune of ‘O Canada’ perhaps, of referring to the nation” (2008, 8).  This is also 
referenced by Keillor in a 1995 UN survey that ranks Canada last in “terms of 
presentation and promotion of its own art” (2006, 4).  Keillor, in her own argument, 
disagrees with this notion, offering two concepts to define Canadian music, as music 
relating directly with “landscape and rubbaboo.”  Landscape refers to referencing 
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Canadian terrain and specific locations in music and “rubbaboo” is a synonym of 
multiculturalism, derived from a First Nations word describing a blended soup (Keillor 
2006, 11-12).  Furthermore, when University of Toronto professor Patricia Shand 
surveyed a number of high school students, they defined Canadian music as 
referential to landscape and geography, music that is of high quality and diverse 
(Shand 2003).  Such qualitative descriptions are prevalent in this debate.  The CRTC, 
in its own definition of Canadian music, does not reference genre, style or specific 
musical form.  Symbolic metaphors have emerged to define what ‘Canadian’ popular 
music is, for example by linking its output to the rural, the pastoral or a sense of the 
rugged such as the tracks “Wheat Kings” by The Tragically Hip or “Whale Music” by 
The Rheostatics.   
Such perceptions began in the 1970s, when a sense of what Canadian music 
sounded like differentiated it from its American counterpart.  The nascent sector 
argued, led by the Canadian Independent Record Production Association (CIRPA), 
the world’s first independent music trade association, that this intangible stylistic 
difference required protection to be able to compete with foreign content.  
Therefore, any act permanently residing and composing in Canada could qualify, but 
that did not guarantee any support from disseminators, such as radio or record 
labels.  This has to do with exporting as well as importing content, to facilitate 
competitiveness.  Wright argues: “The truth of the matter is that even ardent 
CANCON supporters acknowledge that the main pre-occupation of the Canadian 
music industry is not one of protecting or enhancing ‘Canadian culture’ so much as it 
is that of finding and developing international markets” (1991, 311).  
This quote is useful and provocative.  Popular music in Canada is funded through 
two general frameworks.  The first comprises content production, including demo, 
album and collective initiative programmes and is aimed at ensuring that archival or 
production requirements are met for quota purposes.  The second is aimed at 
marketing and promoting the content, including touring, marketing and showcasing 
programmes.  These are focused on positioning Canadian content for export, both 
outside the producer’s domestic region in Canada and beyond Canada’s borders.  
While one structure theoretically develops the other, this has not always been the 
case.  This is not because of the programmes themselves, but more due to the 
policies that influenced the programmes.   
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To best understand these programs as they are analysed in this dissertation, it is 
important to reveal the theoretical framework that initiated the Canadian experiment 
in the first place, including CANCON and later, popular music funding programs.  
These theories are found in nationalism studies, including concepts and arguments 
relating to the concept and subjectivity of nationalism in general, as well as Canadian 
specific theories.  It is best, at this stage, to present a literature review of these 
concepts, first focusing on more general studies of nationalism in scholarship and 
later, Canadian specific arguments.  This will inform the rest of this dissertation and 
the focus on popular music funding and its relationship with identity formation and 
the concept of being Canadian.    
Literature Review:  Theories of Nationalism and Canada 
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, compiling and presenting a traditional literature 
review has produced challenges, as there is no scholarly history dedicated to 
Canada’s popular music funding structure, nor much mention of its relationship to 
nationalism.  CANCON studies are mostly quantitative or self referential and those of 
most value often ignore popular music, focusing more on CANCON as a singular 
topic.  As a result, in the works cited list, I have separated the sources referenced in 
the work to four sources; government documents, published sources such as 
journals and books, personal interviews and unpublished sources, such as blogs.  
Personal interviews were the best tools to discover what occurred in this history, as 
most of the protagonists remain active in the industry.  Otherwise, the majority of 
my sources derive from official state documents or those commissioned by the state 
but written by private contractors.  Each of these carries its own objective, usually 
contained in the brief or tender agreed upon to write the document.  With each 
successive government, from the publication of The Massey Commission to analysis 
of Canada’s radio contributions in the late 2000s, each document sourced comes 
with its own agenda, differing from those that came before it depending on which 
government sponsored it and what the overarching objectives of the piece was.   I 
have provided an in-depth analysis of interviewing procedures, questions of ethics 
and a discussion of my relationship with the material in the appendices, including 
outlining who refused to be interviewed, potential biases and related politics that 
impact the theoretical framework of this dissertation.  
However, one must first look at discourses of nationalism, the concept of the nation 
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and its complications before analysing Canada as a specific case study.  Nationhood 
and nationalism, as a concept, is inherently contradictory, according to Benedict 
Anderson’s seminal study, Imagined Communities  (2006).3  For Anderson, “nation-
ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (2006, 
3).  But, defining the concept is often fruitless as it is “taken to imply the regrettable 
outcome of a long, self-conscious search for theoretical clarity” (Anderson 2006, 3).  
Anderson argues that the definition of nationalism centres on three paradoxes.  One 
is that nations are subject to “the objective modernity of the historian’s eye,” which 
creates “the formal universality as a socio-cultural concept” based on “the ‘political’ 
power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even incoherence” (1991, 
5).  In other words, Anderson argues that nationhood is often at odds with historical 
fact, which develops a false singularity based on political interference rather than 
tested theories or what actually happened.  For Canada, the concept of nationalism, 
in the case of popular music funding, was developed by the state.  This is further 
elaborated on by Breton in his article, The Economics of Nationalism.  He states that 
nationalism is defined by top-down procedures, often devised as “underhanded 
policies by nationalist governments to attain their objectives” (1964, 377).  He 
elaborates: “We know that for collective goods it is in the interest of each individual 
taken independently not to signal his true preferences or to signal them incorrectly. 
For this reason it is difficult, if not impossible, for a government to know these 
preferences; it will consequently engage in various tactics to discover these 
preferences” (Breton 1964, 377). 
For Breton, it is the process of the state reflecting or reimaging a concept of 
individuality that presupposes the concept of nationalism on their citizenry, even if 
the state – a plural – cannot feasibly define a singular, each person’s individuality.  
Anderson expands on this, arguing that there is little reflection in such activities, a 
process he argues as a “self-conscious search” (2006, 3).  This process avoids 
reflection, as it is the state that enacts the policy, rather than it emerging from 
elsewhere or someone independently.  Yet, a national identity and supposing a way 
of defining oneself is inherently individual, even if it is created in the least individual 
manner possible.  As a result, understanding such a paradox provides greater clarity 
to analyse how nationalism and the concept of ‘being Canadian’ have been 
constructed and manipulated, and how it relates to the history of popular music 
                                                 
3 This year is from a reprint.  The original title was written in 1972.  
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funding in Canada.  
While many Canadians – those who live within the accepted international borders of 
the country – define themselves as ‘Canadian’, other citizens, such as those residing 
in Quebec, often eschew the term ‘Canadian’ in favour of other definitions.  Each 
‘definition’, in and of itself carries complexities, as most are constituted externally as 
much as internally, as one has to be seen to be ‘Canadian’, for example, to believe 
that such a definition satisfies their objectives.  As a result, there are many examples 
of Canadian identity formation theories and its inherent challenges in scholarship, 
including Berton (1987), Edwardson (2006 and 2008), Handler (1985), Cook (2005), 
Gwyn (1996), Grenier (1996) and Straw (2000, 2007 and 2012). Handler, in applying 
these theories to Canada, conceptualizes this concept of nationalism as “the nation 
as a collective individual and a collection of individuals” (1985, 39).  He continues: 
“these conceptions of the nation and its members privilege boundedness, continuity 
and homogeneity as central to a healthy national existence.  Yet, precisely because 
these metaphors draw the boundaries of national existence so sharply, they invite 
people to speculate about what is included in national life as well as what is not” 
(Handler 1985, 47).   
This concept of assessing the concept of nationalism on “what is not” is one that has 
grown increasingly relevant in Canada.  In The Future of North America: Canada, 
The United States and Quebec Federalism, Peter Alexis Gourevich argues that 
Canada is “an advanced industrial country with a serious chance of breaking apart” 
(1979, 237).  This chance of “breaking apart”, focused primarily on the relationship 
between Canada and Quebec, relates to an assessment of nationalism on the basis 
of what “one is not”, as Handler suggests.  This concept framed on what one is not 
supports Canada’s unique nationalistic framework.  By asserting what one is not, 
what “one is” becomes a singular interest, separate from the collective national 
identity.  The result is a nation that does not “break apart” (1979, 237). 
Here, Canada’s cultural narrative is a structure that “come[s] into being as a system 
of cultural signification” (Bhabha 1994, 306).  This, according to Bhabha in Narrating 
the Nation, is “the representation of social life rather than the discipline of social 
polity, which emphasizes instability of knowledge” (Bhabha 1994, 306).  In other 
words, Bhabha argues that this instability, or defining oneself based on what one is 
not, is what best represents how Canada, in terms of its social identity, is posited.  
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This theory can be elaborated on by analysing Eric Hobsbawm’s writings on the 
theories of nationalism.  He states, in a lecture delivered in 1996, that “the concept 
of a single, exclusive, and unchanging ethnic or cultural or other identity is a 
dangerous piece of brainwashing” (1996, 1067).  This cultural signification that 
Bhabha refers to can be seen by Hobsbawm as a didactic tactic by states to 
symbolize a certain set of specific parameters as representing a nation, ones that in 
totality, if approached as a singularity, is seen as brainwashing. Once again, the 
collective is deriving a singularity and not the other way around, which Hobsbawm 
argues as ‘brainwashing’.  He continues, in Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe 
Today:  “Nations without a past are contradictions in terms. What makes a nation is 
the past, what justifies one nation against others is the past, and historians are the 
people who produce it” (1992, 3).  To Hobsbawm, it is this past that affirms 
nationhood, a past that is created by the state as singularities.  In Canada, the lack 
of history, as Canada is less than 150 years old, has encouraged this instability of 
knowledge, leading to less well-defined social representations of ‘Canadianness’.  
This has challenged the concept of nationhood in Canada, leading to theories that 
posit  ‘being Canadian’ on non-absolutes, such as what one is not, rather than what 
one is.      
Hobsbawm continues this analysis in his historical text, Nations and Nationalism 
Since 1780.  He defines the term ‘nation’ and its extensions as subjective, because 
nationalism as a concept, “in its modern and basically political sense is historically 
very young” (1992, 18).  Canada, in this context, is especially young, having become 
a nation less than 150 years ago.  One such tool that Hobsbawm refers to is 
language.  In using the modern French republic as an example, he argues that the 
requirement to speak French was mandatory and that “in a sense, acquiring French 
was one of the conditions of full French citizenship and therefore nationality” (1992, 
19).  Speaking the same language provided a pathway for organizing resources and 
finances under a collective banner, a trait Arthur Smith refers to as “bureaucratic 
incorporation”, where “rational bureaucratic administration, aided by the 
development of merchant capital” developed the state, which “formed a matrix of 
the new population’s unit format, the nation” (Smith 1994, 151).  Hutchinson, in 
Cultural Nationalism and Moral Regeneration, simplifies this by separating 
nationalism into two camps, cultural and political.  To him, “political nationalists may 
be driven to adopt ethnic-historical identities and in the process may become 
     21 
ethnicized and ‘re-traditionalized’” (Hutchinson 1994, 123).  Cultural nationalists, he 
argues in contrast, “perceive[s] the state as accidental…which is the product of its 
unique history, culture and geographical profile” (1994, 122).  In the context of 
Canada, this can also be seen in opposition, as culture is utilized to shape nations.  
Therefore, in essence, nationalism can be argued as being two separate but 
conflicting concepts at once that attempt to meet in the middle.  On one side, 
nationalism is perceived as intangible, but this intangibility is carefully and 
painstakingly crafted.  As a result, the universality of nationalism, as Anderson notes, 
is far from universal.  It is controlled through political discourses that are often 
contradictory, that assert the existence of two camps, one within the nation and one 
outside of it.  Alongside, being part of a nation is prescribed as a universal right, or 
set of rights, forever enshrined in one who is born into this universality.  To be 
‘Canadian’, one has been born ‘Canadian’ and is therefore, in totality, a ‘Canadian’; 
or one has earned it, through immigration and assimilation.  Yet, ascribing a set of 
social constructs to a set geographical area is, by nature, didactic and not universal.  
These descriptions by Hobsbawm and Smith are based on political nationalism, as 
nation formation, in this argument, is a tool for organizing and controlling a territory.      
Asserting one’s national identity as a right to controlling territory and any resulting 
economic opportunities and resources is asserted by Pierre Berton, one of Canada’s 
most revered historians.  To him, being Canadian was a description one utilised in 
order to have access to geographic-specific resources, to assert dominance and claim 
ownership of them.  This description follows the political construct Hutchinson 
outlines.  “What we really wanted were well-to-do, right-thinking, English farmers,” 
he argues in Why We Act Like Canadians.  “Unfortunately,” he continues, “these 
[English farmers] had no intention of leaving [England] so we settled for those 
Europeans who came to Canada to escape intolerable conditions at home; Canada 
was advertised not as the land of the brave and the home of the free but as a place 
to make money” (Berton 1987, 71).   
Berton argues that the best reason to be Canadian is to profit off its natural 
resources.  Edwardson, in Canadian Content, elaborates on this concept of Canadian 
national identity.  Being Canadian, he states, is “adapting the national project to 
challenges and changes, particularly the rise of mass media, shifts in ethnic 
demographics, the threat of American imperialism, an increasingly politicized 
Québécois nationalism and an escalation in transnational economic and trade 
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engagements” (2008, 5).  Edwardson argues that Canadian identity is solidified 
through a response to the threats challenging this perceived opportunity – making 
money.   
These arguments relate to Handler’s assertion that nationalism is a collusion of 
retaining personal individuality while ascribing to a collective individuality.  For 
Handler, “nationalism is an ideology of individuated being…a living individual is one, 
precisely delineated with reference to a spatial and temporal environment (1988, 
50).  In other words, if one ascribes to this concept of being, it is most advantageous 
to accept being “bounded in space, continuous in time, and homogenous within 
those spatiotemporal boundaries” (Handler 1988, 51).  By doing so, one can best 
access resources, as Berton argues.  However, this acceptance, in terms of being 
Canadian, is equally framed on knowing what one was as much as what one was 
not.  Handler wrote the above quote in describing Quebec nationalism, a construct 
even more bounded to logistical challenges and externalities as that of being 
Canadian.   
Ramsay Cook, in Regionalism Unmasked, a review in Canadian journal Acadiensis, 
continues this argument by discussing regionalism.  He states; “regionalism had 
always been the basic functioning unit of Canadian society (1983, 137).  This, 
according to Cook, advanced the “argument that national unity had never been 
anything but a smokescreen for Canadian regionalism and domination of the rags 
and patches of Confederation” (1983, 138).  For Cook, being Canadian, as a whole, 
is a construction used to patch together regions.  Such amalgamation across such 
expansive territory was resource and profit driven, as a complete nation could better 
profit from such access to water, arable land and other natural resources.  The 
nation, in this sense, was a capitalist construction.  By developing political structures 
to administer greater access to resources for those involved, Canada became a 
nation, fuelled by what Anderson refers to as “the highwater marks of dynastic 
expansionism” (Anderson 2006, 95).  This framework of Canadian identity further 
developed as it encountered threats to its proposed unification, threats impacting the 
concept of Canadian identity and its influence on how popular music was to be 
supported.  
Literature Review: Canadian Cultural Funding Theories 
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A few scholars have investigated the history of Canada’s popular music funding 
structure, but few have considered this independently of other cultural sectors, such 
as film, television and broadcasting.  Much has been done on the periphery of 
popular music, rather than focusing on popular music as a standalone topic.  The 
most comprehensive analysis has come from Sutherland in his 2008 PhD study, 
Making Music Industry Policy (2008) and from Edwardson’s books, Canadian Content 
(2008) and Canuck Rock (2009).  Sutherland offers a concise argument revealing 
intensive government intervention in Canada’s music businesses, but his study stops 
in 1998, only mentioning a series of significant developments that occurred from 
2000 onwards.  Edwardson offers a more historical analysis of content regulation 
across all cultural industries, but he limits his analysis of funding programmes within 
popular music, offering a broader debate on the cultural industries as a whole in 
Canadian Content.  Although my research differs from these authors, as I focus 
exclusively on policy and funding rather than cultural policy or regulatory affairs, it is 
best to first look at film and television, as policies to regulate and support the audio-
visual sector were utilized to influence popular music funding initiatives.   
As outlined by Ted Magder in The Cultural Industries in Canada (1996) in his 
chapter, “Film and Video Production,” since the establishment of the Canadian Film 
Development Corporation in 1968, “the Canadian government has been involved in 
financing private-sector film production” (1996, 148).  Yet, Magder argues, while 
“the private sector film and video production in Canada has grown exponentially 
since the late 1960s, the Canadian film and video market is still inundated by 
Hollywood productions” (Magder 1996, 148).  Dorland in his 1998 work, So Close to 
the State(s), argues that while this support is well documented, it is poorly 
contextualised within cultural theory framework.  In discussing Canadian film studies, 
he argues it “can be seen as an attempted conversation with the state in the form of 
a discourse between intellectual or scholarly forms of knowledge and those forms of 
knowledge of which state power is comprised” (1998, 19).4  Canada’s federal 
government in the late 1960s saw film as a tool to promote domestic narratives, 
even if there was a lack of agreement concerning what these narratives were.  A 
narrative was constructed through the National Film Board (NFB), Canada’s federally 
funded film promoter since 1938, but it was often in contrast with what consumers 
watched at the time.  According to Dorland, the NFB had developed entirely “within a 
                                                 
4 Emphasis in original.   
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separate film production, distribution and exhibition economy of its own” (1998, 40).  
There was a focus on films that propagated themes that were “predominately rural,” 
with NFB films mainly “aimed at educating schoolchildren, agriculturalists and 
American tourists” (Dorland 1998, 41).  The NFB’s work existed outside of 
mainstream film production, which differed from the activities of the Canadian Film 
Development Council (CFDC) upon its establishment in 1968, before any regulation 
appeared for the popular music industries.  The CFDC, now renamed Telefilm, began 
supporting Canadian private film production in an attempt to compete with the 
dominance of Hollywood in Canada.  This initiated a “dependency theory” within film 
in Canada (Dorland 1998, 25), which supported a sub-sector of businesses operating 
outside of Canada’s free market, creating state-funded content to purport a series of 
narratives to be defined as Canadian, in order to construct a national identity.  As 
Dorland argues, “nationalist expressions created more problems than they resolved, 
and in particular entailed additional explanations as to why “the nation” did not 
behave nationalistically.  Thus, interpretive frameworks (within film) shifted to focus 
more specifically on the Canadian state itself and the role it played in reproducing 
the structures of dependency” (1998, 25).  This is due to the relationship between 
the NFB and Canada’s private filmmakers at the time.  Funding was allocated to 
producing content that contained agreeable nationalist messages.  This shifted the 
focus onto the state, rather than Canada’s private businesses and their individual 
objectives.   These developments that led to the support of film production took 
place before any Canadian government – federal or regional - became involved in 
popular music.  
Furthermore, concepts of nationalism within Canada are inextricably bound to 
Canada’s relationship with the United States.  Being Canadian, especially English 
Canadian, is bound to the culture, politics and history of the United States, a country 
that is older, larger, speaks the same language (except native French speakers in 
Quebec and other parts of Canada) and is economically dominant in the region.  This 
relationship, while not wholly responsible for the manner in which Canadian content 
production is intervened by the state, must be analysed as its own standalone case 
study.  What one is not, in this case, is American. 
Literature Review: The United States and Its Importance 
Toronto Star journalist Richard Gwyn, in his study Nationalism Without Borders, 
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refers to Canada bluntly as a “better America” (1997, 309), claiming that what 
defines Canadians is “their never ending commitment to trying to be ‘better’ – which 
may be read as trying, forever, to be different” (Gwyn 1997, 309).  Although biased 
in favour of Canada, Gwyn’s pithy description can be taken seriously.  Here, ‘better’ 
and ‘different’ are related directly to how Gwyn claims being Canadian is, compared 
to that of the United States.  It is this theoretical framework that overarches and 
influences Canada’s cultural policy history, from establishing the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in 1932 to current decision making, which impacts 
modern Canadian music funding.  The perceived and actual threat of American 
cultural and economic imperialism can be traced back and identified as one of the 
key justifications used to argue for popular music funding initiatives.  This definition 
of a ‘different Canada’ as a ‘better America’ relates to Handler’s assertion of 
nationalism, purporting that Canadian cultural policy has to do equally with what is 
not Canadian as much as what is.   
Gwyn continues: “To most Canadians, TV was American TV, films were American 
films and the same applied to books, magazines, music, entertainment, clothes, 
food, housing and technology”  (Gwyn 1997, 49).  He even describes a MacLean’s 
Magazine cover of the same year, titled “My Canada Includes Florida” (Gwyn 1997, 
49), relating to the large number of retired Canadians living there during the winter.   
This assertion may be simplistic, but it has been applied to the concept of Canadian 
identity as a whole.  Former Minister of Canadian Heritage Sheila Copps, who 
initiated both the Canada Music Fund and Canadian Television Fund, affirms her 
Canadian cultural beliefs on the geographic and cultural proximity of the United 
States.  “When I was growing up in Hamilton, an hour from the border, we watched 
WBEN all the time, the Buffalo (New York) TV station.  I grew up thinking if we, as 
Canadians, do not protect our identity; we become an offshoot of America.  That 
was my initial motivation to be a Canadian nationalist, by definition” (pers comm).5 
Ramsay Cook, in Canada, Quebec and the Issues of Nationalism, affirms Copps’ 
reflection: “Canadian cultural nationalists want to preserve, or develop, a set of 
Canadian social or cultural values that will guarantee our distinctiveness from the 
United States.  Once this is understood, it is not difficult to comprehend the cultural 
nationalist conviction that state intervention, direction, and even ownership must be 
                                                 
5 The reference “pers. comm” refers to a personal interview conducted with the specific 
individual. I have provided a list of interviewees in the appendix in this format (name, pers. 
comm).  
     26 
seen as fundamental to the whole process of differentiating Canada from the United 
States” (1995, 24).  This differentiation and subsequent policymaking to support it 
has been defined by these perceived threats.  Whatever the term ‘Canadian’ means 
to the individual or group being identified, being Canadian is, at least in part, being 
not American.  For Canada’s media, this comparison is also prevalent.  For example, 
on 1 July 2011, MacLean’s Magazine published an article titled “Top Ten Reasons 
Why It’s the Best Time to be a Canadian”.  The third reason was a comparative 
analysis with the United States, stating that Canada was a better country at fostering 
entrepreneurialism than its southern neighbour (MacLean’s Magazine 2011).  
Furthermore, in an advertising campaign by Canadian beer brand Molson Canadian, 
titled “I am Canadian”, an actor recited a monologue outlining what defined being 
Canadian, according to the firm.  The actor proclaims he speaks “English and French, 
not American”, and that Canada is “the best part of North America”.  While most 
Americans, it can be argued, would claim they also speak English, the tagline, “I am 
Canadian” marketed the brand from 1999-2006.  This advertising campaign 
promoting the concept that one is not American as much as one is, in this case a 
type of beer, is Canadian.   
Being Canadian, in this context, is not reliant on a series of shared values, or the 
subscribing to a certain structure of historically accepted value propositions, but the 
fact that one is not from the United States.  The assertions argued by Gwyn and 
brands such as Molson Canadian simplify Canadian national identity to a basic 
comparative analysis.  While there is probity to such assertions, such one-
dimensional analysis does not effectively encapsulate the complexities of the concept 
of Canadian identity.    
One perceived difference between Canada and the United States has been the 
prevalence of mass, cross-industrial state subsidization in Canada.  Subsidy has 
historically been a tool deployed to assert Canada as a standalone nation state. This 
argument, that such a level of subsidization is inherent in Canadian national identity 
is evident in Berton’s Why We Act Like Canadians (1987).  The term ‘Canadians’, to 
Berton, is not defined; it is assumed as a given that is pre-defined.  But, one aspect 
of Canadian culture that Berton reveals is worth quoting in full, in the book designed 
as a series of letters to an American friend: 
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 Subsidy.  That’s a great Canadian word, Sam, but it’s anathema to American 
 businesses that want to compete in Canada.  In this country we subsidize everything 
 from Atlantic fisherman to prairie farmers, from book publishers to aircraft 
 companies.  The shape and nature of the country is that the strong prop up the 
 weak…these are subsidies that allow Canadians to compete unfairly in the wage and 
 salary market (1987, 9).   
 
One core aspect of Canadian identity for Berton is Canada’s history of mass 
subsidisation.  To best analyse this, we must return to Anderson’s paradoxes.  By 
insuring that support is delivered from a centralised source – be it federal or 
provincial – such “subjective antiquity” is maintained to buttress a nationalist 
aesthetic, such as a country whose identity includes the belief that here, the “strong 
props up the weak”.  This implies that Canada, as a nation, deploys subsidy to 
engender a “formal universality as a socio-cultural concept” (1987, 47).  Handler has 
described this as nationalism through “a negative vision”, where “powers in 
opposition to which the nation has had to struggle maintain its identity” (1987, 47).  
In other words, this “negative vision” is manifested in the problems that economic 
and cultural threats from foreign imports bring, be they from the United States or 
elsewhere. Canadian identity is, in this sense, a response to combating such imports, 
and subsidisation is one of the key weapons in doing so.  For Canadian cultural 
products, and in this case, popular music, this is significant.   
 
This high rate of subsidisation that results from this perceived economic and cultural 
threat brings with it significant consequences.  Marc Raboy, in Missed Opportunities 
(1990), an analysis of Canada’s broadcasting sector, recalls a comment from Harold 
Innis in 1938 that is valuable in analysing the concept of being Canadian and its 
relation to foreign cultural and economic threat.  Innis identified that Canada was 
subject to “the weakening of nationalism, the strengthening of regionalism and the 
stress of imperialism” (Raboy 1990, 339).  Raboy, when analysing Innis’ quote, adds: 
“The principal Canadian policy issue has always been how to deal with American 
cultural domination” (Raboy 1990, 339).  Raboy argues that focusing entirely on 
these policies within Canadian broadcasting destabilised the sector rather than 
emboldened it, so that serving “Canada in the national interest actually serves 
American interests in the long run.  Perhaps that’s what Innis was getting at” (1990, 
340).  In other words, Raboy claims that by subverting American cultural 
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imperialism, Canadian policy is in fact, inadvertently, strengthening its influence 
domestically.  This theory has emerged as an unwelcome consequence of using 
subsidisation to embolden Canadian identity under the threat of foreign imports and 
internal regional divisions.  As a result, the three consequences Innis refers to – 
weak national identity, the strength of Canada’s regions and external pressures - can 
be incorporated, seven decades later, to unpack the complex history of popular 
music funding in Canada.  Such support has been manipulated by whoever is 
constructing the policy.  This, as Innis may have been inferring at the time, weakens 
the core structure of nationhood.   
 
Introducing Popular Music Funding in Canada and Key Topics 
 
By taking into account discourses on nationalism, nationhood and the construction of 
Canadian identity, this dissertation analyses how policy has interacted with popular 
music in Canada for the supposed benefit of developing national culture and the 
creative industries, and what repercussions can be exhumed from this history.  The 
perception and reality are often paradoxical.  Sutherland argues that the analysis in 
Canada’s film production and fine art sectors is consistently more advanced than 
those in popular music, especially up to the late 1990s.  Dorland’s (1998) and 
Magder’s (1996) work outlines the development of film funding in Canada from the 
late 1930s, while Raboy (1990) and Nash (1995) chronicle both public and private 
broadcasting.  However, there is little analysis of the sector supplying the products 
that radio requires to function.  While Grenier (1989, 1993), Straw (2000, 2007), 
Barclay, Jack and Schneider (2006) and Edwardson (2006, 2008) analyse Canada’s 
popular music industries, little analysis is dedicated to the sector’s relationship with 
policy and subsidization.  As Sutherland comments, “the music industry did not make 
the same transition in terms of policy discourse” (Sutherland 2008, 17).  It was an 
argument for parity with other cultural sectors, according to Sutherland, that 
directed this emerging debate.  I agree with this, but a comparison of popular music 
to other Canadian cultural industries only reveals a portion of its specific 
complexities.  In many countries, popular music is historically placed within market 
forces, such as in the United States or United Kingdom.  The government tends not 
to intervene as a primary investor.  In Canada, this has never been the case. It was 
incorporated from its beginnings as a sector within a series of fluctuating national 
narrative constructs.  From its onset as an exportable cultural form, Canadian 
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popular music served as a definer of popular culture and developer of national 
characteristics.  However, the music makers and their requisite businesses were only 
one of the three parties involved in this development, often with little understanding 
of the core Canadian cultural policies.  The sector, comprising of both multinational 
and independent companies, had two conflicting investors; a number of government 
administrations focused on enhancing Canada’s cultural narrative and Canada’s 
private broadcasters, driven by market capitalism and supporting content that 
brought the largest listener base to their portfolios.    
 
The first funding body in Canada to support popular music, minus a few singular 
initiatives, was Canada’s private broadcasters, not the state.  However, this 
development was driven by public policy, where the airwaves these companies 
licensed were publicly owned and managed in the public interest.  The cultural 
argument posits that Canadian music, according to those arguing for subsidy, is a 
part of Canadian identity and, as such, warrants public protection.  This is a 
nationalist argument that content protection can be systematised through 
bureaucratic administration.  However, the economic argument – a need to subsidise 
for market parity or preference – has developed another set of outcomes that, when 
merged with Canada’s history of cultural policy intervention, has created a confusing, 
decentralised and frustrating ecosystem.  
 
On the surface, Canada is seen as a munificent and culturally active nation in terms 
of supporting its music makers and businesses.  These descriptions are often given 
without extensive analysis.  Often, this is misread as the Canadian government 
purchasing flights for bands, vans for touring and bankrolling recordings en-masse.  
At international conferences, Canada is lauded for this perceived munificence.6  This 
is somewhat warranted – the amount distributed is substantial and supportive of 
Canadian businesses - but requires clarification, as Canada continues to be used as a 
global case study in how the state can intervene in popular music.  The Canadian 
model has been discussed in the UK and Australia (Spalding 2008, 155), and in the 
last four years alone, music industry and government representatives from Bulgaria, 
Ireland, Scotland, Israel, France, South Africa, Switzerland and Denmark have 
approached Canadian policymakers and funding administrators to consult on new 
                                                 
6 This is from personal experience, having attended over 50 international conferences 
representing ‘Canada’ through the independent label body, CIMA.  
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policies (McKie, pers comm).7  
 
Many of these misconceptions concerning the history of popular music funding in 
Canada have been justified by statistical evidence.  But their use of data belies a 
series of challenges inherent within Canada’s popular music funding structure and 
subsequent sub-structures.  Often, it is not the data itself that is misleading, but how 
it is utilised.  The same data is consistently and often blindly misrepresented, with 
most organisations lobbying for support with an interpretation of data that has not 
been accepted by other competing organisations.  Until the late 1980s, little 
statistical data was compiled in Canada, concerning sales of domestic content and 
radio play for emerging music (Roman and Leblanc, pers. comm).  Sales Charts were 
the main source of information and were not corroborated by publicly archived 
playlists or track placements.    
 
In addition, the definition of the term ‘emerging’ and its impact on musicians and 
their business representatives was introduced in policy, to refocus CANCON onto the 
promotion of new Canadian music, rather than all Canadian music. But it was not 
clearly defined (and in most cases, it remains this way at time of writing), allowing 
each organisation to skew data into facts for its own requirements.  This promotion 
of ‘new’ music in Canada to satisfy the content quota has been thoroughly debated 
since the quota was installed.  There was no definition of what Canadian music was 
suitable for radio, and CRTC’s emerging music policy, one that remains empirically 
tested, was only introduced in 2006.  For Canada to bolster its national archive of 
popular music, a requirement of CANCON, enough new music must be produced to 
prove, quantitatively, that support structures assist in developing more content than 
there would be without such intervention.  However, specific and nationalised 
opportunities to disseminate this new content, both in English and French Canada, 
has never been legislated, leaving the term ‘emerging’ to be defined differently by 
CAB, the CRTC and the music sector.  To some, this has compromised the 
programming options available for Canadian content.  This can be seen in early 
reports concerning the sound recording sector in Canada, as well as in the earliest 
annual reports from FACTOR.   
 
                                                 
7 I have personally consulted with Israeli, Bulgarian and South African policymakers and 
industry representatives on understanding Canada’s system.  
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These challenges, as Sutherland states, “make it difficult to generate a unified 
account of this history” (2008, 25).  The few cumulative histories published are 
either promotional, such as Leblanc’s The FACTOR Story (2007) or focused on 
qualitative artist development, including Edwardson’s Canuck Rock (2009) and 
Barclay, Jack and Schneider’s Have Not Been the Same (2006).  Sutherland’s account 
of popular music policy ends in 1998 and focuses primarily on copyright, a topic I do 
not analyse, but do not want to minimize the importance of in this debate.  This 
dissertation takes up from Sutherland’s analysis, but uses funding instead of policy 
as the main theoretical framework, although they are intrinsically tied.  However, 
much has changed since 1998 in the history of Canadian popular music funding that 
reveals the challenges in both the origins of the structures and its current roles and 
responsibilities in the modern, global music industry.   
 
One final relationship that this dissertation will include and requires introducing is 
between Canada’s independent labels and multinationals operating within Canada.  
The relationship is different to other industrialized music industries, such as the 
United States or United Kingdom, and impacts the history of popular music funding 
in Canada as a result.  In English Canada, multinationals control the majority of 
distribution networks, often licensing their services to independents, either for a 
fixed fee or a recoupable marketing advance.  All multinational imprints active in 
Canada, from Capitol EMI in the 1960s to Universal Music today, employed domestic, 
Canadian staff, but managed budgets allocated to them from offices outside of 
Canada.  Canadian artists were signed by both America and Canadian managed 
multinational labels, often in competition with one another.  Finally, multinationals, in 
some instances, were required to provide significant contributions to Canadian 
content development, as part of their own internal artist investments. Any purchaser 
of a multinational subsidiary in Canada was required to negotiate with Investment 
Canada, a separate government department, to ensure that Canadian jobs and 
interests were protected throughout the sale as per Canadian cultural protectionist 
policies.  Investment Canada operated similar protectionist measures as the CRTC, 
which will be expanded on throughout this dissertation.  This has resulted in a 
number of Canadian artists being signed to foreign-managed multinational outfits for 
release in Canada and abroad.  Currently, very few Canadian branch offices sign 
Canadian talent, outside of those that are also signed for other markets.  This is not 
only due to policy but global market economics.    
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Chapter Descriptions  
 
It is important to note at this stage that each chapter except chapter five will focus 
primarily on English Canada and the policies concerning its development; the cultural 
policies of Quebec and French Canada will be elaborated on mainly in chapter five, 
although reference will be made to Quebec throughout this dissertation.   
 
Chapter One 
Chapter one analyses the early developments to support Canada’s nascent music 
industry, from 1949.  The most important of these is the establishment of CANCON 
in 1971, and this will be introduced through debates and committee hearings from 
1962, when regulations were placed on Canadian commercial television 
broadcasters.  In addition, influenced by the Massey Commission and an increasingly 
vocal music business lobby, a number of initiatives were tested in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s that combined structural support of Canadian content development and 
economic imperatives.  These included The Maple Music System, a radio-syndication 
agreement and The Maple Music Junket, Canada’s first showcasing music festival.  
These are the first initiatives that combined sector development with the promotion 
of Canadian cultural output, involving the state, Canada’s private radio stations and 
Canada’s independent labels.  Furthermore, the growth of multinational record 
company branch offices in Canada in the 1960s impacted these early initiatives, as 
multinationals in English Canada operated in association and competition with 
independent producers and government regulation.  By the early 1970s, CANCON 
was established on commercial radio, but other than a few sporadic initiatives, no 
collective funding structure was set up.  The initial relationship involving cultural and 
economic imperatives, and the stances of each party – the music sector, the 
broadcasters and the state – was established by the time CANCON was introduced.  
 
Chapter Two 
Chapter two begins in the mid 1970s with an analysis of the initial perceived and 
actual results of the CANCON quota, including its impact on programming 
opportunities, sales and the profitability of Canada’s independent labels.  By the late 
1970s, the quota had laid bare a core belief of Canada’s private broadcasters.  This 
bore fruit in 1982, with the first mention of the popular music sector in a government 
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document, the Applebaum-Hébert Report.  In the same year, the first national fund 
to support English Canadian content producers was established, the Foundation to 
Assist Canadian Talent on Record (FACTOR), financed by a levy on the private radio 
industry.    
 
Chapter Three  
Chapter three will analyse the early difficulties and fluctuations affecting the 
partnership between FACTOR, Musicaction and the federal government.  This 
includes further developments at FACTOR as budgets increased, and the regulations 
and objectives of SRDP and administrations from 1986 to 2000, when SRDP 
concluded and was replaced by a larger, more expansive set of programs titled the 
Canada Music Fund (CMF).  In SRDP’s fifteen-year history, the programme increased 
the amount available for FACTOR and Musicaction to disburse, creating the core 
popular music funding structure that remains active in 2013.    
 
Chapter Four 
Chapter four analyses this new era in Canadian popular music history, one that 
ultimately favoured economic intervention over cultural identity formation.  To start, 
the introduction of the Canada Music Fund (CMF) is analysed with a breakdown of its 
original eight streams.  While SRDP primarily supported content production, CMF 
offered comprehensive funding opportunities for labels, content creators, festivals 
and distributers across record production, marketing, touring, video production, radio 
promotion and business development.  Its introduction more than doubled the total 
amount of funding available, compared to the mid 1990s.  The chapter analyses two 
further developments that contributed to such complexities, the introduction of the 
private Radio Starmaker Fund (RSF) and FondsRadiostar in Quebec and the 
subsequent commercial radio review of 2006, which enforced new guidelines on 
broadcasters as to how content development was to be financially supported in 
Canada.  
 
Furthermore, the chapter details the cancellation of two international promotion 
programmes, Trade Routes and PromART.  These programs were framed on 
promoting Canada’s brand abroad, with those working in Trade Routes dubbed 
“Team Canada.”  Canadian labels and artists utilized both programs to subsidize 
international travel.  However, the government dissolved the programs and curtailed 
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cultural spending at Canada’s missions abroad.  These decisions provoked protest 
from Canada’s arts community.  By 2010, funding popular music in Canada combined 
market interference and cultural obligations within a cumbersome and conflicted set 
of programs, ones on the cusp of revision at FACTOR.  This chapter will analyse 
these challenges, as seen through the dissolving of Trade Routes and PromART, the 
renewal of CMF and the structural reform at FACTOR, one completed with a new set 
of programs, introduced on 1 April 2013.  
 
Chapter Five 
Chapter five presents a case study on the history of popular music funding in 
Quebec, which differs on a number of levels to the history in English Canada.  
Quebec is culturally autonomous from the rest of Canada, both linguistically and in 
its music industry infrastructure.  Quebec’s distribution networks, performance 
outlets, record labels and retail chains are owned and operated by domestic firms.  
As a result, the manner in which firms are supported by both regional and federal 
governments, and the ecosystem Quebec labels and music businesses operate within 
differs greatly to the rest of Canada.  This has brought with it successes and 
challenges.  While Quebec is argued as having the most profitable and financially 
stable music sector in Canada, it does so through an increasing insularity, one 
buttressed through popular music funding initiatives.  
 
Chapter Six 
Chapter six returns to Canada as a whole, arguing that a distinct shift has occurred 
in the history of popular music funding, through an increase in broadcast media 
consolidation.  This shift has altered how CANCON interacts with Canada’s popular 
music business.  From an initial focus on supporting content production and 
impacting programming, Canadian content policy has grown less involved with the 
content itself, becoming a structure to further justify, reinforce and defend the 
subsidization of Canada’s popular music sector.  This sea change occurred when CAB 
members were permitted to consolidate.  As consolidation increased, the music 
sector argued that fewer programming opportunities were made available, claiming 
station programmers satisfied the quota with a small number of multinational or 
RSF/FondsRadiostar supported content.  As a result, the role of programming in 
CANCON regulations minimized as financial disbursement to the music sector 
increased.  
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Conclusion 
The conclusion will return to the general questions of identity and the concept of 
being Canadian to discuss how Canada is perceived internationally, and how these 
perceptions both affirm and conflict with the initial justification and current structure 
of how and why popular music is funded in Canada.  
 
The quote with which I began this dissertation, taken from Richie Yorke’s Axes, 
Chops and Hot Licks, was written in 1971 at a moment when the Canadian music 
industry was very small.  For nearly a decade prior to this, Canada’s music producers 
had been arguing that domestic market entry for local talent was hampered by 
foreign dominance of Canadian radio and the lack of promotional avenues.  Forty 
years later, Yorke’s quote remains salient.  The issues concerning Canada’s domestic 
music businesses then still impact companies at time of writing, albeit in a different 
context.  In 1971, businesses argued for government intervention to protect their 
content.  The same arguments persist, but the interventionism has become 
commonplace and part of the core business.  On the other hand, forty years ago, a 
series of issues were not debated, including how such intervention would change 
business models and what comprised Canadian content, in terms of popular music 
and what that meant for the concept of being Canadian.  The reasons that cultural 
protectionism was enacted in 1971 and the reasons such laws remain today are 
different.  Where it has ‘gone’, as Yorke pondered in 1971, is the story I hope to 
reveal here.          
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Chapter 1 
1960s / 1970s – Forming and Framing Canadian Content Regulations       
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the historical context that initiated the history of popular music 
funding in Canada.  This began with The Royal Commission on the Arts, Letters and 
Sciences in 1951, better known as The Massey Commission.  This document argued 
that a top-down approach to developing a concept of national culture be initiated by 
government to support a singular, definable and attributable concept of Canadian 
culture and identity, one initiated by the state, rather than the private sector.  This 
was structured on ‘high-art’ concepts, mainly influenced by other national arts 
policies, such as the United Kingdom.  This has had far-reaching implications on 
popular music, despite the art form not being mentioned in the report.  The report 
established the core framework that Canadian interventionism is based upon, framed 
on an objective to support certain forms of domestic cultural production for the 
perceived benefit of Canadian creators and consumers.  The document was not 
supported by all Canadians, fuelling a series of disagreements outlining the 
responsibility of public and private interests towards Canadian cultural production.   
 
Such debates led to the establishment of a Canadian content quota on television and 
later radio called CANCON.  Simultaneously, the Canadian recording music industry 
increased their activities, fuelled by a series of releases aimed at capturing a greater 
share of the market in the face of foreign imports.  The need to ring fence this 
content and assert a perceived definition of its value to Canadians, influenced by 
those agreeing and refuting theories in The Massey Commission, developed the 
argument that Canada needed to subsidize music production.  Two frameworks were 
posited; one to benefit Canada’s cultural plurality and another focused on business 
development and industry support.  The policies enacted to intervene treated these 
issues through these objectives: A desire to enhance Canada’s national narrative and 
a need to support Canadian business.  What developed, by the end of the 1970s, 
was a set of systems at odds with itself in terms of how best to support Canadian 
content producers, their businesses and the greater need to define and promote 
Canada in general.  This began with the announcement of The Massey Commission 
in 1951 and continued with the installation of CANCON in 1971, developing the 
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beginnings of a system that would grow to involve Canadian independent labels, 
content creators, multinationals, private broadcasters and the state.   
 
Early State Intervention and The Massey Commission 
 
The first report produced by the Canadian government to analyse and measure 
Canadian cultural production and the state’s responsibility began in 1949 with a 
series of symposiums led by then Chancellor of the University of Toronto, Vincent 
Massey.  Commissioned a few years after the conclusion of the war, the objective 
was to “establish the rationale for many of the national cultural institutions that 
would play key roles in the subsequent half century” (Druick 2006).  What followed, 
in 1951, was one of the most influential government reports written on the arts in 
Canada, the Royal Commission on the National Development of the Arts, Letters and 
Sciences, better known as The Massey Commission or The Massey-Lévesque Report 
(Edwardson 2008, 52).  In its introduction, it argued:  
 
 It is desirable that the Canadian people should know as much as possible about 
 their country, its history and traditions; and about their national life and common 
 achievements; that it is in the national interest to give encouragement to institutions 
 which express national feeling, promote common understanding and add to the 
 variety and richness of Canadian life, rural as well as urban (Cloutier 1951, 3).  
 
This was the first of many commissions evaluating domestic culture production in 
Canada in relation to state intervention.  The report favoured so-called ‘high-art’, 
top-down cultural production and influence over what was deemed culturally 
beneficial for Canada.  This is significant, as it labelled certain material more 
culturally valuable than others.  Massey reveals these objectives in this 
autobiography: “We had to think of culture, using the term in its most popular sense; 
we were concerned with what we were doing in Canada to help our nation express 
itself” (452, 1963).  In this case, ‘popular’ can be defined as a top-down, ‘high art’ 
approach.  Raymond Williams, in “On High and Popular Culture” an article in The 
New Republic, wrote; “the two common positions (high art and popular culture) and 
the debate between them are intolerably confused by failures of definitions, and the 
social policies that follow from them largely ignore the realities of contemporary 
society” (Williams 1974).  The approach that Williams warns against was used by 
Massey in his report.  To Massey and his commission, Canada as a nation-state had 
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a definable, tangible and recognisable identity, and what lay within Canada’s borders 
was distinct and definable.  This identity, however, was reinforced with a series of 
prerequisites.  If one could define culture, in this case high art, then one could 
propose policy reforms to protect or enhance it, as Massey theorised.  To Massey, 
supporting Canadian culture was simple and a state responsibility, as it was his 
commission that defined what this Canadian culture was to be.        
 
In researching the report, Massey staged 200 symposiums across Canada, querying 
the public on how the state could support or influence culture.  By cataloguing and 
reporting on these symposiums, Massey and his commission constructed an 
argument of what is ‘Canadian’, and it is this argument that first shaped Canadian 
cultural policy, in both English and French circles.  Wagman argues in On the Policy 
Reflex in Canadian Studies that The Massey Commission “provided the basis for state 
support of the arts and cultural industries—and did so in a language shot through 
with notions of high culture, anti-Americanism, latent magic bullet theories of media 
effects, and blatant cultural nationalism” (2010, 622).  This definition, one that 
Williams’ theory opposes, introduced a concept that was reinforced as absolute in 
Canadian cultural policy.  This emphasised the support of ‘high art’ within the 
concept of Canadian identity, reinforcing it within “direct political and economic 
interests” (Williams 1974), interests that Williams’ argued were instinctively tied 
together.  Through the commission, the term ‘Canadian’ had, in its own right, a 
series of definable signifiers, which is the first time that a state report had concluded 
as such.  Massey denoted what, in his – and the state’s – eyes, Canadian popular 
culture should be.  Over time, The Massey Commission has been seen as a defining 
report in Canadian cultural theory.  This, to Wagman, produces complications.  “A 
testament to the power of The Massey Commission report — and to the power of a 
policy reflex in the critical imagination”, he argues, “is its appearance alongside other 
policy documents in the appendix of the recently published Canadian cultural studies 
reader” (2010, 623).   Sutherland expands on this, arguing that the “discourse 
around culture (at the time) is one of humanism, invoking non-quantifiable terms 
such as character or civilization” (2008, 17).  This was representative of the report’s 
findings.  
 
Here is an argument for a meaning of the term, ‘Canadian’ as expressed in the 
report: 
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 CANADIANS, with their customary optimism, may think that the fate of their 
 civilization is in their own hands. So it is. But this young nation, struggling to be 
 itself, must shape its course with an eye to three conditions so familiar that their 
 significance can too easily be ignored. Canada has a small and scattered population 
 in a vast area; this population is clustered along the rim of another country many 
 times more populous and of far greater economic strength; a majority of Canadians 
 share their mother tongue with that neighbour, which leads to peculiarly close and 
 intimate relations. One or two of these conditions will be found in many modern 
 countries. But Canada alone possesses all three (Cloutier 1951, 11). 
 
Massey split the notion of Canadian into three categories; geographic vastness, 
language and differentiating oneself as Canadian, if and when compared with other 
nations.  Through these variables, the objectives of the report were to recommend 
policies to make Canada a “learned nation built on Canadian content of high 
standards” (Edwardson 2008, 59).  This would better assert a concept of Canadian, 
with respect to the country’s size, resources and bilingualism.  Massey himself 
reveals:  
  
 We produced a report, presented simultaneously in both our national languages, of 
 over 500 pages, divided between a stock taking of our cultural resources and 
 recommendations for their nourishment…What we regarded as our most important 
 recommendation was accepted pretty much as it stood.  We felt strongly that there 
 should be in Canada a body, adequately financed, that would be concerned with the 
 promotion of endeavours in the field of letters, the arts and sciences (1963, 462-3).   
 
The report stated that Canada needed a federally funded arts council to protect, in 
Massey’s words, “Canada’s cultural sovereignty” (Raboy 1990, 97).  However, he 
never stated, in full, what ‘Canadian’ meant to him.  This body became the Canada 
Council for the Arts.   
 
As a whole, the recommendations of The Massey Commission created tension 
between the government, Canada’s public broadcaster (CBC) and the Canadian 
Association of Broadcasters (CAB), the organisation that represents private radio 
licensees.  Culture, in the context of state policy, needed to reflect positively on the 
image of the country, or at least construct an image of Canada that could be co-
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opted and used in the national interest.  However, it was at this stage, in the 
debates concerning the validity of the recommendations in The Massey Commission, 
that Canadian cultural policy began being utilized in an economic context.  CAB 
members argued, “a certain form of private ownership was in the public interest”, 
and “in any question between private or local interests and national interests, the 
national interest must prevail” (Raboy 1992, 97).  In this case, the private interest of 
Canadian businesses, as stated in the report, was different to the national interest.  
This was the first of a series of disagreements to solidify in these debates, three-
decades before any popular music funding structure was initiated.      
 
While at the time there was no mention of popular music in the report and 
subsequent legislation, a duality was created that posited ‘Canadian’ on one side and 
‘not Canadian’ on the other.  This is conceptually dangerous, as it posited an 
inconclusive view of Canadian culture.  As Johansen stated in 1973, while analysing 
The Massey Commission and the development of the Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), such “policies did not rise, phoenix-like, 
from the ashes. They are, rather, an extension of a process as old as Canada itself - 
a response to the dilemma that arises in almost every sphere of Canadian life…the 
Canadian attempt to create an identity” (1973, 183-184).  This need to create and 
embolden an identity was at the crux of The Massey Commission, but it was never 
succinctly positioned in the report.  Instead, Liberal Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, 
in his letter to Massey attached to the report, focused on how others would view 
Canada, asking Massey to develop “methods for the purpose of making available to 
the people of foreign countries adequate information concerning Canada” (Cloutier 
1951, 1).  In this argument, ‘Canadian’ was defined as whatever the outsider, be it 
investor, tourist or government, defined it to be.  Once again, the concept of 
Canadian identity related back to what one was not, although in St. Laurent’s letter 
this was left open to who interacted with Canada rather than those that lived within 
it.   
 
The report also highlighted problems with how Canada’s radio airwaves were 
managed.  Both public and private broadcasters argued that they were beneficial to 
“cementing the unification of Canada”, as a CAB memorandum stated in 1949 
(Raboy 1990, 99).  The final report favoured public broadcasting, although it was 
stated that public and private radio could be “Canadian in character” (Raboy 1990, 
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100).  However, it was made clear that private broadcasters were criticized for not 
supporting Canadian artists.  On page 32 of the report, the commission provided 
figures supporting his argument, stating that Toronto and Winnipeg radio performers 
produced figures comparing the amounts paid to live talent by the CBC and private 
stations.  In Winnipeg, its Musician’s Association in 1947 received $94,357 from the 
CBC and $1,950 from private stations; in 1948, it received $80,609 from CBC and 
reporting no earnings from private stations.  In Toronto, the figures from the 
American Federation of Musicians for 1949 amounted to $382,000 from the CBC and 
approximately $30,000 from the private stations (Royal Commission of the Arts, 
Letters and Sciences 1951, 32).  This data is not corroborated elsewhere, nor was 
any published refuting of the data archived by the commission.  In addition, these 
numbers are misleading.  In 1949-1951, the CBC regulated all private broadcasters, 
minimizing CAB’s impact on the market.  This was to change in 1957, but was not 
alluded to in the report.  The argument that public radio supported Canadian 
musicians more than private radio was evident in the report, asserting Massey’s 
argument that private radio was most suited to providing “isolated areas of the 
country with programming…to encourage and develop local talent” (1951, 281).  
This argument was accepted in the final version of the report.  
 
Most of the public forums conducted as research across Canada reflected this public 
support of state broadcasting and criticism of private broadcasters.  Massey added: 
 
 Of the more than 170 voluntary organizations which discussed radio broadcasting in 
 our public sessions the great majority expressed approval of the  national system. A 
 number of them hailed it with enthusiasm, as an important and distinctive national 
 achievement, "our greatest asset culturally" and "the most outstanding broadcasting 
 agency in North America. We observed indeed a certain alarm at any suggestion of 
 change in the existing system on the ground that it has so far met with tolerable 
 success in combating commercialization and excessive Americanization of Canadian 
 programmes (Cloutier 1951, 29). 
  
Popular music was not mentioned in the commission.  In its overall tone, it 
recommended that protectionist policies support domestic Canadian culture, a 
culture built on top-down, hierarchical recommendations that supported a pre-
defined, state-approved number of cultural producers, institutions and artists.  By 
1968, before popular music was ever mentioned in policy, the state impacted, and in 
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some manner controlled what was to be supported by the state in Canada.  This 
was, as stated in The Massey Commission, bringing together a nation despite 
extreme geographic vastness, American cultural influence and cultural pluralism. 
 
These findings were not unique to Canada.  Vincent Massey referenced the 
development in 1949 of the Arts Council of Great Britain as an influence.  Massey 
was Canada’s High Commissioner in the United Kingdom from 1936-1945.  Anna 
Upchurch of the University of Leeds argues, while referencing Paul Litt and his study, 
The Muses, The Masses and The Massey Commission that “the liberal humanists on 
that commission sought to entrench European artistic forms within Canadian life as a 
bulwark against mass culture and its effects” (1992, 241).  This is prevalent on page 
184 of the report.  It states: “although it is true that most of the music broadcast or 
recorded is of a light or popular nature, it is equally true that there is readily 
available to any Canadian genuinely interested in more serious works as much good 
music as he has time to listen to” (Cloutier 1951, 184).  This separation of “popular 
music” and “more serious works” (Cloutier 1951, 184) was positioned as policy, 
similarly to the forms of music supported by the Arts Council of Great Britain.  For 
Massey, supporting popular music, similarly to his recommendations concerning the 
support for private radio, were not in Canadian’s public interest.   
 
Furthermore, in a chapter titled “The Projection of Canada Abroad”, The Massey 
Commission introduced another structure that has grown to influence the history of 
popular music funding.  It states:  
 
 It is not unnatural that Canada has been frequently called ‘the unknown country’. 
 Most striking of all is the ignorance of Canada among the people of our nearest 
 neighbour, whose unfamiliarity with our affairs is equalled only by their 
 friendliness. Most Americans probably know Canadians as persons, but few could 
 pass an examination on Canadian institutions. It may be that the many features 
 which the two countries have in common present a difficulty in themselves; 
 similarities can be deceptive…The promotion abroad of a knowledge of Canada is 
 not a luxury but an obligation, and a more generous policy in this field would have   
 important results, both concrete and intangible (Cloutier 1951, 248-249).   
 
The state believed that cultural export promoted national values – in their eyes – as 
much as economic development.  What is deemed best to promote is the decision of 
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the exporter, a responsibility the report assumes on the state.  Such 
recommendations grew increasingly influential, as the place of Canadian content in 
global markets, and the cultural value of such content, was to become increasingly 
entangled with public funding.  Furthermore, this nationalistic promotion to 
encourage greater global understanding of a fluctuating set of Canada national 
characteristics was to heavily impact popular music, several decades later.  
 
Nationalism, Broadcasting and the Early Music Industry 
 
After the publication of The Massey Commission, a series of national organizations 
were created as per the document’s recommendations, including the Canada Council 
for the Arts (CCA) and National Archives of Canada.  However, after an election 
victory by the Conservatives in 1957, their first victory since 1935, a number of 
recommendations supported by the Liberals were altered, including the role of the 
CBC as the regulator of publicly owned airwaves, through the Report of the Royal 
Commission on Broadcasting, or The Fowler Commission in 1955.  The challenge of 
regulating private licenses was one of a few topics concerning the CBC in the 
hearings.  The CBC, funded with a license fee on users, had their financing altered in 
1953 when the license fee system was eliminated and replaced by a tax on the 
purchase of new television sets and a tax on advertising revenue (Vipond 2006, 
297).  This was trialled for five years, but altered once more through the 
recommendations of the report.  In the end, The Fowler Commission recommended 
that the CBC financing “return to a set of parliamentary appropriations” (Vipond 
2006, 297) and that a 55% content quota be placed on those who license television 
frequencies external of the CBC, because “Canadians want Canadian broadcasting” 
(Breton 1964, 385).   
 
The Fowler Commission concluded; “overwhelming weight of the evidence submitted 
to us, reports that Canadians wish to have a Canadian broadcasting system that they 
want to keep some part of their broadcasting fare Canadian, and that they are 
willing, within reason, to pay for it” (Johansen 1973, 186).  The commission 
recommended that “a new regulatory agency be established, The Board of Broadcast 
Governors (BBG), and that the CBC operate separately to private broadcasting” 
(McCormick 1959, 92).  While Massey asserted the power of Canada’s national 
broadcaster over all airwaves, The Fowler Commission removed this influence, 
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leading to the establishment of Canada’s initial regulatory board for its nationalised 
airwaves.  To CAB members, broadcasting was a form of publication and should be, 
as McCormick argued in 1959, self regulating (McCormick 1959, 93).  This created 
further tension between The Massey Commissions’ conclusions – further 
nationalisation and protectionism – and private interests put forward in The Fowler 
Commission.  However, The Fowler Commission proved contradictory.  While it led to 
the formation of the BBG, it also re-asserted a substantial amount of 
recommendations contained in The Massey Commission.  In the end, a quota was 
introduced for film and television production in 1960, requiring private broadcasters 
air 40% Canadian content during off-peak hours, increasing to 55% during peak 
hours (Raboy 1990, 145).  Radio quotas were first discussed two years later, in 
1962, and promises were made by the BBG but never taken up by the Conservative 
committee with little explanation as to why (Sutherland 2008, 23).   
 
The creation of the BBG was mandating through an amendment passed in 1958 after 
The Fowler Commission, titled The Broadcasting Act.  This act would become the 
most important piece of legislation in Canada to define and assert Canadian cultural 
protectionist and promotional state policy.  Influenced by recommendations of The 
Massey Commission, the law stated that the broadcasting system must be “basically 
Canadian in content and character” (Parliament of Canada 2003).  This law, first 
passed in 1958, rewritten in 1968 and later in 1991, has become the definitive 
wording to contextualize and affirm the role of Canadian content production in the 
development of how the concept of Canadian would be promoted by government.             
 
Nationalism, Broadcasting and the Early Music Industry 
 
By 1962, the Canadian music industry had a small number of domestic record 
companies releasing singles, along with multinational branch offices, such as RCA 
and Capitol EMI.  While no Canadian sales charts existed until 1968, personal 
interviews from label owners at the time reveal a context in which Canadian popular 
music struggled to compete against foreign imports.  This was detailed in Canada’s 
first music business magazine, RPM (Records, Promotion, Music Magazine).  In its 
first weekly chart, there is one Canadian in the top 50, Toronto act Kensington 
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Market (Collections Canada 2004).8  According to their manager at the time Bernie 
Finklestein in his memoirs True North, “musicians and those working in the music 
business, both young and old, were starting to feel that no matter how hard they 
tried they weren’t going to get a fair shake on Canadian radio” (2012, 105).  As a 
result, there were musicians and music makers but little collective industry structure 
to support them.  Instead of focusing on who created it, the domestic industry was 
focused on selling “music in Canada rather than Canadian music” (Edwardson 2008, 
7).  Most record shops stocked chart singles, and most chart hits were foreign 
composed and recorded (Edwardson 2008, 45). Only a small amount of public 
support was bequeathed to classical, jazz, ballet and opera through the Canada 
Council for the Arts (CCA).  Consequently, the nascent domestic popular music 
industry failed to compete for airplay on private radio.  According to music journalist 
Jerry Ross, writing in the Toronto Telegram in 1964, Canada had “so many good 
records available from the States that there is really not much point in doing a great 
deal of recording up here” (Green 2004).  This sentiment, albeit fatalistic and 
skewed, illustrated a point.  A desire to record music existed in Canada, but there 
was little hope of a successful career.  Most albums released in Canada at the time 
came through multinational subsidiaries, with EMI’s Capitol Records being the 
largest.  In 1964, Lorne Greene’s “Ringo” is the only record by a Canadian artist to 
hit number one on Rpm single charts (RPM 1964), released via American subsidiary 
RCA9.  Finklestein expands on this, qualifying the landscape; “there were no record 
companies in 1966 signing acts…and the only band I knew that had a record deal of 
any consequence was Mandala, with Decca Records in New York”  (2011, 51).     
 
Rpm, first published in 1964, was one of the first voices to actively call for a similar 
quota on Canadian radio, which had been initiated in 1962 for television.  Its writers 
criticised CAB and its member stations for limiting Canadian content by not playing it 
on their stations.  In the magazine, a ten-part series arguing for the quota was 
published, stating that Canadian content must be prioritised over advertising revenue 
(Edwardson 2008, 176).  What that content was, other than it being Canadian, was 
not defined.  This proved influential in rallying the nascent sector to collectively 
support the quota.  Edwardson quotes an editorial piece from founder Walt Grealis 
                                                 
8 RPM was Canada’s first music industry trade magazine.  
9 RPM weekly charts and singles charts are different.  The weekly charts were reserved for 
full-length albums, a product not measured by the magazine until 1968.  
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that presented Rpm’s demands: 
 
 Airwaves are a publicly owned resource; regulations a sign of good corporate 
 citizenship; a level playing field between the few stations that aired Canadian records 
 and those that operated for maximum profit; the creation of a star system essential 
 for attracting industry investment; opportunities for talent otherwise lured to the 
 United States or England – these were just a few of the justifications for a 
 legislated, minimum amount of airplay (Edwardson 2008, 143).10  
 
CAB opposed Rpm’s recommendations and calls for a quota, stating that the amount 
of Canadian music they played pre-quota was between 75% and 80%, although the 
industry estimated it to be between 4% and 7%, revealing the sizable rift in 
consensus between CAB and the early estimations (Edwardson 2008, 201).  Both 
were estimates, and neither was ever proven, but both were used as arguments in 
parliamentary hearings, revealing a statistical disagreement in the debates 
concerning a need for a quota on Canadian radio.  Both did not utilize any definition 
of what music was Canadian in their estimates and statistically, neither argument 
was corroborated.  
 
By 1968, RPM had developed a canon to measure Canada’s popular music output, in 
relation to domestic content production and foreign import dominance.  Its analysis, 
in the form of editorial pieces and sales charts, initiated a lobby that began to 
actively call for radio to be subjected to the same quota structure in place for 
television.  However, Canada’s private broadcasters, now under the regulatory 
authority of the BBG, claimed that their ability to compete was reliant on airing 
content that encouraged the largest listenership.  From a policy standpoint, the BBG 
had to coalesce a number of divergent arguments.  The first, purported by The 
Broadcasting Act of 1958, stated that Canadian airwaves must be definably Canadian 
on content and character.  This definition of Canadian was left to the committee 
members and Canada’s nascent popular music sector had yet to become a priority 
for the regulators, compared to that of audio-visual broadcasting or periodicals, a 
sector that had its own independent commission.  The committee, faced with 
regulating Canadian businesses, opted not to install a quota on Canadian airwaves.  
This was to change in the late 1960s, when Canada’s Liberals returned to power.   
                                                 
10 The primary source of this quote no longer exists. I was unable to locate this issue of RPM 
and relied on personal interviews, including Mair, Roman and Rosen.  
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The 1968 Broadcasting Act and The Introduction of CANCON 
 
In early 1968, Canada held a federal election.  As a result, the left-leaning Liberal 
party was awarded a majority, defeating the Conservatives.  The new government, 
led by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, adopted a “new-left slogan, calling for a more 
participatory democracy in Canada” (Harris 1987, 102).  Trudeau was against 
America’s war in Vietnam, socially liberal and a staunch Francophone federalist.  
According to his manifesto, he wanted his administration to “give citizens a sense of 
full participation in the affairs of government”  (Harris 1987, 102).  In doing so, over 
his three terms as Prime Minister, Trudeau reconstructed state policy towards 
cultural support in Canada.  
 
A few months after winning the election, his government rewrote The Broadcasting 
Act, replacing the BBG with the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications 
Commission (CRTC).  Taking influence from Massey, The Broadcasting Act 
amendments in 1968 add to what the term ‘Canadian’ is posited to mean, according 
to this administration.  In subsection one, it asserts that broadcasting must 
“encourage the development of Canadian expression by providing a wide range of 
programming that reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas, values and artistic 
creativity, by displaying Canadian talent in entertainment programming and by 
offering information and analysis concerning Canada and other countries from a 
Canadian point of view” (Department of Justice 1991).  This act officially regulated 
Massey-influenced rhetoric within broadcasting.  However, it did not officially state 
what ‘Canadian’ was, instead leaving the term, like in The Massey Commission, 
loosely defined.  
 
In the same year, Trudeau published a book, Federalism and the French Canadians.  
Quebec had recently elected a separatist government, one petitioning for an exit 
referendum.  Trudeau, as a French Canadian, promoted Canada’s bilingual 
federalism and he saw national, dualistic policy as a tool to do so.  However, in his 
book, he presents complicated justifications for his early decision-making, ones that 
ultimately led to the enacting of Canadian content regulations.  He states:  
 
 A truly democratic government cannot be ‘nationalist’, because it must pursue the 
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 good of all its citizens, without prejudice of ethnic origin.  The democratic 
 government, then, stands for and encourages good citizenship, never 
 nationalism…more than language or culture, more than history and geography, even 
 more than force and power, the foundation of the nation is will (Trudeau 1967, 
 169). 
  
This establishes the policy framework that Trudeau set forth, while revealing some of 
its contradictions.  While promoting the idea that the nation was not singularly a 
linguistic or geographic construct, Trudeau ultimately calls for the establishment of 
the singular nation even if such singularity is inherently conflicted.  This singular 
national identity is different to the three tenets Massey posits - geographic vastness, 
language and differentiation.  Here, Trudeau states that a generalized, collective 
nationhood supersedes these three tenets.  By pursuing the “good of all its citizens” 
(1967, 169), Trudeau considered linguistic and geographic requirements, often 
pandering to them to ensure that each Canadian lobby, be it provincial or cultural, 
was satisfied under his definition of the nation.  But his beliefs were not based on 
separating these frameworks to define Canadian national identity.  As a result, his 
definition relied on an acceptance of internal difference that, at the same time, 
fractured the very structure he aimed to develop.  In essence, in terms of cultural 
policy, the framework stated the following; whilst everyone would be pacified in 
getting some of what they wanted, compromise for the sake of furthering the 
concept of national identity came first.   
     
The CRTC was given the responsibility of policing The Broadcasting Act.  Pierre 
Juneau, a French-speaking nationalist bureaucrat and former vice-chair of the BBG, 
was installed as its chairman.  He was a staunch supporter of the Liberal 
government’s proto-nationalist stance.  By 1968, private broadcasters were made to 
show a “promise of performance”, ultimately proving that they were supporting 
Canadian domestic music (Edwardson 2008, 200).  This was followed in 1970 with a 
memorandum, “recommending a 25% Canadian quota to be placed on all daytime 
AM content in January 1971, later expanded to FM broadcasts” (Edwardson 2008, 
199).  This quota was not made law, but it led to a series of hearings.  On 30 
January 1972, a quota was finally approved by parliament at “30% and measured to 
be scheduled in a reasonable manner throughout the period 6:00am to midnight’"  
(Fraser Institute 1999).  There are no hearings or justification as to why the level 
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was increased from 25 to 30%, although the music lobby, whom Juneau and 
Trudeau were compassionate towards, argued for a higher quota.  By 1972, 
Canada’s radio content quota was implemented as law, one that private broadcasters 
had to comply with in order to renew their licenses.  The quota was referred to as 
CANCON, short form of ‘Canadian Content’. 
 
The quota was not a simple 30% blanket rule.  30% is the mandate most of the 
time, but there were other circumstances. This is outlined clearly in A Time for 
Action, a significant sector analysis produced in 1996: “FM stations which play 
popular vocal music are required to meet the same 30% requirement, with lower 
Canadian content levels required of stations playing 35% or more instrumental 
music. Stations playing traditional or special interest music must play at least 10% 
Canadian music and ethnic music stations 7%. A lower Canadian content 
requirement — 25% of popular music selections — is expected of licensees between 
6:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, and the CRTC also expects a 
reasonably even distribution of Canadian selections throughout the day and through 
the broadcast week” (Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Music Industry 1996, 
11).  For classical, jazz and blues, a 10% quota was initiated.  This differentiates 
CANCON from the recommendations of The Massey Commission, revealing a shift in 
what was included, from a regulatory perspective, as Canadian content.  The music 
sector that argued in favour of the quota consisted primarily of those releasing music 
labelled as ‘rock and pop’, as these genres were most susceptible to foreign 
competition.  There was little discussion of classical, jazz and ‘high art’ genres in the 
initial wording of CANCON.  In addition, the quota was only a requirement of AM 
stations at first, with FM being included in 1975 after the first review, as FM was first 
reserved for classical music. 
 
This reveals the initial structure of the quota.  It was, in its first instance, a 
compromise.  The requirement was higher for popular music, a genre that suffered 
more from American and British imports and FM was exempt, despite it developing in 
popularity in the early 1970s as formats shifted from classical to more popular 
genres, including rock and pop.  In addition, it was clearly biased, where music that 
offered more commercial incentive were more tightly controlled than niche genres, 
like jazz or traditional.   
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This was, as defined in its establishment, a populist strategy for the Liberal 
administration.  The argument was that more Canadian content on the radio 
promoted both Canada’s struggling sound recording sector while complimenting the 
state’s federalist policies.  This was assumed to create more opportunities for 
Canadian musicians (of certain genres) and, subsequently, their business 
representatives.  The realities of such assumptions have proved complex.  Private 
broadcasters saw impending quota legislation as a threat, so in a bid to avoid quota 
requirements after the rewriting of The Broadcasting Act, twenty-two radio stations 
across Canada formed the Maple Music System.  This was an agreement between 
these radio stations to playlist an artist every few weeks across Canada.  The 
stations “would have a conference call where they would agree on certain Canadian 
records and each of those stations would play the record for a minimum of eight 
weeks” (Jones 2008, 10).  These records were taken from Canadian independent 
releases, focused mainly in rock and pop.  One was chosen each week (Jones 2008, 
10), although there are no documents outlining what was played, and there is no 
indication that conference calls were recorded.  While the amount of Canadian music 
the Maple Music System cooperative played was insignificant, its existence was seen 
as a response by Canada’s private broadcasters to support Canada’s music industry 
at the time.  In theory, it provided Canadian acts with more national airplay, as those 
Canadians that received airplay often did so in their local regions, rather than 
nationally.  In addition, before the system, Canadian acts experienced difficulty in 
touring nationally, as music remained regionalised due to the size of the country and 
the cost of touring (Leblanc, pers. comm).  “The booking agencies made a pact, 
including Bruce Allen Talent in Vancouver, Hungry Eye Agency in Winnipeg, 
Brimstone in Calgary, Concept 376 in Toronto and DKD in Montreal.  They agreed 
that they would book each other's bands.  This is significant, because for the first 
time, bands from Vancouver could get gigs in Toronto because radio could possibly 
support it.  All of the sudden a band could tour, which before these policies was next 
to impossible” (Leblanc, pers. comm).  This created Canada’s first ever touring 
circuit.  Leblanc remarked to Christopher T. Jones in Canadian Publisher magazine in 
2008, “with these bookers working together for the first time, and with national 
airplay, you could finally take a band and tour coast to coast” (Jones 2008, 10).  If a 
band could tour, then a greater reasoning existed to ensure that this was supported 
by national airplay.  
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The reconstituting of The Broadcasting Act further enshrined the importance of 
Canadian content in the development of the Canadian identity within state politics.  
It mandated that private broadcasters, when licensing airwaves, must support the 
production and promotion of Canadian content.  While there was no direct state 
funding for the popular music industries, this requirement altered the context in 
which the industry was situated between 1967 and 1972.  By 1972, a small touring 
circuit had been created and Canadian content and popular music was given 
regulatory protection.  However, the quota was not widely accepted, nor rigorously 
administered, evaluated or examined.  While the context had altered to provide 
Canadian music makers with more opportunities to be heard on private radio, this 
did not mean that such opportunities would materialize.  The cultural imperatives of 
the legislation remained reliant on the economic realities of broadcasters, who opted 
to air content that reflected their business interests, Canadian and otherwise.    
 
The Structure of CANCON and Arguments For and Against 
 
To be eligible for airplay under the quota, records were assessed through a four-part 
analysis called MAPL, created by Stan Klees, the co-editor of RPM and John Mills, the 
CEO of CAPAC, for Juneau in 1971.  MAPL is an acronym for Music, Artist, Place of 
production and Lyrics.  
 
Specifically, each is defined as follows: 
 
 M (music) -- the music is composed entirely by a Canadian. 
 A (artist) -- the music is, or the lyrics are, performed principally by a Canadian. 
 P (place of production) -- the musical selection consists of a live performance is (i) 
 recorded wholly in Canada, or (ii) performed wholly in Canada and broadcast live 
 in Canada.11  
 L (lyrics) -- the lyrics are written entirely by a Canadian. 
 (CRTC 2009b, 1). 
 
In this definition, Canadian was defined by citizenship, not residency.  Two of these 
                                                 
11 This requirement means that the performance on the record and where it was recorded 
needs to be in Canada.  The second point was added in 1991 to include artists who debut 
material live in Canada.  The term ‘live performance’ is confusing and refers, in this case, to 
music performed live in the studio, either through a series of dubbing or off the floor.       
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categories must be determined to be ‘Canadian’ for an album or single to qualify as 
CANCON.  In the beginning only one category was required, but this was amended 
to two in 1972, a decision argued against by CAB, as this made it more difficult to 
work around CANCON.  With one qualification, it was easier to qualify with co-writes 
and internationally produced albums under MAPL.  In addition, Canadian singers 
recorded in American studios with American bands and producers, and this was seen 
to qualify.  This made it difficult to protect Canada’s domestic sector, as the 
regulations were easily manipulated by multinationals at first.  As a result, of the four 
parameters, Place of production (also referred to as ‘performance’), the third 
requirement, has been seen as the most controversial since its adoption, as it was 
developed with peculiar and misleading wording.  Originally, Canadians recording 
abroad were able to qualify under this stipulation, as recording studios in the early 
1970s were deemed inferior in Canada compared to those in the United States.  This 
wording has been altered.  Currently, Canadian acts must record in Canada to qualify 
under ‘P’.   
 
On 18 November 1972, Billboard reported that the Canadian branch offices of 
Polydor, Capitol and Columbia marketed content aimed at meeting quota 
requirements, from Capitol’s Edward Bear to Polydor’s Joey Gregorash.  At first, 
CANCON was utilized primarily by multinationals to develop Canadian content, often 
utilizing American production structures to support it.  The week the regulations 
were announced, there was one Canadian album in the top 20, The Band’s self-titled 
album, released by Canada’s largest multinational branch office, Capitol EMI Canada 
(Billboard 1970a).            
 
At its inception the quota was both supported and heavily scrutinised.  Peter W. 
Johansen, writing in the Journal of Communication in 1973, argued in favour of the 
quota.  He stated, somewhat prosaically, “through a change in legislation by the 
CRTC, rock music became a viable economic entity…forming an effort to reduce 
American social-cultural impact in Canada” (35, 1973a).  Other academics and policy 
makers disagreed, arguing that the quota bluntly and presumptively championed 
“nationalism, elitism and paternalism,” raising questions as to what Canadian culture 
this quota was intended to influence (Handler 1985, 678).  Much of the debate was 
structured on cultural imperialism, both perceived and real from the United States 
with arguments for and against the quota taken from a viewpoint to cull or ignore 
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American dominance of the airwaves.  Like The Massey Commission before it, the 
quota mandated what was not Canadian as much as what was, prompting Handler 
to argue that the quota and subsequent reports reinforcing it “had a rhetorical 
finality that rests ultimately on notions of natural inevitability, implying that a 
Canadian ‘essence’ exists which inheres naturally in Canadians, and that only they 
can impart it to cultural products” (Handler 1985, 79).  This comment is significant, 
as it illustrates these Canadian policy experiments, from The Massey Commission to 
CANCON, as being based on shaky foundations.  However, these shaky foundations 
are attributed to a consistent one-way process from the state, when the concept of 
being Canadian is affirmed first in policy, rather than being a result of the content 
that is created within it.  
 
This is further expanded on when reading discussions from Straw’s (2000), 
Edwardson’s (2008) and Sutherland’s (2008) analyses of Canada’s music industry 
policy.  As Straw argues in In and Around Canadian Music, “the place of music within 
the discourses of national cultural identity remains vague and elusive” (2000, 176).  
Edwardson, in Canuck Rock, argues that the quota structure is part of a “myth-
symbol complex for the citizenry to communally engage in a sense of what it means 
not only to be citizens of a country but members of a nation” (2009, 19).  Sutherland 
agrees, stating, “even more singularly than a discourse of failure, what a history of 
Canadian music policy also lacks is the volume of discourse oriented around textual 
representation of identity” (2008, 15).   
 
All three theorists are critical of Massey and the positioning of Canadian culture as an 
indefinable catchall.  CANCON was initiated as a cultural policy, but its impact 
combined both cultural and economic objectives.  Edwardson’s comments, ones that 
relate back to Anderson’s concepts of nationalism, argue that the quota is primarily a 
tool for nation-building, a tool that Sutherland purports is best utilized to support 
national identity formation.  However, both theorists do not question the role of 
market economics in installing a quota to support content development.  By 
developing a stronger and more unilateral manner to protect popular culture, the 
consumption of the content deemed ‘popular’ increases, further developing the 
businesses of those Canadians creating, marketing and airing the content.  In a later 
quote, Sutherland expands on this, arguing that it is products that, in the end, make 
those involved better off.  His comments are worth quoting in full: 
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 The CRTC’s Canadian content guidelines, which are as close as we get to any 
 definition of a national musical identity in policy terms, make no reference to the 
 actual content of the work, either lyrically or musically, concerning themselves with 
 the nationality of the creators and the recording location.  Nor do guidelines for 
 federal government funding make any stipulations regarding the actual content. If 
 Canadian music is meant to reflect Canadian identity (as it clearly is in these 
 regulations), the precise means by which this happens are not specified. The lack of 
 a clear sense of national identity in terms of Canadian music may be more marked 
 than in other cultural forms. What is even more marked is the particular manner in 
 which cultural nationalism is present in Canadian music industry policy. This 
 reconfigures some of the debates that characterize discussions of Canadian cultural 
 policy, with the result that some of the characteristic oppositions of these discussions 
 recede in importance or disappear altogether (2008, 19).   
 
When economics are considered in the context of both Canadian content regulations 
and the concept of Canadian identity, further complexities emerge.  The more 
economically successful a record is, the more CANCON it satisfies, as it is played on 
the radio more frequently.  Yet, keeping such proceeds in Canada is not 
straightforward.  One act may satisfy CANCON regulations and be commercially 
successful to a point where it takes up an inordinate amount of CANCON on the 
radio because the music is more valuable to the broadcaster.  However, no value 
propositions were proposed or mandated in the policy.   
 
In its first few years, broadcasters received little guidance on what to play and were 
left to formulate their own definitions of suitable Canadian content, resulting in the 
airing of records that satisfied their business models.  While The Massey Commission 
staged public symposiums before writing its report, the CRTC engaged with industry 
and business, but never with the public.  As a result, the quota was not initiated as 
part of public demand and no research was conducted to quantify the level of 
Canadian content that was consumed on radio at the time, or what the public, when 
surveyed, desired.  This was initiated, similarly to the recommendations in The 
Massey Commission, as a top-down exercise.  However, with The Massey 
Commission, such recommendations were first tested with the public, an exercise not 
conducted by the CRTC.  The supposed viewpoints of the broadcasters and the 
sound recording sector were well debated and documented in the late 1960s and 
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early 1970s, but little public engagement remains on record.  
 
However, despite its challenges the quota did produce a temporary boom in 
Canadian content production.  Paul White, then Capitol Records’ A&R director for 
Canada, stated to Billboard on 28 Feb 1970, “these regulations will probably force 
some major companies, who have been reluctant to become actively involved in the 
Canadian music scene, to start producing some Canadian records” (Billboard 1970).  
In other words, White hinted at the possibility of more branch activity for foreign 
major labels in Canada, to sign and market Canadian content.  On 2 October 1971, a 
total of twelve Canadian singles were represented on the Billboard Top 100 Chart, 
one more than were represented by British artists (Billboard 1971b, 62-64).   
However, a close reading of these illustrates the challenges embedded in the policy.  
One record, Joan Baez’s “The Night They Drove Old Dixie Down” qualified for 
CANCON as it appeared on The Band’s self-titled album and was composed by 
Canadians (and Levon Helm, an American and The Band’s drummer).  Of the seven 
representative singles, three were recorded in Canada (Billboard 1971b, 62-64).  As 
a result, a demand arose to showcase new talent, resulting in the first Canadian 
popular music initiative to be funded by Canada’s federal government.  This event 
was titled The Maple Music Junket.    
 
The Maple Music Junket 
 
In 1972, music journalist Richie Yorke curated an important event in the history of 
Canada’s domestic music sector.  In June, 92 European journalists were flown to 
Montreal and Toronto for the first Canadian music showcase.  It was titled The Maple 
Music Junket and lasted four days.  The cost of the project was $120,000, and of 
that, $30,000 was delivered through government grants to subsidise the attendance 
of foreign journalists at the festival (Billboard 1972b).  This was split across three 
agencies, the Department of the Secretary of State’s Arts and Culture Branch, the 
Canada Council for the Arts and the Department of Industry.  While publicly funding 
one quarter of an industry-led showcase is commonplace now, it was novel in 1972.  
In fact, it was “unique in that it represented the first time any national government 
in the world had officially recognized the popular music industry” (Yorke 1971, 5).  
These comments must be taken in context, as Yorke himself organised and 
promoted the event, but it received public money and was the first of its kind in 
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Canada to do so.  
 
While it was not the first event in which popular music and public policy interacted in 
Canada, it was the first music event to be publicly financed in Canada outside the 
realms of jazz, classical, ballet and opera.  This event, however small when placed 
within this history, is significant in explaining how and why the Canadian government 
has created a structure for implementing itself as a principle investor in the popular 
music industry. 
 
Yorke convinced the policymakers at the time that to develop suitable content for the 
quota a showcase event should be held to raise domestic profiles.  Yorke, a 
journalist for Billboard, testified at CRTC hearings in favour of the quota and often 
complained of the marginality of Canada’s homegrown talent on its radio stations.  
The festival was a tactical move on his part.  It was staged at a time when the quota 
needed reinforcement through support structures that were beneficial for Canadian 
recording artists.  In addition, at the time, multinational major labels were investing 
heavily in Canada, setting up bricks and mortar offices to not only distribute 
international talent within Canada but also to sign and develop local talent.  This 
started as early as 1963 and continued throughout the 1960s, when Capitol Canada 
(subsidiary of EMI) released a host of British acts, including The Beatles, Dave Clark 
Five, the Yardbirds, Gerry and the Pacemakers, Freddie and the Dreamers, the 
Swinging Blue Jeans, Billy J. Kramer and the Dakotas, the Hollies and Manfred Mann.  
This produced what Edwardson refers to as a fringe benefit, where “profits from 
imports were being used to support an anaemic domestic music industry” 
(Edwardson 2008, 176).  
 
There is little literature and analysis on The Maple Music Junket other than a series 
of articles in Billboard, local broadsheet reviews and mentions in the Canadian 
industry newsletter Rpm in the early 1970s.  Nevertheless, in these accounts, it is 
shown to have developed a heightened amount of attention for Canadian popular 
music at the time, but through a critical lens.  For example, on 6 June 1972, the 
Montreal Gazette wrote that most of the journalists were as concerned with drinking 
as they were with the music (Kapica 1972).  Those that performed, included The 
Stampeders, Andre Gagnon and Anne Murray, were, according to the journalist, “par 
for the course” (Kapica 1972).  
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There were more positive reviews in trade magazines.  On 10 June 1972, Billboard 
published a Canadian Music Report, the first of its kind.  Under the title The Maple 
Music Junket Lets Canada Put It Best Foot Forward, its language is promotional and 
hyperbolic, albeit slightly patronising.  It is labelled as “quite clearly the biggest thing 
that has ever happened to the Canadian music industry” and in later paragraphs, 
“one of the most important events in the global pop industry” (Billboard 1972c).  The 
report, ten pages long, mentions the challenges amidst which The Maple Music 
Junket was staged and those that it was responding to.  Quota or not, Canada still 
had little domestic music industry of its own.  An advertisement in the magazine 
even stated: “Canadian music is happening in Canada.”  This was paid for by GRT 
Records, a foreign-owned major-affiliated label (Billboard 1972b).  A year later, 
Billboard wrote, “it is hard to find anyone in the global pop industry who isn’t faintly 
aware of The Maple Music Junket” (Billboard 1973).  There was even a review of the 
event in Germany’s Der Spiegel on 19 June 1972 (Der Spiegel 1972).  It remains 
difficult to ascertain the overall impact that it had on the acts that performed.  Some 
achieved mass success within Canada, such as Crowbar and Chilliwack, while others 
have been largely ignored.  In the end, the event was not repeated in Canada nor 
were similar events held elsewhere.     
 
There was no discussion on how and if Canadian national identity was portrayed at 
the festival, either for the bands or to the visiting journalists.  However, a sense of 
national responsibility and its accompanying challenges can be ascertained 
concerning the manner in which the event was filmed for broadcast.  In The Ottawa 
Journal on 8 January 1973, Arnold Gosewich of Capitol EMI Canada, along with 
Yorke, formed Maple Music Inc., described as a “non-for-profit organization formed 
to promote Canadian talent” (Ottawa Journal 1973).  The organization helped broker 
the license to air the special, with artists forgoing copyright revenues in exchange for 
promotion on CBC.  However, due to scheduling, the CBC was forced to restrict the 
program to 60 minutes from its agreed upon 90, cutting performances from Bruce 
Cockburn, among others (Ottawa Journal 1973).  It is revealing that an executive 
from a multinational branch office in Canada, along with an Australian-born 
journalist, created an organization to promote Canadian content, but ran into 
difficulties in negotiating its dissemination with Canada’s public broadcaster. Yorke 
and Gosewich called the CBC’s actions “the ultimate snub” (Ottawa Journal 1973).  
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While The Maple Music Junket proved to be the largest showcase of Canadian music 
ever produced, its impact on the value of the music, both culturally and 
economically, proved inconclusive.  However, it reveals an increased set of activities 
that emerged to support or justify the quota on behalf of Canada’s music sector, 
both through its independent labels and multinational branch offices.  The festival, 
along with the earlier Maple Music System, RPM’s ten-part analysis of the benefits of 
a content quota and the eventual installation of CANCON established a need for an 
industry where one had not existed.   
 
The Early Lessons of Canadian Content Regulation 
 
Hobsbawm writes, in The Nation as Invented Tradition, that one of the methods 
modern France deployed to bolster nationalism was “the invention of public 
ceremonies” (1994, 76).  In discussing Bastille Day and its creation in 1880, he 
states, “while it left scope for, and could hardly avoid, popular manifestations, its 
general tendency was to transform the heritage of the revolution into a combined 
expression of state pomp and power and the citizens’ pleasure” (1994, 77-78).  To 
Hobsbawm, one of the core structures that develop nationalistic tendencies is the 
collective acceptance of events – in this case a national holiday.  Bastille Day, as a 
construct, brought the French nation together by state decree, as it included all 
those under the French republic and produced a “combined expression” of state 
power and popular will (1994, 78).  In Canada, while such holidays exist such as 
Canada Day on 1 July, state legislated quota regulations attempted to perform the 
same task that Hobsbawm describes.  Essentially, what Massey, the reconstitution of 
Broadcasting Act and the creation of CANCON did was transform the concept of 
Canada’s national heritage by creating a need to develop it.  They addressed a 
supposed and actual cultural threat – American and other foreign imports – in the 
process of ensuring that a certain amount (of a certain type) of Canadian content 
was created to develop a “Canadian story”, where one might not have been before, 
ultimately developing the need for a business that previously worked in Canada’s 
cultural fringes, its popular music sector.  The policy developed Canadian content by 
regulating a need for it, but did not define what this need could be most satisfied 
with.    
 
These policies began to combine the promotion of popular culture with the 
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development of national narratives.  The concept of Canadian cultural identity, while 
rigidly mandated in terms of a need to protect it, remained open-ended.  However, 
this did not pluralize content dissemination.  Canada’s private broadcasters were no 
more inclined to support Canadian music beyond the requisite selection of a few 
tracks to fill the quota.  The reporting structure was non-existent, ultimately raising 
questions about the power of this invented tradition that was policed by the CRTC.  
Such questions concerning Canada’s national identity formation and the impact of 
CANCON, as well as its relationship with cultural and social development and market 
economics, remained unanswered in the early results of this new policy.     
 
Clifford Geertz states, in discussing cultural policy, that “between the stream of 
events that make up political life and the web of beliefs that comprises a culture it is 
difficult to find a middle term.  On the one hand, everything looks like a clutter of 
schemes and surprises; on the other, like a vast geometry of settled judgments” 
(2000, 311).  Such settled judgments, as they emerged in Canada, failed to address 
how the “middle term”, according to Geertz, was not met at the time.  For example, 
British historian Goldwin Smith posed such challenges in 1891 in his polemic, Canada 
and the Canadian Question.  Canada, at the time, was “a mere illusion, produced by 
the vague use of a common name for things which have nothing in common” (2006, 
240).  The concept of Canadian identity remained vague, often expressed through 
assertions of what one was not – American, a separatist etc. - rather than what one 
was.  For the music sector, the quota did not state what type of Canadian music 
must be supported.  This was left to private interests, resulting in the airing of music 
that was sonically and stylistically similar to foreign imports.  Much of the popular 
music being created in Canada was borrowed in style and substance from earlier 
British and American influences – minus Québécois chanson, for example - and 
noting a definable “Canadian” style was subjective, rather than objective.  Often, the 
most “Canadian” artists had an association with America at the time.  This can be 
argued to offer a number of positive implications.  For example, The Band featured 
an American drummer, and most of their lyrics were influenced by American themes, 
such as the Civil War or rural Americana.  Moreover, Neil Young and Joni Mitchell 
relocated to Los Angeles to build their careers.  However, these artists were known 
as being Canadian.  
 
The sound recording sector, frustrated with a lack of access to private airwaves and 
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marginalised by multinational competitors, rallied against the broadcasters to play 
more of their music on the radio; the broadcasters argued that Canadian music, 
whatever it was, was worth less than imports.  This dichotomy was to become 
further entrenched and continue as Canadian content regulations further developed 
in CRTC policy.  However, the impact of the policy on those who were required to 
follow it differed from the goals of the regulator itself.  To the CRTC, this was a 
geographical and residency issue, old themes borrowed and reconfigured from The 
Massey Commission.  Most of the variables used to define it taken from external 
structures, like not being American, for example.  By 1972, Canada had enacted a 
series of culturally protectionist policies to protect, promote and enrich Canadian 
content on both television and radio.  It was these policies that would grow to 
become known as Canadian, independent of the culture they were initiated to 
protect.     
 
Conclusion 
 
By the mid 1970s, Canada had a set of policies initiated to protect and support 
Canadian content development, through The Broadcasting Act and CANCON.  In 
addition, a number of experiments were conducted to support a growing industry’s 
ability to provide the best content possible within the quota regulations, such as The 
Maple Music System and later on, The Maple Music Junket.   These policies posited a 
belief that Canadian content can be assessed and compartmentalized as a singular 
concept.  This is simple to accomplish economically, but less so culturally.  However, 
the events, reports and commissions that informed this legislation, and the theories 
that can be extrapolated to provide a framework for such activity, had yet to assess 
such impending challenges in singularly regulating Canadian cultural and economic 
objectives.  Furthermore, when music was regulated, questions concerning the 
cultural and economic value of the music under the quota, how it was to be 
implemented, what checks and balances would be in place and how it would be 
audited were inadequately discussed and formalised.  The quota itself, an arbitrary 
percentage in and of itself, did not produce definitive conclusions such as a clear 
increase in the consumption of Canadian music or a healthier, more prosperous 
popular music sector.     
 
The construction of national identity signifiers in Canada, and its relation to these 
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policies created further uncertainty, as CANCON became a fixture in Canada’s music 
spectrum.  The wide range of theories pertaining to the construction of Canadian 
nationalism, and their impact on these policies, was not assessed by regulators, 
despite such concepts of nationalism informing how the development of Canadian 
cultural identity was to feature in this legislation.   
 
While CANCON did assist Canadian musical creators, such assistance was wide 
ranging and complex.  By the end of the 1970s, Canada had been through a decade 
of popular music policy, but no direct state support, minus the grant given to The 
Maple Music Junket, was provided to assist content creators in making music suitable 
for radio.  The same questions that Massey asked as he travelled across Canada 
were approached by Trudeau and his administration.  Neither party provided a 
complete set of answers.  In the end, Trudeau and Juneau utilized a 
recommendation in The Massey Commission to ‘Canadianize’ content en-masse, but 
in this case it was popular music that was to benefit.  This had yet to be fully 
analysed, but would resurface in debates as CANCON evolved throughout the 1970s.  
How this was to impact Canada’s popular music industry moving forward was 
significant.   
 
It was becoming clear that support was needed to produce more suitable Canadian 
content, music that could satisfy all parties involved – the music businesses, 
broadcasters and the state.  In 1982, these debates would create Canada’s first set 
of programmes to fund content development, marketing and promotion.  This fund, 
FACTOR, would have significant implications for the history of popular music funding 
in Canada.  
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Chapter 2  
1980s – The Introduction and Development of FACTOR and Other 
Administration 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the issues raised in the development of CANCON throughout 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, leading to the establishment of Canada’s first 
national funding structure, the Foundation to Assist Canadian Talent on Record 
(FACTOR), in 1982.  FACTOR began after a long period of negotiation, lobbying and 
interaction between the music sector, private broadcasters and the state.  Once 
again, policies aimed at developing and fostering Canadian national characteristics 
impacted the activities of Canadian businesses, both for those creating the content 
and those responsible for disseminating it.  Furthermore, as popular music became 
more prevalent on FM formats, the value of the type of music protected by the quota 
became important, with an ever-increasing focus on new music as the more suitable 
form of Canadian content in this context.  The end result, a national organization to 
subsidize the creation and development of new musical works, emerged from these 
debates and the hearings, reports and structures.  Once again, the influence of The 
Massey Commission returned with the publishing of another commission on culture, 
The Applebaum-Hébert Report in 1982.  These activities both supported and 
challenged how CANCON and its cultural requirements impacted Canada’s business 
community, its ability to compete nationally and internationally and the impact of 
these policies on Canadian national identity formation.      
 
It is best to first state how the Canadian record industry, in the mid-to-late 1970s 
and 1980s, functioned on an international level, with multinationals and 
independents working both individually and collectively, depending on the content.  
Canada’s distribution warehouses were mainly controlled by multinationals and each 
operated branch offices in Toronto, providing independent releases with distribution 
and marketing services at a cost (Mair, pers. comm).  However, independents also 
financed and produced their own content.  As a result, a bias developed, influenced 
by the activities of the sector, that CANCON should be most utilized to support new 
Canadian music, often released by independents.  This definition of new music, and 
the one that is prevalent in this chapter, is music that overwhelmingly featured on 
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CIRPA members release schedules.  This music incorporated rock, pop and 
alternative genres and its focus was placed equally on the content itself as much as 
its ability to compete with foreign content.  This can be traced back to the Canadian 
artists influenced by the ‘British Invasion’ in Canada, including the music that 
showcased at The Maple Music Junket.  
  
In 1982, for the first time, financial support was made available for Canada’s music 
makers. The decisions that were made to introduce the support failed to adequately 
analyse the changes that were taking place at the time, such as the increasing role 
of multinationals in English Canada’s music industry, a continued lack of quantitative 
analysis to measure the impact of the quota and the continued combining of cultural 
and economic objectives in Canadian cultural policy.  To address this, I begin with an 
analysis of the policy amendments and cross-industry debates in the mid-to-late 
1970s and early 1980s, before returning to address how nationalism and attempts in 
policy to develop a Canadian national narrative have been influenced by and have 
impacted the history of popular music funding in Canada, up to this point.  By 
establishing a nationally recognized program to support the creation of new 
Canadian content, the process of developing new Canadian talent became impacted 
as much by the system that was created to support it.  In some ways, it is this 
system that grew to be seen as Canadian as much as the music that it supported.  In 
terms of supporting new Canadian popular music, a sense of Canadianness began to 
develop not through the styles and genres offered, but through the creation and 
defence of subsidization.  
 
CANCON in the mid-to-late 1970s         
 
By the mid 1970s, CANCON did not appear to have the impact that Canada’s music 
makers and recording businesses had hoped.  The regulation did encourage 
broadcasters to play more Canadian music, but the selections remained constrained, 
predominantly limited to previously tested and commercially successful acts, rather 
than developing artists.  No structure to support new Canadian music in CANCON 
was created, allowing broadcasters to feature the content that best suited their 
needs.  While more suitable music for Canada’s broadcasters satisfied their economic 
requirements, this content often bypassed the needs of Canada’s fledgling domestic 
music industry.  By supporting new content, broadcasters were not guaranteed an 
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economic return compared to tried and tested commercial content.  For example, 
commercially successful acts like Nazareth (an American act covering a Joni Mitchell 
song) and Bachman Turner Overdrive featured heavily in the charts, both supported 
by multinationals with Toronto branch offices (Records, Promotion, Music 1975, 1).  
For the broadcasters, this was justified as they claimed they were responding to 
audience tastes and market demands, claiming that Canada, in the mid 1970s, did 
not have a strong enough developing music scene.  It was in the interest of both 
sides to change this.  More recordings would diversify label catalogues, and if these 
were of high enough quality, it would ease broadcasters complaints that there was 
an unsatisfactory selection of CANCON.  
 
In late 1973, the CRTC held its first commercial radio review.  In the hearings, the 
commission stated that Canadian music was worth 25% of a $125m sector 
(Sutherland 2008, 122-3) and there were fewer objections to support Canadian 
content than compared to those aired in the quota negotiations.  In 1975, when the 
review was published, CANCON regulations were extended to FM formats, as the 
format overtook AM in popularity (Leblanc 2007, 4).  For FM, different requirements 
were assigned to those in AM, including a new series of ‘promise of performance’ 
guidelines attached to license renewals (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 1990a).  The concept of ‘promise of performance’ 
was part of the license renewal, where the CRTC asked broadcasters to defend the 
actions they had taken to support developing Canadian music as part of the ‘promise 
of performance’ construct (Leblanc, pers. comm).  If the broadcaster could outline 
that they had adequately supported Canadian music, this would support their 
renewal process.  However, this process was not structured or quantified in CRTC 
regulations.  It was optional for each licensee, though politically encouraged.  
Therefore, one can attribute a number CAB member stations donating a small 
percentage of revenue to Canada’s music businesses, but not in any organised 
fashion (Roman, pers. comm).   
 
Effectively, this allocated ‘promise of performance’ funding was mainly spent on 
talent shows, school band seminars and other individual activities (Roman, pers. 
comm).  One broadcaster, Moffat Communications, for example, supported the 
development and performance of marching bands at Canadian fairs and military 
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events (Roman pers. comm).12  This ‘promise of performance’ support negotiated in 
these early license renewals reveals complications in how the CRTC monitored 
compliance.  In The CRTC’s Enforcement of Canada’s Broadcasting Legislation, M.L. 
Auer argued that the CRTC uses “informal sanctions, rather than the penalties set 
out in Canadian broadcast legislation” to monitor license holders (Auer 1992, 114), 
relying often on “strong sounding, but legally meaningless, terminology to sanction 
non-compliance” (Auer 1992, 128).  As a result, only 28 stations were denied 
renewals between 1968 and 1981 of over 250 applicants per year and of those, only 
three were due to breaches of “maintaining minimum standards of performance” 
(Romanow and Romanow 1982, 70).  The majority of refusals involved transfers of 
ownership (Romanow and Romanow 1982, 71).  Each specific ‘promise of 
performance’, whether it was a higher percentage of CANCON or financial divestment 
to content creators, was not recorded in hearings, developing a compliance system 
framed on informal promises as much as legislated requirements.     
 
One must return to the objectives of the CRTC that were outlined when it replaced 
the BBG in 1968, as measured through its initial license review process in 1975 to 
measure its impact on the changing music sector.  While the law required 
broadcasters to comply with both the quota and a ‘promise of performance’ creed, 
they continued to challenge the CRTC over how the quota was legislated, even 
though the quota remained popular within the recording sector.  There were even 
claims at the time “that the industry was simply spawned by the regulations” 
(Sutherland 2008, 91), which in some cases was true.  This argument is significant, 
further expanding on the cultural and economic implications of the regulations in its 
first five years.  The results were inconclusive.  While the Canadian music industry 
further expanded between the end of 1960s and early 1970s, this cannot be 
attributed exclusively to Canadian content regulations.  Globally, new forms of rock, 
pop and alternative music became increasingly popular and foreign imports, both 
from the United States and United Kingdom, impacted Canadian listenership and 
playlists as much as new forms of Canadian music.  While record labels continued to 
invest in English Canadian artists, the opportunities provided to them through 
                                                 
12 There are no records outlining where and how the broadcasters allocated ‘promise of 
performance’ in the 1970s and early 1980s, as such detail was not included in their annual 
reports or CRTC hearings.  As a result, detailing the usage of the support at the time is based 
on personal interviews and recollections.  It is difficult to present a bipartisan view of this, as 
the decisions on who to support fell to the broadcasters and I am relying on their collective 
memories.  
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commercial radio remained inconclusive, with ‘promise of performance’ requirements 
remaining a quid-pro-quo structure with the regulator.  Furthermore, the economic 
development of the sector could not be effectively correlated with the increase in 
Canadian music as a tangible, cultural identifier, one that enhanced and developed 
Canadians’ access to domestic content.  Instead, one must measure this separately 
at the time.  Canada’s music industry had burgeoned and one variable responsible 
was Canada’s cultural protectionist policies.  However, beneath such policies lay 
global forces investing in acts and labels to expand the content commercially, rather 
than culturally.  
 
In the debates to regulate the quota, Canadian consumers were visibly absent from 
CRTC commissions.  In February 1974, there were 300 public interventions tabled by 
the CRTC (Romanow and Romanow 1982, 73), but none questioned if Canadians 
were satisfied with the quota; instead, the focus was on the level this content should 
be mandated at.  In addition, the hearings focused on the perceived value of 
community radio, multiculturalism and rural broadcasting, with little measurement 
dedicated to how Canadians consumed popular culture.  This lack of perspective 
would further differentiate the arguments tabled by the music industry and 
broadcasters at the time, with each claiming they were providing what the public 
wanted.  
 
For the broadcasters, the position focused on chart analysis and measuring, 
qualitatively at the time, Canadian consumption patterns to ascertain the true 
economic value of Canadian content.  “I feel our position was legitimate”, recalls 
CHUM director, former CAB spokesperson and co-founder of FACTOR Duff Roman.  
“Financially, one could understand our situation, but culturally and politically, we 
were a little late to understand the requirements.  But given our market share, we 
were pushing for a compromise” (pers. comm).  In retrospect, Roman believes that 
there was a cultural need for the quota, although CAB did not share this opinion at 
the time.  This was most sensitive in border markets with the United States.  In 
these markets, Canadian stations were struggling to compete with American 
competitors (Roman, pers. comm), and at the time, owning more than one station in 
the same band per market was restricted by the CRTC.  As a result, CAB members 
claimed that they were forced into supporting unprofitable content that, so they said, 
impacted their ability to turn a profit as private companies.   
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In addition, broadcasters at times attempted to subvert the quota by becoming 
labels, releasing content for the sake of airing it on their stations.  This is most 
evident in CHUM Records, a label that first employed Roman and former President of 
CIRPA, Brian Chater.  This decision by CHUM initiated the first meeting in a hotel in 
Toronto that led to the creation of CIRPA, according to attendee Al Mair (pers. 
comm).  In order to lobby both the state and the CRTC for the benefit of the 
independent music sector, and to rally against CHUM’s activities in setting up their 
label, a trade association was set up.  Here, the independent music sector was 
defined as Canadian owned and operated labels, ones operating outside of 
multinational branch offices.  With a board of ten, the Canadian Independent Record 
Producers Association (CIRPA) was founded.13 Although it was established in 1970, 
CIRPA did not become a standalone organisation with its own staff until 1975.  Its 
primary role was negotiating with CAB, various government departments, other 
industry organisations and the CRTC.  As True North Records founder and 
Kensington Market manager Bernie Finklestein recalls in his memoirs, the labels 
believed that “it is one thing to play music that you own.  But when you add that to 
the threat of boycotting everyone else’s records, that was a problem” (2012, 148).  
 
CIRPA’s first task was to challenge CHUM.  On 19 December 1970, Billboard reported 
that the organisation believed that “its members were not being allowed free and 
open access to the airwaves” (Yorke 1970a). They argued that along with the 
problem of stations starting record labels, the Canadian Manufacturing Recording 
Organisation (CMRO) was dominated by multinationals and CHUM had too much 
influence on the distribution chains.  On 30 January 1971, Billboard reported that 
CIRPA accused CHUM of “moving into record production and programming their own 
content” and of “unfair competition and questionable practices”, a claim refuted by 
then CHUM President, Allan Waters (Billboard 1971a).  Regardless of wrongdoing on 
either side, CIRPA convinced CHUM to abandon its sound recording division, 
replacing the business by financing certain master recordings for CIRPA members, 
including Aquarius Records (Mair, pers. comm).  This ended the broadcasters’ 
production of sound recordings for commercial purposes.  
                                                 
13 The word ‘Producers’ was changed to ‘Production’ in the early 1980s.  Presently the 
organisation is called CIMA, the Canadian Independent Music Association (Rosen, pers. 
comm). 
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In the same year that CIRPA was registered, editor of Canadian Composer Magazine, 
Richard Flohil, published an editorial, coupled with a radio interview on CBC claiming 
that CANCON regulations had “gone incredibly well” (Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation 1975), stating that unlike 1970, “Canada now had a viable pop music 
industry” (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 1975).  This comment is significant, as 
Flohil signals out Canada’s pop music sector as benefitting the most from the quota, 
with artists like Gordon Lightfoot and Anne Murray referenced in the piece.  In this 
case, the success of CANCON was evaluated on the economic success of popular 
music, above other indicators.  For Flohil and the CBC, this popular music industry 
represented Canada’s new music makers, and it was their content that benefitted the 
most.   
 
The same argument was posited by the independent music sector, led by CIRPA and 
CAPAC, as they began actively lobbying Canada’s Department for the Secretary of 
State, then responsible for music, for more financial support.  By 1976, the 
department began actively engaging in sound recording policy research and 
annotation, led by film analyst Dinah Hoyle and sound recording analyst Marla 
Waltman-Dashko.  As a result, the department hired CIRPA President John Watt as a 
sound recording consultant in late 1978.  “To me, we were taking a big risk.  My job 
was a risk”, recalls Waltman-Dashko (pers. comm).  “It was seen within the 
department as an area that was more about sex, drugs and rock and roll.  John was 
seen as an outsider.  But he wasn't a bureaucrat and this was an advantage for all of 
us” (Waltman-Dashko, pers. comm).  Then executive director of CIRPA, Earl Rosen 
recalls; “in the fall of 1979, we had a meeting with Dinah Hoyle, who was in charge 
of the film certification programme.  Pierre Juneau recommended the meeting, as he 
was the deputy of the department at the time” (Rosen, pers. comm), having moved 
from the CRTC in 1976. 
 
While CIRPA’s increased lobbying and Watt’s internal consulting produced results by 
1986, initially his actions did not result in anything concrete.  As these discussions 
continued in 1979, Canada’s recording output shrunk, according to official state-
published statistics.  Canada’s Cultural Industries: Vital Links, a Department of 
Communications report from 1985 presents information that suggests that domestic 
recordings declined by 15% in quantity from 1978-1984 (Spalding 2008, 142).  The 
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report also stated:  
 
 The Canadian marketplace is abnormal in comparison to that of other major 
 industrialized countries. First, the vast majority of books, films, and records available 
 to Canadians are produced elsewhere. Second and more ominous, the revenues from 
 the distribution of those goods accrue not to Canadians, who are inclined to help 
 finance the development of Canadian talent and Canadian industries, but instead 
 largely flow out of Canada to finance production industries elsewhere (Audley 1994, 
 10).   
 
There is an interesting linking of cultural and economic imperatives in Audley’s 
comments pertaining to CANCON.  Much of the financial benefit of CANCON, 
according to Canada’s Cultural Industries: Vital Links, ended up with multinationals 
with branch offices in Canada, and this, according to the writers, was “ominous” 
(Audley 1994, 10).  Regardless of CANCON, by 1979 “the Canadian sound recording 
industry was dominated by six multinational firms” that “captured 80% to 90% of 
the Canadian market” (Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Music Industry 
1996, 14).  This is similar to many other countries around the world; however, in 
Canada such data was used to argue for state intervention by the independents, on 
the basis of supporting Canadian content and a need to diversify and support quota 
requirements.     
 
However, these statistics contradict the argument that they are positioned to defend.  
Direct major label investment in Canada did increase CANCON production, but it was 
argued that revenues ended up at major label headquarters in the United States. 
This is reflected in Canada’s Cultural Industries: Vital Links, a report that clearly sides 
with the independents.  In actuality, this 80%-90% of the market is much more 
complex than the simple assertion that most revenues are accrued externally.  With 
the majors controlling distribution channels, it was their infrastructure that was most 
utilised by independent releases at the time, in both English and French Canada, but 
these were for-profit infrastructures, usually accessed through a recoupable advance 
on sales, rather than an investment (Mair, pers. comm).  However, quantifying such 
domestic return remained a challenge for the independent sound recording sector.  
CANCON did not resolve this.  More music did not necessarily mean more domestic 
revenue and consequent tax revenue for the government, nor did it lead to more 
financially successful Canadian-owned record labels.  It only meant more music, 
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which was potentially culturally beneficial but economically unquantifiable, shifting 
the focus from quality to quantity.  Once again, the cultural objectives of CANCON 
differed from the businesses’ economic interests who operated within the legislation.  
As a result, CIRPA argued for more intervention from government to ameliorate such 
circumstances as those outlined in Canada’s Cultural Industries: Vital Links.  While 
the federal government was sympathetic, they remained determined, at the time, to 
keep any funding a private matter.   
 
By 1981, broadcasters CHUM, Moffat and Rogers – represented by CAB - along with 
CIRPA, CAPAC and the CMPA continued to negotiate, at the behest of the 
Department of Communications (formerly Department for the Secretary of State), for 
better uses of  ‘promise of performance’ contributions.  While the CANCON legislation 
was nearly a decade old, there remained no tangible link between ‘promise of 
performance’ and the production of CANCON, as each station independently 
administered the voluntary amounts that they wished to contribute for the benefit of 
easier license renewals. Watt and CAPAC President John Mills spearheaded the 
negotiations for CIRPA, with Roman leading the delegation for CAB.  Roman explains 
that, in addition to the fact that there were few worthwhile places to contribute the 
mandated funds, “as broadcasters, you were making compromises because you 
simply had to play what was available” (Spalding 2008, 141).  “I knew John well”, 
Roman continues.  “We knew we needed to find a way to work together, but both 
sides had talking points and it was clear the divisions were difficult to solve” (Roman 
pers. comm).  “I remember the broadcasters still saying there wasn't enough music 
in 1979 for their needs, so it became logical that we cooperate on a strategy to make 
better records so they would play better records”, adds Donna Murphy, then 
secretary to Earl Rosen and now Vice President of Operations for CIMA (pers. 
comm).  Eventually, a compromise was struck in 1980.  This was formalised and 
announced in 1982, becoming the first privately run grant and loan agency for 
popular music in Canada.    
 
The Creation of the Foundation to Assist Canadian Talent on Record 
 
The Foundation to Assist Canadian Talent on Record (FACTOR) was established in 
1982, with a budget of $200,000 from the three founding broadcasters (Spalding 
2008, 142).  This money was welcomed by the Department of Communications and 
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the CRTC but provided voluntarily outside of license renewal requirements.  Moffat 
contributed $100,000, CHUM $60,000 and Rogers the final $40,000 (Roman pers. 
comm).  It was, according to Spalding, “good public relations at least within the 
industry” (2008, 142), but it was not nationally known or publicized at the time.  
“The broader public, including music fans, was not aware of FACTOR in its early 
years, as it did not receive much publicity at its inception” (2008, 142).  In its first 
year, FACTOR employed one administrator and a board of directors made up equally 
of music industry representatives and broadcasters.  Headquartered in CIRPA’s 
Toronto office, it approved 50 applications of loan funding in its first year, each 
contributing to recording costs, including a sound recording loan for Martha and the 
Muffins (FACTOR 1983).  Each loan was repayable through a $1 recoupment on each 
CD sale, with unpaid amounts written off after two years of release.  FACTOR funded 
up-to 50% of costs, a rule borrowed from the Canadian Film Development Council 
(CDFC).  The process of allocating support to artists was juried in person at CIRPA’s 
offices in Toronto.  The system, in its earliest stages, was simple; the jury as a whole 
assessed each application.  If the majority approved of its request, the applicant was 
supported (Rosen, pers. comm).  
 
There is no documentation explaining why the recoupment process was initiated.  It 
could be argued that such bylaws were politically motivated.  By limiting 
recoupment, the program remained open to all content creators, regardless of one’s 
business development.  However, by creating a loan, rather than a grant structure, 
economic indicators were assigned to the support, measured through sales.  This 
attempted to satisfy both CANCON in general – the production of more Canadian 
content – with those of the principle investors – the need to produce commercially 
successful content for radio.  By 1984, the funding increased to $314,000 (Spalding 
2008, 142), consisting entirely of private investment encouraged at arms length by 
government.  The Department of Communications was provided with progress 
reports on the fund in order to lobby for their involvement (Rosen, pers. comm).   
 
CIRPA newsletters reveal its members initial response to the fund.  In July 1982, the 
organisation stated that they “have almost reached the 100 application mark and so 
far distributed $132,400 for 13 projects on the basis of seven juries” (Canadian 
Independent Record Production Association 1982).  In February/March 1983, “19 
CIRPA members received FACTOR funding totalling $180,000.  It also specifies the 
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allocations, stating that the average contribution was $6800, while 35% went to 
pop/rock, 29% to adult contemporary and 41 out of 50 approved projects came from 
Ontario” (Canadian Independent Record Production Association 1983).  Furthermore, 
it states: “The test of FACTOR’s impact on the broadcast industry has yet to be 
calculated.  For the projects that have been completed and released, it is too early to 
tell what kind of response they have received from radio” (Canadian Independent 
Record Production Association 1983).  This analysis was not conducted at first, so 
the contribution that the funding made to the creation of more music for private 
radio was assumed, rather than quantified.  
 
While the establishment of FACTOR was intended to build as much publicity as 
possible to lobby for match funding from the state, its early intervention did not 
change the market share of domestic content. Canadian artists had enjoyed three of 
the top ten places on Canada’s album charts on 10 April 1982, six of the top thirty 
qualified with MAPL (Records, Promotion, Music 1982).  This is an improvement, but 
it must be taken in account under the circumstances at the time.  After a decade of 
CANCON requirements, Canada’s domestic music sector had grown substantially 
since the early 1970s.  Of the three acts in the top ten, two were signed to major 
labels and both were coordinated through American offices, rather than Canadian.  
Therefore, analysing these chart placements under CANCON produces mixed results 
(Records, Promotion, Music 1982).  While the quota may not have initiated a more 
diversified amount of Canadian content on the radio, its existence continued to 
support multinational investment in Canadian content, which increased overall 
production.  If one analyses the single charts on the same date, 10 April 1982, the 
first Canadian listing is at number 22, with Aldo Nova on Epic Records.  In this case, 
it was Epic’s management team in the United States that signed and managed Aldo 
Nova (Records, Promotion, Music 1982).   
 
However, 1982 was a successful year for Canadian artists, regardless of their 
business affiliations.  According to The FACTOR Story (2007), a qualitative public 
relations document commissioned by the organisation and written by Billboard 
journalist Larry Leblanc, “1982 was co-incidentally the year an unprecedented 
number of Canadian pop artists jumped onto U.S. radio charts and radio play lists. 
‘Beaver takes a Bite out of Uncle Sam’ read a headline in the Toronto Star [10 April 
1982]” (Leblanc 2007).  Seventeen Canadian acts made it onto Billboard’s Top 200 
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album chart in the year, the most ever recorded at the time, including Rush, 
Loverboy, Saga, Aldo Nova, April Wine, Chilliwack, Triumph, Eddie Schwartz, and 
Bob and Doug McKenzie (Leblanc 2007).   
 
This quote is revealing.  Leblanc writes that the success of Canadian artists in 1982 
was coincidental.  On close reading, such coincidence can be questioned.  Leblanc 
does not detail the management and label structures of the artists.  As a result, this 
can be read as a cultural success – that more Canadians were in the charts – rather 
than an economic one, as deconstructing their business structures was not 
completed.  In that year, six of the nine artists  - Rush, Saga, April Wine, Chilliwack, 
Triumph and Bob and Doug McKenzie - were signed to Canadian independents and 
all, at one stage in their career, utilized early FACTOR support (Mair and Leblanc, 
pers. comm).14  Therefore, this success reveals that this coincidence was guided by 
a more active, prosperous and strong independent sector.  FACTOR, in 1982, 
contributed to that.  
 
Another event occurred in 1982 in addition to the creation of FACTOR.  This was the 
publication of the next national policy document to measure arts and cultural policy 
in Canada since The Massey Commission, titled The Federal Cultural Policy Review or 
The Applebaum-Hébert Report.   This document revisited the question of furthering 
understanding of the concept of Canadian national identity.  Taking up from the 
recommendations of The Massey Commission, The Federal Cultural Policy Review 
further expanded on how Canadian culture was to be approached by the state, in 
terms of representation, financial support and promotion.  In addition, this was the 
first official government report to include the sound recording industry, providing a 
precursor to eventual government involvement in FACTOR in 1986. 
 
Sound Recording Policy – The Applebaum-Hébert Report 
 
Like FACTOR, the development of The Federal Culture Policy Review began in a 
series of debates between the government and private businesses a few years 
previous.  Between 1980 and 1982, the Canadian government had confronted a 
series of political challenges, including a failed secession referendum in Quebec by 
                                                 
14 This is corroborated by personal interviews (Mair and Leblanc, pers. comm), independent 
research and FACTOR’s annual reports in 1983, 1984 and 1985. 
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the separatist Bloc Québécois government in 1980 and the formal independence 
from the United Kingdom via the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and 
Constitutions, signed into law by Trudeau in 1982.  Trudeau, having lost the 1979 
federal election to Conservative Joe Clark, tabled a non-confidence motion in 1980 
that led to a snap election and his re-election for a third tenure until 1984.  Upon 
winning re-election, his government continued his nationalistic stance by 
commissioning an extensive national cultural policy review, made up of eighteen 
commissioners and two co-chairs.  This report, released in the same year that 
FACTOR was created, is an important policy document for Canada’s popular music 
industries, as it was the first policy document to mention and qualify Canada’s sound 
recording business.  It also reaffirmed many of the initial recommendations 
suggested by Massey, furthering the concept of Canadian identity within policy.       
 
Commissioned by the Department of Communications, The Federal Cultural Policy 
Review was chaired by classical composer, Stratford festival musical director and 
one-time CAPAC employee Louis Applebaum and writer Jacques Hébert.  Known by 
the last names of the chairs, this report was the first cultural policy document 
commissioned since The Massey Commission, and its core findings represent a 
similar ideology to that expressed in 1951, including “protecting high art and 
articulating a cultural policy consistent with a highly centralized state” (Jackson and 
Davies 1983, 460).  This focus is odd, as it did not align with the objectives of 
FACTOR, where popular music was prioritized over the once dominant, Massey-
influenced focus on promotion Canadian culture and ‘high art’ as one and the same.  
According to Sut Jhally in Art for Art’s Sake, “the report attempted to use the 
mediation of the market to resolve the problems of national expression by setting up 
the government in the role of regulator”  (1983, 139).  This regulation prioritized 
cultural expression deemed valuable to government at the time, which remained tied 
to The Massey Commission’s recommendations.  Promoting Canadian culture as ‘high 
art’ remained a priority for the state.   
The report produced three publications: Speaking of our Culture, in 1981, A Guide 
for Submissions; Summary of Briefs and Hearings, and its final report in 1982, 
containing 101 recommendations (Berland 2011).  While some of these 
recommendations were based on The Lambert Report, a previous document 
commissioned in 1979 that “proposed rationalizing fiscal and administrative 
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procedures of state” (Berland 2011), this was the first federal policy document that 
dedicated a section to the sound recording industry (Spalding 2008, 144).  Dinah 
Hoyle, previously in charge of film certification for the Department of 
Communications and one of the first government representatives to work with Watt 
and CIRPA, wrote the sound recording section.  The end recommendations 
concerning the sound recording industry were that Canada’s music businesses 
required public support in order to meet the CANCON quota with products that were 
suitable for private radio and greater Canadian cultural output.   
 
The report itself was contradictory and in the end, ineffectual for Canada’s popular 
music industry.  Despite three decades of interventionism that combined Canadian 
popular culture with national identity development, the report focused on the 
promotion of so-called ‘high-art’, similar to Massey, which differentiated from the 
activities of the music sector and CAB at the time.  The impact of the report was not 
in its content, but in the contextual inclusion of sound recording.  For the first time, it 
was a debatable and recognized sector in Canadian cultural policy.   
 
Of the 300-page report, sound recording was given 14 pages.  This is best examined 
by Wagman in his study on music video programming, where he argues, “to provide 
justification for additional support of the sound recording industry, the authors of 
The Applebaum-Hébert Report utilized a combination of imagery and rhetoric that 
closely aligned the sound recording industry with other cultural industry sectors that 
had garnered government support” (Wagman 2001, 44).  Included in its 
recommendations, according to Berland, was “government assistance to Canadian-
owned companies to distribute and market recordings of pop music and specialized 
materials recorded by Canadian artists” (Berland 2011), as well as subsidies to 
support “international marketing, specialist record production and support drawn 
from a levy on blank cassettes” (Berland 2011).  In 1982, cassette duplication was 
seen to minimize copyright royalties due to composers.  A levy on the producer of 
blank cassettes, returning to copyright holders, was posited as a compromise.  The 
recommendations were not taken up when the report was published in 1982, and 
Earl Rosen, then Executive Director of CIRPA explains that what was written in the 
report was, in practice, not important.  What was significant, according to Earl 
Rosen, was “the fact that sound recording, as an industry, was mentioned in a 
government document” (Rosen, pers. comm).  Those working within the department 
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also saw this inclusion as a milestone.  “The department took a risk,” adds Marla 
Waltman-Dashko.  “We took these milestones very seriously” (pers. comm).      
 
There is no documentation to show that The Applebaum-Hébert Report had any 
effect on FACTOR, either by influencing the broadcasters, CIRPA and its allies.  Its 
publication in the same year as the creation of FACTOR was coincidental.  The 
inclusion of the section on sound recording, however, was not.  It detailed a growing 
relationship between the government and the industry, centred on a series of 
lobbying exercises by CIRPA to the Department of the Secretary of State (and later 
the Department of Communications) as well as Watt’s involvement as a paid 
government consultant.  In effect, the report became a sort of public relations 
exercise for CIRPA, SOCAN and its members for defending the impact of their 
lobbying efforts.   
 
However, the report was significant in reasserting the manner in which the state 
approached national identity formation.  In its introduction, the report states: “We 
believe in particular that no cultural policies aimed at promoting contemporary 
creation can possibly succeed unless they are firmly rooted in a respect for our 
artistic and intellectual heritage” (Department of Communications 1982, 3).  This 
artistic and intellectual heritage was heavily promoted in the report, despite never 
been singularly quantified.  Instead, the report argued that while artistic activities 
must be separated from state involvement, the state has a responsibility to support 
this creation.  “When we speak of the removal of political constraints,” the report 
states, “we mean that artistic activities must be sheltered as much as possible from 
the imperatives of government.  This idea has clear implications for the effects of 
public policy on cultural life; above all, that policy should facilitate self-expression, 
rather than control or organize it” (Department of Communications 1982, 5).  
Therefore, being Canadian, in this sense, was defined through a reimagining of how 
one intervenes in the arts.  State involvement was lobbied for, but not at the 
expense of leaving this cultural output free from definition.   
 
The report continues; “however desirable it may be, state support of the arts can 
have a liberating effect on creative energies only if such support is allocated through 
arms-length mechanisms” (Department of Communications 1982, 7).  This arms-
length approach, such as FACTOR, would better support Canada’s national narrative 
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by enabling the production of more content.  Yet, the report still promoted a top-
down approach, where policy was used to encourage artistic expression, regardless 
how passive these policies were meant to be.  If there were more support available, 
then more content would be created.  However, it would be created because there’s 
more support available, potentially leading to a reliance on funding.  
 
The recommendations in the report to expand support mechanisms were not taken 
up by the state immediately, but they continued to influence departmental hearings, 
eventually leading to the Department of Communications becoming involved with 
FACTOR.  Until then, FACTOR remained a private organization, reliant on broadcaster 
funds.  As a result, another Canadian broadcaster, Standard Radio, decided to merge 
an initiative it had launched in 1965 called the Canadian Talent Library (CTL) in 
FACTOR.  This set of circumstances that occurred between 1984 and 1986 changed 
FACTOR once more as it edged closer to signing an agreement with the state, 
ultimately becoming Canada’s first public/private partnership to support content 
development.  
 
Standard Broadcasting and the Canadian Talent Library 
 
Standard Radio’s Canadian Talent Library is one of the least discussed, yet one of 
the most influential initiatives in the history of popular music funding.  Its existence 
influenced not only FACTOR, but also the recommendations in The Applebaum-
Hébert Report and conceptually, CANCON and the quota structure as a whole.  In 
1961 when the Board of Broadcast Governors (BBG) initially discussed regulating 
Canadian content on radio, one of the broadcasters interviewed was J. Lyman Potts, 
then programme manager for Montreal-based Standard Radio.  According to his 
official biography on the CAB website, Potts  
 
 Convinced the Board of Broadcast Governors (BBG), which had taken over the 
 regulation of programming from the CBC, that a station’s support of Canadian 
 talent should be assessed on the amount used in its programmes, and that money 
 expended by a station to produce Canadian music programming, whether, live or 
 recorded, should be credited by the BBG in analysing a station’s performance.  He 
 told the Board that the future of Canadian content was dependent on a large and 
 continuing supply of records by Canadian artists (of which there were few), and that 
 radio station owners, themselves, would have to take the initiative to fund their 
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 making (McCreath 1996). 
  
Potts’ early initiatives, ones that predate CANCON, altered the manner in which 
Canadian content was programmed on commercial radio.  To support his 
programming, Potts contracted Canadian musicians to record material to broadcast 
on his stations. Originally aired in Montreal and Toronto, these compositions were 
amalgamated into a format called the Canadian Talent Library, and by 1962, a 
structure to market and distribute Canadian talent was created, as Standard Radio 
licensed this material through a subscription fee, which was cost dependent on the 
size of the station that was requesting the music.  While CIRPA rallied against CHUM 
in 1971, they did not bother with CTL, as the music was not in direct competition 
with Canada’s independent recording sector at the time.  This is due to the genres 
that CTL operated within, compared to the majority of CIRPA members.  While 
CIRPA members traded in rock, pop and alternative, music that was classified as 
‘new’ at the time, CTL focused on easy listening and adult contemporary, attracting a 
different listenership.  Much of the material was comprised of cover versions of 
foreign-owned material, but Canadian musicians were hired to perform the tracks. 
According to CAB in describing his actions, Potts’ “set-up CTL as a non-profit trust, 
inviting any and all stations to join with them in expanding CTL as a service to the 
industry” (McCreath 1996), and “by 1965, CTL had invested $200,000 alone in 
developing new Canadian records” (Morgan 1965).   
 
In June 2013, Potts, then 97, gave an interview to the CBC, who credited him as 
“leading the way to have more Canadian music on the radio” (Wilson 2013).  In 
August 2013, Joan Little of The Hamilton Spectator chronicled Potts.  In developing 
CTL, he remarked; “Remember, those were the days of "live" programming — no 
tapes or CDs. They played hardly any Canadian records because there were so few. 
He explained that an organist, for example, might charge $25 for a half-hour. CBC 
could pay that because it had a network. If 25 stations were on that network, it cost 
a dollar per station, but private broadcasters were cash-strapped to pay a live 
entertainer for a single show” (Little 2013).  In 1963, they produced 10 master 
recordings, prompting involvement from RCA Records, who offered basic distribution 
for the produced albums (Little 2013 and Murray 2003).  In the end, 268 records 
were produced in total.   
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Potts’ initiative was the first of its kind to support Canadian content on private radio. 
Pierre Juneau cites CTL as an early advocate of Canadian talent, an initiative he 
noticed when sitting on the BBG.  Furthermore, Canadian broadcaster Dave LeBlanc 
in the Toronto Star argues “musicians and music fans of all tastes owe a debt to J. 
Lyman Potts and his Canadian Talent Library” as it was “the single most important 
vehicle for Canadian music production ever created” (Leblanc 2008).  Potts’ initiative, 
ten years before CANCON, is significant.  However, such commendation reveals only 
one opinion that can be inferred from this complex intervention.  While CTL did 
support Canadian content creators, the manner in which this support was 
coordinated posed challenges and engendered criticism, leading to its eventual 
demise and folding into FACTOR.  This reveals not only an admiration to support 
local content creators, but also one structured as for-profit initiative.  Standard Radio 
developed the system to profit off of its content.  Its cultural value increased if 
Standard Radio’s other stations’ licensed the material.  
 
In the mid 1960s, CTL provided a consistent pool of Canadian recorded music to 
draw on, but the music was not Canadian as it is defined by CANCON now, as the 
MAPL definitions did not exist at the time.  Instead, the content was deemed 
Canadian by Standard Radio themselves, often as a result of Canadian musicians 
performing on the tracks.  Most content, including tracks from Moe Kaufman and 
Peter Appleyard (Little 2013) were cover versions, rather than Canadian 
compositions.  Instead of utilizing Canadian composers, those who would have 
benefitted from copyright royalties of their tracks, CTL hired musicians for a flat fee 
to record the tracks, paying each for their services but offering no royalties, as 
Canada did not have a neighbouring rights collective at the time.  Furthermore, RCA 
published the compositions, benefitting from the royalties (Leblanc, pers. comm). 
However, no data is available to cross-reference such publishing income.  Despite 
RCA’s involvement, the commerciality of CTL records proved inconclusive.  Only one 
CTL produced album, Hagood Hardy’s album Homecoming, was certified gold (Little 
2013) and overall, CTL was “not concerned with forming a basis of recorded music 
for consumers” (Sutherland 2008, 113).  
 
After the commercial radio review in 1975, regulations concerning FM were loosened, 
allowing more broadcasters to switch to rock, pop and alternative formats that had a 
larger listener base.  As a result, the commercial value of the content produced by 
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CTL and its ability to license to other stations depreciated.  In the mid-1960s, most 
radio formats aired ‘easy listening’ content, providing a host of broadcasting options 
for the music created by CTL.  As heavier rock and disco gained popularity 
throughout the 1970s, much of the music created by CTL was made redundant and 
non-suitable for new FM station formats.  
 
With its waning influence in the late 1970s, the license fee system grew more 
expensive, as less content was introduced to support its business needs.  In the end, 
Standard Radio was sold, renamed Standard Broadcasting and its chair, Gary Slaight 
merged its catalogue and administration with FACTOR in 1985 on the advice of then 
FACTOR chairman Roman among others.  As Earl Rosen, then Executive Director of 
FACTOR, describes, “CTL was both a negative and a positive influence on us at the 
time.  It was founded by one radio company and focused on one specific genre of 
music - easy listening.  We were ambivalent as far as I can recall, as there wasn't a 
lot of retail sales in that area to begin with so we did not care” (Rosen, pers. comm).  
CTL’s merging with FACTOR, however, was good business, according to Rosen.  
FACTOR lobbied Standard Broadcasting and Slaight to administer the fund, as it 
would have significantly increased its budget.  The amount collected, as part of the 
license fees, was combined with FACTOR’s annual revenues, with a certain 
percentage allocated to the production of records classified as ‘easy listening’.  This, 
to FACTOR, expanded their ability to support their applicants.  “We sort of wore Gary 
down”, explains Roman.  In 1985, the merger accounted for an increase of $224,304 
in FACTOR’s loan programmes (FACTOR/CTL 1987).  As a result, between 1985 and 
1987, FACTOR officially changed its name to FACTOR/CTL.    
 
There were other industry voices that did not view CTL positively.  Some questioned 
its motives, especially after the introduction of CANCON.  “When CTL came along, 
they were releasing music because they had to”, argues Billboard contributor Leblanc 
(pers. comm).  “To be honest, CTL was a giant slush fund for Lyman and his friends 
and cohorts.  There were not five of the recordings you would want to own that they 
did” (Leblanc, pers. comm).  This comment, however impassioned, reveals the 
conflicting objectives CTL satisfied at the time.  If one approaches their activities 
from a cultural standpoint, one similar to the wording in The Broadcasting Act of 
1968, the perceived quality of the content may not be seen to enrich and promote 
Canadian content development.  In addition, the content was produced for a profit 
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and the artists, while paid for their contributions, were not given royalties.  Standard 
Radio was able to supply their stations with content deemed suitable to them at the 
time, but as this content lost popularity, its perceived value within CANCON waned.  
However, the initiative pre-dated and influenced CANCON and when merged into 
FACTOR, provided $100,000 more to the organization’s budget.  As Leblanc argues, 
radio changed, and CTL did not.  However, the content that was produced featured 
Canadian performers, providing a precursor and case study to the development of 
CANCON in 1971.  What was left, when CTL stopped trading, was a substantial pool 
of money for FACTOR and the inclusion of another broadcaster in FACTOR’s 
investment portfolio, Standard Broadcasting.   
 
The Founding of Musicaction 
 
FACTOR continued to send progress reports to the Department of Communications 
to summarize its activities.  One requirement to lobby the state into investing was 
that FACTOR must also support French-language Canadian content.  At the time, 
FACTOR only supported English language content, ultimately breaching Canada’s 
official language minority legislation, in which each policy needed to be bilingual.  
In 1985, on the recommendation of The Applebaum-Hébert Report and later working 
committee documents, the Department of Communications established a Music 
Action Group.  The committee argued that if FACTOR were to receive government 
funding, it would require a French language equivalent.  Coincidentally, both Roman 
and Rosen began traveling to Montreal, meeting members of the French language 
CIRPA equivalent Association Québécoise de l’industrie du disque, du spectacle et de 
la vidéo (ADISQ) and Francophone broadcasters, including Malcolm Scott of CKOI in 
Montreal (Spalding 2008, 149). While there had been access to low interest financing 
and tax rebates for cultural industries production companies in Quebec from the 
early 1980s (Sutherland 2008, 196),15 no FACTOR-type programme existed at the 
time that specifically administered support for music makers and businesses.  The 
conclusion of the Music Action Group was that the broadcasters and music 
businesses establish a Francophone FACTOR, administered in Montreal and funded 
by French-language broadcasters.  This would then lead, as CIRPA and ADISQ 
argued, to the state matching the investment.  “One of the things we realised early 
                                                 
15 These programs are discussed in chapter 5. 
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was that FACTOR was exclusively Anglophone”, adds Rosen, “so a number of us 
went down and met with ADISQ in 1984-5.  A number of broadcasters including Duff 
joined me.  We hoped it would be just a national programme called FACTOR but it 
didn’t end up that way.  We did provide funding to set up there, such as to hire 
lawyers and pay staff for the first year” (Rosen, pers. comm). 
 
In 1985, Musicaction, the French equivalent to FACTOR, was formed.  CHUM funded 
the first two years, with FACTOR providing administrative support from Toronto.  
From the beginning, Musicaction was administered independently for Francophone 
acts, both from Quebec and other provinces.  In 1985, Musicaction was part-funded 
by FACTOR and created through its influence, both from CIRPA and the 
broadcasters.  $26,527 was distributed by FACTOR to Musicaction in 1986 (FACTOR 
1987).  By assisting a French-language counterpart, FACTOR had satisfied one 
integral requirement to convince the state to support its programmes, ensuring that 
funding was available to both English and French artists and businesses.  In addition, 
when dealing with the government, the two organisations established a holding 
company, FMC Canada (FACTOR/Musicaction). 
 
The Creation of Other Programs at FACTOR 
 
Alongside the creation of Musicaction, the incorporation of support via CTL 
substantially increased the amount of support available to FACTOR to distribute.  In 
the fiscal year ending in mid-1983, FACTOR distributed $327,000 (Canadian 
Independent Record Production Association 1983), jumping to $604,330 in 1986 
(FACTOR 1987).  Its 1986-1987 annual report presents the loan structures available 
at the time.  These include the FACTOR Loan Programme, evaluated by a jury and 
capped at $60,000, $35,000 more than the original total in 1982 (FACTOR 1987).  In 
addition, a Direct Board Approval (DBA) scheme was implemented in 1985-1986, 
enabling labels with notable track records and sales histories to apply directly to the 
board of directors, skipping the juried process and associated paperwork.  With DBA, 
FACTOR created a new evaluative process, one less rigorous than its juried 
processes.  Rosen, who left CIRPA directorship before the implementation of DBA 
explains the rationale at the time:  
 
 DBA was a very simple concept.  The jury system was working well but it was hugely 
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 time consuming and labour intensive.  We wanted to not second-guess record labels 
 so we decided that if they have a reasonable track record, we could bypass the A&R 
 side of juries and allow them funding based on their history. At the time the 
 funding was the same as everyone else’s, so all we did was simplify the availability 
 (Rosen, pers. comm).     
 
DBA remains within FACTOR today, although the program titled DBA was abolished 
in 2013 and replaced with a similar ‘track record’ type of program called 
Comprehensive.16  Its existence created controversy and contention, due to the 
manner in which it has been enhanced, and in select cases, exploited.  Some labels 
produce hits one year and failures the next, so many have argued that each project 
be juried independently, or labels be assessed for the program each fiscal year.  
Gary Muth, the executive director of FACTOR in 1984-85, disagreed with the DBA 
implementation at FACTOR in 1985.  He and others saw the loan structure as a way 
for CIRPA members, the labels with noticeable track records, to siphon off more 
funding for themselves.  While label owners controlled half the board of directors at 
first, it was these members who submitted most DBA applications, prompting calls 
that DBA created a conflict of interest.  Muth, then a concert promoter, saw DBA as 
“a good idea in theory, but one that could be co-opted unnecessarily.  I didn’t want 
to have any part in it” (Muth pers. comm).  In the first instance, the amount of 
support that one could apply directly to the board of directors was similar to that of a 
juried loan.  Both offered 50% of support, with loans recouped on a percentage of 
sales and the outstanding amount written off after two years.  But this process 
provided easier access to FACTOR funding, proving contentious, particularly as 
FACTOR’s budget increased. 
 
FACTOR also operated a radio syndication programme, making up to $25,000 
available for the production of a programme series, $5,000 for a single feature and 
$2,000 for a pilot (FACTOR 1987), while offering 25% or up to $25,000 of 
recoupable expenses for international touring, when the act was touring in support 
of a new album.  In 1986, only one tour was supported, as the structure was created 
within the fiscal year, The Mercy Brothers tour of the Netherlands, which received 
$1,438 (FACTOR 1987).  This was to increase as FACTOR developed more 
                                                 
16 DBA was abolished on 1 April 2013, replaced by a program titled ‘Comprehensive’ with 
similar guidelines.  
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substantive international and later, domestic touring programs.   
 
The Introduction of VideoFACT – More State Funding in Canada 
 
In addition to FACTOR and its set of programs, one other funding administration was 
established in the mid-1980s.  Titled VideoFACT, this initiative was set-up in 1985, 
separate to FACTOR, Musicaction and its negotiations at the time with the 
Department of Communications.  It provided funding for Canadian music video 
production.  Like the inception of FACTOR, VideoFACT is a direct result of CANCON 
requirements, but this time in relation to the licensing of Canadian television 
frequencies.   
 
While MTV was first broadcast in America in 1981, CRTC did not grant a license to a 
Canadian company to set up an equivalent until 1984, when CHUM won the license 
to establish a station called MuchMusic.  This process lasted four years, culminating 
in a series of applications, committee hearings and reports.  One challenge to CHUM 
was its ability to compete with MTV, which was prevalent in Canada.  There were 
fewer Canadian videos at the time compared to ones by American and British artists, 
prompting CHUM to argue that CANCON should be minimised in their programming.  
Producing music videos was a required promotional activity at the time, but the cost 
to do so professionally was extensive.  “Videos became a required fact for any act 
that had the chance for mainstream success, and this came out of marketing 
budgets,” remarks Al Mair (pers. comm).  In 1984, there were only 100 high-quality 
Canadian music videos in circulation, according to then Vice President of Promotions 
at A&M, Larry Chappell (Wagman 2001, 55).  Rosen argued, in a CRTC hearing that 
“without videos, we (Canadian independent labels) are precluded from international 
markets” and “no record company, major or independent, can afford to invest in 
music videos in Canada” (Wagman 2001, 54).   
 
Wagman, in “Rock The Nation: MuchMusic, Cultural Policy and the Development of 
English Canadian Music Video Programming - 1979-1984”, presents a thorough 
history of MuchMusic’s inception and these debates in CRTC committee hearings.  
Citing a series statements from Rosen, Chappell and Brian Robertson, then head of 
CRIA (Canadian Recording Industry Association and representatives of the major 
labels in Canada), the industry was in favour of a music video station, but only one 
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that would support Canadian promotional material under a CANCON-style quota.  
Alongside the independent labels, Canadian-operated major branch offices supported 
a quota for MuchMusic, as it provided more opportunities to sign domestic content, 
rather than having it controlled by their foreign parent companies.  MTV only aired 
content from Canadian acts with international commercial appeal, and it operated 
freely, with no quota requirements as a foreign import.  Wagman states: 
 
 The “social” elements of the Canadian cultural system were almost completely  
 marginalized by the Department of Communication’s position, which held that the 
 role of cultural policy was for the development of cultural industries. This 
 transformation would have major ramifications, affecting the ways government was 
 to conceive of and administer to the cultural sector in the years that followed. As a 
 result of the particular orientation expressed by The Applebaum-Hébert Report, the 
 CHUM/Citytv application was now the only serious contender for the national music 
 video license, as it possessed the marketing prowess, commitment to Canadian music 
 promotion, and solid fiscal footing needed to placate the various interested parties 
 that stood to benefit from MuchMusic’s influential national reach (2001, 58).  
Wagman argues that the Department of Communications’ focus was on the 
development of Canada’s cultural businesses, and that cultural policy, in this case, 
would be best implemented with clear economic benefits.  The cultural imperatives in 
the debate, that Canadians have access to a certain percentage of Canadian video 
content on television, was coerced to collude with market economics, arguing CHUM 
and Canada’s content creators would profit from such a station’s existence.  As a 
result, the development of the station, according to Wagman, became more 
important than regulating the content that was going to be aired on it.  Yet, the 
CRTC’s position differed from the Department of Communications, requiring that 
Canadian content be actively supported in station programming, similar to pre-
existing television and radio quotas.  While CHUM was one of 41 companies 
competing for the initial license, it convinced the CRTC that the programming would 
best support Canadian content.  When the license for MuchMusic was approved, the 
CRTC required 10% of all content to be Canadian, increasing to 20% three years 
later (Wagman 2001, 57).  This percentage was raised under the presumption that 
more videos would be produced in three years’ time, as long as Canadians were 
provided with the means and support to do so.  This expectation was supported with 
a mandatory ‘promise of performance clause’, the first for the CRTC, where “2.4% of 
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its gross revenues (to a minimum of $100,000) would be allocated to a video-
production fund administered by an independent advisory board composed of 
representatives from MuchMusic, CIRPA and other members of the Canadian music 
industries” (Wagman 2001, 57). 
   
FACTOR, at the time, had its own video production programme, and CHUM’s head 
Moses Znaimer did not want this new support to be combined with pre-existing 
programmes.  As a result, in 1984, the contribution was allocated to create a new 
organisation, led by CIRPA executive Bernie Finklestein. “We wanted a completely 
independent organization that would have only one responsibility and that was to 
fund videos only”, states Finklestein (pers. comm).   This established the first 
national grant structure outside of FACTOR’s control.  In its first year it was 
administered by CIRPA before moving into its own offices and hiring its own 
administration.  This was enhanced in 1986 when MuchMusic’s French language 
equivalent, Musique Plus was created, providing funding for French language videos. 
 
The decision to administer the fund independently as VideoFACT highlights the 
complexities impacting FACTOR at the time.  Similar to the way that CRTC mandated 
content development money, CHUM was allowed to disperse its funding how it saw 
appropriate, which was outside of FACTOR’s control.  This introduced a level of 
competition to fund what was one of the more expensive investments, the 
promotional music video.  Structuring a separate music video funding program was 
mainly a time sensitive concern for the sector.  In the late 1980s, music videos were 
a core publicity vehicle for emerging talent, but remained prohibitively expensive to 
produce for most.  However, the inception of VideoFACT raises further questions that 
were not answered at the time, despite the consistent growth of total funding 
available.  The quota was set at 10% and initially, the station only aired six hours of 
independent content a day, raising to 20% by 1989 (Worsfold 2007).  But 
MuchMusic’s importance at the time, and the introduction of VideoFACT added 
another structure of funding in Canada.  This would further develop alongside 
FACTOR, as FACTOR moved closer to establishing a new organization with the state, 
combining public and private support.  
 
Assessing FACTOR’s First Five Years   
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By the end of 1986, FACTOR and Musicaction did not receive state support.  The 
following year, however, under a Conservative administration, this was to change.  
The impact of a decade of lobbying had initiated a review within the Department of 
Communications, leading the ministry to begin to design a programme to support 
FACTOR.  Before this is discussed, it is best to analyse the first few years of FACTOR 
and its impact on the music producers and broadcasters. FACTOR, as a standalone 
organisation, is a solution to a number of different problems perceived to exist by 
Canada’s music businesses and broadcasters.  These include addressing a lack of 
domestic competitiveness in chart placement and radio play, a perceived devaluing 
of Canadian content en-masse and a need to satisfy a quota that is framed on the 
protection and promotion of Canada’s cultural identity.  How such challenges were 
addressed is revealing and can help further examine the first five years of FACTOR 
and its role in the history of popular music funding in Canada.   
 
While FACTOR provided a new model to assess the impact of broadcaster support, 
its early results were inconclusive.  It remained a support structure limited to 
independent companies, multinational outfits retained a significant share of the 
domestic market, both in their signing of Canadian content and the releasing of 
foreign acts.  As it was not yet reliant on satisfying any government mandates, its 
business-focused approach prioritized economic support over a need to diversify and 
support a wider range of Canadian content.  However, its existence is a by-product 
of CANCON regulations.  Therefore, the more Canadian content that succeeded in 
the market, the more beneficial FACTOR was.  However, 14 foreign owned 
companies operated in Canada in the late 1980s, controlling 43% of all Canadian-
content sales by 1991 (Cliche 2006).  The support did not minimise the 
independents’ reliance on multinational distribution chains, nor was there any report 
commissioned to quantify if the funding that was provided was benefitting radio 
playlists, which is questionable given the centrality of radio in establishing FACTOR.  
Larry Leblanc, the author of the only published history of FACTOR and the writer 
critical of CTL, sees the challenges at the time to be tied up with the perceived 
expectations of the alignment of FACTOR and CANCON, even if their mandates were 
separate.  “FACTOR started by providing a need for radio.  This was a need to get 
more recordings.  Everybody thought that with CANCON coming in 1971, there 
would be this big boom, but there wasn't.  There wasn't an industry here and radio 
was giving lip service to most Canadian music” (Leblanc, pers. comm).  Muth agrees:  
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“I knew a lot of radio people and I remember when CANCON first came along. When 
stations had a top 30 they would literally play 30 records. These would be 22 hits 
and 8 stiffs, and the stiffs were the CANCON, the 30%” (Muth pers. comm). 
“CANCON certainly created opportunities, but it is a double edged sword,” adds 
Leblanc.  “It picks winners and it picks losers” (Leblanc pers. comm).    
 
The production of more music in Canada, by 1982, did not increase Canada’s 
independent music sector’s market share.  Therefore, FACTOR was set up to address 
this lack of competitiveness, particularly on radio.  FACTOR, according to Spalding in 
his study of the fund’s first five years, “had to consider the economic repercussions 
of its decisions” (Spalding 2008, 151-152).  However, the regulations that led to 
FACTOR were initiated for cultural reasons.  CANCON, a nationalistic tool to develop 
content to foster a national narrative, is what led to initiation of FACTOR.  Without a 
quota to uphold, the importance of Canadian content on Canada’s radio stations 
would be different.  However, FACTOR, in its support of musicians, is not associated 
with these concepts of nationalism.  It is focused on supporting Canadian artists to 
provide greater access to opportunities for their business to develop.  FACTOR, in its 
mandate, was an organization supporting potentially successful talent.  This was 
reflected by the sector’s complex relationship with multinationals and their 
investments in the sector.  As a result, a number of frameworks evolved together, 
creating an organization that was faced with a number of disparate objectives, 
including a need to support a collective set of characteristics defined as Canadian; 
the developing of commercially successful talent and providing suitable content for 
radio.  This was to be further complex when the Department of Communications 
opted to initiate a new organization with FACTOR and Musicaction, titled FACTOR 
Musicaction Canada.  Popular music, from then on in, was to be funded by the state.     
A Public/Private Partnership Born:  FACTOR and the Federal Government 
 
The partnership between the federal government and FACTOR began under Brian 
Mulroney’s Conservative government in 1984.  The party’s early mandate was to 
reduce the size of government employees through spending cuts and devolution of 
public services.  Marcel Masse, then minister of communications, wanted to shrink 
government involvement in private matters, valuing “reduced public spending, 
expanded private development and a greater role for provincial governments and 
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agencies”  (Spalding 2008, 150).  This view is different to that of the 
recommendations in The Applebaum-Hébert Report, in its section on sound 
recording, but what emerged from Masse’s policies was consistent with the cultural 
interventionism of the report.  FACTOR, as a private enterprise, was seen as 
desirable to the state, as little internal administration would be needed, in essence, 
to monitor its investment.  This would all be done by FACTOR.  In actuality, the 
introduction of federal funding into the popular music sector was as nationalistic and 
collectivising as the recommendations of the report, two years before.  However, it 
emerged through an era of uncertainty for the cultural industries.  One of the first 
policies Masse announced was a substantial cutting of CBC’s budget, ultimately 
worrying music trade associations like CIRPA and ADISQ.  As a result, the sector 
increased its lobbying efforts, resulting in a cross-sector study by a new committee 
called Music Working Group, titled “a Discussion Paper on the Initiatives for the 
Radio and Sound Recording Industries” at the end of 1984 (Sutherland 2008, 198), 
which was different to the earlier Music Action Group.  The paper reaffirmed and 
argued for an increased interventionist structure, stating that the “attainment of 
Canadian content requirements is directly tied to the availability of sufficient 
quantities of Canadian recordings”  (Sutherland 2008, 198).  Eleven 
recommendations in the working paper were relevant to the sound recording 
industry, and five were previously mentioned in The Applebaum-Hébert Report.  
These included support for recordings, international business missions and sector 
development associations, including CIRPA and ADISQ (Sutherland 2008, 199).  
There was no budget provided to assess or argue for these proposals.  After the 
publishing of the discussion paper, the Music Working Group dissolved, but the 
conversations between the department and the sector remained active.    
 
By 1986, CIRPA had been lobbying the federal government for nearly a decade and 
what had emerged was a privately funded initiative to fund Canadian content.  The 
federal government, aside from money for the Canada Council for the Arts or 
occasional events such as The Maple Music Junket, had yet to financially support the 
sound recording industry.  Moreover, a series of CANCON initiatives administered by 
the CRTC convinced some industry representatives that any state funding would 
therefore allow broadcasters to minimise their commitment to comply with CANCON 
regulations.  As a result, not all labels were in favour of the support, as it was 
thought it would be used to limit CANCON, not support it.  CAB members 
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consistently challenged the CRTC to reduce CANCON, and as a compromise, one 
theory posed in committee hearings was an increase in private funding should be 
coupled with a reduced CANCON requirement.  CFNY in Toronto and CHUM in 
Windsor, along with a few other border stations successfully lobbied to have their 
CANCON requirements reduced, prompting fears in the music sector that any funding 
increase would decimate CANCON (Sutherland 2008, 205).  Both stations, as a 
compromise to a lessening of their quota requirements, increased their contributions 
to FACTOR/CTL and were treated favourably by the CRTC, a decision CIRPA argued 
against.  Both “made its FACTOR/CTL contributions part of its promise of 
performance, allowing CHUM’s Windsor station to use the same rationale in lowering 
its Canadian content, resulting in a situation where the foundation, rather than 
strengthening Canadian content, was undermining the policy” (Sutherland 2008, 
197).  FACTOR became further entangled in CANCON via license renewal hearings, 
as support for it was used as a bargaining tool to reduce CANCON, an argument that 
held sway within the CRTC for stations with high American competition, such as in 
Toronto or Windsor.  In 1985, the CRTC allowed three stations to lower their 
CANCON quota from 30% to 25%, angering the sound recording sector and 
publishing representatives (Sutherland 2008, 146).  It was decided “in all cases the 
CRTC agreed with the applicants in their assertions that they had difficulty in finding 
sufficient Canadian material in their formats” (Sutherland 2008, 147). This prompted 
CIRPA to appeal these decisions to the federal cabinet.  CIRPA lost the appeal, 
increasing the disagreements and challenges faced by the CRTC at the time.  While 
both sides supported FACTOR/CTL and its set of programmes, they did so from 
contrasting motives.  Muth states; “you have to look at what everybody wanted from 
FACTOR at the time.  The broadcasters and CIRPA formed FACTOR/CTL but had very 
different reasons for doing so.  CIRPA wanted money for their projects and the 
broadcasters looked at it as a license fee.  It was basically to fulfil their promise of 
performance and to me, was essentially a tax” (Muth, pers. comm).   
 
Negotiations went back and forth between Masse, FACTOR/CTL, CIRPA, SOCAN, 
CRIA and the broadcasters, leading in early 1985 to an agreement that the 
Department of Communications would deliver $5 million per year in support, split 
60/40 between FACTOR/CTL and Musicaction, with the funding renewable for five 
years, totalling $25 million.   This support began a new era in Canada, where the 
state directly funded the production and marketing of popular music.  While CIRPA 
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argued for an investment of $7.5 million per year, they accepted the compromise 
(Rosen, pers. comm).  The funding was split as follows: 
  
 Record Production     $2,600,000 
 Radio Syndication Programming   $200,000 
 Music Video Production     $500,000 
 Foreign Tour Support     $450,000 
 Foreign Marketing Support    $350,000 
 Business Development     $500,000 
 Classical Music Production and Distribution  $400,000 
 TOTAL $5,000,000 
 (Sutherland 2008, 206). 
 
No funding was allocated to domestic touring and marketing, while 8% of the 
budget, $400,000 was provided to classical music production.  More than half the 
fund was allocated to sound recordings, a direct influence of CANCON requirements.  
The categories of support were contradictory.  In one case, the support followed 
traditional models of Canadian cultural policy, from Vincent Massey to Louis 
Applebaum and Jacques Hébert through the support of classical music.  On the other 
hand, international marketing and touring was favoured over domestic market 
expansion, focusing state policy, for the first time in the music sector, on export.  
 
While the agreement was signed in late 1985, Flora McDonald, the new 
communications minister, announced the fund quietly on 9 April 1986.  At the time, 
according to Billboard, the department wanted to keep the announcement quiet, as 
“some executives had objections to conditions attached to the dispersal” of the funds 
(LaPointe 1986b).  While Rosen was quoted as being “very, very happy” (LaPointe 
1986d), CHUM, the broadcaster that administered the VideoFACT program, had yet 
to agree to administer the “Music Video Production” money, leading to confusion as 
to which administration would be responsible for SRDP distribution (LaPointe 1986d).  
This allocation ended up with FACTOR.  
 
Canada’s independent labels overwhelmingly welcomed the support.  However, little 
explanation was given to if and how the fund would affect CANCON, license renewals 
and debates concerning increasing or decreasing the quota.  Only in December 1986 
were all the rules announced through an information guide published by the 
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department.  Some of the rules were economically focused, like FACTOR.  For 
international marketing, record companies must be in existence for two years and 
have produced three albums, while publishers must own twenty-five copyrights.  
Managers, for example, must represent two acts full-time to qualify (LaPointe 
1986b).  The contribution agreement stated that it aimed for: 
 
i.  The improvement of Canadians’ access to sound recordings with Canadian content 
and the influence of Canadian artists and musical products abroad through increased 
availability, quality, and distribution of sound recordings with Canadian content in 
Canada and abroad; and  
ii.  The development and strengthening of the Canadian sound recording industry. 
(Spalding 2008, 151).  
  
In its first year, a total of $1,649,999 was allocated to FACTOR (FACTOR 1987).  
Sound recording was posited as the most important sector to fund.  The other 
sectors – live, publishing, video production, merchandising – were not directly 
represented in SRDP, as the fund focused on the production of sound recordings, 
products that can be archived and validated as satisfying Canada’s content 
regulations.  There were few economic objectives listed.  This was left to FACTOR to 
administer, if it deemed such objectives suitable.    
 
By 1987, a number of structures that remain in place today had been created.  The 
first and most important is FACTOR, not only as a public/private partnership but also 
as the de-facto administrative agent for federal money in Canada for popular music.  
While still relatively unknown in Canada as a whole, FACTOR had become one of the 
organisations at the heart of the Canada’s domestic music industry, with most 
nationally and internationally successful acts benefiting from it, both before 
government involvement and after.  Also, the government required all recipients to 
put the FACTOR and Government of Canada logo on supported sound recordings, 
ultimately solidifying the partnership to support bands.  Before the government’s 
contribution, FACTOR/CTL did not allow acts to put its logo on sound recordings, to 
try and distance its support from those that acquired it.  Now, all support was 
publicised, as per the government’s request, to promote the creation of Canadian 
content and its development and to promote the government’s involvement in the 
scheme.  At the same time, CANCON requirements continued to be challenged by 
the broadcasters, as their main problem – not enough Canadian talent to air on 
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private radio – had not changed in their eyes.  The funding structures had enlarged 
and now the state was directly involved, but the core challenges that began in the 
1960s remained untouched in the late 1980s.  
 
Conclusion 
The history of popular music funding in Canada had changed markedly by the end of 
the 1980s.  In less than a decade, FACTOR was an established, growing 
administration to fund music makers and labels, the state contributed $5m per year 
to a variety of sound recording-influenced initiatives and Canada had a dedicated 
support structure to fund music videos.  In addition, each structure was replicated in 
Quebec, creating a bilingual, dualistic structure to satisfy language and diversity 
laws. 
 
However, no conclusive analysis had been produced to measure FACTOR’s first five 
years, nor the impact of these structures, both independently and collectively, on 
their applicants.  The sector continued to develop, with healthier sales figures being 
reporting through Statistics Canada.  The total “sales value of sound recordings in 
Canada increased from $222m in 1982 to $531m in 1991-1992” (Cliche 2006).  
However, when one deconstructs this data, the combined impact on Canadian 
companies and copyright holders is inconclusive.  Most of this increase is attributed 
to foreign-operated major labels and their distribution of both Canadian and foreign 
content.  Over four-fifths of all sales in 1989 were through multinational outfits and 
less than half of all Canadian content was sold through a foreign multinational 
(Cliché 2005).  The total value of Canadian content, both culturally and economically, 
had increased.  More Canadian music was being played on the radio and purchased 
from retail outlets, regardless of the outfit behind its release.  Yet, such arguments, 
one posited by the sector associations, focused on qualitative assessments or 
uncorroborated statistics, not once referring to the regulations of The Broadcasting 
Act and its role in this development.  The consumption of Canadian music and its 
role in the promotion of Canadian national characteristics was separated from the 
debates within the sound recording sector, as no matter how the music was brought 
to market, its cultural value was deemed to satisfy requirements, even if no 
Canadian company was behind the marketing of the artist.  This was to become 
further complicated as FACTOR, now a public/private partnership, included both 
broadcaster and state guidelines in its mandate.  
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Furthermore, while policymakers continued to encourage Canada’s sound recording 
businesses to produce more content, the broadcasters remained consistent in their 
belief that there was little demand for the content, so inserting it into their business 
models would adversely affect their bottom line.  In 1984, for example, CAB noted 
that 40% of its member stations lost money and half of radio operators were “in the 
red” (LaPointe 1985).  CAB members had successfully lobbied the CRTC to reduce 
their requirements in border stations, prompting Billboard to write, in the mid-1980s, 
that “the issue of Canadian content still seems out-of-reach in the new era of looser 
regulations” (LaPointe 1985).  As a result, most of FACTOR’s early programmes had 
little to do with CANCON, other than qualifying under MAPL as one of the application 
criteria.  
 
By the end of the 1980s, FACTOR and Musicaction were part state, part private 
sector supported administrations, allocating ten times more support than they did 
when they were first created.  SRDP, installed for five years was due for its initial 
assessment as renewal proceedings began in 1990.  At the same time, Canada’s 
music sector continued to evolve, in line with its international contemporaries as 
access to new technologies and distribution structures improved.  The perceived and 
actual value of Canadian music remained inconclusive, with a different justification 
being argued depending on those asked.  The formation of Canadian national 
identity characteristics and the development of nationalism continued to influence 
the manner in which popular music was supported by the state, but little analysis 
was conducted to measure and assess such impact.  By the end of 1980s, a set of 
structures were in place that were to expand substantially, for a number of different 
reasons, as the sector continued to develop into the 1990s.  In addition, Canada held 
another election in 1993, one that would alter the relationship between the state and 
the creative industries as a whole.  This would lead to more support for content 
creators, through SRDP, FACTOR and other initiatives.  The following chapter will 
chart these regulations, funding structures and implications of both federal and 
private decision making in the 1990s, leading to the conclusion of SRDP in 1999 and 
the creation of a new more expansive set of federal programs to support the popular 
music industries from 2000 onwards. 
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Chapter 3 
1990s – The Years of Plenty 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the history of popular music funding from the late 1980s, 
beginning after the introduction of the Sound Recording Development Program 
(SRDP), to its eventual conclusion in 2000.  A number of changes and advancements 
occurred throughout the administration of SRDP.  This includes a change in 
government in 1993 returning the Liberals to power, a result that ended in a 
substantial increase in public funding for Canada’s creative industries.  These 
changes began in 1994 with the establishing of the Department of Canadian Heritage 
(PCH), a new ministry set-up to replace the Department of Communications.  The 
name of the new department evolved the state’s nationalist narrative, asserting an 
argument that there was a heritage to govern and protect.  In its first years, cultural 
funding was audited and increased, leading to a doubling of support available 
through SRDP and ultimately, FACTOR and Musicaction.   Alongside, the next 
commercial radio review began its committee hearings, leading to an extensive 
commission report in 1998.  The guidelines introduced by the review would 
significantly impact the music and broadcasting sectors, introducing further financial 
support for music businesses alongside new regulations to mandate Canadian 
content.  This chapter will conclude with the dissolving of SRDP in 1999, leading to 
the introduction of a new cultural industries fund titled Tomorrow Starts Today, one 
that included a set of programs for music titled the Canada Music Fund.  These 
advancements would further impact the development of popular music funding as a 
tool to promote a national narrative, as funding and policy was enhanced to satisfy 
the wording in The Broadcasting Act, which was ratified once more in 1991.    
 
While a number of state-specific initiatives began in the 1990s that influenced the 
history of popular music funding in Canada, the music sector was equally influenced 
by the global music market, which was enjoying record profits in the early-to-mid 
1990s. “Between 1986 and 1996, retail sales value in current prices rose at a 
compound rate of just over 10 per cent per annum, or around 7 per cent per annum 
in real terms” (Throsby 2002, 3).  This influenced the activities of multinationals in 
Canada, both through their American outfits and Canadian branch offices, resulting 
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in these administrations signing a number of Canadian artists, including Our Lady 
Peace, Barenaked Ladies and Shania Twain.  Such growth slowed in the late 1990s, 
as the arrival of illegal downloading impacted Canada, a trend that was not 
thoroughly measured at the time by the sector or Canada’s policymakers.  
 
While the state increased cultural funding, even renaming the department 
responsible with the term ‘heritage’, to denote that there is one to defend and 
support, the music sector remained tied to multinationals, with significant 
investments made to support CANCON by multinational outfits.  This supported a 
number of objectives, but did so in a complex manner.  With more Canadian artists 
achieving national and international acclaim through the support of major labels, 
both American run and Canadian managed, a set of national characteristics 
developed to define Canada’s popular music output, but it was mediated through 
sales and economic success.  The percentage of CANCON on radio remained 
stationary until 1998, increasing after the review announced its findings.  However, 
this rise was completed as a compromise with the music sector, which permitted 
broadcasters to consolidate ownership across Canada, a trait that would significantly 
impact opportunities for a diverse array of Canadian content on commercial radio.  
By 2000, the relationship between Canada’s popular music sector and Canadian 
content regulations, in terms of how one supports the other, had changed.  This 
impacted the narrative surrounding Canadian identity formation, and how popular 
music culture fitted in to the construction of Canadian national identity.  In the end, 
more money became available for Canadian musicians and labels, a trait that was to 
increase in the new millennium, but this came with complications, ones that began 
surfacing in the early-to-mid 1990s.  This will be analysed chronologically by 
deconstructing SRDP, FACTOR’s growth through the period and the changing policies 
of the state, leading to the commercial radio review in 1998, the conclusion of SRDP 
and the introduction of new cultural policies, titled Tomorrow Starts Today and the 
Canada Music Fund.    
 
The State, CRTC, FACTOR and Early Complications   
 
In 1991, a number of changes occurred with both SRDP and the CRTC.  For the first 
time, SRDP was up for renewal through the Department of Communications.  At the 
same time, the CRTC coordinated its radio review, leading to the publishing of a new 
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commission document, titled An FM Policy for the Nineties.  This document required 
all stations operating in FM in English Canada to adhere to the 30% quota 
requirement, which was previously malleable in certain circumstances (Goff 2007, 
71).  These are: 
 
 Group I (Softer music, ranging from instrumental to middle-of-the-road and soft 
 rock) — 20% Canadian content when more vocal than instrumental music was 
 played, otherwise 10%; 
 Group II (Rock, hard rock and harder popular music) — 30% Canadian content; 
 Group III (Country music) — 30% Canadian content; 
 Group IV (Other kinds of popular music, such as folk-oriented and jazz-oriented) — 
 varying between 20% and 30% Canadian content, depending on the mix (Task 
 Force on the Future of the Canadian Music Industry 1996, 46). 
This grouping system was eliminated, establishing the same content requirements on 
FM stations, now the dominant format, that existed on AM since 1971.     
 
The perception of genres in An FM Policy for the Nineties produces a number of 
questions concerning how Canadian content regulations attributed certain genres to 
be more representative of national characteristics than others.  The review states 
predictably, “The Broadcasting Act stipulates that programming provided by each 
broadcaster should make use of predominantly Canadian creative and other 
resources" (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 1990a).  
The following paragraph, outlining the policy objectives, is telling: 
 
 While diversity among commercial pop and rock stations is a desirable objective, the 
 private sector is limited in this regard. At a certain point, programming becomes so 
 specialized that audience levels become too low to generate the revenues that 
 commercial stations need to survive. Almost all commercial FM stations concentrate 
 on the presentation of popular music. This approach enables them to appeal to the 
 broad general audiences they must attract to generate adequate advertising 
 revenues. However, with the convergence of pop and rock music styles over the 
 years, it has become increasingly difficult to retain the distinctions between stations 
 basing their programming on pop and rock music. The Commission believes that a 
 level of diversity will result as stations differentiate themselves in order to serve 
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 different audiences. At the same time there is still a necessity to ensure that a wide 
 range of all types of musical and spoken word programming is available in the 
 broadcasting system (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications 
 Commission 1990a).  
   
In the past, CANCON was most represented with music that received greater airplay.  
This is explained in the quote above, with those genres challenged most by foreign 
imports given higher quota requirements with other genres such as easy listening, 
jazz or classical, less represented in the quota.  However, by eliminating these 
guidelines, the commission was caught in an unresolvable context.  It admits that 
popular music is less representative of national diversity, in its forms, musical styles 
and accompanying genres.  However, at the same time a theory is posited that 
popular music remains part of Canadian content requirements.  This produces both 
theoretical and practical challenges.  The Canadian content most represented was 
that of most value to the broadcasters.  The commission recognizes this.  However, 
it also refutes this market reality, as its mandate through The Broadcasting Act 
necessitates a greater diversity on airwaves than supposed ‘popular music’.   
 
Interestingly, the first content to satisfy Canadian content objectives, before the 
quota was established on radio, was J. Lyman Potts’ Canadian Talent Library 
productions, content that was labelled ‘easy listening’.  This content, no longer 
market dominant on FM, was deprioritised in CANCON legislation throughout the 
1970s compared to emerging popular music genres such as rock and pop.  By 1990, 
the system was simplified to include all music – minus a few specific instances 
involving border stations, ethnic and classical music – as a catchall under the quota.  
Easy listening was increased to 30%, even though CAB campaigned against this, 
arguing that a previous 20% requirement was too high (Canadian Radio-Television 
and Telecommunications Commission 1990b).  This revaluing of genre in CANCON 
ultimately gave more autonomy to radio stations to alter their formats to air content 
that satisfied the most suitable CANCON to them to maximize economic benefit.  As 
a result, this commission did not fully assign a defined concept of what Canadian 
content the quota was aimed at protecting.   
 
In addition, the CRTC required that stations prove that they were spreading their 
Canadian content throughout the day in an attempt to address claims that many 
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commercial format stations aired their CANCON at off-peak times, as the practice 
was unregulated.  Both requirements were published as part of a new radio policy, 
implemented on 14 February 1991 (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 1992).  Based on the previous An FM Policy for the 
Nineties, it asserted that broadcasters must adhere to The Broadcasting Act, 
upholding Canadian content as a top priority (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 1990b).  It stated:  
 
The maturation of the Canadian music industry over the past two decades has made 
it practical to increase the Canadian broadcasting system's reliance on Canadian 
talent. Programming must give pride of place to Canadian performers and address 
matters of Canadian concern.  Accordingly, increased emphasis on Canadian musical 
and other creative resources is the primary thrust of the new policy (Canadian 
Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 1990b).  
 
This shift in CRTC policy outlines its changing nature of why cultural protectionism is 
deployed to support Canada’s music industry.  While the initial justification was to 
support this ‘immature’ industry, its current justification focuses on supporting a 
‘mature’ set of businesses.  CANCON, in this sense, can be seen less as a structure to 
facilitate content development, and more to enable greater distribution and 
economic opportunities, as a ‘mature’ industry is producing the content 
independently, rather than relying on federal mandates to encourage its production.   
 
This reference in policy as being mature emboldened the sector to lobby the 
Department of Communications to extend SRDP for five more years.  As a result, the 
department commissioned a cultural industry statistics document in 1988, followed 
by a short summative evaluation of SRDP in 1990, a report aimed at assessing the 
value of the programme in its first five years.  Yet, while the report lists the number 
of applications, approvals and amounts, it does not quantify the value of the support 
in terms of greater radio penetration, domestic market share or master tape 
revenue.  This lack of summative evaluation at the time is significant for two distinct 
reasons.  First, it placed the discussions concerning renewal within a cultural, rather 
than an economic framework.  While the federal government committed to the 
programme, it did so hesitantly in 1991.  This was not unique to SRDP, however, as 
between 1986 and 1991, the total amount invested in Canada’s sound recording 
sector, including the Canada Council for the Arts, decreased by 27% (Cultural 
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Human Resources Council 2002, 10).  Instead of five years, SRDP was extended only 
for three years, with a review set up to analyse and audit the programme in 1994 
rather than in 1996.      
 
The support, nevertheless, influenced FACTOR, as the introduction of SRDP 
prompted more munificence from CAB members at the time.   For the broadcasters, 
it was argued that increasing one’s contribution to FACTOR resulted in favourable 
agreements under which CRTC could reduce a station’s CANCON requirements.  As 
CAB lobbied against the CANCON restrictions outlined in An FM Policy for the 
Nineties, this was seen as a worthwhile compromise to lobby for favourable licensing 
conditions.  While this did not end up being the case, FACTOR enlarged its 
programmes and support availability through both state and private broadcaster 
funding, to include radio syndication, marketing and touring programmes.  
 
At the time of renewal in 1991, FACTOR programmes were significantly larger than 
in 1987.  FACTOR offered juried demo and song-writing awards, studio support and 
publishing grants, in addition to expanding DBA.  In 1991, juries had been conducted 
in five cities, and 69 applications were accepted out of 525 for sound recording 
loans, while FACTOR supported 14 international tours, including those by Anvil, Blue 
Rodeo and k.d. lang (FACTOR 1992), acts marketed within pop, rock and alternative 
markets, all deemed ‘new’ by radio formats.  The following year, 37 tours were 
approved for 32 artists from of a total of 66 applications, one of the highest success 
rates ever, but one that did not measure the level of acts that were deemed 
unsuccessful, in terms of their career development, label affiliations and genres 
(FACTOR 1993).  The successful applicants were primarily artists categorized within 
popular music genres, including the Tragically Hip, Sarah McLachlan, k.d. lang and 
the Cowboy Junkies.   
 
This lack of data analysis is reflected in FACTOR’s annual reports in the early 1990s.  
Most highlighted statements of support by FACTOR recipients, but little evidence was 
provided to assert FACTOR’s success in providing more CANCON for radio 
broadcasters.  On paper, the reports stated that FACTOR supported artists to 
produce a greater number of sound recordings.  Off paper, questionable trends 
emerged, challenged by two evolving problems.  First, some acts and companies 
began to rely on FACTOR, especially those with DBA status (their success rate was 
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substantially higher than juried applications but so was their repayment rate). 
Second, as the popularity of FACTOR increased within the industry, its role in 
satisfying both CANCON and sector needs at the same time became further complex. 
The more commercially successful acts became, the more their content featured on 
Canadian radio and in Canadian popular culture.  It was these acts and their 
representative labels that more often qualified for DBA, receiving more substantive 
and frequent support.  This had little to do with fostering Canadian content 
development or the wording of The Broadcasting Act for two reasons.  The first is 
that major-label content is exempt in this debate – as it does not qualify for FACTOR 
and second, the definition of success, in the case of FACTOR, is determined by both 
the artist and its label.  If a label qualifies for DBA, than it can support yet-to-be 
successful artists in its catalogue.  At the same time, FACTOR was satisfying 
CANCON and sector needs, but the results favoured artists that the market 
supported most at the same time.  While this is one of the objectives of DBA – to 
assist labels with a proven track record – it began to foster complications between 
the administration and some of its applicants, mainly the ones who did not qualify 
for these levels of support.  
 
These issues continued to remain prevalent as FACTOR grew and SRDP moved into 
its second five-year phase, from 1991 onwards.  As funding increased, the objectives 
behind the policies evolved alongside, placing new pressures on the funding 
administrators in terms of how the support was allocated to the music sector.  This 
directs our attention to the second SRDP renewal, Canada’s election in 1993 and the 
eventual abolishment of the Department of Communications and the establishment, 
post election, of the new Department of Canadian Heritage (PCH).  
 
The Doubling of State Support:  Funding and Policy From 1994 to 1997  
 
While significant to the sector, state funding for music production and distribution 
through FACTOR and Musicaction remained miniscule compared to the support that 
was given to film, literature and other cultural sectors. In 1993-4, government 
spending on film and video amounted to $240.4m, and $167.5m was provided for 
literary arts, compared to $5m for music outside of the Canada Council for the Arts 
(Sutherland 2008, 210).  While CIRPA, CRIA and other music trade associations 
lobbied for more support in the second phase of SRDP, the amount provided 
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fluctuated slightly between 1991 and 1993.  In 1993, funding was reduced from $5m 
to $4.3m, before it was raised to $4.45m in 1994 (Task Force on the Future of the 
Canadian Music Industry 1996, 17).  If one incorporates inflation, which was at 5.6% 
in 1991, 1.4% in 1992 and 1.9% in 1993 (Statistics Canada 2013), the support 
provided to the sector reduced between 1991 and 1994 in SRDP’s renewal.  
However, this was to increase after 1994, as Canada’s left-leaning Liberal 
government committed to supporting the cultural industries in its election manifesto.  
This section will chart the developments that occurred, leading to such an increase 
and the impact that it had on state policy, the music sector, Canada’s private 
broadcasters and Canada’s cultural identity as a whole.  
 
This shift is not limited to Canada, as a number of other governments elected left-
leaning administrations in the mid 1990s, altering their support structures for the 
arts.  Canada was part of a global shift, rather than a nation that acted 
independently.  In the United Kingdom, with the election of New Labour in 1997 
under Prime Minister Tony Blair, the government moved from “benign indifference 
towards promoting pop as a business” (Cloonan 2007, 39).   Under Secretary of 
State for Culture, Chris Smith, a new department was created – the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) – to “take the British creative industries and 
market them in the most favourable way possible” (Cloonan 2007, 40).  A Music 
Industry Forum was created in 1997, leading to a number of changes between the 
state and the sector, all seen favourably compared to what occurred previously in 
the United Kingdom.  These included the creation of the Live Music Forum, a policy 
think tank to measure the impact of live music in the United Kingdom, and the 
funding of a number of local initiatives, such as Generator, a music development 
agency in Newcastle.  A number of popular music initiatives have emerged as a 
result of these early interventions, including British Music Abroad (BMA) and most 
recently, Momentum Music Fund (MMF) and a Music Export Growth Fund (MEGS).  
In France, a blank tape levy and a tax on concert tickets provided 16m Francs for 
popular music initiatives in 1994 (Laing 1999) and the state established a Bureau 
Export, to market French music abroad. 
 
From 1988 to 1991, Canadian Talent Development (CTD) spending through 
broadcasters ‘promise of performance’ requirements increased by 69%, a statistic 
researched and published by the Radio Action Plan Consultation Group, the 
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government committee that had been set-up for negotiations between CAB and the 
music businesses (Filion 1996, 134).  This statistic was not corroborated by the CRTC 
or the independent music sector, as CTD support remained discretionary, so 
broadcasters were able to use the funding as they wished.  However, most was 
delivered to FACTOR and specific one-off initiatives such as talent shows and 
educational projects, such as Startrack, a talent competition in Canada’s maritime 
provinces.17  In this instance, 11 stations allocated their resources into staging a 
competition to find and promote one group, as voted by listeners.  In 1990, the 
competition was won by an act called The Trees (FACTOR 1991, 12).  Due to these 
regulations, CAB members argued they were being doubly penalised by CANCON, 
both in terms of their freedom to programme the content they wished and by the 
requirement, however discretionary, to provide support to funding initiatives in 
exchange for favourable licensing arrangements.   
 
As a result, the CRTC held its CTD review in 1995.  CTD, until then, was voluntary.  
It was not necessary for a broadcaster to allocate any of its revenues to support 
Canadian talent, but such support often factored into quid-pro-quo agreements with 
the CRTC to ease license renewals.  These revenues provided the largest amount of 
funding for FACTOR.  CAB members wanted these payments either standardized or 
reduced and after a series of public consultations, the CRTC published its review on 
21 April 1995.  This hearing changed how Canada’s private broadcasters supported 
developing Canadian content.  It first presented its initial policy, outlined An FM 
Policy Review for the Nineties.  “At the time of license renewal, all licensees of 
private commercial radio stations are asked to make financial or other commitments 
to Canadian talent development. Since 1992, however, unprofitable stations have 
generally been granted relief from financial commitments until profitability has been 
re-established” (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 
1995, 1).  The report continues: 
  
 Annual direct cost contributions by private radio broadcasters to Canadian talent 
 development projects total approximately $11m. This amount includes 
 commitments of some $7m made in license renewal applications, while the 
 remaining $4m represents commitments made in the context of applications for new 
 licenses and for transfers of ownership.  Approximately $1.8m of the $7m offered as 
                                                 
17 The maritime provinces of Canada are: Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, 
Newfoundland.    
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 commitments in license renewal applications consists of  payments to third parties, 
 such as the Foundation to Assist Canadian Talent on Record (FACTOR) and 
 Musicaction, as well as national and provincial musical organizations, cultural 
 organizations, performing arts groups, schools and scholarship recipients (Canadian 
 Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 1995, 2).  
 
The Commission’s intention was to address CAB’s request to eliminate the 
requirement of voluntary CTD for license renewal or transfer, which, in reality, was 
hardly voluntary.  In the end, Director General Allan J. Darling suggested, “at license 
renewal, all private commercial radio stations would make annual direct cash 
commitments totalling not less than $1.8 million” (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 1995, 5).  This meant that the $11m would remain 
consistent, and at least $1.8m of the extra $7m that was contributed through CTD 
would be required to go to FACTOR and Musicaction.  This decision, upheld in 1996, 
reduced mandatory CTD payments.  This re-asserted the relationship between CAB 
and FACTOR/Musicaction by ensuring that each received a certain amount of 
investment, rather than only the voluntary contributions from CAB members.  In fact, 
both organisations received substantially more than $1.8m, as part of the $11m was 
allocated to them already.  In effect, what this ruling did, by publishing this eventual 
compromise, was provide FACTOR and Musicaction with greater security in these 
private contributions.  CAB wrote that they “believe that the Commission's CTD policy 
is working as evidenced by the fact that radio broadcasters have exceeded the 
minimum $1.8 million direct contribution” (Canadian Association of Broadcasters 
2000), while FACTOR reported a 37% increase in voluntary contributions in its 
annual report in 1996 (FACTOR 1997, 1).  The Commission succeeded in ensuring a 
better distribution of CTD money and in increasing publicity for future development.  
While contributions were still voluntary (this was to change a decade later), the 1995 
CRTC commission instituted a ‘mandatory volunteerism’ to CTD support.      
 
In real terms, this was a victory for CAB and the broadcasters.  While their 
contributions to FACTOR and Musicaction in CTD increased by 14.5% in 1991, 
contribution agreements to both organisations revealed that from 1992-1995 there 
was a 28.3% decrease, from $1,493,463 to $1,109,996 (Task Force on the Future of 
the Canadian Music Industry 1996, 43).  As a result of the cap, regardless of the size 
of the station, a blanket requirement of $27,000 was all that some profitable stations 
would pay.  This data was compiled and announced in 1996, by the cross-
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parliamentary body that had been set up in 1992, titled the “Canadian Music Task 
Force”.  Administered by the Department of Communications and later PCH, it 
published A Time For Action: Report on the Task Force of the Canadian Music 
Industry (herein referred to as A Time for Action), a significant study in the history of 
popular music funding.  This came at an important moment, as the following year, 
the new Liberal government would install a new Minister of Canadian Heritage, 
Sheila Copps.  It was the argument over CTD, the findings and analysis of the 
reports and the willingness of Copps to act for the benefit of Canadian content that 
further strengthened the music industry lobby, as the new minister began her 
tenure.  
 
A Time For Action 
 
A Time for Action represented, for the first time since the installation of CANCON, a 
document representing a relatively united Canadian music sector.  Until the 
document was published, there had been no collective, mutually agreeable stance to 
promote, assert and defend Canada’s domestic music businesses at the time, and 
this document was an attempt to do so. This was achieved by outlining the problems 
associated with domestic marketing opportunities and assessing them in relation to 
both cultural and economic threats from abroad and in many aspects, was one of the 
more complete documents in assessing the complications between how state policy 
impacts cultural and economic objectives.  The report was constructed to make the 
reader aware of such threats, revealing many of the challenges that had emerged 
alongside Canada’s music funding initiatives.  In its executive summary, the authors 
state that most Canadian independent labels are “financially vulnerable…weaker than 
in the past and are now relatively stagnant" (Task Force on the Future of the 
Canadian Music Industry 1996, 8).  This language is affirmed as the report separates 
its analysis into cultural and economic chapters, which is different to the manner the 
policy had been approached before.  For the first time, a clear dividing line had been 
postulated by the sector, as in A Time for Action the writers separated the economic 
and cultural requirements of the policies set down by the state.  This separation was 
coalesced with an argument aimed at defending the funding that had already been 
established, as well as arguing for stronger copyright reform and more concessions 
from broadcasters.  In its cultural section, the argument mirrors Williams’ definition 
of culture:  
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 For most other industrialized countries, including Canada, cultural products are not 
 viewed as merchandise: they have a language and a unique national character, they 
 bear witness to human experience, convey values, alter our perceptions and 
 influence the way we live. In short, they are essential tools for affirming national 
 identity and sovereignty (Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Music Industry 
 1996, 8).   
However, this argument ignored economic objectives, even if its thesis is unable to 
do so.  The authors claim that cultural products “affirm national identity and 
sovereignty,” without explaining how this process of “bearing witness of human 
experience” is constructed.  Canadian culture, according to the passage above, is its 
own industry, separate from market economics.  However, for culture to industrialize 
and develop financial and intangible value, it is influenced by market economics.  As 
cultural value further solidified as an argument for the music sector to argue for 
increased subsidization, it became further tied to economic indicators.  At FACTOR, 
for example, the artists with the most supposed cultural value were those that 
succeeded most in the market.  Cultural value, in this sense, cannot be easily 
separated from economics, as A Time for Action attempted to assert.      
The argument in the economic section is equally provocative, as the authors accuse 
Investment Canada of undermining Canadian labels in favour of multinationals, at 
the expense of CANCON.  This accusation is worth quoting in full: 
 Two policy goals have been reflected in decisions. Applicants have been expected 
 either to offer commitments, technically referred to as "undertakings," to record and 
 release the work of Canadian artists, or to distribute the recordings of Canadian 
 artists released by independent labels. In some cases commitments of both types 
 have been sought. Typically such commitments expire after five years. 
 Over the past decade the transactions that have occurred have involved most of the 
 major multinational record companies. In general the emphasis has been on 
 requiring that the new owners expand their involvement in releasing the work of 
 Canadian artists. Since there was no specification that the Canadian artists involved
 should be new ones, there is a perception among the independent labels — which 
 were already financially vulnerable — that the Investment Canada requirements were 
 the direct cause of the independent labels losing a number of successful Canadian 
 acts they had developed, and that they now faced overwhelming competition in 
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 signing the most promising new acts (Task Force on the Future of the Canadian 
 Music Industry 14).  
The economic objective in A Time for Action argued that CANCON be used as a tool 
to foster and develop new talent.  By claiming that broadcasters support their quota 
requirement with catalogue content, an accusation that was lobbied in the mid 1970s 
as well, the music sector claimed that despite the regulations and financial support, 
there were few opportunities for their content on radio.  In 1996, radio remained the 
dominant form of consumption for Canadians, as online streaming and satellite radio 
had yet to be introduced.  To the music sector and the authors of the report, new 
music had worth attached to it, and that worth should be represented in CANCON.  
However, the domestic music sector argued that Investment Canada’s own 
guidelines for supporting the quota were, in effect, favouring foreign businesses to 
market more established Canadian and, in some cases, international artists.  
Canada’s independent labels argued that developing acts was a self-defeating 
process, as for their businesses, a glass ceiling existed that upon achieving a level of 
commercial success, artists would be courted by major labels.  This is not unique to 
Canada, as it is prevalent throughout the global music sector and its dominance by 
multinationals.   
However, in Canada, the role of Investment Canada in this is unique.  This is due to 
how free trade was legislated by the Canadian government in the mid 1990s.  Since 
1993, when the North American Free Trade Agreement was negotiated with the 
United States, Canada has operated a “cultural industries exemption”, retaining a 
number of cultural sovereignty measures outside of the free trade agreement, 
including CANCON (Atkey 1999, 177).  This is outlined in a document prepared by 
the United States, titled Foreign Trade Barriers.  It lists twenty barriers to conducting 
business in Canada, with half of them focused on cultural industries (Atkey 1999, 
178).  It included the sale of foreign magazines and regulation of Canada’s 
broadcasting sector, but did not mention the music sector.  However, the impact of 
these regulations enforced by Investment Canada informed the arguments in A Time 
for Action.  Multinationals were given more market access to Canada if they signed 
domestic talent, prompting a wave of Canadian signings in the mid 1990s, including 
Shania Twain, Alanis Morrisette and Our Lady Peace (Mair, pers. comm).  Therefore, 
in an effort to remove the trade barriers, multinationals continued to invest in 
Canadian content, often by selecting artists that had been developed by 
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independents.  While this practice exists in other music markets, it was done with 
the assistance of Canadian cultural policy, argued the authors of A Time for Action.  
The economic objectives of the sector and its independent, nationally identifiable 
cultural values once again conflicted, and multinationals benefitted most from the 
artists deemed most culturally valuable.   
 
This argument began with the establishment of CANCON in 1972.  With FACTOR and 
other funding administrations established to support Canadian talent development, 
and mandates placed on broadcasters to oversee that this content be aired regularly 
on publicly licensed airwaves, CANCON as a whole was intended to foster a more 
competitive market.  Yet, by focusing on cultural policy as a guide through The 
Broadcasting Act, Canada’s domestic businesses were, in some manner, 
compromised by the conditions of the quota.  Independent labels argued that the 
development of Canadian content, which showed no indication of substantially 
increasing market viability by 1996, profited major labels as well as independents, 
once this content had reached a certain commercial level.  While multinationals – in 
English Canada - controlled distribution channels, this was inevitable to some extent.  
Yet, A Time For Action argued that these “national tools for affirming our cultural 
identity and sovereignty”, in their case, inadvertently, were to the benefit of foreign, 
rather than Canadian businesses.  This brought the cultural justification for CANCON 
back into conflict with the economic realities of the market.  While Canadian labels 
benefitted from the success of their products, this success was often stunted by 
multinational encroachment.         
In chapter five of A Time for Action, the task force outlines its recommendations.  It 
states that Canada’s recording industry, as a whole, is underfunded, comparing it 
with film where “at the federal level the film and video industry receives 44 times as 
much support as sound recording and 21 times as much at the provincial level” (Task 
Force on the Future of the Canadian Music Industry 1996, 81).  It argued: 
 In the music industry there is also an obvious historical neglect that should be 
 remedied. Doing so might look impossible, were it not that so much can be 
 accomplished with such limited resources. The music industry does not need 
 resources comparable to those committed to the publishing, film or broadcasting 
 industries.  If the resources committed to the music industry could be increased from 
 the current level of just over $5 million annually to between $15 million and $20 
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 million the strategic deployment of these resources would begin a fundamental 
 transformation (1996, 101). 
Music, as argued in A Time for Action, is less supported by the state than other 
cultural industries, an argument that was aired in lobbying for CANCON in the late 
1960s.  For example, they argued, it took a decade for the state to establish similar 
quotas for music broadcasters as existed for television stations.  A belief remained 
within the sector that music, to outside constituents, was considered to require less 
support than other sectors.  The businesses producing the content argued otherwise.   
Sheila Copps and her new ministry were sympathetic to these demands.  The report 
was tabled and released at the right moment to promote her government’s policy 
direction towards culture, and as a result, A Time For Action had impact.  In the 
same year, the budget allocated for SRDP increased threefold.  For the first time, the 
collective Canadian music industry had presented a united voice to the state outside 
of lobbying against the broadcasting sector.  While still significantly less money was 
provided compared to film funding, these changes transformed how popular music 
was funded in Canada.      
The First Years of PCH and the Commercial Radio Review 
 
Developing Canada’s national narrative and asserting Canada’s cultural value as a 
whole was evident in PCH’s policies.  Sheila Copps was a staunch supporter of 
CANCON regulations across the creative industries.  This was evidenced in her 
message in a CRTC review in 2002, where she stated that it is “our culture…what 
defines us as a society and it is what we are referring to when we talk about our 
Canadian identity”  (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 
2002, 1).  However, Copps never defines this culture she speaks of, whether 
referring to its general output or within popular music specifically.  This culture, to 
Copps, remained open-ended, which benefitted the policies set up to support its 
development.  They were inclusive enough to mould policy to suit them, but 
exclusive at the same time, so the state could fashion policies to best suit their 
objectives.  Copps accepted many of the reforms that were requested in A Time for 
Action and introduced a series of measures from 1996-1998, most in opposition to 
CAB and in support of Canadian music makers and Canadian content producers.  
This began in November 1996 with the announcement of a three-year, $15 million 
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increase to SRDP.  In total, FACTOR received an extra $5.14 million per annum from 
1997-1999 (Government of Canada 2000, 3:3).  The main beneficiaries, according to 
FACTOR’s own documents, were touring and sound recording programs (FACTOR 
2000, 6-10).   
 
Also in 1997, the CRTC began its license renewal process for commercial 
broadcasters, seven years after its previous review, and for the first time in the 
history of PCH.  The 215-page report, tabled by CRTC Secretary General Laura 
Talbot-Allen, outlined a series of reforms stating what firms would have to comply 
with in order to be granted renewals.  These adhered to CANCON more stringently 
than any prior legislation.  The negotiations, hearings and preliminary reports were 
rife with disagreement between the music businesses and the broadcasters.  The 
music businesses, campaigning on the recommendations listed in A Time for Action, 
argued that CANCON be increased, while the CAB claimed the 30% quota and CTD 
contributions were too high.  In truth, CTD contributions had been reduced in 1995, 
primarily benefitting the more profitable broadcasters that were still only required to 
provide $27,000 per station, regardless of its net value.  CAB disagreed with these 
assertions, arguing that the music should only be one requirement for judging 
CANCON.   
 
 In assessing the predominant use of Canadian creative and other resources in the 
 creation and presentation of programming, the administrative, technical and creative 
 infrastructure should also be taken into account.  It contended that these factors, 
 coupled with Canadian music requirements, are sufficient to ensure that radio is 
 predominantly Canadian” (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications 
 Commission 1998, 181).   
 
CIRPA, CRIA, SOCAN and the music lobby argued that this did not qualify as 
Canadian content, and the amount of Canadian content used to fulfil the CANCON 
quota was insufficient.  This same overall disagreement was aired in the hearing: 
 
In their comments, broadcasters generally agreed that the requirement for Canadian 
content should be maintained at the existing level, but noted that it is sometimes 
difficult to fulfil the existing quota without playing some material that is of lower 
quality, or without keeping some selections on the playlist for longer periods. The 
CAB contended that no increase in the required level of Canadian content should be 
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implemented until sales of Canadian recordings, as a percentage of total recordings 
sold, exceed 15%.  The CAB further suggested that the requirement for Canadian 
music would then be set at a level that is two times the retail sales of Canadian 
music, as a percentage of all record sales in Canada. The percentage would be 
averaged over three-year period to remove the impact of year-to-year fluctuations 
(Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 1998, 88).  
 
     On the other hand, several representatives of the recording industry argued that  the 
 level should be increased immediately to levels that, they suggested, should 
 range from 35% to 40%. Others recommended further increases, to be introduced 
 over time until a 50% level is achieved. Those advocating increases argued that 
 these are necessary to achieve the objectives of the act. They also considered that 
 the current level of new releases, plus the extensive catalogue of Canadian 
 recordings that has accumulated since Canadian content requirements were first 
 implemented, is assurance that sufficient material will be available to fulfil a higher 
 requirement (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 1998, 
 89) 
 
Once again, the statistics of how much Canadian content was consumed in Canada 
differed depending on who was asked.  CAB stated that 15% was an appropriate 
number, while the music businesses disagreed.  More reliable statistics existed 
concerning Canadian content sold domestically than did for the previous review, but 
the variance of the content was not tracked, nor were listening habits of consumers 
or radio playlists.  This disagreement remained unresolved and upon the publication 
of the review, CANCON was increased from 30% to 35% in English Canada, on both 
AM and FM bands.  Of this, the prior 25% CANCON that was required to air between 
6AM and 6PM was increased to 35%.  From 1998, CAB members were required to 
abide by the higher quota, aside from a few specific instances such as CKLW in 
Windsor, because of its close proximity to the United States.  Once again, the 
argument centred on the supply and perceived demand of Canadian music.   
 
For the independent labels and producers, a higher CANCON quota was seen as 
necessary for improving business prospects, even though no assessment had been 
conducted to verify this.  The simplicity of such an argument, however, ignores the 
inherent complications in CANCON policy from 1972-1997.  Nonetheless, as the 
CRTC announced its findings in 1998, the Canadian popular music funding system 
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had become larger, and the state was more responsive to ensuring that Canadian 
content, whatever that was deemed to be was protected and supported.  
 
In addition to CANCON and station license renewals, the review in 1998 debated 
another issue with private broadcasters.  At present, the CRTC did not permit 
broadcasters to own more than one station in each band per market.  Multiple 
station ownership was seen to further lower the range of music used for CANCON 
(as stations would copy formats).  CAB lobbied to ease the restrictions, arguing their 
stations would not be able to compete with American stations.  In its review, the 
CRTC noted, “strong Canadian radio and recording industries are essential if citizens 
are to have access to a variety of Canadian services providing high quality Canadian 
music and other programming that reflects both their communities and their country 
in this more competitive environment” (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 1997a, 3).  This music of ‘high quality’ is 
undefined, unrelated to its origin or newness and most often, subject to individual 
programming structures.  In The Massey Commission, ‘high quality’ was synonymous 
with ‘high art’ forms of music, such as classical or opera.  At the time Massey 
conducted his review, rock and roll music had yet to emerge and contemporary 
classical music was considered ‘popular’.  This had changed and by 1998, ‘high 
quality’ was not synonymous with ‘high art’ in CRTC’s comments; yet, the institution 
did not establish any qualitative markers on this, instead leaving ‘high quality’ as an 
indefinable marker.  To the broadcasters, ‘high quality’ meant popular.  For the 
sector, it was inconclusive, as each label deemed their content as high quality.  In 
the wording of The Broadcasting Act, reaffirmed in policy in 1991, Canadian content 
was not assessed through the concept of high quality.  It was a catchall, for the 
supposed benefit of all Canadians.  However, such a benefit, in terms of nationalism, 
must contain some discursive traits for it to purport to strengthen the Canadian 
narrative.  For the CRTC in its review, such ‘high quality’ was left for the sectors 
involved to determine.  This tactic was reliant on economic indicators as much as 
cultural, as music that was most popular, most active in the public sphere and most 
consumed by Canadians, often best contributed to national narrative characteristics.  
This content may not have been deemed ‘high quality’ by all assessors, such as 
Canada’s independent labels.   
 
This is another example where the usage of cultural policy to impact Canadian 
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businesses is fraught with complications, ones that were not addressed by the CRTC 
at the time.  CANCON was not separated in ‘high quality’ and otherwise, nor should it 
be, as it would go against the core mandate posited in 1958 and legislated in The 
Broadcasting Act.  However, for Canada’s private broadcasters, ones licensing 
publicly owned airwaves for the purpose of commercial profit, this cannot align.  To 
maintain this polemic, the CRTC sought further compromises with those it governed.  
 
CAB claimed that its stations were losing money, an argument the music lobby 
refuted strongly in A Time For Action.  The music businesses and campus radio 
associations rallied against CAB, claiming that consolidation would ultimately 
homogenise CANCON, as stations would recycle playlists, similarly to formats that 
existed for commercial radio in the United States.  In some manner, this 
consolidation was a tactic to compete with foreign commercial outfits, particularly 
American stations with a listener base in Canada.  In a hearing proposing the 
permitting of multiple station ownership, director of the National Campus and 
Community Association (NACA) Christine Cote stated; “a further concentration of 
radio station ownership would only exacerbate this situation.  Instead of two stations 
- one AM, one FM - sharing news, technical, and programming staff, we can imagine 
four stations doing so, with a resulting loss of variety and choice” (Cote 1997).  This 
was echoed by CIRPA, who argued multiple station ownership was a veiled attempt 
at minimising CANCON requirements.  Along with ADISQ, CIRPA stated that “if the 
Commission does permit multiple station ownership, the benefits policy should be 
maintained, and support for Canadian music, including financial contributions to 
Canadian talent development, should increase” (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 1998, 43).  
 
In the end, the CRTC deregulated its ownership rules, allowing CAB members to 
consolidate with up-to four stations per market, or two per band.  This new policy, 
as decided on 30 April 1998, was outlined as follows: 
 
  In markets with less than eight commercial stations operating in a given language, a 
 person may be permitted to own or control as many as three stations operating in 
 that language, with a maximum of two stations in any one-frequency band. In 
 markets with eight commercial stations or more operating in a given language, a 
 person may be permitted to own or control as many as two AM and two FM stations 
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 in that language (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 
 1998, 7). 
 
This was a boon to CAB members, who could distribute resources across a greater 
number of stations, minimising cost and increasing profit.  However, this decision 
was seen as anathema to the music sector, with this perceived to limit emerging, or 
new Canadian content on radio, particularly those signed to independents.  Over 
time, both parties were correct; furthermore, while intended as a compromise, CAB 
members were provided with a new structure for conducting business that would 
significantly increase their profitability from 1998 onwards.  As a result, to allay 
concern from the music sector, the CRTC initiated a tax on any merger, station 
transfer or acquisition to occur under these new regulations, exchanging favourable 
economic conditions for the loosening of cultural obligations.  The tax, tabled at 6% 
of the value of the transaction (although CAB argued for 3%), would be split across 
three streams.  33.3% would go to FACTOR, 16.6% would be discretionary and the 
final 50% would be used to set up a new fund, entirely broadcaster administered 
and coordinated.  It was named Radio Starmaker Fund (RSF) in English Canada and 
FondsRadiostar in Quebec, a name referencing quantitative market success, rather 
than qualitative cultural promotion.  The CRTC outlined this on page 70 of the 
review:  
 
 In consideration of the above, the Commission has decided to modify its benefits 
 policy in respect of all transfers of ownership and control of radio undertakings. 
 Specifically, the  Commission has determined that it will henceforth expect that, in 
 the case of such applications, commitments be made to implement clear and 
 unequivocal benefits representing a minimum direct financial contribution to 
 Canadian talent development of  6% of the value of the transaction (Canadian 
 Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 1998, 70).  
 
Radio Starmaker and FondsRadiostar were incorporated in 1998 and operational by 
2001 (Radio Starmaker Fund 2001).   
 
Measuring Success of FACTOR and SRDP  
 
The 1998 commercial radio review, the publishing of A Time for Action, the increase 
in SRDP funding between 1996 and 1999 and the ability of private broadcasters to 
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own up-to two stations per band in each market mark the start of a new era in the 
history of popular music funding in Canada.  Upon the completion of the SRDP in 
1999, PCH produced a review of its activities, compiling the numbers of applications, 
approvals and allocations for its programmes.  This review did not quantify the 
impact of this support on radio play, sales or artist development.  Instead, it audited 
the core amount that was spent in the programme.  If one totals the amount of 
public and privately mandated funding that was delivered to support and develop 
Canada’s sound recording industry from 1982 to 1999, over $100m can be traced, 
with the largest percentage of this going to record companies and directed towards 
releasing product and satisfying CANCON regulations.  In total, 1,692 sound 
recordings were produced over twelve years with support from SRDP at FACTOR, 
and a further 782 were produced with Musicaction support (Government of Canada 
2000: E:3).  The review also reveals the significant increase in the amount of support 
that the Department of Canadian Heritage (PCH) provided in 1997.  It also reveals 
changing priorities, as the budget increase coincided with a new focus placed both 
on marketing and recording, rather than a primary focus directed towards record 
production.  For example, in 1997 the share of the budget allocated for the 
production of sound recordings decreased from 64% between 1987-1996 to 38% 
between 1997-1999, while it drastically increased for marketing support, from 18% 
between 1987-1996, up to 45% in the final three years (Government of Canada 
2000, 2:3).  These changes reflect the changing nature of music marketing in 
Canada, with a greater focus applied to international marketing and touring as 
recording costs decreased. The need to market Canadian content, both domestically 
and internationally, grew in importance alongside the requirement to create it in the 
first place.  
 
FACTOR had become involved in every aspect of the music making and marketing 
process in Canada.  However, little official research was initiated to understand the 
impact of FACTOR, SRDP or any other administration.  For example, the amount of 
support recouped from loans was never revealed.18  In addition, a sort of brokerage 
developed within DBA, with some companies buying up insolvent DBA companies, 
because labels were infrequently removed from the system (McKie, pers. comm).  
                                                 
18 It has been known to be as low as 3% on juried sound recordings and as high as 100% 
on DBA applications, as they required much higher repayment rates to retain DBA status 
(Mair, McKie and Roman, pers. comm)  
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This challenged the transparency of DBA, as companies that had not released 
content for many years remained in the program.  When they were purchased, the 
new owner took the status, rather than earning it themselves.  This is one challenge 
that is poorly documented, as it was contrary to the organizations bylaws.  
 
Complications aside, those at work to shape and administer FACTOR continued to 
promote the successes of the support.  For example, support was given to 
developing acts like Nickelback and Sarah McLachlan, which enhanced their career 
prospects as FACTOR supported their recording projects (and activities of their 
management and label representatives) at the developmental stage in their careers.  
Through these successes, a sense of pride developed in Canada’s music sector, one 
that was shared by both the businesses and some of the broadcasters.  “To me, 
FACTOR works and is a good thing, as it was in its beginning”, argues Roman (pers. 
comm.)  “I think there is an element of Canadian pride and identity involved here.  
We are and should be very proud of what it has done” (Roman pers. comm).  
However, such pride was equally attributed to the funding as the music itself.  By 
1997, the systems that had emerged represented Canadian music as much as the 
music itself.  This is echoed in FACTOR’s 1997 report, where chairman Jason 
Sniderman, in his executive statement, “we do it for one reason and one reason 
only; it is the right thing to do” (FACTOR 1997, 3).  This right thing to do, Sniderman 
writes, is to support bands and develop Canada’s domestic popular music industries.  
However, troubling questions concerning the administration of this interventionism 
remained unanswered, and this sense of pride does not approach the core problems 
inherent within the overall structure of popular music funding in Canada.   
 
Reading FACTOR’s annual reports reveal concealment alongside revelation.  There is 
an absence of important statistics such as radio tracking and return on investment.  
In addition, industry lobbyists - CIRPA, CRIA and the CMPA - continued to argue that 
more Canadian music was the best approach for developing the industry.  This is an 
economic argument, rather than a cultural one.  Industry development relied on the 
bottom lines of Canada’s businesses, rather than the singular expansion of content 
proliferation.  However, such economic advancements were posited through a thick 
layer of cultural policy, one that remained above all arguments concerning Canada’s 
industry development.  If the industry was to further develop – and in this case the 
term industry refers to Canada’s independents – it needed more support from the 
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state and more legislation to democratize programming opportunities.  These 
arguments, calling for economic intervention, are posed under a framework where 
Canadian cultural policy – the impact of CANCON, MAPL etc. – is the norm.  As a 
result, these two requirements continued to collide, but had yet to coalesce.  The 
definitions in The Broadcasting Act, CANCON and Canadian cultural policy towards 
popular music began to accept financial intervention on top of cultural requirements, 
if the results benefitted those involved.  CANCON became slowly deprioritised, if it 
was exchanged for more financial considerations.  As a result, as the sector grew, it 
did so under a blanket of subsidy guided by protectionist and nationalistic policy, but 
the objectives of the policy grew less important.  If the policy is structured on 
ensuring that Canadian content maintained a semblance of identity, defining this 
identity was no longer the core objective in Canadian popular music policy.  This 
identity, in most instances, was structured on subsidization, similarly to the 
comments Berton made in Why We Act Like Canadians.  This sense of pride, outlined 
by Sniderman, in both the systems and the music is not one and the same.  The 
concept of Canadian nationalism – a sense of pride and place in being Canadian and 
the meanings attached to that – were unrelated to the pride claimed of the system 
itself, which was satisfied with increased subsidization.  The pride and national 
characteristics purported by the music are different to the mandates of Canada’s 
popular music funding system.  These complexities, by 2000, further developed into 
a more problematic, complex and paradoxical music-funding spectrum, with more 
money to distribute than ever.  
 
By the end of the 1990s, the number of acts receiving FACTOR funding doubled, 
through both PCH support and private broadcasting CTD payments.  Two documents 
examine this.  The first is the only history of FACTOR thus far, Larry Leblanc’s 2007 
promotional, The FACTOR Story.  The second is the evaluation of SRDP.  Leblanc 
states that FACTOR was swayed by its broadcaster base, as “by the early 1990s, 
FACTOR support became even more relevant as a vibrant, grass-roots alternative 
scene developed with a high number of alternative-styled bands enjoying sizeable 
success releasing their own independent recordings, leading to intense A&R scrutiny 
from multinationals” (2007, 11).  This comment is interesting, as it argues that 
multinationals were welcomed in Canada, even though artists signed to their 
subsidiaries were not able to apply for state support.  This can be analysed through 
the application data that is collected in the SRDP report.  58% of the public 
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contribution was spent on sound recordings and 91.3% of all funding provided to 
record companies went through this stream.  This represented a 30% success rate in 
juried loan applications and a 78% approval rate in direct board approval from 1993-
1997 (SRDP 2000, 3:5-7).  Direct board approval companies increased in the mid-
1990s, as the number of beneficiary companies remained relatively constant from 
1987 to 1992 (10, 9, 9, 13, 12, 10), after which it progressively increased over the 
following 6 years (14, 15, 15, 19, 24, 25) (SRDP 2000, 3:8).  Canada’s popular music 
business and sound recording sector grew inextricably linked to FACTOR, and its 
investment model was tied to the organisation. The industry was now tied to the 
government more than ever.   
 
Conclusion  
 
As the new millennium approached, there was more funding available to music 
makers in Canada than ever before.  This heightened subsidization, from 1993 
onwards, was encouraged by Canada’s liberal administration.  However, more 
support did not alleviate the challenges inherent in the systems.  Instead, the 
development of new programs and mandates, such as the review of Canadian Talent 
Development (CTD) or the compromises leading to the establishment of Radio 
Starmaker Fund/FondsRadiostar (RSF), created further complications.  The 
administration, delivery and assessment of support contained points of conflict 
among the active parties – the music sector, broadcasters, CRTC and the state.  The 
debates concerning how support would be structured, however, ignored core 
questions concerning how funding addressed the initial problems in Canada, both in 
terms of the cultural and economic threats from abroad and the definition of what 
Canadian collective identity was at home, and how that identity differed depending 
on who was asked.   
 
By 2000, popular music was firmly at the centre of national narrative in Canada but 
in a perplexing manner.  It was not the specific music itself that was used in the 
primary shaping of these structures, but it was the fact that popular music – as a 
whole – was protected by legislation.  Most of the Canadian content that featured 
heavily on private radio continued to be content that had achieved international 
success as well as domestic, often mimicking genres that were similar to those that 
were popular in the United States or United Kingdom, such as the mainstream, 
 120 
chart-influenced pop of Celine Dion or Alanis Morrisette.     
 
Producing popular music is collaborative, and this is no different in Canada.  Some of 
the contributing songwriters or producers working with Canadians were foreign, so 
attributing a national identity onto specific pieces of work is difficult.  Canada’s most 
famous acts at the time, Bryan Adams, Celine Dion or Shania Twain, for example, all 
employed foreign co-writing and production partners.   It was not musical creation 
but instead the omnipresence of CANCON in Canada and its unadulterated protection 
and financial support of the state that placed popular music firmly within Canadian 
cultural identity formation.  In assessing economic impact, this produced difficulties. 
Music simply being defined as Canadian under CANCON, as evidenced in this 
chapter, did not necessarily translate to greater profitability.  Defining the term 
‘Canadian music’ relied more on the funding systems enacted to support it than the 
music genres and styles offered in Canadian recordings.  By the new millennium, 
Canadian music, as defined through the policies enacted to defend, protect and 
promote the concept of being Canadian, was more about being able to apply for 
funding than producing anything uniquely and definably Canadian.  This situation 
would continue in the new millennium, with the introduction of further intervention 
and the evolution of Radio Starmaker Fund / FondsRadiostar.    
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Chapter 4 
2000s - The Introduction of the Canada Music Fund and Other Programs 
 
Introduction   
 
This chapter will examine the developments in the history of popular music funding 
from 2000 to 2012.  By 2000, the Canadian music sector, like other global music 
markets, had been impacted by new technologies, as illegal downloading and the 
Internet changed the consumption patterns of consumers.  This is noted in the policy 
announcement that marked the end of SRDP and the beginning of the Canada Music 
Fund (CMF) in 2000.  In it, the Department of Canadian Heritage states: “The 
Canadian music industry is undergoing fundamental changes.  Faced with the 
challenges of a global digital economy, Canadian sound recording must transform 
itself to keep pace with our changing world, and to remain relevant and competitive” 
(Department of Canadian Heritage 2010a).  To respond to this, the document 
proposes that the Government of Canada can “contribute to a smooth transition for 
this industry in this period of flux.  Ensuring that Canadians continue to have access 
to diverse Canadian music choices means developing the right policy framework and 
tools for meeting today's global and digital challenges” (Department of Canadian 
Heritage 2010a).    
 
This chapter will analyse these policy challenges by deconstructing the Canada Music 
Fund (CMF), a new series of state programs that were introduced after the 
conclusion of SRDP and other programs, including Radio Starmaker Fund (RSF), 
Trade Routes and PromART, export programs for Canadian businesses.  By 1999, 
government had assisted in producing nearly 1500 recordings throughout SRDP, but 
at the end of the programme, the same questions remained that had led to the 
programme’s development of SRDP in the first place.  Emerging artists had not 
quantifiably increased in CAB member playlists, and domestic sales of Canadian 
music were not higher than the consistent average of 15-20% of market share.  This 
does not mean that the policies in place had failed, but it suggests that their 
continuation and proliferation overshadowed impediments to progress, ones that 
were inadequately accounted for and analysed by any party.  The individual 
requirements of each of the protagonists – the music sector, broadcasters and the 
state - led to compromises but never outright cohesion.  Policy was introduced to 
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support businesses to compete in a free market, but was done through a 
nationalistic structure, where Canadian choices, whatever they may be, were to be 
protected in the face of competition.  As a result, in its Review of Plans and Priorities 
in 2000, the departmental brief stated: 
 
 Many federal departments and agencies play a role in supporting cultural activity. 
 The Canadian Heritage Portfolio plays the central and most comprehensive role. The 
 portfolio agencies and crown corporations are among the key Canadian cultural 
 institutions that  support artistic expression: creating, promoting, regulating and 
 disseminating Canadian  choices to Canadians; and preserving and protecting our 
 cultural heritage and shared history. (Department of Canadian Heritage 2001a, 3) 
 
Since its introduction in 1994, PCH retained responsibility to support this creation of 
content through promotion, regulation and dissemination.  The most important 
phrase in the above quote, “disseminating Canadian choices to Canadians”, 
encompassed the objectives behind these policies.  Policies remained influenced by 
the recommendations of The Massey Commission and The Applebaum-Hébert 
Report, but simultaneously reliant on global market shifts and economics.  For the 
state, the Canada Music Fund introduced a shift where these market challenges 
began to influence policy as much as Canada’s content regulations and cultural 
policies.  It remained important that Canadian content be produced and archived, 
but at the same time policy must influence content’s relevance and competitiveness 
in an increasingly borderless, transnational economy.  These two sides – the 
promotion and development of Canada’s national narrative and the competitiveness 
of Canadian businesses – were approached by a few large-scale policies, this new 
Canada Music Fund (CMF), a private initiative created by the CRTC, Radio Starmaker 
Fund (RSF) and export driven Trade Routes and PromART.  However, the impact on 
each throughout its implementation produced complexities, ones that influence the 
history of popular music funding in Canada.   
 
To best understand this period, it is productive to begin with the development of the 
Canada Music Fund as a response to both national and international pressures of the 
music market of the time, concerning Canadian national identity and market 
competitiveness.  
 
New Digital Technologies and the Development of the Canada Music Fund 
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By 2000, peer-to-peer file sharing sites such as LimeWire and Napster had infiltrated 
the Canadian market.  CANCON regulations, those applied to commercial radio, were 
not enforceable online, and Canadian consumers took advantage of these new 
technologies to discover music.  As a result by 2001, recorded music sales in Canada 
had decreased by 7.5%, despite legal downloading increasing by 37% (Pietz and 
Wellbrook 2004, 18).   This is similar to data from the United States whose recording 
industry suffered similar declines (Pietz and Wellbrook 2004, 18).  This equated to a 
reduction in sales by 6%, compared to 2000 (Canadian Recording Industry 
Association 2001).  This reduction in sales was noticed by the state in its policy 
introductions.  It is this state of “flux”, as per the wording from PCH, that influenced 
the debate concerning popular music funding at the time.   
 
As a result, the Canadian music industry faced significant challenges.  In a report 
written by Paul Audley for the CMPA, of an estimated $290 million collected in 
revenues for Canadian publishing companies (up from $240m in 1999), only $100m 
was returned to domestic coffers (Audley 2005, 14).  This data, although confined to 
publishing, reveals the impact of CANCON on new Canadian content.  While $50m 
more was aggregated by collection societies in 2004 than in 1999, only one-third of 
this remained in Canada (Re:Sound 2010).  As a result, Canada’s balance of trade 
was negative, with $507.1m worth of content exported, compared to $1.279b worth 
of content imported (Sutherland and Straw 2008, 153).  In addition, the monies 
returned to Canada were not in the form of sales but in rights administration.  Since 
March 1998, a new private copying levy had collected $212,643 (Re:Sound 2010) 
while Canada’s Neighbouring Rights Collective was established, now called Re:Sound.  
It collected $20m per year for distribution, split across five member agencies 
(Gervais 2001, 14).  This was due to more rigorous rights administration, not an 
increase in demand of CANCON. However, as the system itself ballooned, more 
challenges also emerged.  In addition, much of this new revenue benefitted 
established artists over emerging.  For example, the blank tape levy was delivered to 
Re:Sound to distribute on a pro-rata basis, so those with greater catalogues benefit 
more.  Therefore, while more support was available, the overall sector did not 
benefit collectively at the time of the introduction of CMF.     
When CMF was initiated, publishing was the only revenue stream experiencing 
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growth.  The recording sector was in a state of flux in Canada, similar to the global 
music market.  In 2001, the revenue of Canadian-owned sound recordings was 
$764m.  This shrunk to $721m in 2002 (Department of Canadian Heritage 2005d, 4). 
This improved slightly by 2004, when in the five-year report of the Canada Music 
Fund the authors reported that domestic content had totalled 25% of the market, up 
from 18%, as revealed by Neilson (Department of Canadian Heritage 2005c, 5).    
New opportunities for content to find audiences in Canada often came through tracks 
being illegally downloaded, where artists and their representatives were not 
remunerated for the right to consume their works.   A solution to this, posited by the 
music lobby as SRDP expired, was that funding be increased to support more 
emerging Canadian content and that regulations be placed on commercial radio to 
mandate airing a certain percentage of new music in CANCON.  For the 
broadcasters, this increase of online music consumption by consumers fuelled a 
rebuttal, as they claimed the rate of CANCON on radio, after the review in 1998, 
created enough barriers for their business profitability.  The structure of CANCON, 
minimally altered since 1972, overshadowed these disagreements, but little was 
done to assess these complexities.  As a result, many of the changes implemented 
focused on increased subsidization, rather than in-depth analysis of the changing 
nature of Canada’s popular music spectrum.  
 
These were the challenges facing the Liberal government in 1999.  For the state, 
CANCON remained a requirement to promote and assert federalism and a 
nationalistic narrative, even if such a definition of what this narrative was and its 
relationship to popular music remained undefined.  For example, if a Canadian artist 
became popular through their music being illegally downloaded, a popularity not 
benefitting their label or the broadcasters, this was seen as detrimental to the sector, 
rather than beneficial.  However, if an artist developed an audience in this manner, a 
cultural value could be attributed to such popularity.  However, often content was 
consumed that bypassed Canadian business interests.  Therefore, the success of 
Canadian content, in this era of new technological consumption, was no longer 
simply examinable and delineable by CANCON.  Cultural value of Canadian content, 
the core mandate in The Broadcasting Act, was equally tied to Canadian businesses 
development.  As a result, more funding was initiated – from a culturally 
protectionist basis – to support Canadian businesses and their bottom lines, 
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regardless of how their content was being heard, consumed and purchased.    
 
As a result, in 2000 the Liberal government announced a $764m restructuring of 
cultural industries support, titled Tomorrow Starts Today.  It included new legislation 
to support music, film, fine art, museums and other cultural sectors like libraries and 
new interactive technologies.  The portfolio covering popular music was titled the 
Canada Music Fund (CMF).  It was structured to operate similarly to SRDP, with 
some programmes outsourced to third party organisations, such as FACTOR and 
Musicaction and others coordinated in-house.  The core strategy is compiled in CMF’s 
initial report, titled From Creators to Audience: New Policy Directions for Canadian 
Sound Recordings.  This document, part strategy and part publicity, emphasises 
sound recording and CANCON.  The document states: “Ultimately, the Canadian 
Sound Recording Policy will measurably contribute to the success of Canada's sound 
recording sector.  And, in building on the success of the SRDP, the policy will adopt a 
more holistic approach to developing this sector” (Department of Canadian Heritage 
2001b, 4).  The programme was split into eight streams, divided administratively 
through FACTOR, Canada Council for the Arts, Telefilm, PCH and the SOCAN 
Foundation.19  The total amount made available was $24,676,920 (Department of 
Canadian Heritage 2005c, 4).  There is no justification for this odd amount, other 
than a cumulative figure of the amount available through the eight programs.   
 
In its first formative review in 2004, the authors write that senior managers from 
PCH wanted “to build a Canadian music small and medium enterprise (SME) sector, 
complementary to the large international majors such as Sony, etc.  This senior 
management group indicated that the Department of Canadian Heritage’s focus was 
on the music industry SMEs - many “stars” (such as Céline Dion) have come out of 
the talent lab of the SMEs, at least in the 1990s. The Department of Canadian 
Heritage wanted a program that supported this sector” (Gilroy 2004, 18).  In this 
justification for the introduction of CMF, the department focused on economic, rather 
than cultural objectives.  Here, the development of Canadian business for the 
purpose of fostering “stars” is the objective, alongside the mandate of The 
Broadcasting Act to develop Canadian content for the benefit of Canadians.  As a 
result, a number of programs within CMF were designed to subsidize high-level 
                                                 
19 The Canadian Film Development Council (CDFC) was renamed Telefilm in 1984. 
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Canadian independent labels and trade associations, alongside support for content 
diversification and creation.  However, an economic objective – support directed at 
commercially successful artists – is mandated here in Canadian cultural policy.  As a 
result, the Canada Music Fund (CMF) asserts popular music and culture as the most 
powerful definer of Canadian identity formation, as these “stars” better assert a 
Canadian message than producing more content as a whole.  As a result, CMF was 
more expansive and thorough than SRDP.  It also grew to become more 
controversial.  
 
The programmes are listed in alphabetical order below: 
 
 Canadian Musical Diversity 
 
This programme was allocated to the Canada Council for the Arts.  It provided a 
number of grants to genres that PCH classified as ‘diversity genres’, including 
classical, jazz, Aboriginal music and ballet.  According to PCH at the time, genres 
defined under the term ‘diversity’ were those that had traditionally received support 
from CCA, including classical music.  This remains central to the recommendations in 
The Massey Commission, where so-called “high-art” was protected in Canadian 
cultural policy.  This concept of diversity and the definition of who could apply for 
support in this programme were devolved to CCA.  It consisted of two sub-sections, 
Grants for Specialized Music Production and Grants for Specialized Music Distribution, 
which were available for up to $20,000 per applicant and capped at $1.3m per fiscal 
year in total (Schellenberger 2009a, 6).  Over 80% of the programme was provided 
for sound recording and distribution, intended to support more diversified Canadian 
content production.  This programme was eliminated in 2009 during a restructuring 
of the fund.      
A review in 2009, administered by MP Gary Schellenberger, argued to retain the 
program despite a restructuring in 2009: “The different forms of specialized music, 
while they may not reach a mass audience, reflect the diversity and creativity of 
Canadian artists. The committee therefore feels that this component of the Canada 
Music Fund plays a strategic role and must be maintained” (Schellenberger 2009a, 
7).  The report consisted of interviews with recipients as well as executives from 
FACTOR, Musicaction and the Canada Council for the Arts.  The Conservative 
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government at the time did not accept its recommendations, with the support re-
allocated to digital distribution and international showcase opportunities.  
 Canadian Musical Memories 
 
This fund is administered by the Library Archives of Canada and, as of 2007, 
received $360,000 of funding within CMF (Department of Canadian Heritage 2007b).  
Its objective is to archive as much CANCON as possible, with 300,000 songs 
accumulated between 1970 and 2007.  This stream is the smallest programme in the 
portfolio.  
 
 Collective Initiatives 
 
Collective Initiatives (CI) is the most comprehensive programme in CMF and is 
administered by FACTOR and Musicaction.  There are four streams, as follows: 
 
• Music Conferences, Awards Shows and Educational Initiatives (“BD Component”)   
• Music Showcases for Canadian Artists from Official Language Minority Communities 
(“CLM Component”)   
• Music Showcases for Export-Ready Canadian Artists (“CIM Component”)   
• Marketing of Canadian Music on Digital Platforms (“CDM Component”) 
(FACTOR 2011c) 
 
Collective Initiatives is one of the largest programs within CMF.  From 2001-2005, it 
delivered $5,857,198 to FACTOR and $4,179,687 to Musicaction (Department of 
Canadian Heritage 2007a).  Through Collective Initiatives, companies, festivals and 
conferences can support a variety of activities, loosely defined as an event or activity 
that involves two or more Canadian companies containing both consumer and 
business-to-business offerings.  Events like Canadian Music Week apply for overhead 
costs through the ‘BD’ component, while labels apply to the ‘CIM’ component to 
attend conferences like MIDEM.  Each of the four streams has its own guidelines and 
requirements and collectively comprises of one of the more over-subscribed sets of 
programmes at FACTOR and Musicaction, outside of touring and showcasing.      
 
 Creators Assistance 
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The SOCAN foundation, in existence since 1992, has administered the program since 
its inception (MacMillan 2009, 2).  This is done through funding not-for-profit 
associations, such as local music troupes.  National organisations are given 
preference, and funding is provided for a series of productions or projects, such as 
ballet performances or classical concerts.  The maximum amount that one 
organisation could apply for in 2010 was $300,000, which has increased since 2001, 
when it was $150,000 (MacMillan 2011).  $1,290,000 was delivered to the 
programme in 2008, and this increased to $1,457,000 in 2010 (MacMillan 2009, 2), 
up from around $900,000 in 2001 through 2004.20  Organisations that receive 
regular funding include the Songwriters Association of Canada and Canadian Music 
Centre, a classical music information and lobbying outfit.  This stream closed on 31 
March 2013, following an announcement made by Minister James Moore on 29 
March 2012 (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2009).     
 
 Music Entrepreneur Program (MEP) 
 (Renamed Music Entrepreneurs Component – (MEC) - in 2005) 
 
This programme, originally administered by Telefilm in 2002, was re-assigned to the 
PCH in 2005 (Department of Canadian Heritage 2005c) and renamed, replacing its 
original title, the Music Entrepreneur Program (MEP).  It provides labels with yearly 
contributions of up-to $550,000,21 providing activities are subsidised in half by 
private initiatives.  Those successful are not allowed to apply to programmes under 
New Musical Works (NMW) if their MEC contribution is above $200,000. 22  The 
guidelines for MEC are strict; companies must be in operation for five years or more, 
be Canadian owned and operated, own Canadian copyrights and prove financial 
worth of at least $200,000 per year.  In addition, labels must have at least four 
artists in their roster and have sold 150,000 units in total.23  
 
                                                 
20 The total amount provided was:  $932,996 for fiscal year 2001-02; $906,561 for fiscal 
year 2002-03: $906,561 for fiscal year 2003-04.  This was averaged at $906,561 from 2006 
onwards before being increased in 2008, as stated.   
21 The maximum amount available for MEC companies was $650,000 up until 2012.  This 
was reduced in a budget restructuring exercise in April 2012.  The total amount was reduced 
from $8.5m to $7.5m (CIMA 2012).  
22 The New Musical Works program is discussed on the following page.  
23 This is not true as of 2009 with sector associations, as they now apply to MEC instead of 
the now defunct Support to Sector Associations component. 
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The support is determined mathematically.  Company revenues are pinned against 
MEC’s total budget.  Rankings are given for sales and compared against the other 
companies applying.  If a company sold 2% of the total sales of all MEC applicants, 
they get 2% of the funding and so on, up to the maximum available.  Three years of 
financial statements are required, and once funding is guaranteed, all bottom lines 
are audited to ensure the contribution is less than 15% of the company’s total net 
value.  As a result, less than 30 companies and associations receive MEC funding 
each year.  In 2009, 22 companies were recipients across both English and French 
Canada.  This is the highest and most substantial level of support offered in Canada.  
Moreover, those who qualify for MEC can still apply to RSF/FondsRadiostar and show 
its support as a private contribution against MEC on their bottom line, and thus 
eliminate the challenges of being taken off NMW programmes at FACTOR, such as 
sound recording programmes.    
 
This programme has been the most controversial within CMF, both in its 
administration and delivery.  When it was initiated in 2002, the guidelines were 
claimed as too stringent to be satisfied by most Canadian independent labels.  For 
example, an editorial in The Montreal Mirror in 2002 argued, “the eligibility guidelines 
set out by Telefilm, the federal agency responsible for handing out the money, will 
benefit only the larger, more established music labels while the small, independent 
labels will get nothing. This, they charge, will only make the already uneven music 
industry field that much more lopsided” (Lejtenyi 2002).  In the same editorial, then 
administrator Shelley Stein-Sacks revealed, “there is actually very little consultation 
between the independents” (and the Department of Canadian Heritage).  He then 
stated, “there should be more communication with the independents” (Lejtenyi 
2002).    
 
In truth, the programme was not initiated to provide support for developing artists 
and labels.  Instead, it added a tier to Canada’s popular music funding system, much 
like DBA did at FACTOR.  It supposedly rewarded success, offering high-level support 
to those that could show a return on investment, but its administration was not as 
straightforward as its mandate.  In fact, Telefilm were poor administrators, ultimately 
losing the contract when Stein-Sacks was forced to resign on an accusation that he 
promised support to a few Quebec companies that were then refused, leaving the 
entities out of pocket for expenses that they expected to recoup.  The affair, outlined 
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in Montreal broadsheet Le Presse on 11 December 2008, claimed that in 2003, Stein-
Sacks and analyst Nat Meranda supposedly promised over $1m funding to several 
Quebec companies that was never delivered (Brunet 2008).  As a result, Telefilm was 
found responsible and ordered to pay $900,000 plus interest in damages to three 
companies (Brunet 2008).  Following a review of the programme in 2004, PCH took 
responsibility for administering the programme, which it still controls at time of 
writing.  
  
 New Musical Works 
 
New Musical Works is a reworked version of the sound recording structure at SRDP.  
It is outsourced to FACTOR and Musicaction and comprised of demo and sound 
recording grants.  This is the largest component of CMF, resulting in 50% of total 
funding occurring between 2001 and 2005.  In its first five years, “a total of 
$19,245,548 of NMW funds (as well as broadcaster funds) invested in 490 albums, or 
an average of $39,277 per album” with FACTOR alone (Department of Canadian 
Heritage 2005c, 11).  According to data supplied by CRIA at the time, “NMW funding 
accounted for about 47 per cent of the estimated wholesale value of NMW-funded 
CDs” (Department of Canadian Heritage 2005c, 11).  This has not been quantified 
since 2005.  Nevertheless, the support has continued with NMW remaining the 
largest programme within CMF and one of the largest supporters to FACTOR and 
Musicaction for sound recording, both within juried programmes and DBA strands.     
 
 Policy Monitoring Program 
 
This stream is intended to provide a budget for PCH to monitor the policy.  Much of 
the consulting has tended to be outsourced, including a 2005 evaluation of the 
Canada Music Council, a cross party working group comprised of parliamentarians 
and music sector representatives.  Each year, the programme has a budget of $1m 
(Department of Canadian Heritage 2009), and in 2004-05 an evaluation was 
produced that stated that it is in place to “ensure that the CMF’s programs remain 
effective and responsive to sector needs, and serve the interests of all Canadians, 
the program monitors and measures the progress and impact of the CMF programs” 
(Department of Canadian Heritage 2005b, 4).  In the end, there was little need for 
this allocation, and the stream was discontinued in 2006 and merged with the 
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department’s overall sound policies directorate, which has its own separate budget.  
 Support to Sector Associations 
 
This stream was discontinued in 2009, but it provided a strong backdrop to the 
development of CMF throughout the past decade.  Its origins begin in 1988, when 
the Department of Communications initiated the Canadian Sound Recording Service 
Organization Contribution Program (CSRCO).  It provided support to music trade 
associations for their investment and export activities, such as producing Canada’s 
trade stand at MIDEM.  This was supported with $350,000 between 1988 and 1993, 
which was then reduced to $315,000 in 1994-1995 (Task Force on the Future of the 
Canadian Music Industry 1996, 39).  While the programme was cut in 1995, its 
structure remained in place, resurfacing in CMF as Support to Sector Associations.  
This programme provided overhead funding for national and regional Music Industry 
Associations (MIA), including CIRPA, ADISQ and CMPA.   
In 2009, the programme and the recipients were given the choice of either merging 
into MEC or becoming an applicant of FACTOR.  CIRPA and ADISQ decided to join 
the MEC programme while all other associations went with FACTOR through its CI 
and NMW streams.  As a result, MEC was restructured to include a strand for sector 
associations, with CIMA receiving $445,000 in 2010-2011 and ADISQ receiving 
$562,500 (Department of Canadian Heritage 2012).  The same amount was provided 
the following year.  No reason has been provided by PCH as to why ADISQ receives 
more than CIMA, even though CIMA represents a larger population base, as this has 
not always been the case.  In 2004-2005, CIRPA received $197,317, while ADISQ 
received $175,261 (Department of Canadian Heritage 2005a, 5).  However, the total 
amount awarded in the programme was $650,998 annually, and currently, ADISQ 
and CIMA receive more than this through PCH, with other provincial organisations 
reporting to FACTOR.  
Analysing the Canada Music Fund 2001-2006 
 
By 2001, a number of diversified revenue streams emerged through publishing, 
Internet distribution and touring and as a result, more funds were made available for 
these activities, with the total budget eclipsing SRDP five fold, with $25m available 
instead of $5m.  However, the new program introductions did not analyse pre-
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existing complexities with how the policies reflected CANCON and The Broadcasting 
Act.  Nor did it qualify any method of measuring success, such as through radio 
playlist penetration or greater international development.  
CMF, as a whole, was pointed more at market penetration than any public support 
mechanism established previously, with a redefined focus on establishing and 
supporting commercial success.  As a result, the impact of CANCON in this policy was 
different to previous interventions.  It remained a pre-requisite to adhere to – both in 
quota and supposed diversification – but CMF took a set of objectives that “picked 
winners and losers” more, as Billboard journalist Larry Leblanc notes (pers. comm).  
Those with the most commercial viability were provided with more subsidies.  The 
development of Canadian content was not ignored; it was reinforced, but done so 
with another variable placed on top, one where the state was focused on influencing 
and developing commercial success through cultural policy.  Once again, economic 
and cultural objectives intertwined, but with CMF, those leaning towards business 
interests were prioritized.      
These new methods of intervention altered Canada’s cultural policy framework, as 
new structures grew increasingly far removed from the policies that came before.  As 
Straw and Sutherland state in Canadian Music Industry at a Crossroads, the industry 
“seem[s] to be moving from a model that sought to protect Canadian culture at 
home to one more oriented towards promoting and exporting it on the global stage” 
(2008, 153).  This is evident in the wording of From Creators to Audience, which 
outlines the political position to introduce CMF at the time.  It states: “Globalization 
is taking down barriers, eroding borders and making way for a world of opportunities 
for Canadian artists and recording companies.  It is also opening the door to even 
greater competition for the mostly smaller and undercapitalized Canadian firms” 
(Department of Canadian Heritage 2001b, 4).  No longer is the production of content 
a satisfactory outcome in Canadian cultural policy.  Such content must be able to 
compete domestically and internationally, and it is the state’s responsibility to 
encourage such competitiveness, by assisting companies with higher revenues.  This 
policy is not framed, nor reliant on CANCON guidelines; its existence, to ensure the 
production of content, becomes only a level within a greater framework of policies, 
meant to impact both economic and cultural objectives.  
However, if one returns to The Broadcasting Act, it states that policy towards 
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Canadian content “encourage[s] the development of Canadian expression by 
providing a wide range of programming that reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, 
ideas, values and artistic creativity” (Department of Justice 2012a, 3).  The 
regulation continues;  “the Government of Canada is committed to ensuring that the 
industry develops the tools to succeed in this challenging environment and that 
Canadians continue to have access to a diverse range of quality Canadian sound 
recordings” (Department of Justice 2012a, 3).  Such requirements were deprioritised 
in CMF.  As a result, a gap widened where policy was framed through an accepted 
state objective to promote and focus on those with more commercial viability.  As a 
result, CMF benefitted established labels and other entities more, altering the 
manner in how popular music funding was administered in Canada.   
One can posit a theoretical complexity in From Creators to Audience, where “an 
ongoing reluctance in music industry discourse” is continued that remains hesitant 
“to make significant claims about the cultural effectiveness of the music itself” (Straw 
2000, 176).  Once again, there is no attempt to define what Canadian music is and 
for the first time, unlike The Massey Commission and The Applebaum-Hébert Report, 
qualifying a definition of what is and is not Canadian in this context is deprioritised.  
This is because CMF is more economically focused, prompting a marked change in 
rhetoric from previous policies.  CANCON remains an underlying factor in policy and 
a cultural focus is retained in CMD and CA, for example, but the core focus is on the 
development of Canada’s businesses and the state’s role in subsidizing their market-
driven activities. 
Sutherland, in analysing the early stages of SRDP, introduces concepts that can be 
applied to 2001’s policy document.  In essence, the same complexities addressed in 
1986 were revisited in 2001.  He states: 
 
We see a more precise and narrow conception of the industry than in Canadian 
content regulations. Here ‘Canadian’ means Canadian-owned; foreign-owned labels 
are relegated to infrastructure, as distributors. Sound recording is privileged as the 
defining activity of the music industry, both in terms of the program’s name, as well 
as the bulk of the funding.  The relationship between music industries and radio 
broadcasting is still operative and is a feature in the rationale for the SRDP, as well 
as in its administrative structure. The SRDP inherited some of this from Canadian 
content regulations and other broadcast regulation.  If, as we suggested, the limits of 
Canadian content’s efficacy necessitated other, more direct measures, the policy did 
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bequeath other legacies (Sutherland 2008, 170).  
Canada Music Fund, if analysed as a whole, is one of the legacies that Sutherland 
notes that has emerged from CANCON policy.  However, the program’s relationship 
to CANCON, other than requirement that the applicant be Canadian, is deprioritised 
in comparison to SRDP.  
This can be measured through its formative evaluation in 2004.  In the report, three 
objectives are noted that CMF failed to meet in its first three years.  They are; “lack 
of clear objectives, lack of performance management and delays in implementation” 
(Gilroy 2004, vi).  In the same document, it states that CMF did succeed in creating 
more Canadian musical products, adapting artists and the industry to different 
markets and promoting increased access to diverse Canadian music (Gilroy 2004, 
vii).  The three failures, according to the document, can be measured through 
Sutherland’s comments.  Such “limits of Canadian content efficacy” (Sutherland 
2008, 170) is what produced such a lack of clear objectives and performance 
management noted in the review.  This is because CMF, as a complete set of 
programs, included multi-faceted objectives that often contradicted one another 
when placed together.  As a policy influenced and dictated through CANCON 
regulation, CMF succeeded in promoting the core objectives in The Broadcasting Act, 
including encouraging more diverse content and greater content creation.  However, 
the new objectives made apparent in these programs that prioritized economic 
intervention were less conclusive, because little analysis into the impact and 
narrative of CANCON’s legacy, up until this point, was included in CMF’s programs.  
As a result, CMF’s economic focus often did not align with Canada’s cultural 
obligations, shifting the focus to internationalization and commercial success.  
CANCON was not initiated to directly impact commerciality, but CMF was.  This is the 
marked shift in policy in Canada in 2001 and one that would remain the core 
structure from then on, one where economic objectives more often overarched 
Canada’s cultural policy requirements.          
Evaluative Challenges To Policy Alterations 
One of the marked shifts in the early activities of CMF was the changing relationship 
in Canada between nationalism and globalization in Canada’s cultural policy.  In 
Ethnic Nationalism and Post Industrialization, Anthony H. Richmond refers to this as 
a “problem of integration” (1984, 7).  He states; “there is evidence that advanced 
 136 
industrial states are converging in their increasing interdependence as sub-systems 
within a global economy” (Richmond 1984, 7).  In the case of Canada, this comment 
can be used to elaborate on the changing nature of funding in Canada with the 
introduction of CMF.  By 2001, compared to 1986, Canada was more dependent on 
the impact of global technologies on how cultural products were consumed.  
Nationalistic policies such as CANCON were incapable of being enforced on the 
Internet and recorded music, as a whole, was less reliant on traditional borders with 
the development of online file sharing.  As both Canadian and international labels 
lost revenue with the increase in illegal downloading, such interdependence 
increased, as commercial success depended on increasing one’s reach both inside 
and outside of one’s borders.   
The same context influenced The Maple Music System, which first enabled Canadian 
musicians to tour nationally and garner coast-to-coast radio play.  By 2001, the state 
not only had to support the promotion and development of Canadian content, as 
enshrined in The Broadcasting Act, its policies had to also recognize and react to 
global competition and interdependence, to allow such content to compete 
collectively as a “sub-system within the global economy” (Richmond 1984, 7).  As a 
result, nationalism and globalization, in terms of Canada’s music sector, continued to 
converge and CMF is a result of such convergence.  Canadian content needed to 
continue to internationalize for its national identity to be reinforced.  Such 
internationalization increased the cultural worth of content, a trait that the programs 
in CMF identified.  As a result, more funding was allocated for such purposes, even if 
the support lacked “clear, quantifiable objectives” according to the program’s first 
review, one conducted in 2004 (Gilroy 2004, vi).  
To best deconstruct CMF’s eight programs in its first few years, it is best to return to 
the formative evaluation delivered to PCH in 2004.  In its strategic objectives, the 
review states:  
 Canadian Heritage senior managers consider music as part of the cultural policy 
 statement, i.e., music as a source of content. In the chain of supply, it is the sound 
 recording businesses that are essential. From their perspective, while it is true that 
 without the individual artists the music would not be created, it is also the case that 
 without the production, the music would neither reach an audience, nor create a 
 history. As a result, the intent of the CMF design is to affect the structure of the 
 industry, rather than to support solely project-based funding (Gilroy 2004, 18).  
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As a result, in an effort to support the structure of the industry, policymakers posited 
two objectives.  The first was “greater clarity between economic and cultural 
objectives” and the second was a “better targeting of funds” (Gilroy 2004, 18).  For 
this discussion, the first objective is significant.  The review singled out MEC as a 
program that encouraged such clarity, as the guidelines focused on economic 
intervention.  CMF, in this sense, satisfied this objective, but did so with an increased 
bias.  With this increased economic focus, cultural priorities were taken for granted, 
as more support automatically initiated more content production and this could be 
assumed, without qualifying such a statement, to benefit Canadians as a whole.  
However, the funding was tilted towards established companies via an economic 
focus.  For example, at FACTOR, DBA was a programme that only established labels 
could access, and this program was funded through New Musical Works (NMW).  
Arguments were aired that accused the programme’s guidelines of bankrolling labels, 
in order to give the labels influence to retain artists, rather than empowering artists 
to administer their own business dealings.  However, CIRPA, the organization that 
co-founded FACTOR and represented Canada’s independent labels supported DBA, 
as it enabled their members to invest more funds in their artists.  Larry Leblanc, in a 
report submitted to PCH on Canada’s music distribution spectrum, posits this 
argument.  He states: 
 Fierce A&R competition from multinationals has hindered Canadian independent 
 distributors and Canadian labels in attaining new acts. Also according to several 
 Canadian independent distributors, multinationals have recently been more 
 aggressive seeking out foreign-owned independent labels for distribution in Canada. 
 This is a concern to Canada’s independent distribution sector because access to 
 foreign product is core to their businesses. (Leblanc 2006, 5)  
DBA’s focus on supporting established companies correlates with the direction of 
CMF, one that prioritizes economic objectives.  “We did not want to second guess 
the independents so we decided if they have a reasonable track record, we could 
bypass the A&R side of it and allow them funding based on decisions that had a 
proven marketability”, argues Earl Rosen, one of the early architects of FACTOR and 
the DBA program (pers. comm).  “Plus, the major labels are indirect beneficiaries of 
FACTOR, as us independents use their distribution networks.  I don't have a problem 
with that if it helps both the independents and the artists, but we need to protect the 
labels and DBA allows access to this” (Rosen, pers. comm).   
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This structure was corroborated with the guidelines of CMF, but was altered in the 
forward of the initial program review.  In 2004’s CMF annual report, its wording had 
changed from 2001, revealing the aim of the structure to be the “development of 
young artists, the production and promotion of new recordings, multidisciplinary 
projects involving the entire industry, and the conservation and digitization of great 
Canadian musical works” (Department of Canadian Heritage 2004a, 1).  This 
mandate was even greater than had been itemised in From Creators to Audience.   
This change can be best measured through an analysis of the Music Entrepreneurs 
Component (MEC).24  The majority of labels that qualified for MEP/MEC in its first 
year were Quebec labels, questioning how diverse this allocation was in reality.  Such 
accusations have occurred since the establishment of FACTOR within CIRPA.  In a 
2002 editorial in Exclaim!, Canada’s largest independent music magazine, label 
owner Neil Haverty accused both parties of “starving indie labels and only rewarding 
success” (Haverty 2002, 4).  His opening salvo revisits an old argument: 
The Canadian music industry is fed from below by a team of dedicated, underpaid 
enthusiasts who stoke the fires of underground culture. But while the major labels 
hover like vultures to acquire artists at the first sign of success, money earmarked to 
support Canadian culture ignores these ground breaking independent labels. (Haverty 
2002, 1) 
Haverty does not delve into the complexity of Canada’s major and indie structure, 
leaving out the fact that many independents rely on multinational distribution 
structures.  His comments highlight his clear bias towards independent labels, as he 
ignores any talent development that takes place at multinationals.  As a result, his 
argument is unsubstantiated, and yet it was taken as a rallying cry for many 
emerging Canadian artists and labels at the time.  In the feature, he interviews MEP 
administrator Shelley Stein-Sacks who, in his explanation of MEP states the program 
“identifies companies that are in need of having support that will allow them to grow 
in terms of structure. It might just be a matter of upgrading their personnel or it 
might be a full overhaul. You get to a point where, in order to survive, companies 
have to look at better structures to deal with the way they'll position themselves in 
the future" (Haverty 2002, 3).  The comment was contradictory, as only companies 
                                                 
24 This program was renamed in 2005 after the administration transferred from Telefilm to 
the Department of Canadian Heritage.  It’s acronym altered from MEP (Music Entrepreneurs 
Program) to MEC (Music Entrepreneurs Component).  
 139 
with established structures were supported.  In 2001-2002, all 26 who applied 
received support totalling $3m (Gilroy 2004, 16) and in 2002-2003, all 13 companies 
that applied were awarded funding (Department of Canadian Heritage 2005d, 12).  
In all three years from 2001-2004, there was not one unsuccessful applicant.  At the 
time, 315 Canadian companies were trading in the music industry in Canada 
(Department of Canadian Heritage 2005d, 3).  These companies received almost 
one-third of all total funding available through CMF.      
In the history of SRDP between 1987 and 1998, FACTOR approved 1,692 recording 
projects worth $21,731,095, totalling $1,975,554 per year.  In four years of CMF, the 
amount given to FACTOR for NMW totalled over $7m per year, effectively tripling the 
public funding available to sound recording through the programmes.  As a result, 
153 projects per year, on average, were supported through SRDP (for this program 
only) compared to 299 for CMF.  For Musicaction, $1,232,225 was distributed per 
year through sound recording loans, with an average of 85 projects per year 
(Government of Canada 2000, 2:3).   Through CMF, $6,717,669 was distributed to 
673 approved projects, totalling $1,679,417 and 168 projects per year (Government 
of Canada 2000, 2:4).  This equates to double the amount available.  
As a result, a confusing picture emerged as CMF was slated for renewal in 2004, 
three years after its implementation.  This process did not pass without incident.  In 
fact, it set the scene for another problematic period for the three parties involved – 
the music businesses, the state and private broadcasters.  
Canada Music Fund’s First Renewal: 2004 and 2005   
In 2004, CIRPA, CMPA, SOCAN, ADISQ and others began to lobby for the renewal of 
CMF.  This was not an independent issue at the Department of Canadian Heritage.  
CMF only occupied a small fraction of the renewal debate, as it was not CMF itself 
but Tomorrow Starts Today that was expiring.  As a result of the expansive program 
review, the debate was delayed in parliament, prompting a flurry of lobbying on 
behalf of the domestic music sector in early 2004.  In an interview with Ottawa’s 
Capital Arts, FACTOR President and CEO Heather Ostertag claimed that the delay 
was “ironic”, stating that FACTOR had been “audited 47,000 ways to Sunday and, 
time after time, we keep coming up with the thumbs up.  And here we sit in this 
position. We’re not asking for handouts. We’re asking for some investment dollars. 
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The government has to realize how they’re putting things in jeopardy and come up 
with some long-term, stable funding” (Rifkin 2005).  Ostertag’s comments are telling 
for two reasons.  First, she states that the administration has undergone a series of 
auditing procedures. However, these audits, other than releasing annual financial 
statements, were not made public.  Second, she argues that FACTOR is an 
investment structure as opposed to a series of handouts.  This argument challenges 
FACTOR and its core mandate in managing both cultural and economic objectives.  
From the onset of the fund, when it was supported through private broadcaster 
support, FACTOR’s programs resembled those of a cultural business bank, rather 
than a granting administration.  Much of its funding was delivered through loans, 
rather than grants, ensuring that business development of its applicants – in the 
case of greater radio play at the time – remained an argument to defend the nature 
of the fund.  This continued when the state partnered with the organization in 1986.  
If the organization was seen to be simply ‘handing out’ money to its applicants, with 
little analysis or expectation of return, its economically-influenced mandate would be 
compromised, both for its public and private stakeholders.  However, FACTOR 
needed to abide by Canadian cultural policy regulations as well, ensuring that its 
allocation provided support for diverse content and that more Canadian music was 
being produced as a result.  Therefore, repayment rates on FACTOR loans, an 
economic requirement, were never published and no data on the return on 
investment, other than pull-quotes from artists was made public.  This is what 
Ostertag refers to in her comments, as FACTOR lobbied for CMF’s renewal on its 
economic impact, rather than its cultural requirements.  This economic argument 
produces confusion when placed alongside the structures of CANCON and the initial 
policy document outlining the Canada Music Fund.  Ostertag does not argue that 
FACTOR is supporting diversity and an increase in CANCON, but that it is an 
investment structure.  There was no mention of supporting the mandate in The 
Broadcasting Act in the lobbying at the time.  
In the end, the programme was renewed, but only for one year, rather than three or 
five years.  In an official commons debate on 20 November 2004, Minister of 
Canadian Heritage Liza Frulla announced the one-year renewal, stating, in her 
speech to the house, “it cannot be denied that Tomorrow Starts Today has enabled 
us to achieve notable progress.  All over Canada, performance halls, cultural 
institutions, festivals, art schools, publishing houses and theatres have received our 
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support” (Department of Canadian Heritage 2004d, 96).  Frulla did not quantify this 
progress or differentiate between its cultural, Canadian-quota implications and the 
economic value to its constituents, nor does she mention CMF or popular music in 
any regard.  CMF was renewed at the same amount as previous years.  
In the end, alongside the renewal of CMF, FACTOR’s contract was renewed.  
However, the renewal of CMF and subsequent contract extension with FACTOR was 
not confirmed until early 2005, after the renewal of Canada’s film, book and new 
media programmes.  There is no documented explanation for why CMF was renewed 
after other programs, but such delay created tension between the state and the 
music sector.  One argument that could be attributed to the delay was that certain 
programs needed further clarification.  In Gilroy’s review, the author states:  
 There are also some issues concerning clarity of program eligibility criteria, primarily 
 between CCA and FACTOR. One of the administrators notes that the other is 
 referring clients who don’t qualify for their funding, when they are clearly not an 
 eligible client. The administrator feels there is a need to ensure staff in other  
 administrator organizations are clear about each other’s eligibility requirements. 
 (Gilroy 2004, 26) 
Furthermore, the concept of repayment was further examined.  The report 
continues: 
 For two of the main administrators (FACTOR and Musicaction), there has 
 historically been a process of repayment by recipients for some portions of funds 
 received via programs administered under the former SRDP. If a recipient reached a 
 certain level of success with a product for which he/she received funds from the 
 program, he/she would be expected to repay a portion of the funds to the 
 administrating organization. These funds would then be reallocated to other program 
 applicants. 
 There appears to be confusion concerning this aspect of the CMF. The administrators 
 understanding of this process is that it still exists for projects under the New Musical 
 Works Program, however, repayments must now be made to the Receiver General of 
 Canada (according to Treasury Board guidelines), rather than directly to the 
 administrators. Thus, from their perspective, there is no reallocation of funds directly 
 back into the industry. (Gilroy 2004, 30) 
This delay caused some distress at FACTOR and other administrations.  This 
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occurred across the greater cultural industries as Tomorrow Starts Today, as a 
whole, was threatened with closure.  In “Clouds Clear and Cash Comes,” an article 
published in the Toronto Star, Martin Knelman outlines this tension:  “The sense of 
dread engulfing Canada’s arts community is about to be lifted — for now” (Knelman 
2004).  By renewing, “the decision comes after months of fierce lobbying and 
parliamentary hearings, as well as fear, anger and frustration.  And it removes a big 
black cloud hanging over the cultural world” (Knelman 2004) as “reflecting 
widespread anxiety about what would happen if Tomorrow Starts Today came to an 
end on March 31, members of parliament have been bombarded with letters, faxes 
and email messages throughout the fall” (Knelman 2004).  
Furthermore, at the same time as the late announcement of the renewal, Frulla 
presided over a new report analysing Canada’s broadcasting sector, the first since 
The Fowler Commission.  Titled the Lincoln Report, or Our Cultural Sovereignty: The 
Second Century of Canadian Broadcasting (Edge 2004, 76), it tabled 97 
recommendations concerning the future and health of Canada’s broadcasting sector 
and its impact on cultural sovereignty.  Compiled in 2003 by then head of the 
Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, Clifford Lincoln, some of the report’s 
recommendations, ones tabled before the renewal process began, were 
contradictory to the overall focus of CMF.  While the report was largely ignored by 
Canada’s media, it became a strategic policy document to advise the government in 
the wake of the renewal of Tomorrow Starts Today.  One recommendation stated 
that MAPL “be reviewed to ensure that the system fosters the development of new 
artists”, whilst another argued that “the CRTC permit distributors to offer a wider 
range of international programming services” (Parliament of Canada 2003).  This 
proved confusing, as while the report advocated protecting CANCON, it also called 
for less regulation on international ownership.  Funding was not mentioned, but 
Tomorrow Starts Today was referred to as a support mechanism for Canadian 
content development.  The report was comprehensive but little consensus was 
delivered in its release.  Marc Edge, in “Convergence and the Black News Hole: 
Canadian Media Coverage of the Lincoln Report” outlines this, revealing rifts in 
policymakers that stalled its release.  He outlines a comment from the commission, 
stating The Canadian Alliance, Bloc Quebecois and even the Liberal vice-chairman of 
the committee filed “separate opinions disagreeing with or amplifying parts of the 
report, which includes in its title the words “Cultural Sovereignty”” (Edge 2004, 80).  
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Such disagreements concerning The Lincoln Report’s findings infiltrated the renewal 
process of Tomorrow Starts Today.  The title, one relating to Canada’s cultural policy 
objectives, was not agreed upon by all parties, as the report questioned the impact 
of Canada’s business development on the mandate written in The Broadcasting Act.  
By the end of 2004, when Tomorrow Starts Today was renewed and FACTOR had its 
contract extended to administer parts of CMF, these disagreements had further 
infiltrated the work within PCH.  As a result, many of the decisions made became 
increasingly inconclusive, leading to a one-year renewal, rather than three-or-five 
year renewal.  
In addition to the internal review by Gilroy and Associates, PCH produced a public 
facing review of CMF in 2004, titled Music For Everyone.  This report can be argued 
as misleading.  In the report, three objectives are outlined:  to ensure “Canadian 
music artists and entrepreneurs have the skills, expertise and tools to succeed in a 
global and digital environment; to enhance Canadians’ access to a diverse range of 
Canadian music choices and to increase the opportunities for Canadian music artists 
and entrepreneurs to make a significant and lasting contribution to Canadian cultural 
expression” (Department of Canadian Heritage 2005, 3).   These three objectives are 
not easy to align, as once again cultural and economic objectives were placed 
together.  The first, economic success, remained reliant on multinational distribution 
chains and the Canadian music that succeeded in this regard, whether it was 
supported or not, did so by appealing to market-driven radio playlists. In addition, 
quantifying a “significant and lasting contribution” to Canadian cultural expression 
remained undefined, as the concept of what Canadian cultural identity was as a 
standalone entity, remained no less defined than when Goldwyn Smith commented 
on the subject a century earlier.  If more Canadians are producing content, 
regardless of its impact on the market, it can be argued that this is “a significant and 
lasting contribution”.  Yet, the policies were evaluated simultaneously on market 
penetration, which often contradicted a need to diversify Canadian cultural content.  
This was not resolved during the initial renewal process of the Canada Music Fund.  
In addition to the Canada Music Fund, another portfolio was launched in 2001 that 
impacts the history of popular music funding in Canada.  It was introduced by the 
Liberal government in its final term, before being eliminated by the Conservatives 
upon their election victory in 2008.  This fund further questions the impact of 
Canada’s cultural funding structure and its impact on economic objectives.  This 
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portfolio consists of two funds, jointly administered by PCH and DFAIT, called Trade 
Routes and PromART.    
Is Canada a Brand? The History of Trade Routes and PromART 
In 2001, the Liberal government introduced a portfolio that was not specifically 
designed for popular music, but was utilized by popular music organisations and 
companies.  This was comprised of two similar export programmes; one for the 
cultural industries titled Trade Routes (administered by PCH) and a separate cultural 
sector grant programme known as PromART (administered by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)).  This support is significant, 
because its focus centred on branding and promoting Canada to encourage trade, 
cultural exchange and investment, under the promotional term ‘Team Canada Inc.’, a 
term that combined a cultural term  – Team Canada with an economic term meaning 
incorporated – ‘Inc.’ (Department of Canadian Heritage 2003d, 3).    
Trade Routes was first announced in a press conference by then Minister of 
Canadian Heritage, Sheila Copps, on 28 November 2001.  It was initially guaranteed 
for three years and was allocated $23m (Department of Canadian Heritage 2003d, 
3).  Its objective was to support cultural export including film, theatre, dance and 
sound recordings.  The initial brochure outlining the program states:  “Trade Routes 
provides Canada’s arts and cultural entrepreneurs with access to the full range of 
government trade programs and services that operate under the Team Canada Inc. 
banner.  It helps private and non-profit sector entrepreneurs to strategically increase 
their export capacity and sell in international markets” (Department of Canadian 
Heritage 2003c, 3).  Trade Routes, from the onset, was a complicated set of 
programmes that proved difficult to administer and quantify.  Not only did it provide 
export development support to associations and independent labels through a 
“contributions program”, it also placed “in-market specialists” in export territories 
such as the United States and United Kingdom (Department of Canadian Heritage 
2003d, 4).  The allocation of funding was administered by PCH while the in-market 
specialists were administered by DFAIT through its network of embassies and high 
commissions.  It was this team that was referred to, in official documentation, as 
Team Canada, Inc.  This concept of defining Canada through the term “Team 
Canada Inc.” revealed both cultural and economic objectives to the program.  The 
leading concept, “Team Canada” attempted to model Canada as a standalone brand 
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with definable content that could be developed outside its borders while the term 
‘Inc.’, hinted that the Canadian government was acting as a corporation, whose 
saleable product was Canadian content, from oil and gas exports to agribusiness and 
for our purposes, culture.    
Both programs can be traced back to 1995 when the Liberal government published 
Canada in the World, a document analysing how Canada represented itself globally 
(Canadian Council for International Cooperation 1995).  Most of the document 
focused on human rights and Canada’s African policy, but within it led to the 
development of the Arts Promotion Program (APP) in 2001, offering $4m in grants 
per year to the cultural industries through DFAIT.  APP was concluded in 2005 after 
four years, being replaced by PromART.  APP, however, did not support the sound 
recording sector.  Its mandate included “Film, Video and Television, Literature, 
Performing Arts, and Visual and Media Arts” (Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade 2006, 2.3).   It was the introduction of PromART in 2005 that 
directly involved Canada’s independent sound recording sector.  Trade Routes had a 
similar objective, but did not include popular music from its introduction.  According 
to the first application developed for the programme, the fund had two objectives: to 
assist arts and cultural entrepreneurs to become more “export-ready” for 
international markets and to increase trade in cultural products and services 
(Department of Canadian Heritage 2003d, 3).  The rules of the programme are 
similar to FACTOR.  75% of allowable expenses were provided with a maximum 
investment $100,000 per fiscal year, although companies were allowed to “stack” 
funding, or seek support from other government agencies (Department of Canadian 
Heritage 2003c, 14).  This 75% funding structure required independent investment 
from the applicant, although that could be provided through other funding 
structures.  The programme, first introduced for only three years, was renewed in 
late 2004 by then Minister of Canadian Heritage Liza Frulla.  At the time, it provided 
another substantial source of support.  Independent labels, management and 
publishing companies attended major music conferences like MIDEM, South by 
Southwest and Popkomm with Trade Routes support, and Canadian cultural trade 
commissioners were posted abroad were able to provide in-market support for 
Canadian companies, including scheduling meetings and performances at embassies 
and high commissions.   
By 2007, Trade Routes and PromART were contributing a total of $13.7m per year to 
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Canada’s cultural industries (Schellenberger 2009b, 6), and from 2003-2007 the 
programmes were significantly supportive of Canadian musical exports abroad.  For 
example, to launch a partnership with The Great Escape Festival in 2006, one of 
Canada’s trade commissioners in London, Jeffrey Crossman, along with his colleague 
in Canada at DFAIT, Nicki Dewar, paid £20,000 for a covermount partnership with 
NME, titled Canadian Blast: The Sounds of the New Canadian Scene (Dewar, pers. 
comm).  This CD featured acts performing at the festival and was combined with a 
trade mission before the festival at the high commission (Dewar, pers. comm).  A 
portion of this project was underwritten through Trade Routes, with the rest coming 
via CIRPA (through its ability to source support from central government), the 
industry partner.  This was publicised in an internal DFAIT newsletter, titled 
“Canadian music industry heads across the pond” (Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade 2007, 6).  The newsletter interviewed NME’s features editor, 
James McMahon.  He states; “every so often, a city or country inexplicably comes 
alive and spews forth a whole load of great new music and now, all ears are on 
Canada. From the jittery art punk of Tokyo Police Club, to the glorious gloom of The 
Besnard Lakes, to agitated noise of Holy Fuck and the croon of Patrick Watson, 
Canadian Blast is your definitive taster of one of the most exciting new music scenes 
in the world” (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2007, 7).  This 
advertorial promoted the Canadian brand, under the title Canadian Blast, to provide 
publicity for the aforementioned acts (Dewar, pers. comm).   
These types of initiatives supported in Trade Routes were short lived.  In 2007, the 
newly elected Conservative administration reviewed PCH’s arts support in its 
inaugural budget.   In the end, both Trade Routes and PromART, along with ten 
other programmes were eliminated, providing $47m in savings to government.  
These cuts were not formally announced.  Instead, they were published on the 
Government of Canada website, possibly in an attempt to allay criticism towards the 
decision (Quill 2008a).  In the end, the amount saved attributed to Trade Routes 
was $7.1m per year and $4.8m for PromART (Schellenberger 2009b, 8).  As a result, 
the cultural industries community rallied in opposition to the cuts.   
However, in the coverage that followed, much of the criticism levied on the state 
was by those working in the cultural industries, rather than the creators themselves.  
The Canadian Conference for the Arts, in their newsletter outlining the cuts, argued 
that “we have too much to lose if we merely shrug our shoulders – the real value for 
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money in these programs cannot be measured without an appreciation of how our 
artists, creators and arts professionals enhance the image of Canada as a 
sophisticated, diverse and creative nation” (Canada Conference for the Arts 2008).  
This opinion was echoed by Antoni Cimolino, director of the Stratford Shakespeare 
Festival, who claimed the cuts would have a “devastating effect” (Quill 2008a).     
The state’s response was that “programs affected were those that were not 
effectively meeting objectives, or had attained their original objectives” and that only 
3.4% of PCH and DFAIT’s budget was re-allocated (Moore 2007).  Other state 
officials expressed ideological concerns towards the programs, including then Foreign 
Affairs Minister David Emerson’s spokesperson, Anne Howland.  She stated; “we felt 
some of the groups were not necessarily ones we thought Canadians would agree 
were the best choices to be representing them internationally", as reported by CBC 
(Fortin 2008).  Howland singled out instrumental Toronto act Holy Fuck and a $3,000 
tour grant received through PromART as one such example (Fortin 2008).  Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper defended the cuts, at a press conference on 26 August 
2008, explaining, his government had increased funding for the arts in total.  He 
stated; “every five years we go over all our funding programs to find which are the 
most effective.  Some arts programs went down, others went up" (Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation News 2008a).   
A number of international media outlets covered the fallout, including the Austin 
Chronicle who published an article titled What Happened to Canada?  In it, writer 
Darcie Stevens argues; “what is especially disheartening is the reasoning behind the 
cuts, as the money “went to groups that would raise the eyebrows of any typical 
Canadian, according to a government official” (Stevens 2008).  Here, an ideological 
shift concerning why music (and the greater cultural industries in this case) was 
funded in Canada came into question.  For the Conservative government, in addition 
to financial reasons, these funds supported content they deemed unsuitable to their 
definition of Canadian content, according to Howland.  For Holy Fuck, Exclaim 
interviewed bass player Matt McQuaid, who stated: 
 I guess more than anything it's a little bit annoying that we've been made the 
 scapegoat when you consider how much money we received relative to the budget 
 for the entire program.  So, all of these other larger groups who need money more 
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 than we do to travel abroad — like ballet and symphonies — we  become the 
 scapegoat for the cutting into their funding. (Thiessen 2008b) 
 
McQuaid’s comments are significant.  Here, he comments on the ideological reasons 
behind the decision to cut the fund, rather than the elimination of the program itself.  
The rest of Exclaim’s interview with McQuaid is equally telling, and is worth quoting 
in full: 
 McQuaid went on to tell the CBC he realized how the band’s name could make them 
 an easy target but said, considering they were nominated for this year’s $20,000 
 Polaris Prize and other awards, he doesn’t understand how supporters of the cuts 
 could say they and other artists aren’t mainstream enough.  "We've been nominated 
 for a Juno Award — that's as mainstream as you get for popular music in Canada," 
 he said. "That argument falls flat in our case and from what I've read… for a lot of 
 other people as well."  McQuaid also said other programs such as FACTOR and the 
 Canada Council are crucial for the success of Canadian artists. "They just help bolster 
 Canadian artists as they're achieving their goals — whether it be music or whatever 
 they do," he said. "A lot of times people are doing things that are valuable and 
 meaningful but not necessarily commercially viable. (Thiessen 2008b) 
 
McQuaid, part of an act used as a scapegoat to justify the removal of the fund, 
outlines the complexities that were not approached by either the government or the 
creative sector in measuring the core objectives and worth of the fund.  One criticism 
McQuaid notes is that, according to the article, supporters of the cuts preferred 
funding to be provided to more economically viable projects.  In addition, he 
separates “valuable and meaningful” from “commercially viable”.  However, Trade 
Routes and PromART (Holy Fuck were blamed for the cancelling of PromART) were 
not economically focused support structures.  As a result, measuring their impact on 
Canada’s cultural commerciality was unsustainable, providing a justification for it to 
be cut in favour of other programs.  This reveals the complexities at the time, ones 
that further increased with the cancelling of these programs.  The new 
administration sought to change the definition, and did so by restructuring two 
programs and justifying it by claiming the content supported did not satisfy their 
objectives.         
The reasons why the Liberals established the programmes also reveal justifications 
for why the Conservatives cancelled them.  Former Minister of Canadian Heritage, 
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Sheila Copps, claims that their concept of federalism was different to the 
Conservatives, who initiated the policy in the first place.  “We started it to reinforce 
culture with our Quebec partners”, argues Copps. “We would spend all this money in 
Telefilm and other cultural endeavours, and when acts went abroad, our embassies 
didn't know anything about it.  And the Quebec provincial government was very 
good promoting their content abroad.  So, to me, we were developing this talent and 
when it came to marketing, our own embassies didn't know.  So it was a cheap way 
to maximize what we were already spending money on” (Copps, pers. comm).  In 
this sense, the policy itself was concerned equally with reflecting positively on the 
state to promote federalism, as it was supporting Canadian content abroad.  When 
the Conservative government won the election, this concept of federalism was re-
ordered, and with it such programmes within DFAIT and PCH aimed to influence it. 
In Holy Fucked: Strategizing Resistance to Harper’s Arts Cuts, Lorraine York 
elaborates on the program elimination:   
 
 The Department of Canadian Heritage pursues two strategic objectives, known in 
 acronymic bureaucratese as SO1 and SO2.  The former covers support for Canadian 
 artists’ expression at home and abroad (literature, music, film, other media, support 
 for festivals, etc.), whereas SO2 promotes “intercultural understanding,” “citizen 
 participation,” and “sports.” Since the Conservatives were elected in 2006, 
 contributions to SO1, which is the core source of funding for the arts, have declined 
 from $817m million to $759m million. Contributions to SO2, however, which has 
 nothing to do with the arts, have increased from $567.7m million to $631.6m million, 
 which accounts  for the overall augmentation to the ministry budget. (York 2007, 11)  
As a result, the priorities within PCH concerning the greater arts budget were 
reordered.  This corroborates Howland’s comments implicating Holy Fuck, as well as 
comments made by Stephen Harper, who stated that arts were “a niche issue” 
(Benzie, Campion-Smith and Whittington, 2008).  He stated:  “I think when ordinary 
working people come home, turn on the TV and see a gala of a bunch of people at, 
you know, a rich gala all subsidized by taxpayers claiming their subsidies aren't high 
enough, when they know those subsidies have actually gone up – I'm not sure that's 
something that resonates with ordinary people" (Benzie, Campion-Smith and 
Whittington, 2008).   
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Officially, the administration’s response was: 
 
 We actively support the work of Canada’s creators both at home and abroad. We do 
 this through programs that deliver effective results for both Canadian creators and 
 taxpayers. In 2008-2009, the Department of Canadian Heritage, its partners and the 
 Portfolio provided almost $22M in support of international activities. This includes 
 $12m through the Canada Council for the Arts, $4.7m through the Association for the 
 Export of Canadian Books, $1.9m through Telefilm Canada, $2.3m through FACTOR 
 and Musicaction and $0.6m through the National Film Board of Canada. (Canadian 
 Broadcasting Corporation 2009b) 
 
In essence, the elimination of Trade Routes and PromART signalled a new 
framework in how the Conservative government was to support Canada’s cultural 
industries.  Supporting Canadian content in a manner similar to the wording of The 
Broadcasting Act – to strengthen, enrich and promote – was no longer a standalone 
justification for state support.  As a result, some cultural industries leaders that 
commented on the program elimination did not properly assess this change.  For 
example, Co-Chair of the Canadian Cultural Industries Board, Menno Plukker, wrote; 
“this unilateral decision clearly contradicts the government’s stated desire that the 
public and private sectors should work together in order to make more efficient use 
of the limited resources available to the Cultural Industries” (Plukker 2008).  Plukker, 
in referring to the resources available as limited, unintentionally provided further 
justification for the program’s removal.  If one claims Canadian cultural industries 
support at the time was limited, one must question an over-reliance on support, so 
much so that reducing it is seen as limiting.  On behalf of the independent music 
sector, CIRPA argued that the cuts “could not come at a worse time” (Werb 2008b).  
They argued; “unpaid and illegal downloading of music is crippling the Canadian 
music industry.  Since 1999, income from the sale of recorded music has been 
halved.  Canadian illegal downloading leads the world.  As a result, Canadian 
musicians are leaving the business, and their incomes are at, on average, poverty 
levels” (Werb 2008b).  Furthermore, Al Mair, who was granted $4200 to attend the 
By:Larm festival in Norway and speak in Finland published an editorial in the 
conservative-leaning National Post, argued that “every opportunity to promote the 
export of Canadian music is important and creates new markets for Canadian artists 
in foreign territories”, and, positively, “the vast majority of our internationally 
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successful artists have received government support in the early parts of their 
careers” (Mair 2008).  
 
Each comment from Canada’s arts professionals is underlined with supposed cultural 
obligations that assert that it is the state’s responsibility to support content creators, 
both at home and abroad.  It is this responsibility that underwent a restructuring, 
with Trade Routes and PromART the first programs affected.  However, it is this 
argument that has been slowly reordered since 2001.  The new administration 
expedited and reordered it and did so insensitively, but this removal was not 
exclusively the result of a budgetary exercise.  It signalled a further expansion of a 
shift from cultural to economic objectives, where funding would continue to be 
prioritized for commercial pursuits.  As a result, many in Canada’s cultural 
communities believed the state was turning its back on its content creators.  
Ironically, it is McQuaid, the content creator rather than the cultural industries 
worker, that best verbalized the complexities of the programs’ elimination.    
  
An Ideological Shift in Popular Music Funding 
 
This abolishment of both Trade Routes and PromART is significant in introducing a 
new phase in the history of both arts and popular music funding in Canada.  Trade 
Routes and PromART reflect ideals voiced by Massey, Louis Applebaum and Jacques 
Hébert.  Returning to The Massey Commission, the report argues, “it is generally 
agreed by those competent to give informed views that there is room for the 
development of Canada's information and cultural activities abroad” (Cloutier 1951, 
253).  “By those competent”, according to Massey, is not defined, but in 1951, it was 
recognized that Canada required robust cultural outposts abroad to project its 
national narrative to its neighbours.  This is the same belief of the Liberals in their 
introduction of Trade Routes and PromART.  The Massey Commission claimed, “it is 
not unnatural that Canada has been frequently called "the unknown country"”  
(Cloutier 1951, 1).  Defining this “unknown country” since 1951 influenced the 
introduction of CANCON and content quotas and later, a need to disseminate and 
promote such content.  While the definition of what this content is shifted from high-
art forms to more popular music over the years, a desire to promote this content as 
a tool to foster a national identity remained enshrined in policy, as this was a tool to 
“enrich and promote” Canadian content.  As a result, an inherent set of values was 
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ascribed onto the external promotion of Canadian culture, so much so that Canada, 
as the state believed, required an incorporated team to support it.  However, Trade 
Routes and PromART were not policies concerned with commercial success or 
stardom.  While the state did not abandon this historical narrative focused on 
developing Canadian cultural content, under Prime Minister Stephen Harper, this 
narrative was redefined.  This does not mean that his government did not support 
the cultural industries; at the same time Trade Routes and PromART were cut, the 
budget for the Canada Council for the Arts (CCA) was increased by $50m (Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation 2009) and the Canada Music Fund was, in the end, 
renewed and increased.  Both support structures, however, were more hands off, 
with program design and allocation decided by third party administrators, rather than 
the state itself.   
 
However, the polemic displayed by both sides of the argument failed to recognize 
this continued reordering of priorities.  Instead, the argument fell on a simplistic 
notion that supporting Canadian cultural production was being abandoned by the 
state.  For Stephen Harper and his government, comments blaming specific artists 
supported claims from the arts community that this was true.  In fact, what had 
emerged was a change in how the state approached its responsibilities to promote 
Canadian cultural content, one that had begun with the commercial radio review in 
1998.  The shift, conceptually, had been reasserted that placed economic objectives 
above cultural, despite the system continuing to be principally legislated through 
cultural policy.  In terms of the wording on The Broadcasting Act and the objectives 
of CANCON, the “protection” of CANCON remained.  The quota system was not 
reduced and extensive subsidies remained, mainly administered by third parties.  
However, the concept of “promoting” Canadian content and the reasons this was 
done, at least by the federal state, was minimized.   
 
In The Economics of Nationalism, Breton theorizes this imbalance in terms of cultural 
and economic objectives that can be used to analyse this shift in Canada’s national 
narrative policies.  He states:  “The economic significance of political nationalism 
arises from the fact that this type of nationalism generates and encourages demands 
for changes in the international or interethnic distribution of property…in the territory 
where nationalism exists. But changes in the distribution of titles to real wealth in 
favor of nationals can only be effected in the absence of confiscation, at a cost in 
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terms of present resources” (1964, 377).  This hypothesis, written in 1964, offers 
interesting conclusions in measuring the ideological shift that led to the elimination 
of Trade Routes and PromART.  Breton argues that nationalism, in this case, is 
reinforced through a distribution of wealth and property, and those that are most 
nationalistic are the ones who control the distribution of such property.  As a result, 
this “absence of confiscation” (Breton 1964, 377) leads to such reprioritization of 
cultural objectives, as it is are those pre-existing “resources” that are realigned.  
Here, what was most “popular” was most valuable in the context of cultural funding 
in Canada.  Both Trade Routes and PromART, structures set up to support a sense of 
“Team Canada Inc.”, did not conclusively produce such a return.  Instead, this was 
done through more economic initiatives, such as those supported through MEC.   To 
Breton, “nationality, then, is a form of capital which can be augmented through 
investment or reduced through depreciation and consumption” (1964, 377).   
In the introduction to How Canadians Communicate III, a series of articles published 
by Athabasca University in 2009, editors Bart Beaty and Rebecca Sullivan re-assert 
this theory by placing it firmly in its temporality.  They state:   
 Claims of a hidden ideological agenda were furthered when the government cut the 
 PromART program, which funded international travel and foreign exchange among 
 artists and journalists.  In this case, there was a near and refreshing honesty coming 
 from government officials who identified journalists and artists like Avi Lewis and 
 Gwynne Dyer as people who were not necessarily ones we thought Canadians would 
 agree were the best choices to be representing them internationally.  (2009, 12)  
This “near and refreshing honesty” (2009, 12) that Beaty and Sullivan outline is in 
fact the reassertion of a shift in the concept of nationalism in Canada, and how 
popular culture influences and promotes Canada’s national narrative.  The concept of 
being Canadian, according to what can be derived from these policy decisions, was 
one akin to Breton’s description, where it is more a form of capital, one incorporated 
to produce and develop economic objectives, rather than those more focused on 
cultural objectives enshrined in The Broadcasting Act.   
By 2010, Trade Routes and PromART were officially cancelled.  There was no 
cumulative analysis undertaken of the programs’ efficacy or impact.  The Liberals, in 
2004, released the only formative evaluation of Trade Routes.  It acknowledged at 
the time “on the delivery side, the implementation of the Contributions Program is 
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considered to have a number of challenges,” including lack of timeliness, 
communication difficulties and a lack of performance management (Gilroy 2004, 21).  
A shorter and more general report followed in 2006.  It claimed; “Trade Routes 
would be renewed for another five years (to 2010)” (Department of Canadian 
Heritage 2006, 1).  This decision to renew was set by 2004, as in the review of CMF, 
in a section explaining the fund’s links to “Canadian Heritage Objectives,” it is noted: 
 Trade Routes, by supporting the marketing of Canadian cultural content to 
 those outside Canada, allows access to aspects of Canadian cultural life.  In addition, 
 participation by Canadian cultural entrepreneurs in trade shows and exporting events 
 in other countries allows Canadians to showcase their work.  Through 
 strengthening cultural industries opportunities to export and expand their business 
 foundations, cultural participation and engagement is enhanced. (Gilroy 2004, 45) 
These objectives were no longer a priority for Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s 
administration.  However, these priorities did not begin with Harper’s election victory.  
Such priorities have been shifting since 1998.  Emerging from the mandates 
introduced during the 1998 commercial radio review, Radio Starmaker Fund (RSF) 
and FondsRadiostar launched in 2000, allocating its first round of funding in 2001.  
RSF reinforces this trend towards prioritising economic objectives, the same that led 
to the elimination of Trade Routes and PromART.  Therefore, it is best to return to 
the beginning of the millennium and introduce this fund, as its introduction and 
proliferation further examines a shift in the history of popular music funding in 
Canada.  Here, nationalism and the development of Canada’s national narrative are 
eschewed, as there is no public money in these programs.  However, it is a complex 
mechanism as its existence, created by allowing media companies to consolidate, 
impacts the development of Canada’s national narrative and its relationship with 
state policy.  
Radio Starmaker Fund 
 
Radio Starmaker Fund (RSF) and FondsRadiostar (English and French) were created 
in 1997 but not launched until 2000, with the first round of funding awarded to over 
a dozen acts in 2001.  This fund is different to other administrations created before, 
as its name reveals its objective, one not outlined in FACTOR or other programs.  
RSF/FondsRadiostar was commercially focused and designed exclusively for 
established artists.  In addition, it did not support content production, a structure 
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that broke from the core objectives of CANCON and state policy, where the creation 
of Canadian content underwrote all policy.  In its first year, just under $3 million was 
guaranteed, with a cap placed at $50m, which was expected to last a decade 
(Canadian Association of Broadcasters 1998).  For FondsRadiostar in 2001-2002, the 
fund distributed over $1.5 million (FondsRadiostar 2002), or 20% of the total amount 
available for the fund.  Both funds are non-renewable, as the support is accrued 
through half of the 6% tax on broadcaster mergers and acquisitions, as mandated in 
the 1998 commercial radio review.  While it was initially estimated to conclude in 
2010, the fund remains operational, with four rounds of funding available per year 
with RSF and a rolling programme through FondsRadiostar.  Musicaction administers 
the support allocated to FondsRadiostar in Quebec.  For the purpose of this section, 
the analysis and program outline will focus primarily on RSF, with FondsRadiostar 
being evaluated in more detail in chapter 5, a case study of Quebec.  While the 
funds originated together, their guidelines and administrations are separate and 
require different analyses.   
 
Both funds were initiated by CAB members Gary Slaight of Standard Broadcasting 
and Ross Davies of CHUM.  According to now executive director Chip Sutherland, the 
fund was developed through two requirements; the first allowed stations to buy up 
rivals in the same market, and the second was that control over the funding was 
independently administered.  This allowance amounted to ownership of two AM or 
FM stations in any market with eight or more stations (Roman, pers. comm).  If a 
company owned two FM stations in a given market, they were also allowed to 
purchase one AM station, or vice-versa (Roman, pers. comm).  “The broadcasters 
knew such consolidation of ownership would have an effect on culture, in theory, so 
they accepted a tax on such agreements, which was arbitrarily decided at 6%” 
(Sutherland, pers. comm).  This tax that Sutherland argues as being wholly accepted 
was in fact heavily negotiated, and there were debates concerning who would 
administer this allocation and how much it should be.  In its initial discussions, 
FACTOR lobbied heavily to retain the funding in-house, while CIRPA argued that only 
independent labels should have access to the funding.  In the agreement with the 
CRTC, a compromise was reached, albeit begrudgingly.  Of the 6% tax, 2% was 
delivered to FACTOR, 3% became the new fund, 0.5% was delivered to community 
radio programming and the final 0.5% was discretionary, ultimately being used as 
marketing reinvestment in the stations themselves.  Initially, CAB members argued 
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for a 3% tax, while the music industry lobby aired percentages as high as 10%.  In a 
speech that was recorded at The Empire Club in Toronto in 2001, Michael McCabe, 
then President of CAB, stated: 
 
Private radio broadcasters accept the public-policy goals underpinning the Canadian-
content requirements. But many in our industry are concerned about the continued 
shortage of high-quality Canadian music that appeals to a mass audience.  In other 
words, Canada does not have enough music stars.  This is a serious challenge, and 
one that cannot be overcome through government regulation. Statistics prove this 
beyond any doubt. (McCabe 2001)  
 
There are thematic complications with McCabe’s description.  He equates ‘high 
quality’, a term used to define a specific form of music with those appealing to mass 
audiences, as if they are one and the same.  This ‘high quality’, for the purposes of 
the fund, is tilted towards an emphasis on hit making and stardom as a core definer.   
As a result, the quota, to CAB in these negotiations, was satisfied by the CANCON 
that suited them, which in this case was music with commercial potential.  As such, 
RSF/FondsRadiostar were more in tune with the desires of broadcasters, than any 
previous culturally focused initiative.  To defend this shift, McCabe argued CANCON 
was not satisfying the needs of his members.  He claimed that Canada did not need 
more music, per se, but more music stars and commercial successes.  This was the 
framework that became foundational to this new support structure, which, it can be 
argued, contradicted the initial objectives that enacted CANCON.  Canadian content 
regulations have never been written, in policy, to assist in building a star system.  
While the review of the Canada Music Fund expressed a desire to facilitate greater 
commercial success, achieving stardom was not a pre-requisite for support.  Instead, 
being Canadian and creating content as a Canadian was.  For RSF/FondsRadiostar, 
this was not the case.  The support was privately delivered and the requirements to 
meet such guidelines were up to the broadcasters.  This, for the broadcasters, was a 
triumph of economic objectives over cultural, or in other words, a refined focus on 
international success over local content development.  Their argument was that 
while more music may not beget more stars, more stars may beget a stronger, more 
sustainable sector.  
 
In this speech, the theory behind the initiatives are outlined:  
 
 157 
The concept behind these two funds is very simple: they are going to seek out and 
identify the most promising musical artists, and then provide them with the 
marketing and promotional support needed to help them become stars. Our business 
goal is very straightforward: we want to increase the supply of Canadian music that 
Canadians want to listen to. It's a revolutionary concept, I know: we intend to do 
nothing less than give the people what they want. (McCabe 2001) 
  
Four important points can be taken from McCabe’s speech.  Firstly, in his desire to 
promote international stars, McCabe intonates that what he feels Canadians want to 
listen to are artists performing music that is more ‘international’ than Canadian.  
Second, for the industry to develop, according to the mandate taken up by CAB, is 
that it must produce artists that sound ‘international’.  Thirdly, the music becomes 
unimportant, as it could be composed by any nationality.  Therefore, to satisfy the 
quota, McCabe intonates that it is in their best interests that these artists that 
compose such ‘international’ music be Canadian, so they can satisfy the quota 
regulations.  Lastly, his intention to “give people what they want” supposes that CAB 
and its member stations either knew what “people” wanted or intended to structure 
that desire according to their model and objectives.  That desire is a further 
internationalization of Canadian music, for the sake of making it more palatable for 
their programming needs.  There is no mention of diversity, nor a definition, in their 
case, of Canadian music proposed.   
 
Previous policies have not focused on giving people ‘what they want’.  Instead, they 
focused on giving people ‘Canadian content’, whatever that was defined to be.  As a 
result, to qualify for support, RSF/FondsRadiostar enacted sales quotas that each act 
had to meet, proven by Neilson receipts upon submission of application.  These were 
separated by genre and remain intact today, although they have changed slightly.  
The highest quota is in pop/rock, with world, jazz and classical having the lowest.  
Ultimately, the concepts defended by The Massey Commission had been reversed by 
RSF/FondsRadiostar.  Now, pre-defined ‘high art’ music was the lowest in scale of 
popularity and protection, replaced by a focus on stars.  
 
Here, the concept of what had the most value to the policymakers had shifted from 
the cultural to the economic.  RSF/FondsRadiostar differed considerably from the 
initial reasons CANCON was developed.  Here, the support was delivered to acts that 
 158 
had already achieved a certain level of success, similar to the DBA programme at 
FACTOR, but given directly to the artist rather than the label.  It was self-serving for 
CAB members, as it provided content that better suited its programming 
requirements.  By setting larger quota levels, unlike the early stage programmes at 
FACTOR, the support was destined for those with previous success, almost implying 
that RSF will assist those who have already displayed promise or some degree of 
career viability.  No support would be provided to record, and one’s CANCON 
contribution must have pre-proven commercial worth.  This was a new manner of 
satisfying quota requirements without producing content.  
 
FACTOR was separated from these developments.  This is significant because it 
challenged the status quo at the time, when the administration of broadcaster 
money was usually deferred to FACTOR.  The result, for the CRTC, was to split the 
monies, giving FACTOR one-third of available support.  “At the time, the 
broadcasters were 60% of FACTOR”, argues Sutherland.  “And there has been this 
uneasy truce between the parties involved – FACTOR, CRTC and broadcasters.  This 
is what created the conditions of the money” (pers. comm).  One such condition, 
argued against vigorously by CIRPA at the time, was that major-label content could 
be eligible and allowed to apply. The rules stated that the royalties from the record 
must return to a Canadian company.  
 
You do not qualify for funding if the royalties and revenues from the Canadian sales 
of your records flow directly to a corporation outside of Canada. You must receive 
your royalties from Canadian sales directly through a Canadian company. (Radio 
Starmaker 2001)  
 
By the creation of RSF all four major-labels had stakes in domestic companies.  Most 
of these had been in operation since the early 1960s, as the only one to emerge in 
the 1990s was Universal Music’s investment in Maple Music Recordings, which is not 
to be confused with Maple Music Inc., set up during The Maple Music Junket (Mair, 
pers. comm).  This challenged independent labels to increase their market share, 
which never eclipsed 15-20% of content on Canadian radio playlists, although this 
has never been formally quantified across all playlists (Sutherland, Mair, Roman and 
McKie, pers. comm).  CIRPA argued that allowing major-label content to access RSF 
was unfair to independent labels.  RSF responded by opening up applications to 
 159 
individual artists, regardless of the artists’ labels.  As a compromise, artists on major-
labels would have to meet higher sales quotas.  This created the first instance where 
multinational entities could access funding for their projects in Canada.  While the 
funding was not from public coffers, it was mandated by a public body and was, in 
effect, created through legislation.  
 
In its final reports, RSF lists the artists the fund supports, not the labels that may 
have applied for the support.  This was an economic decision, one akin to an 
industry subsidy rather than cultural support.  Again, this shift in how and why artists 
were funded in Canada was reinforced by the fund’s guidelines.  For this support, it 
did not matter how an artist accumulated their success and which businesses they 
worked with; it mattered more that they had the success, regardless of business 
infrastructure.  This was influenced more by the new technologies in place to support 
artist development, rather than the series of programs created in Canada to foster 
the growth of the sector and Canadian content.  By 2003, artists had technology 
available to record at home and release independently if they wished, and such 
structures were not limiting one’s audience, as the distribution mechanisms of online 
downloading, streaming and aggregation could turn any artist into a record label.  
Here, the internationalization of music marketing and distribution was placed on top 
of the development of Canada’s domestic sector.  However, accruing success in 
Canada remained at the core of RSF, despite this push towards greater 
internationalization.  All sales figures for qualification were for Canada only, and it 
was the health and variety of broadcasters’ playlists, along with artist development, 
that influenced this fund.  CANCON still encompassed the backdrop of support and 
success in Canada, though a greater internationalization of one’s product remained 
the core objective to satisfy.  If one sold the equivalent amount to qualify abroad but 
few records in Canada, they would not qualify for RSF.  This regulation remained so 
that content for Canadian radio would remain a priority for the administrators, as 
well as being a subsidy system to build stars and reorder market share.    
 
RSF’s rules were outside of state control.  After CAB members agreed to the levy on 
consolidation and the amount that was delivered to FACTOR, further regulations 
were up to the funders themselves.  The CRTC was not mandated to control the 
manner in which the money was allocated, but only to ensure that support was 
available for Canadian content development.  The CRTC did not mention how the 
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money was to be spent.  It stated simply that from the 6% allocation, “3% to be 
allocated to a new Canadian music marketing and promotion fund” (Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission 1998).  In explaining what 
marketing and promotion meant in this context, the report concluded, “the purpose 
of the Canadian music marketing and promotion fund will be to support co-operative 
activities by broadcasters and the music industry to market and promote Canadian 
music, including new talent” (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications 
Commission 1998).  The fund explicitly mentioned new talent, once again associating 
it as having a tangible value within the definition of what Canadian music was to be 
supported.  What this new talent was to be was left undefined, and given that such 
new talent would have to sell between 2500 and 10,000 units in Canada to qualify, a 
level was established that, in some ways, eliminated a significant amount of new 
artists from applying.  For RSF, the new music that was to be supported had to be 
established.  
 
This support has enhanced acts’ ability to market sound recordings and to tour 
domestically and internationally; on the other hand, it has provided this support 
through a non-renewable structure that will conclude when no more consolidation 
occurs in Canada.  As a result, RSF presents a peculiar structure in comparison to 
other Canadian funding initiatives. While CANCON and the requirement to air a 
percentage of Canadian music on radio initiated the discussions leading to RSF, the 
fund itself is distanced from the wording in The Broadcasting Act.  These 
complexities are evident through an analysis of precedence.  Throughout the history 
of popular music funding until the introduction of RSF/FondsRadiostar, support has 
been delivered through a complex structure encapsulating both public and private 
support.  Even when FACTOR was introduced and privately funded, the 
administration submitted reports to government and abided by its regulations, such 
as establishing a French language equivalent in Musicaction.  As a result, RSF was 
created on behalf of supporting CANCON without adhering to its requirements 
concerning Canadian cultural policy.  This was the first privately run and directed 
fund, even though it was created to ensure that Canadian content, and the 
requirements assigned to it through The Broadcasting Act, be supported when 
Canadian media companies bought and sold each other.  It is not the development, 
protection and promotion of Canadian content that is being supported here 
exclusively.  Nor is it a set of programs geared to supporting the activities of 
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Canada’s businesses.  Instead, this is a market-driven subsidy, privately delivered, 
but publicly initiated focused on building stars and supporting, as McCabe outlined in 
his speech; the internationalization of Canadian music, both in style and acclaim.       
 
Radio Starmaker Fund and the Industry 
 
As the fund increased its disbursements, domestic artists market share of Canadian 
content remained stationary, hovering between 15% and 22%.  Overall sales of 
Canadian content, similar to other national music industries, had declined.  By 2008, 
Canada’s trade value of music sales declined by 8% compared to 2006 (Department 
of Canadian Heritage 2007c, 5).  This is not unique to Canada, as the trade value of 
global music sales, however, declined from $24b to $18.4b, according to the IFPI 
(Department of Canadian Heritage 2007c, 6).  However, the amount of albums 
released by Canadian artists remained almost stationary, from 2,562 in 2004 
compared with 2,465 in 2008 (Department of Canadian Heritage 2007c, 9).  Through 
this period, funding continued to increase in Canada, through greater 
RSF/FondsRadiostar availability and the introduction of a series of regional funding 
structures.  However, the amount of support allocated and its impact on its 
recipients in the current music industry had yet to be measured.  For example, the 
2007 Canadian Music Industry Profile does not mention this subsidization, despite 
being published by PCH.  When interviewed in 2008 during Juno week, seven years 
into RSF’s inception, Slaight revealed to Toronto Star writer Greg Quill that the 
increase of support had unintended consequences.  To him, “the problem is not just 
financial.  In fact, there's too much cash available from governments and 
broadcasters (through FACTOR, Radio Starmaker, VideoFACT and Arts Councils) but 
no grand game plan as to how the cash can be best used" (Quill 2008b).   
This is the first time a complaint of this nature was noted publicly.  This private-
sector initiative, targeted at business development, aimed to intervene in Canada’s 
music sector where the most return could be qualified (as little return on investment 
was quantified).  In addition, this funding was delivered as a compromise, one that 
impacted Canada’s cultural plurality as much as the value of its businesses.  As 
Canadian media companies bought and sold each other, each returning a portion of 
the value of the transaction to Canadian content development, the activities of these 
broadcasters were affected alongside their musical programming structures, along 
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with content in newspapers and televisual entertainment.  This resulted in a greater 
debate concerning consolidation in Canada, but not until 2007 with a new set of 
hearings at the CRTC.  In the early 2000s, such issues were predicted, but not 
measured.  For example, the Canada Conference for the Arts, in a paper analysing 
the impact of media consolidation on “safeguarding” the mandate in The 
Broadcasting Act in 2001, remarked that “the scope of vertically integrated 
companies combined with shareholder pressure for internal efficiencies has led to 
both cutbacks and to bringing work in-house that was once done by unaffiliated 
companies. These trends concern us, particularly as they affect news reporting and 
the livelihoods of unaffiliated producers” (Canada Conference for the Arts 2001, 5).  
These potential consequences were not thoroughly debated in the music sector, as 
they were benefitting from the increase in funding delivered through consolidation, 
funding that ended up in RSF/FondsRadiostar, FACTOR, Musicaction and other 
administrations.  
While RSF/FondsRadiostar provides more acts with subsidies to afford expensive 
touring costs, it produces an economy of scale that will eventually disappear, as 
RSF/FondsRadiostar will no longer exist when there is no more media consolidation.  
This temporality, and its impact on the applicant and the sector in general, is hidden 
beneath the size of the fund and its continued investments from consolidation.  The 
fund itself may be temporary, but its influence on Canada’s music sector could have 
lasting, more permanent effects.  Once again, like CMF, the focus was reordered 
towards supporting commercial, economic development and away, at least in 
program guidelines, from more cultural support.  As a result, a substantial amount of 
funding in Canada, through RSF and other administrations could be seen as 
‘Starmakers’, and by investing in this system, Canada’s cultural objectives were 
satisfied, as each international success became, in effect, more Canadian through 
this acclaim.  Funding in Canada, by the mid 2000s leaned towards this focus, and 
RSF was its most evident example.  However, how this would impact Canadian’s 
access to diverse, expansive Canadian content, remained unresolved.  This was to be 
further measured as the CRTC announced its next commercial radio review, to be 
held in 2006.   
 
The 2006 Commercial Radio Review and Defining Emerging Artists 
In 2006, Canada held an election.  The Conservatives won, ending twelve years of 
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Liberal leadership.  Before the election, another CRTC commercial radio review was 
announced, seven years on from the last.  The review was originally intended to take 
place in 2005, but was delayed because of the election and parliamentary debates 
concerning the rollout of digital and satellite radio.  On 31 January 2006, the CRTC 
released a “call of interest” (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications 
Commission 2006b) for hearings set to take place in Ottawa on May 13 and 15, four 
months after the election that was held on January 23.  Like the review of 1998, 
these hearings were intended to debate the financial stability of the private radio 
sector in accordance with its demographic reach, contributions to developing 
Canadian content requirements and issue license renewals.  Once again, the review 
proved controversial between CIRPA, CMPA, its partners and CAB, with each 
providing recommendations to amend the regulations.  The rulings of 1998 were first 
addressed, outlining the financial benefits of the decisions made to CAB members: 
Canadian commercial AM and FM radio stations, as a group, experienced an average 
annual growth in total revenues of 5.5% between the broadcast years 2001 and 
2005. Increases in the limits on the number of stations that a licensee may own in a 
single market established by the 1998 Commercial Radio Policy resulted in a 
consolidation of radio ownership, enhanced operational synergies and improved 
profitability. (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 2006b, 
10)  
All parties who submitted recommendations argued that CANCON be changed.  The 
35% quota level was seen by the industry as too low and by CAB as too high.  CIRPA 
argued that 45% would better suit emerging Canadian content, while the Canadian 
Association of Songwriters argued for 55% (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 2006a).  The broadcasters, once again, argued that 
the quota must reflect market conditions, with “data from Statistics Canada 
indicating that Canadian recordings only comprised 17% of total sales of recordings 
in 1998 and 16% of total sales of recordings in 2000 and 2003”  (Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission 2006b, 52).  In addition, Canadians 
were listening to less analogue radio in 2006 compared to 1998 since new media, 
such as Internet and satellite technology, was competing with traditional radio.  
Opportunities to listen to foreign content, via online sources and satellite radio 
increased, leading CAB members to argue that consumers were, in fact, listening to 
more foreign content.  It was argued, in their submission that traditional radio 
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consumption decreased by 1.25 hours per week, on average (Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission 2006b, 8).  
Furthermore, the disagreements concerning how much of CANCON quota would be 
needed to satisfy new and emerging Canadian content was equally polarising, let 
alone agreeing on a definition of the term ‘emerging’, one as malleable as ‘Canadian 
music’.  CAB, in an effort to define the term, submitted a statement titled “The 
Issues of Requiring Commitment to the Airplay of Emerging Artists.”  This submission 
is worth quoting in full:  
CAB strongly believes that the purpose of establishing an industry-wide definition for 
each of the French and English radio markets is to ensure fairness, predictability and 
consistency when assessing the level of airplay of music by emerging artists on 
commercial radio. It should not in any way shape or form be viewed or used as a 
way to impose additional regulations on the private commercial radio sector. A new 
level of quota or condition of license based on commitments made by applicants 
either through the renewal of their license, through a competitive licensing process 
for attributing new radio licenses or transfer of ownership of existing radio stations is 
unnecessary and unworkable in an era in which regulated commercial radio is 
competing with other, less-regulated or unregulated music delivery platforms. (Smith 
2008, 8) 
Unsurprisingly, CIRPA, SOCAN, CMPA and its partners strongly disagreed, as 
definitions were based more on a percentage of what one was required, rather than 
defining it outright.  One compromise CAB proposed outlined a bonus system for 
playing CANCON between 6AM and 6PM, where each play of a defined emerging 
artist would count for 125% of CANCON requirements.  This would lower the 
CANCON requirement for the station in exchange for a promise to air an emerging 
artist during peak hours, a rule not guaranteed under CANCON.  CIRPA argued while 
CAB members abided by the quota requirement, most music was aired during off-
peak hours.  This is not a new argument, as similar accusations were present at 
CRTC hearings as early as the mid 1970s.  Arguments aside, no party analysed the 
impact of CANCON as defined by The Broadcasting Act.   In the review, the debate 
was focused on how much, rather than questioning the structure in place at the 
time. 
    
In terms of the definition of what an “emerging artist” was in Canada, the CRTC 
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introduced one option, but not until two years later.  An emerging artist, according 
to the CRTC, is defined as “Top 40”, but only for one year.  It is listed below, in a 
review published in 2008 concerning emerging artists: 
 
 “Top 40, less than one year” definition appears to have the most advantages since: 
 Current and historical chart information is relatively easy for all to obtain;  
 Some of the relevant charts combine airplay and sales data, two important measures 
 of   popularity; and  
 The “Top 40, less than one year” definition may strike an appropriate balance 
 between ensuring name recognition on the part of radio listeners and music 
 consumers and the exposure of an ever-renewing roster of emerging talent. 
 (Canadian Radio Television and Telecommunications Commission 2008a, 8) 
In the review itself, there was little consensus and when the CRTC introduced such a 
definition two years later, it was similar to the definition offered by CAB in 2006.  It 
states: 
 
 CAB suggested that, for the English-language markets, a performer be considered as 
 an "emerging Canadian artist" up until 12 full months after the date the artist's first 
 selection reaches the Top 40 on Broadcast Data System (BDS) or Mediabase all-
 format charts, or becomes gold certified for the first time. (Canadian Radio Television  
 and Telecommunications Commission 2006a, 64) 
 
While the CRTC did not abide by such a definition in the review, it appeared in later 
recommendations as a definition similar to that offered by radio.  Here, this definition 
is economically focused, ignoring most CANCON simply because Top 40 artists, 
whatever genre they are, often have stronger business infrastructures than 
traditional notions of emerging talent, where the goal is to develop such teams.  In 
fact, the definition of ‘emerging’ often classified artists that had already ‘emerged.’  
How the definition of ‘Top 40’ was assessed here was through the Broadcast Data 
System, the structure in which the stations independently monitored their 
programming.  This was a private initiative, controlled by the broadcasters.   
 
The independent music sector rallied against this definition.  In its recommendations, 
CIRPA claimed, “there are more than 20,000 tracks released each year in Canada 
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and on average radio stations add less than 70 of them. It is highly unlikely that the 
other 19,930 of them are unfit for radio airplay” (Ferguson 2006, 1a).  While this 
statistic has not been verified, it outlines CIRPA’s frustration on behalf of the 
independent labels.  Part 43 of CIRPA’s own recommendations submitted to the 
CRTC reveals their position: 
 
Let’s face it: Canadian radio isn’t interested in breaking new acts or new music. They 
are asking to receive extra credit for playing music they should already be playing. 
They just don’t want to play it unless it means they can play less Canadian music 
overall, which is the ultimate goal of their proposed bonus system. (Ferguson 2006, 
7b) 
CIRPA did not offer a viable alternative to define the concept of an emerging artist, 
other than one who fits within its independent member base.  As a result, the 
commission did not agree on a definable and acceptable decision for what an 
emerging artist was in Canada, and how they would be treated on Canadian private 
radio.  In the dissenting arguments section, commissioner Stuart Langford stated:  
 Imaginative is the absolute last word that springs to my mind when I review 
 paragraphs 32 to 96 of the majority decision. In essence, with exceptions so minor 
 as, in my opinion, to be practically inconsequential, the majority's view of an 
 appropriate future approach to promoting Canadian content and talent appears to 
 have been envisaged by looking in a rear-view mirror. What they believe they saw 
 there, though, is anyone's guess (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications. Commission 2006b, 220) 
 
Langford’s writing is significant.  Here, he comments on the perceived value of 
CANCON and how it is being administered to support Canadian content creators.  By 
“looking in a rear-view mirror” (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications 
Commission 2006b, 220), Langford argues that the CRTC is administering CAB in a 
manner that allows them to satisfy the regulations in whichever way they see fit, so 
most decisions made by the commission become inconsequential.  Here, the 
protection and promotion of Canadian culture and its associative identities is what 
Langford claims are being ignored.  He continues:  
 
 In my mind, even more confusing than the majority's apparent inability to recognize 
 that the FM industry itself has set 40% as the new standard for popular Canadian 
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 music, is the fact that the majority has identified another problem, but done nothing 
 about it. I refer to the sad fact that though broadcasters have adhered to the letter 
 of the law requiring 35% or more, many have openly defied the spirit underlying it. 
 They meet the 35% level but they do so by playing just a few marquee artists over 
 and over again. That's great for big names like Shania Twain and Avril Lavigne, but 
 not so good for lesser-known performers. (Canadian Radio-Television and 
 Telecommunications Commission 2006b, 220) 
  
This argument is not new.  In fact, it mirrors Stan Klees, John Mills and Walt Greilas, 
when they lobbied the state to establish CANCON.  Yet, it exposes the contradictions 
in place within the system and how they have evolved up until 2006.  By not defining 
the concept of an “emerging artist” concisely, CANCON has become, for many 
broadcasters, a manner to air the content most suitable to them, even if it comprises 
a few select artists.  However, it is the commission’s rulings that have encouraged 
this, as Canada’s cultural plurality on its publicly licensed airwaves have become 
deprioritised, as long as enough funding is provided back to content creators for the 
privilege of airing majority tried-and-tested content.   
This reveals the changes in the history of popular music funding in Canada, ones 
that became more apparent through the introduction of CMF and 
RSF/FondsRadiostar.  A focus on Canadian business interests – in terms of financial 
divestment to content creators and more expansive ownership of broadcast licenses 
by a select number of Canadian media conglomerates – has grown to supersede the 
wording on The Broadcasting Act in reality, even if such policies remain in place.  By 
accepting a version of CAB’s definition of “emerging artists” and permitting their 
independent administration of the largest fund to support such artists, the definition 
of Canadian content, in the context of popular music funding in Canada, had altered.  
Langford’s comments relate to this change, ones that were included in a section of 
dissenters.  Once again, Canadian cultural policy was utilized to legislate and 
regulate economic objectives.   
Commercial Radio Review and Canadian Content Development 
 
In addition to the debate concerning the definition and administration of emerging 
artists, the committee debated whether CANCON should be increased or decreased.  
In the end, it was decided that CANCON be retained at 35% in English Canada and 
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65% for French language artists in Quebec, but preference would be given at 
licensing renewal to stations who volunteered to play more (Roman, pers. comm).  
In this section of the review, the most profound changes were revealed in how CAB 
member stations would support developing Canadian music.   
 
CTD or Canadian Talent Development was changed to CCD, or Canadian Content 
Development.  CCD, unlike CTD, was a mandatory contribution to support emerging 
Canadian music, rather than the previous structure of voluntary contributions.  CCD 
was split into three tiers: an annual contribution, ones over and above the annual 
contribution at licensing renewal and the existing consolidation tax.  The striking 
change for CAB was the first requirement, as CRTC enacted a minimum requirement 
of gross revenue to support CCD.  This is explained below: 
 
- Stations with total revenues in the previous broadcast year of less than $625,000 
will make a fixed contribution of $500. 
- Stations with total revenues in the previous broadcast year between $625,000 and 
$1,250,000 will make a fixed contribution of $1,000. 
- Stations with total revenues exceeding $1,250,000 in the previous broadcast year 
will contribute $1,000 plus 0.5% of the portion of the previous year's total revenues 
that exceeds $1,250,000. (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications 
Commission 2006b, 116) 
 
For Canada’s larger, consolidated radio firms, this new CCD requirement was 
substantial.  0.5% of gross revenue each year, pegged on previous earnings, was a 
significant amount to invest on top of the 6% tax accrued to consolidations and 
other voluntary contributions.  Of this 0.5% tax, 60% was guaranteed to 
FACTOR/Musicaction (in a 60/40 split).  The rest would be delivered to regional 
music industry associations, battle of the band initiatives, international festival 
support and other industry events at the discretion of the broadcaster (Roman, pers. 
comm).  Compared to the amount provided in 2005, $3.5m extra was estimated as 
being added to CCD in 2006, as per the new regulations.  Such contributions were 
provided over a seven-year period, as defined by the license terms of the CRTC.      
 
For the first time, a tax on all broadcasters’ profits was created, outside of the 
consolidation or licensing renewal contribution.  In a communiqué, CAB was 
conciliatory but disappointed, writing that it “believes the Commission took a step in 
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the right direction with regard to the Canadian Content Development framework, by 
confirming the importance of developing content in all facets of radio production and 
extending these benefits beyond the music industry, to spoken word content. 
However, the increased burden that will result from tying these initiatives to 
broadcasters' revenues is of some concern”  (Canadian Association of Broadcasters 
2006b).  For the music businesses, the result was accepted but not as supportive as 
desired.  The CMPA, in a letter written by President Catherine Saxberg, former 
executive director of RSF, argued that “contributions be raised to $15 million, which 
represents less than 1.5% of the gross revenues of the radio industry”, rather than 
the 0.5% provided (Saxberg 2006).  CIRPA argued that many stations had already 
committed voluntarily to a 40% CANCON quota, arguing that an increase to 40% is 
warranted along with CCD requirements.  Once again, the disagreements were 
temporarily appeased but not resolved.  The definition of ‘emerging artist’ remained 
vague, without collective sector support behind it.  Furthermore, CANCON was 
maintained at 35%, which is in most cases its current state at time of writing.  Little 
was resolved outside of a further contribution that CAB members made to the 
funding structures.  
In her Robarts Lecture at the University of Toronto in 1996, Joyce Zemans details 
this change, a decade before it took place.  She states that the “evidence of this shift 
lies in the transformation in the focus of Canadian cultural policy away from a 
nationalist, public service, market corrective approach towards a growing emphasis 
on a market ideology” (Zemans 1996).  This theory is borrowed from Adorno, who 
argues, “policy is designed primarily to eliminate obstacles to the commoditization of 
culture and to support the cultural industries” (Zemans 2006).  These decisions that 
occurred by 2006, in the history of popular music funding in Canada, satisfied these 
objectives.  No longer was cultural policy the dominant ideology in the construction 
of Canadian nationalism; instead, this was delivered through the support to industry, 
through increased financial concessions for both the broadcasters and the music 
industry.  
Measuring the Economic to Cultural Focus Change 
Edwardson, in the conclusion of Canadian Content, argues that CANCON itself 
changed Canadian private radio to favour the requirements of Canada’s domestic 
music makers.  He states, “the Canadian content regulations opened the airwaves to 
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musicians previously avoided by station owners interested in the proven profitability 
of foreign, primarily American, recordings” (2008, 266).  This assertion is only 
partially true, as the activities that occurred within this history between 1998 and 
2006 do not support Edwardson’s assertions.  Instead, it can be argued that from 
the introduction of the RSF/FondsRadiostar in 1998 through the development of the 
Canada Music Fund (CMF) in 2001 and the commercial radio review in 2006, policies 
in Canada concerning popular music shifted from supporting and protecting the 
content itself to a more economically focused, international perspective.  The core 
objectives enshrined in Canadian cultural policy, such as the protection and 
enrichment of Canadian content as written in The Broadcasting Act and retention of 
CANCON quota remained, but the tactics taken to support them did not align with 
such policy objectives.   
From the wording in From Creators to Audience to the initial disbursement from 
RSF/FondsRadiostar, a refined focus emerged that shifted the importance of 
Canadian content from simply ensuring its production to positioning it as a global, 
commercially successful brand.  While Canadian content creators benefitted from 
these program introductions, those that benefitted most fit into a more refined, 
international definition of what Canadian content was, one more concerned with 
commercial success and stardom than promoting diversity and plurality.  Alongside, 
the organizations debating, enacting and refining these policies – the music sector, 
broadcasters and the state – shifted concern away from the protection of Canadian 
content to focus more on the amount of financing available for each to utilize.  For 
the broadcasters, this financing came in the ability to buy and sell each other and 
control more than two stations per market, while for the music sector, the focus 
honed in on the amount of money available to their represented businesses.   
Such changes occurred during a marked global shift in how music was recorded, 
manufactured, distributed and sold.  By the mid 2000s, no longer were bricks and 
mortar retail outlets the primary source of revenue generation for labels and content 
creators; music was now widely available, often for free through peer-to-peer 
downloading.  In addition, listening options for consumers burgeoned, with online 
and satellite radio altering listening habits and the impact of terrestrial radio on 
commercial success.  No longer were artists confined to relying on large-scale 
distribution structures to support their music.  Through the Internet, a global 
audience was emerging that did not rely on national borders or boundaries to find 
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content.   
As a result, nationalistic, protectionist cultural policy such as CANCON was impacted.  
Both sectors noticed this.  For the broadcasters, the ability to consolidate produced 
leaner, more profitable companies that could compete with international competitors, 
especially those in the United States.  For music makers and labels, the legislated 
right that as a Canadian musician or company their content be reserved a certain 
amount of programming opportunities was deprioritised in favour of greater 
financing available to develop content that could compete internationally.  Here, as 
the global sector changed, the focus of the funding altered alongside.  
RSF/FondsRadiostar supported artists to market content internationally, but only did 
so with content already proven to have domestic commercial success.  For the state, 
the increased programs within CMF, especially the Music Entrepreneurs Component 
(MEC), subsidized Canadian companies to assist them to compete internationally.  
Developing, protecting and enriching Canadian content for the benefit of Canadians 
remained, but the need to compete internationally, as a business and a brand, 
overtook such objectives.  
These new programs, in the context of popular music funding, altered how Canada’s 
national narrative and its associative characteristics were portrayed and supported 
through this content, a trend that was to continue through the next renewal of CMF, 
to be held in 2009.  The most supported Canadian content, in terms of popular 
music development, were the content known as Canadian internationally, mostly 
comprising of internationally successful, commercial pop, rock and MOR acts.  Artists 
like Avril Lavigne, Shania Twain, Celine Dion and Nickelback, all supported by 
funding mechanisms at one stage in their career, enhanced the Canadian brand 
abroad through their continued success.  However, this success did not always trickle 
back to Canada’s domestic businesses, ones that these programs were designed to 
support.  For example, in the Canadian Music Industry Profile in 2008, it states: 
“Although music is gaining in popularity, it is also under significant pressure. 
Pervasive unauthorized downloading presents numerous challenges for the industry, 
which is diversifying its activities and changing its business models to adapt to new 
realities” (Department of Canadian Heritage 2009b, 6).  The report continues; 
“Canadian-controlled record labels experienced an increase in operating revenues; 
however, their profit margin remained smaller than that of foreign-controlled major 
labels” (Department of Heritage 2009b, 8).  Therefore, a number of different and 
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often contradictory definitions of success emerged, each related back to the system 
of popular music funding developed.  While Canada’s music businesses continued to 
develop, they did so in a market dominated by multinationals.  Such success, if 
defined through Canadian artists’ international success may reveal a foreign 
structure behind the artist.  As a result, the domestic businesses’ marketability, 
compared to foreign imports, was not assessed as importantly as the existence of 
the content itself.  If the artist is successful, then the Canadian brand as a whole 
benefits.  However, this success may not benefit Canada’s independent labels or 
publishers, even if their businesses were subsidized in order to develop such 
successes.  As a result, a complex picture emerged that made defining success 
through the existence of popular music funding inconclusive.  In many respects, the 
subsidies available by 2006 produce a number of definitive commercial successes.  
How this relates back to the wording in The Broadcasting Act, however, is more 
difficult to assert.  This was made even more apparent in the next renewal of the 
Canada Music Fund, in mid 2009.    
The Renewal of the Canada Music Fund in 2009 
On 31 July 2009, at the music and arts festival Francofolies in Montreal, newly 
installed Minister of Canadian Heritage James Moore announced the restructuring of 
the Canada Music Fund.  His speech, coming four months after the conclusion of 
Trade Routes and PromART, was half promotional and half conciliatory towards the 
music sector.  He began by remarking; “our government knows the value of arts and 
culture to our communities, our identity, and our economy. That is why we will 
continue to make unparalleled investments in this sector”, before he announced the 
renewal of the fund at $27.6m per year until February 2015 (Moore 2009).  In the 
speech, he did not mention any changes within the program, preferring to focus on 
the renewal itself and collectively, the renewal of Tomorrow Starts Today.  The 
renewal provided an increase in program budget by $9.85m per year, a total only 
$2m less than the funding that was cut with the removal of Trade Routes and 
PromART.  However, the eight streams that comprised the portfolio were altered.  
Two programmes were discontinued, Canadian Musical Diversity (CMD) and Support 
to Sector Associations (SSA) and two new ones introduced, Digital Media 
Development (DMD) and International Market Development (IMD).  Eight months 
after Moore’s speech, the government renewed its contracts with FACTOR, 
Musicaction and SOCAN (for Creator’s Assistance), promising “over $78m will be 
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distributed to these partners over the next five years, under the New Musical Works, 
Collective Initiatives, and Creators' Assistance components of the Canada Music 
Fund” until 2015  (Department of Canadian Heritage 2010c).     
Similar to the decisions made to eliminate Trade Routes and PromART, the 
administration favoured a more economically framed approach than one primarily 
structured on cultural support, as the two funds that were eliminated affected 
content from genres traditionally supported by the Canada Council for the Arts 
(CCA), such as jazz and classical.  In their replacement, Moore introduced the two 
new strands, focused on digital and international development.  Ultimately, this 
further cemented the change in Canadian music policy, where funding policy moved 
from assisting and protecting Canadian cultural production and development to a 
structure focused on subsidies to support more profitable popular culture.  National 
identity, in the context of popular music subsidization, was reordered once again 
towards being represented by the music that best performed commercially in 
general.   
Moore himself, when quizzed by CBC on 25 September 2009, defended the 
restructuring, stating: 
We did this after consultation… It was done after broad consultation with 
independent artists… with music industry [Moore notes that music-industry 
organizations backed the restructuring by standing with him when it was announced, 
including FACTOR and CRIA] FACTOR was there, SOCAN, they were all there, they all 
enthusiastically supported the changes… we listened to artists and we responded to 
them…This was done after a great deal of consultation… This was overwhelmingly 
well received. Heather Ostertag [the CEO of FACTOR] said this was the best decision 
we could have made (Hum 2009). 
In fact, the change was petitioned and lobbied for by the popular music industry, as 
it would provide more funds to FACTOR, rather than the Canada Council for the Arts.  
These decisions were not argued on the basis that CANCON required greater 
protection, but more a response to ensuring Canadian music could compete 
internationally with the support of its subsidy system.   
The two programmes initiated with the changes were, in essence, available to all 
music genres through FACTOR.  There was no written justification outlining that the 
support was fine-tuned to popular genres; this was assumed by those affected by 
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the removal of Canadian Music Diversity (CMD).  The trend, one that began in 1998, 
continued with CMF reordered to satisfy its core constituents, Canada’s more 
profitable, commercially viable labels, artists and managers.  In the same interview 
that Moore participated in, saxophonist Jane Bunnett disagreed with Moore, stating, 
“it is almost like Stephen Harper is just looking at the most popular music and 
supporting it even more” (Hum 2009).  Moore dismissed Bunnett’s comments, 
stating CCA restructured its internal funding to cover the loss.     
This conversation is significant, as it further reasserts the changing nature of 
Canada’s national narrative in the context of popular music funding.  The 
controversial program eliminated, ‘Canadian Music Diversity’, was created in 2001 to 
ensure that the wording of The Broadcasting Act, which also uses the term 
‘diversity’, was protected (another word in the act) in policy.  However, by 2009 the 
importance of this term in the context of music sector development and state 
interaction had changed.  However, funding did not disappear to support Canadian 
content makers creating all variations of musical output.  CCA retained an extensive 
subsidy structure for classical, ballet, dance and traditional ‘high art’ genres, and this 
program was delivered through a different allocation within Tomorrow Starts Today.  
Instead, Moore created a definable separation in subsidization objectives in the 
renewal of CMF, where CMF was no longer concerned with satisfying the mandate in 
The Broadcasting Act.  Such an evolution occurred gradually through policies reliant 
on the same policies written into Canada’s core cultural policy.  CANCON was not 
mentioned in the renewal, other than PCH outlining a requirement that the quota be 
retained at 35% for English Canada and 65% for French language content.  This was 
the first policy of its kind not to mention CANCON.  It was an economic alteration, 
start-to-finish.  
FACTOR, in this case, agreed with government on these changes.  They supported 
the change from CMD to the two new programs, as they were the ones who would 
administrate them.  CMD, according to an article published in The Globe and Mail, 
gave grants for “"specialized music," defined as music whose intent or content is not 
shaped by the desire for wide market appeal - instead, it places creativity, self-
expression or experimentation above the demands and format expectations of the 
mainstream recording industry and has significance beyond being just 
entertainment” (Bradshaw 2009).  In the same article, artist Elizabeth Fischer, who 
performed in a band called DarkBlueWorld, criticized FACTOR’s objectives.  She 
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stated: "[FACTOR is] only interested in commercial product. The people who get 
money through FACTOR are never the people who support the kind of music that we 
do.  When they say they're independents…they're really farm teams for major labels" 
(Bradshaw 2009).  In response, FACTOR president and CEO Heather Ostertag 
“claimed that a large part of the organization's funding goes to culturally and 
musically diverse artists, some of whom have very limited or no sales potential" 
(Bradshaw 2009).  James Moore responded.  He stated; "I'm not at all castigating 
independent artists and what their hopes are for their creations. … It's about funding 
things that are of a higher priority for government and for the industry" (Wherry 
2009).  This priority was not one shared with Fischer.  FACTOR, and their more 
economic focused programs, was better suited to the continued direction of CMF and 
the state’s objectives in general.  
 
However FACTOR was experiencing a number of challenges at the time, all of which 
had been developing for a number of years.  At the same time they were provided 
with the new CMF programs, FACTOR underwent the most extensive reform in its 
history.  
 
FACTOR and The Introduction of Program Reform 
In 2011, FACTOR underwent its first significant reform in three decades.  The roots 
of this change began with the negotiations held between FACTOR, CAB and the 
CRTC during the 2006 commercial radio review.  As part of the process of evaluating 
the cost effectiveness of the private support given to FACTOR and its impact on 
broadcaster playlists, Susan Wheeler, then President of CAB, commissioned an audit, 
assisted by RSF’s internal auditors, Price Waterhouse Coopers.  During the 2006 
review, CIRPA and its partners argued for CANCON to be increased, a decision CAB 
disagreed with.  In order to argue against further CANCON requirements, CAB 
members argued that increased support to FACTOR would be better suited to 
support Canadian content, rather than to restrict programming once more.  Yet, 
similar to the discussions in the 1998 review, CAB questioned if FACTOR was 
supporting suitable content for its specific requirements.  Wheeler commissioned an 
audit to quantify the cost per play of CAB members’ support to FACTOR.  The 
introduction of the report states its hypothesis: 
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As specifically agreed, we have performed the procedures set out in the attached 
schedule related to information from FACTOR (Foundation to Assist Canadian Talent 
on Record) and Radio Starmaker Fund related to the use of proceeds from private 
radio’s significant benefits contributions to FACTOR through the “Radio Marketing 
Fund” and the Radio Starmaker Fund. The procedures were performed to assist the 
Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB) in their evaluation of the spending of 
these contributions. You indicated to us that this information was required in order 
for the CAB to perform an analysis of the nature of FACTOR and Radio Starmaker 
Fund funding initiatives; the recipients of this funding; the cost per record of your 
investments. (Wheeler 2006, 1) 
This report was tabled in March 2006, eight months before the CRTC announced its 
findings.  The data accumulated is not represented in FACTOR annual reports, nor 
was it made public before or after the commission.  Yet, within the internal 
discussions between music industry representatives, CAB and the government, the 
findings were significant.  In the 2004-2005 fiscal year, FACTOR approved only 5% 
of juried sound production loan applications, compared to a 91% approval in DBA 
(Wheeler 2006, 7).  Furthermore, the audit quantified the cost per record of the 
funding by dividing the amount provided with the amount sold, verified by Neilson 
receipts.  For Alma Records, a reputable jazz label, folk artist One Take received 
$47,234 from FACTOR in 2005, resulting in a cost per play of $638 (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers 2006, 11).  A sound recording loan to DKD Group for Jennifer 
Aubry in 2002, for example, cost $3060 per play (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2006, 
14).  Each DBA approved label was analysed, with each recipient’s funding broken 
down on a cost per play basis.  There is little actual value for money provided by the 
report in terms of the content that was funded, but these findings were not released 
to the public, as it was not FACTOR that quantified this, but a private study 
commissioned by the broadcasters.  With FACTOR, these figures were never stated 
in official documentation.  However, this data could have been used to question the 
economic impact of FACTOR, even if its programs focused on provided business-
centric funding for its applicants.  
In April 2010, after nearly three decades guiding the organisation, Heather Ostertag 
stepped down as CEO and executive director of FACTOR, four years after the CAB 
report was internally released.  Duncan McKie, former CEO of CIMA replaced 
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Ostertag. 25  At the same time, FACTOR began an internal audit of its procedures. 
DBA presented a challenge, having grown to be larger than its initial set-up intended.  
As a result, the process of brokering inactive DBA companies was regulated:  An 
entity that acquires some or all of the assets of a company with DBA Status does not 
automatically also acquire the DBA Status.  “You can't be in the program forever and 
expect to stay there,” adds McKie (pers. comm).   
While total applications fell from 4,096 in 2009-2010 to 3,181 in 2010-2011, approval 
rates remained similar, at 1,677 in 2009-2010 and 1,622 in 2010-2011 (FACTOR 
2011c, 6-9).  The amount provided increased, with FACTOR offering 40% of 
requested allocations in 2010-2011, compared to 28% in 2009-2010 (FACTOR 
2001c, 6-9).  In total, this amounted to more support released in 2010-2011 than in 
previous years, but the amount of artists and companies supported by FACTOR had 
increased from the 1,412 applications it approved in 2006-2007 (FACTOR 2007, 4-7).  
As a result, certain programmes were pro-rated because there was not enough 
money to support them.  For example, FACTOR had to move $500,000 to domestic 
and international touring, because the program was chronically over-subscribed 
(McKie, pers. comm).  So, while more artists received slightly more than they did the 
year before, the amount required to meet only 40% of the demands on FACTOR 
created problems for its administration (FACTOR 2011a).  As a result, the amount 
available for both touring and showcasing in 2011-2012 was reduced, prompting 
criticism from some prospective applicants.  The maximum a band could receive for 
touring support was $35,000 and $5,000 for showcase support per calendar year, a 
reduction of 20% (FACTOR 2012b).  While there was little debate from CAB 
members or state representatives in response to these changes, as they were seen 
as an internal FACTOR matter, many worried that this reduction would limit touring 
and showcasing opportunities for bands.   
This raises a series of questions.  First, such limits have been argued to impact 
developing artists and labels rather than DBA level companies.  To FACTOR at the 
time, an artist must prove sales of 3,500 units to qualify for the emerging artist 
program, with tour support applicants requiring sales of 2,000 units.  The criticisms 
from applicants mounted.  Greg Ipp, then owner of independent label Unfamiliar 
Records and FACTOR recipient for a number of his artists, argued in his blog that 
                                                 
25 In 2010, CIRPA changed its name to CIMA – The Canadian Independent Music 
Association.  
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while his label and artists were poorly subsidized, artists like Metric were significantly 
supported, which he argued was unrepresentative of the need of the sector (Ipp 
2012).  At the opposite end, the changes were also criticized by acts that had been 
supported significantly in the past.  Larry Wanagas, manager of successful Canadian 
rock band The Trews, one of the most heavily supported acts in the history of 
FACTOR argues; “once an act gets to a certain success level, based on that system, 
some of the changes they are making will eliminate careers.  All of the sudden an 
artist that might have established a career based on a system of financial support at 
its base might not be able to tap into that.  If the changes are such, then it will be 
hard to sustain those artists.  If the funding dries up, then these types of acts will be 
in trouble” (Wanagas, pers. comm).  This argument, stating that there are artists 
who have a career intertwined with the system, is what Ipp rallied against.  
Furthermore, Jonas Bonnetta, vocalist in Toronto-based act Evening Hymns and a 
band that has received showcase grants up to $8,000 by October 2012, argues that 
such concerns should not be considered by FACTOR, as not enough developing 
artists are supported to warrant greater support for emerging acts, according to 
FACTOR’s definition of the term.  “To me, I would spread the money out more and 
give less money to more artists. As opposed to giving one band $25,000, I would 
give ten bands $2500. I feel that it is frustratingly inefficient in that sense” 
(Bonnetta, pers. comm). 
 
This argument once again reveals the complications within Canada’s popular music 
funding system in how emerging artists are handled versus those who are more 
established.  Alongside the increased allocation provided by RSF and the increase in 
DBA and Collective Initiatives support throughout the mid 2000s, FACTOR’s juried 
programs continued to be constrained by low acceptance rates, as the supply could 
not keep up with demand.  However, the supply, in this case, was newer Canadian 
music, whose promotion and development through Canadian cultural policy is 
enshrined in The Broadcasting Act.  However, FACTOR had developed a number of 
programs that continued to better support more established artists, leading to such 
comments from Wanagas when these regulations were threatened with change.  The 
core objectives of these programs, when accumulated and measured together, 
created further confusion in how FACTOR would support new and established artists.  
As a result, the new FACTOR executive altered the structure to try and address this 
imbalance. 
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Those arguing on the side of Bonnetta and Ipp were influenced by the regulations 
written in The Broadcasting Act, where Canadian content is to be protected for the 
benefit and promotion to and for all Canadians.  FACTOR, as they see it, is designed 
to meet CANCON requirements in supporting a varied and diverse amount of 
content.  However, FACTOR’s initial mandate, to provide suitable content to 
broadcasters, developed to become more aligned with the system Wanagas claimed 
to be in jeopardy, where acts are supported throughout their career and subsidy 
increases with economic value.   
 
By 2011, FACTOR was caught in the middle of these arguments and changes to its 
programs revealed such internal sector disagreements.  However, many of these 
arguments became separated from the core questions concerning popular music 
funding in Canada, because the programs themselves were subject to analysis, 
rather than the construction and theorization of the programs in general.  The 
impact of DBA and its higher-level programs on the production of Canadian popular 
culture remained consistent.  A number of acts and labels supplying commercially 
viable content continued to benefit from these programs, such as Wanagas’ 
Bumstead Management Agency, Arts & Crafts, Nettwerk and Last Gang.  
Simultaneously, many of these companies qualified for MEC support, meaning it was 
not the label that communicated with FACTOR (this was not allowed), but the artists’ 
representatives.  Furthermore, the same artists often received support through RSF 
for touring and marketing, providing three distinct support structures available to 
Canada’s most commercially viable music businesses.  Through these disbursements, 
whether they were delivered through FACTOR, RSF or directly through the 
Department of Canadian Heritage via MEC, Canada’s most economically valuable 
artists – and their associative product – received substantial support through 
subsidization.  While many juried programs existed to support demo production, 
sound recording and marketing, those that did not qualify through these more 
substantive, commercial labels were not guaranteed such support, even if the core 
objectives that led to the creation of FACTOR remained part of Canadian cultural 
legislation.   
 
By 2011, Canada’s popular music funding was firmly focused on business 
development and economically focused support.  This helped form comments from 
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some of Canada’s music business community who believed that whatever changes 
FACTOR would embrace these should not impact the higher-level subsidies available 
to established artists. While this was never done at the expense of supporting new 
artists, the amounts of support available through these structures vastly outweighed 
those for new music.  Therefore, instead of providing less support to more content, 
as Bonnetta argued, FACTOR, by 2011, firmly approached their mandate in a manner 
more similar to Wanagas’ comments.       
 
When applications were released for the 2012-2013 fiscal year, nine programmes 
were amended (FACTOR 2012d).  This included altering the tour support structure to 
a flat subsidy, similar to RSF, based on a point system analysing the size of band, 
size of venue and distance of travel.  The total amount eligible was reduced, and 
those eligible for RSF were no longer able to apply, a measure that signalled an 
attempt to address the oversubscription of the programme (McKie pers. comm).  
Furthermore, FACTOR now publishes all recipients (and how much was provided) on 
their website.  These changes began a complete overhaul of FACTOR’s programs, to 
begin on 1 April 2013. 
 
Conclusion  
While Canada’s popular music businesses enjoyed their largest pool of funding 
resources since the introduction of FACTOR in 1982, the same debate described in 
Rpm in 1968 that influenced the introduction of CANCON remained unresolved.  The 
responsibility of Canada’s popular music subsidy structure to promoting and 
enriching Canadian content for the benefit of Canadians had changed and all parties 
- the music sector, broadcasters and the state - were responsible for this.  This 
change, while not positive nor negative, was not assessed, understood or measured.  
Canada’s popular music funding structure emerged at the beginning of 2013 as one 
primarily focused on economic objectives, rather than those written into cultural 
policy as early as 1958.  The creation of RSF/FondsRadiostar and the circumstances 
concerning its development, as well as the elimination of Trade Routes and PromART 
illustrates this turning point.  With the Direct Board Approval (DBA) program at 
FACTOR, MEC support through CMF and RSF/FondsRadiostar and the removal of 
CMD, Trade Routes and PromART, the most support provided to Canadian content 
creators was done for economic objectives, rather than cultural.  However, one can 
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argue that these results by 2013 mirror those FACTOR intended to initiate in 1982, 
before it became a public/private partnership.  Utilizing funding to become a ‘star’ 
became a priority of the set of structures, as the funders, in many respects, became 
‘starmakers’, whether the money came through public or private coffers.    
This has little to do with the original intentions of CANCON and The Broadcasting 
Act.  It provided CAB members the legislative authority to pick and choose CANCON 
more thoroughly and still argue that the majority of acts would be supported in their 
playlists.  Instead, it was the compromises between private radio, the CRTC and the 
music businesses that increased both public and private funding in Canada that 
CANCON regulation is most responsible for.  Therefore, in its current state, while 
these regulations are in place to ensure that there is more varied content on private 
radio, the end result has not definitively altered programming, instead placing a 
cultural price tag on the license.  If the price tag was high enough, the cultural 
objectives were therein satisfied.   
In addition, as funding increased for Canada’s music makers, businesses and 
representatives, this was seen to amalgamate with the changing nature of the global 
music sector.  Canada’s music businesses were focused as much on international 
success as domestic, and both funders – the broadcasters and the state – supported 
this increased internationalization and economic framework the sector ascribed to.  
For the broadcasters, more commercially suitable content would benefit their 
programming requirements, as it was argued in the early 1970s.  However, more 
than a decade into the creation and development of Radio Starmaker Fund and 
FondsRadiostar, these objectives grew more important, as the success of this 
content not only supported their programming, but also their objectives to grow by 
buying and selling each other.  More commercial success, in this sense, supported a 
number of broadcaster objectives.  For the state, Canada’s brand – in terms of 
popular music - grew more synonymous with popular culture exports, a trend that 
was mirrored in policy.  The Canada Music Fund became increasingly focused on 
economic development and commercial success, ultimately altering the original 
mandate of CANCON by prioritizing certain content, because it was deemed more 
favourable commercially.  
This evolution not only impacted national support, it also influenced Canada’s 
regional music funding structures. As a whole, as the national budget for popular 
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music support was reduced, regional budgets increased, often producing a significant 
distance between the policies of the national administration with those of provincial 
governments.  To best understand this, the next chapter will present a case study of 
Quebec, Canada’s most active province in this analysis.  Its influence reaches outside 
its borders, impacting collective Canadian cultural policy, CANCON and the history of 
popular music funding in Canada as a whole.
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Chapter 5 
A Country Within a Country:  Popular Music Funding in Quebec 
    
 This New Year’s Eve, like every year, millions of Quebeckers huddled around their 
 television sets to watch “Bye Bye 2011,” a comedy special satirizing the events of the 
 past 12 months, broadcast from 11 p.m. until the stroke of midnight. Think hour-long 
 version of “Weekend Update” on “Saturday Night Live” in French, and you’re not a 
 million miles off.  This year’s show started with a raucous, special effects laden 
 send-up of Montreal’s recent infrastructure troubles (several bridges and highways in 
 the city are famously on the brink of collapse, causing major traffic problems). One 
 pair of sketches made fun of infighting at the nationalist Parti Québécois and the 
 upstart political party that’s challenging P.Q. for nationalist votes. Another act 
 mocked the provincial premier’s  plan to develop northern Quebec, while others took 
 on a corruption scandal in Quebec’s construction industry and the local government’s 
 ham-fisted response to it.  What was striking about the line-up was that all those 
 skits would have been incomprehensible to most English-speaking Canadians: They 
 simply don’t know who the people being parodied are. (Toro 2012)   
 A country which is composed…of the French and the English, added to by all the 
 other cultures coming from every corner of Europe and every corner of the world. 
 And this is what the world is looking at with astonishment, saying: These 
 people think they might split up today when the whole world is interdependent? 
 When Europe is trying to seek some kind of political union? These people in Quebec 
 and in Canada want to split it up? (Trudeau 1980, 15) 
Introduction 
In The Quebec Question and the Political Geography of Canada, University of 
Montreal geographer A.L Sanguin argues that “Quebec looks at the external world on 
a small-scale, which brings about inevitable discordancy” (1984, 107).  He claims 
that while Canada, English Canada in this case, “better understands the American 
model in which it imitates…Quebec is experimenting with a totally different and 
original route, which produces an increasing risk of non-communication between 
Quebec and Canada” (1984, 107).  If we return to the quote, written three decades 
later in 2012 in the New York Times, this original and different route is measured by 
looking at Quebec’s media landscape.  The author, in witnessing Quebec’s New 
Year’s Eve celebrations, realizes that most of what occurs is incomprehensible to 
other Canadians because Quebec, in its consumption of popular news and culture, 
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differs from English Canada.  The second quote, from a speech given by Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau in Montreal on 14 May 1980, reveals how challenging it has 
been to reconcile these differences throughout Canada’s history.   A week later on 
May 20, Quebec voted in a referendum to separate from Canada, the first of two in 
its history.  The referendum failed by a margin of 56% to 44% with only 60% of 
voters polling (Sanguin 1984, 101).   Three decades later, in a briefing document by 
the Department of Canadian Heritage on culture, it stated; “Canadian cultural 
expression, in all its diversity, must ensure Canadians have access to their own 
cultural products” (Dewing 2010, 10).  The term ‘Canadians’, in the case of the 
federal government, is a standalone and definable entity.  Canadian cultural 
products, in this case, included Québécois cultural products, however different they 
are to the rest of Canada.     
Trudeau’s quote outlines his relationship with Quebec during his leadership.  He was 
against secession but remained astutely aware of its possibility.  His comment, 
“these people in Quebec and Canada want to split it up” (Trudeau 1980, 15), is 
directed at Quebec’s then ruling Parti Québécois and was meant to challenge 
separatism as a whole.  As a result, policies were established to foster nationalism, 
including official language regulations, to appease ‘these people’ and turn them into 
‘our people’, according to Trudeau.  Some policies, including ones aimed at popular 
music, were introduced in a dualistic framework with different rules of engagement 
for English and French speakers.  Each regulation, whomever it was aimed at, 
impacted the other side.  Quebec became a focus even if the policy in question had 
little to do with the province.  Within popular music, this has made Quebec the most 
subsidised, domestically successful and insulated music sector in Canada; one 
simultaneously autonomous while also explicitly tied to federal policies.     
Cultural policy in Canada, from CANCON to the Official Language Minorities Act that 
federalises bilingualism, has always borne in mind the relationship between English 
and French speaking Canada.  For Quebec, the concept of national identity and its 
narrative function differently to that of the rest of Canada.  As a result, popular 
music output and its subsidization by the state offer different conclusions to that of 
English Canada, in terms of how popular music funding impacts the construction of 
Quebec’s national narrative.  As a result, a number of complexities emerge that differ 
from those discussed in previous chapters concerning the Canada Music Fund or 
FACTOR.  Due to its sector isolationism, Quebec artists have enjoyed, by and large, a 
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higher percentage of local commercial success than their counterparts in English 
Canada.  However, this success is often limited to Quebec, a limitation that has 
developed through this history of public subsidization.  As a result, a more active 
cultural nationalism can be inferred through this consumption of popular culture, but 
this nationalism is not aligned with the narratives promulgated in rest of Canada, 
regardless if the artist sings in English or French.  This brings with it a number of 
issues concerning how popular music funding impacts national identity, sector 
development and the greater relationship between how popular music subsidies 
satisfy cultural and economic objectives.   
To best analyse this, the history of popular music funding in Quebec will be split into 
three time periods.  The first is the introduction of CANCON in 1971, including its 
requirements for French-language broadcasters at 65%, compared to 30% at the 
time for English language content.  The second is what Straw (2002), Menard (1998) 
and Grenier (1993) refer to as the crisis of the 1980s, one that spawned fiscal as 
well as renewed cultural interventionism.  Finally, we will analyse Quebec’s current 
popular music funding structure, nearly two decades from the last referendum in 
1995 as a set of structures experiencing both success and significant limitations.  
Popular Music and Patrimoine 
In the popular music sector, Quebec has an independent, standalone industry.  It 
has its own star system, proactive media structure and domestic distribution 
channels outside of multinational control, which differ from the rest of Canada where 
multinationals control distribution chains.  Compared to the rest of Canada, Will 
Straw argues that Quebec “has been extraordinarily successful at developing its own, 
locally-based music industries” (2002, 1).  As a result, Quebec emboldens an 
independent infrastructure not seen in other Canadian music sectors.  For example, 
while physical sales decreased across the global music industry, they decreased less 
during the same period in Quebec.  While a 14.2% reduction was recorded in English 
Canada and a 19.4% reduction in the United States in 2010 compared to 2009, in 
Quebec sales reduced by 11.2% in the same year (ADISQ 2010, 3).  Of these sales, 
200 of the top 500 albums in Quebec were from Québécois artists in 2010, compared 
to 181 in 2009 and 174 in 2008 (ADISQ 2010, 4).  While it is difficult to ascertain 
total health of the sector independent to that of the rest of Canada, it is clear that in 
Quebec the music business functions, reacts and operates differently to its English-
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speaking counterparts.   
In Quebec, the concept of diversity, in a cultural policy context, is asserted through 
language.  The dichotomies that influenced the history of popular music funding in 
Canada are taken beneath the question of language, which overrides policy.  Richard 
Handler, in Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec, introduces a concept 
for understanding this, called patrimoine.  This is taken from the Francophone 
translation of the Department of Canadian Heritage, which in Quebec is called 
Patrimoine Canada.  Loosely translated to meaning a malleable and collectivised 
cultural heritage (Handler 1988, 141), patrimoine “envisions national culture as 
property and the nation as a property-owning collective individual” (1988, 141) and 
is defined as a separate patrimoine, or cultural history, from patrimoine Canada.  In 
this case, popular music and provincial government support of it in Quebec can be 
argued to have formulated as part of this patrimoine.  Handler continues: 
“Possession of a heritage, of culture, is considered a crucial proof of national 
existence…and existence is a function of possession” (1988, 142).  Handler quotes 
former Quebec Liberal leader Georges Emile Lapalme who stated, “one can live 
without formal instruction, but one does not exist, you will leave no trace, if one lives 
without a culture” (Handler 1988, 154).    
Quebec operates its own devolved cultural policies, distinct from those of Canada’s 
national government.  Through such policy, Quebec has emerged as a nation 
“indissolubly linked to a bounded territory and a particular history…links perceived to 
be natural, not arbitrary”  (Handler 1988, 155).  In “Governing National Memories 
through Popular Music in Quebec”, Line Grenier quotes geographer Doreen Massey, 
who offers a different opinion to Handler.  She states that in terms of defining a 
bounded, territorial assertion of Quebec national identity, it is “not the geographical 
space it occupies, but rather the constellation of particular interactions and mutual 
articulations of social relations, social processes, experiences and understandings, in 
a situation of co-presence which, by regulating this place, defines it” (Grenier 2006, 
12).  For Handler, the process of developing Quebec’s national narrative is one of 
developed associations, such as the geographic, political and confederated link to the 
rest of Canada.  However, for Grenier and Massey, this nationalism is developed 
through cultural relations, rather than simply asserting one’s national identity within 
a bounded territory.  As a result, the concept of Quebec’s national identity formation 
has retained a series of independent complexities that create borders that are both 
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bounded and arbitrary at the same time.  In its relation to the rest of Canada and 
place as a province within the confederation, Quebec has “links that appear to be 
natural” (Handler 1988, 155).  Yet, at the same time, an independent, arbitrary and 
indefinable series of social processes, including the production of art, assert this 
sense of nationalism through cultural content, rather than geography.  The concept 
of “national” identity in Quebec is an amalgamation of these two frameworks – 
political and cultural.  This, according to current SODEC Director Gilles Pelletier, one 
of the organizations that funds popular music in Quebec, is what is defined as 
“provincial cultural jurisdiction” (pers. comm).  “Historically, The Quebec 
government, federalist or sovereign, are always the first one to react in this context 
as the other provinces have a tendency to let the federal government get more 
involved in cultural matters.  In Quebec, this situation is more sensitive” (Pelletier, 
pers. comm).  It is this concept of pursuing a singularity within another singularity – 
greater Canadian national identity - that has guided Quebec and its unique popular 
music funding policies.  However, its place as a Canadian province – tangibly and 
intangibly - is significant.  Federal policy, from CANCON to SRDP, influenced this 
independence impacting not only how funding is distributed, but also how the core 
framework functions across Canada.  
Quebec in the 1970s and 1980s 
By the mid-1970s, Quebec had a small but burgeoning domestic music sector, 
resulting in the establishment of the Association Québécoise de l'industrie du disque, 
du spectacle et de la vide (ADISQ) in 1978, the first trade association to represent 
the sound recording sector in Quebec.  The Quebec industry, buoyed by 
multinational investment at the time and similarly organized to the rest of Canada, 
flourished in the late 1970s according to reports and statistics of the time.  According 
to SODEC historian Marc Menard, the period was known as a “golden age”, in which 
recording studios and local production multiplied (Ménard 2002a, 7).  The domestic 
market share, at its height, “peaked at 26% of total sales in 1973-1974”  (2002a, 8).  
This was not limited to Quebec, as total Canadian sales increased from 38m units in 
1973 to 77m in 1977 (Ménard 2002a, 8).   
These statistics can also be linked to the rise and subsequent fall of the separatist 
party Parti Québécois, between 1976 and 1981.  Grenier argues that many single 
releases were utilized in election manifestos and rallies, “mediating the forms of 
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allegiance and belonging to Quebec as an imagined national community” (Ménard 
2002a, 13).  This actively popularised a version of patrimoine, which was framed at 
the time on separatist rhetoric, with popular music heavily attached to and 
embedded within it.   By 1976, folk-influenced indigenous music, often titled 
chanson, overtook a popular style in the 1960s and early 1970s called Ye-Ye, which 
essentially translated foreign rock and roll songs into local dialects.  Ollivier expands 
on this, via an analysis of Aube’s Chanson et Politique en Quebec:  “By 1976 
nationalism gathered momentum and the Yé-Yé practice of translating foreign songs 
gradually disappeared, while a younger and better educated generation caught on to 
the idea of an indigenous popular music” (Ollivier 2006, 100).  In essence, this form 
of music to support a nationalistic narrative borrowed from outside influences, 
similarly to acts in English Canada mimicking The Beatles in the mid 1960s.  As a 
result, this new popular music first supported the Parti Québécois’ intentions. 
However, when the party and its partners lost the referendum in 1980, foreign 
investment in culture in Quebec was curtailed, as outlined by Grenier below: 
This political turmoil did not only affect audiences' tastes and consumption patterns, 
it also affected, albeit to varying degrees, artists who were associated by the public 
with the nationalist movement - if not with the Parti Québécois. Considered to be 
among the few sure bets of the time by local record producers, some of these artists 
reacted by taking several years to release a new album. Given the scarcity of new 
local material and audiences' mixed reaction to it, others appeared less frequently in 
concerts, did not take part in so many television programmes, and modified their 
marketing strategies with regard to radio broadcasting in their attempt to avoid 
media overexposure (Grenier 1993, 211-212).  
Not all acts or their label representatives responded to these associations positively. 
This tactic ultimately reduced content creation in the late 1970s, leading to sector 
growth reaching its acme in 1979.  The production of records domestically, at the 
time accounting for three-quarters of the French-language market, reduced by 53% 
in 1978-1979 (Grenier 1993, 211).  There are a few reasons for this; the cost of 
producing vinyl in Quebec increased (Ménard 2002b, 4), and multinationals closed 
branch offices in Montreal, fearful of the political atmosphere and cost increases 
(Ménard 2002b, 5).  The amount of titles produced was reduced, with local product 
sales collapsing to 10% between 1980 and 1985 (Tremblay 1991, 14).  Will Straw, in 
his profile of the Quebec music industry, summarises this: “In the 1970s, the 
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narrative goes, major labels invested in Québécois music, then withdrew that 
investment towards the end of the decade.  A slump of sales in Québécois music in 
the early 1980s coincided with (or was an effect of) post-referendum malaise” (2002, 
7).   
By the early 1980s, this investment in developing domestic Quebec artists was 
abandoned, leaving an opportunity for domestic outfits to fill the gap.  As a result, 
“indie labels did not succeed in gaining control of the market simply because most of 
their operations are centred on French-language genres… transnational 
conglomerates no longer found Quebec sufficiently lucrative or attractive” (Grenier 
1993, 212).  This, combined with the entrance of state intervention and public 
subsidization in the business interests of these domestic Quebec-owned companies, 
altered the manner in which Quebec’s music businesses traded in the early 1980s.   
The late 1970s and early 1980s set precedents that remain integral to Quebec’s 
independent popular music funding structure today.  The implementation of CANCON 
regulations was seen as one of the reasons major labels were active in Quebec in the 
1970s, as locally produced Francophone talent, if accepted by broadcasters, was 
guaranteed programming consideration on their stations.  With the quota set at 
65%, French language content was more integral to stations’ bottom lines than in 
English Canada, where the quota was 30% at the time.  While this could be filled 
with French language music from any location, this was seen as an opportunity to 
develop local content, especially in the wake of an increasing separatist structure 
deployed by the state at the time.   
By 1980, Quebec was in recession along with the rest of Canada.  In this sense, 
Quebec was not isolated from other national trends, as its economic viability, both in 
the music sector and otherwise, were dependent on both the rest of Canada and 
global financial realities.  For the province, to pursue greater economic prosperity, 
markets and dialogue were opened up and political separatism was deprioritised in 
order to tackle economic challenges.  ADISQ became the main organisation to 
address these issues for the music sector, as the domestic industry was challenged 
by the overall economic situation, changing state sentiment and reduced industry 
revenues.  However, this context initiated a rethink in provincial government.  If 
culture was to strengthen patrimoine and provide economic development, it required 
support, whether the broadcasters were airing domestic CANCON or not.   
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The Beginning of the Recovery 
After Parti Québécois’ election victory in 1976 and subsequent referendum loss in 
1980, the structure of state support for the cultural industries in Quebec was altered. 
Domestic artists, faced with increasingly limited options to release through major 
labels required stronger domestic popular music businesses and record labels to 
support them.  This, along with the changing political objectives at the time, led to a 
reversal in Quebec’s music business structure in the mid-1980s, compared to the 
situation in the late 1970s.  As a result, a recovery began, fuelled by the 
development and ultimate cooperation between local labels and distribution 
channels.   
By 1988, according to ADISQ, only 10% of Quebec’s music output was controlled by 
multinationals with 90% of the framework – recording, marketing, distribution and 
retail – owned domestically (Ollivier 2006, 100).  This scenario did not occur in 
English Canada.  There, foreign multinationals retained majority control – between 
80% and 85% (Department of Canadian Heritage 2009b, 6), in addition to offering 
independents distribution and marketing services in exchange for percentages of 
sales or recoupable advances.  In addition, Quebec labels quickly expanded their 
businesses horizontally, with most organizations becoming active in more than one 
sector, including live promotion, sound recording and publishing.  As catalogued by 
University of Montreal professor and SODEC historian Marc Ménard in 1998, of 43 
Québécois music companies still trading in 1997 that were established in the 1970s, 
27 operated multiple businesses, such as concert promotion and music publishing 
(Ménard 2002a, 7).  Grenier described this in The Aftermath of a Crisis, stating:  
The void their loss of interest created was progressively filled by new Québécois 
independent labels, which emerged in the very crux of the crisis.  About twenty or so 
independent record companies, together with the few remaining already existing 
local labels which were not forced out of business in the 1980s thus played a key role 
in giving the local industry a new start (Grenier 1993, 207).   
These changes, ones directly affecting the labels and producers rather than the 
musicians themselves, began to impact Quebec’s music businesses from 1983.  This 
was heavily influenced by the emerging power of ADISQ, a divisive and often 
controversial trade organisation.  Originally developed as a production outfit to 
produce a television programme to promote domestic Québécois artists in the late 
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1970s, the organisation diversified its portfolio by staging Quebec’s industry award 
show, the Félix Awards and taking over the administration of SOPROQ, Quebec’s 
own collection society in 1991.  Ménard analyses this development: 
The corporate interests of the industry, which were previously scattered and 
conflicting, gradually formed an amalgamated set of policies that began a lobby 
emboldened with a powerful and united message that defended the interests of 
industry. These few elements we consider essential to the understanding of recent 
developments in the music industry in Quebec and deserve, therefore, a little more 
precision (Ménard 2002b, 5-6).26 
One set of activities that supported the development of the sector in Quebec was the 
increased horizontal integration of local businesses, a trend ADISQ supported.  The 
result, as Ménard states, created a significant lobby for ADISQ to represent.  By 
2006, 75 domestic companies controlled 90% of all domestic record releases 
(Cummins-Russell and Rantisi 2012, 84).  While major labels released foreign 
content in Quebec, as they did across Canada, the domestic market developed an 
increased isolationism, where Quebec domestic companies controlled the vast-
majority of all music business activities in the province.  This benefitted these local 
companies, but it also brought with it a number of consequences, ones that were 
made more evident as the sector developed throughout the 1980s commercially, and 
through greater involvement with the provincial government.   
After the referendum, a more supportive relationship began to emerge between the 
provincial government and the music lobby.  By the mid 1980s, the state introduced 
a number of interventionist measures to support the development of Quebec’s 
emerging music businesses.  While a number of standalone provincial funding 
policies towards popular music developed in Quebec, investment was also provided 
by the introduction of Musicaction in 1985, three years after FACTOR.  By the mid 
                                                 
26 This quote is translated from the original.  The translation is by the author with the help of 
Duncan McKie.  The original text is as follows: “D'une part, on assiste à un renforcement des 
structures économiques et commerciales de l'industrie qui s'appuie tout à la fois sur 
l'émergence de maisons de disque et de producteurs locaux, sur la structuration et le 
développement d'un réseau de distribution indépendant efficace et performant et sur un 
appui gouvernemental, direct et indirect, important. D'autre part, les intérêts corporatifs de 
l'industrie, qui étaient jusqu'alors éparpillés et conflictuels, se sont progressivement 
constitués en un amalgame socio-politique, un lobby offrant un front uni et puissant dans la 
défense des intérêts de l'industrie. Ces quelques éléments nous paraissent essentiels à la 
compréhension de l'évolution récente de l'industrie du disque au Québec et méritent, de ce 
fait, un peu plus de precision. 
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1980s, Quebec began introducing, refining and measuring its own popular music 
funding structures.  At the same time, Canada, as a whole, had undergone a change 
in how the federal government intervened in popular music with the introduction of 
SRDP.  These developments brought with them a number of complications specific to 
Quebec, involving the relationship between state intervention and Quebec cultural 
autonomy, the concept of patrimoine, protectionism and the relationship of these 
developments to The Broadcasting Act, a nationalist, Canadian mandate.  
By the mid 1980s Quebec was in a unique position. Will Straw comments on this in 
The Quebec Music Industries:   
Two models of a national music may be glimpsed here. In one, music works to 
nourish and transform collective, public discourse, renewing forms of language and 
tradition which have been stagnant or suppressed. This was true, quite obviously, of 
the music of Harmonium or Beau Dommage. If multinational record companies 
invested in such music, finding value in its integrity or authenticity, these links to 
international capital could be dismissed as incidental when set alongside the music’s 
obvious rootedness in a local culture. In another model, music is primarily a token of 
social and economic exchange -- the pretext for small-scale commerce, dreams of 
show-business careers, fantasies of weekend leisure, and new connections between 
operators in a wide range of industries and institutions. Here, the most trivial and 
disposable of music might, nevertheless, create the thick webs of interconnection 
through which a national culture acquires solidity. What counted in Yé-Yé music, it 
might be argued, were the new forms and sites of social interaction which resulted, 
the networks and personal trajectories which drew new lines of movement and 
intersection across the map of a national culture (2002, 8). 
The development of the sector in the mid 1980s coincided with not only more 
promotional opportunities for music such as music video television, but also the 
solidification of this new standalone popular music subsidy system for Quebec 
companies and artists.  These sets of structures, initiated by ADISQ and other 
stakeholders, were influenced by patrimoine to, as Straw states, assert a nationalistic 
Quebec cultural policy.  This, like CANCON two decades before, amalgamated 
cultural requirements with economic policy; however, this relationship developed 
differently in Quebec.  All policies remained intrinsically linked to the rest of Canada 
through the need to produce CANCON, satisfy the wording in The Broadcasting Act 
and meet broadcaster requirements.  However, in Quebec, one cultural policy 
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requirement – CANCON – was placed on top of yet another – Quebec patrimoine.  In 
terms of content on radio, suitable music did not need to be Canadian, as the quota 
was a linguistic requirement, not a citizenship requirement.  Music qualified as long 
as the content was in the French language.  Linguistic protectionism expanded 
cultural policy requirements, further protecting the promotion, enrichment and 
development of suitable content.  As a result, a different objective in pursuing a 
nationalistic cultural identity was prioritized in policy, where language was a 
satisfactory framework to differentiate Quebec popular culture with that of the rest 
of Canada.  This totality of language asserted the development of national identity.  
However, within Canada, such policies were created through federalist objectives, 
creating further complications in exploring, defining and understanding the 
relationship between state intervention and popular music in Quebec.  Here, 
language was used as a tool to develop Quebec’s national narrative – a tool that 
would enhance and be used to develop popular music funding policies – but this tool 
simultaneously became aligned and in opposition to the policies that mandated the 
protection of Canadian content.  Here, Québécois content was not always Canadian 
content.  It was French language content, most often from Quebec.  It was this 
context and the cultural objectives tied to new support mechanisms that influenced 
how funding was to be allocated to businesses in Quebec.  Quebec music, rooted in 
its own distinct culture and linguistic requirements, required a different 
interventionist approach than the rest of Canada.   
In 1967, Canadian historian Northrop Frye, in The Modern Century, wrote: 
 It is widely believed that Canada's destiny, culturally and historically, finds its 
 fulfillment in being a nation, and that nationality is essential to identity. It seems to 
 me, on the other hand, quite clear that we are moving towards a post-national world 
 and that Canada has moved further in that direction than any of the smaller nations. 
 What is important about the last century, in this country, is not that we have been a 
 nation for a hundred years but that we have had a hundred years to make the 
 transition from a pre-national to a post-national consciousness (1967, 17). 
Here, this “post-national consciousness”, is a useful elaboration in exploring the 
concept of national identity in Quebec.  While Frye was writing about Canada, such 
comments are delivered through a notion that Canada, as a whole, is at once 
bounded by geography, yet within these borders a number of independent, often 
completely separate structures operate.  Quebec, in its cultural, linguistic and 
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political structure, is the most separate of all; however, this separation, or creation of 
a national identity within another national identity, is equally due to the construction 
of Canada’s national narrative as its mother tongue.  It is this that has created a 
post-national nationalism, one that has developed the most expansive popular music 
subsidy structure in Canada to promote these bounded and arbitrary notions, from 
the mid 1980s onwards.     
The Development of Popular Music Funding Structures in Quebec 
While cultural policy is devolved in Quebec, all national policies impact both English 
and French Canada, including those concerning the regulation of bilingualism, 
taxation and parliamentary representation.  As a result, any policy introduced as law 
in Canada must be replicated for both English and French constituents.  In the 
context of popular music funding, to convince Canada’s federal government that 
FACTOR required public funding, the state mandated that FACTOR needed a French 
Canadian counterpart.  This requirement was what created the first nationally funded 
program for popular music makers in Quebec, Musicaction.  
Musicaction was not the first popular music support programme in Quebec.  In fact, 
a year after the introduction of FACTOR, the Quebec government introduced a sound 
recording grant programme, titled the Programme d’aide à l’industrie du disque 
(PADISQ).  It was established in 1983 as a portfolio within film funding in Quebec, 
administered by a new crown corporation titled Société générale du cinéma du 
Québec (SGCQ).   First established by the Quebec National Film Act in 1975, SGCQ 
widened its brief in 1988 and changed its name to la Société générale des industries 
culturelles (SOGIC).  The organisation was split off in 1993, with a new organisation 
responsible for cultural industries being established, the Société de développement 
des entreprises culturelles (SODEC).  SODEC has had a profound affect on popular 
music funding in Quebec since its implementation.  While music was initially a 
subsection of film funding, Quebec’s domestic music companies have been able to 
apply for direct subsidy support since 1983.  ADISQ lobbied heavily for this, which 
led to the introduction of PADISQ.  By 1987, the introduction of seed funding 
through PADISQ, Musicaction and CALQ – the Quebec Arts Council – created a 
significant amount of subsidization options for Quebec’s domestic sector.  This was 
combined with a greater diversification of business interests, which according to 
Grenier, continued to enhance the strength of the sector.  This diversification 
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included organizations operated film, television and periodicals properties, as well as 
music:   
Despite their relatively small size, their almost chronic underfinancing and the lack of 
appropriate commercial and industrial infrastructures, the Quebec labels played the 
cards of diversification and vertical integration well.  Using similar strategies as those 
adopted by transnational firms, albeit on a much smaller scale, they were quick to 
form allied industry interests in artist management as well as television, film, video 
and stage production (Grenier 1996, 212-213).   
This quote does not mention the impact these regional policy introductions had on 
this restructuring.  Regardless, by the early 1990s, Quebec’s domestic music 
businesses had developed differently to that of the rest of Canada.  The 
multinationals were no longer present in developing and promoting domestic content 
– although they retained market dominance over foreign content in Quebec - leaving 
domestic owners in charge of distribution, retail and production structures.  In 
essence, what began to emerge in Quebec was an internal consolidation of sorts, 
where a few entities bought stakes in each area of the sector, from manufacturing to 
distribution, music festivals and labels.  
Alongside, when Musicaction was introduced it increased the availability of support 
for its applicants to support this continued diversification.  In its first year, 
Musicaction supported 119 projects.  Of those 119 projects, 75 were projects applied 
for by record labels, highlighting the growth of the independent recording sector in 
Quebec, one that was expanding into concert promotion, distribution and marketing 
alongside.  In total, Musicaction had a 50% success rate in its first year (Government 
of Canada 2000, 6).  In addition, of all 235 applications that were filed, 221 were 
classified as “popular music”, highlighting the activities of the sector at the time 
(Government of Canada 2000, 6).  The fact that 221 of 235 projects were labelled 
‘popular music’ is revealing.  Scott Piroth, in “Popular Music and Identity in Quebec”, 
expands on this.  He states:  
The music of Quebec has always borrowed heavily from music popularized 
elsewhere, and cultural borrowing proceeds at an ever-faster rate in a globalized 
world.  After all, even if Francophone Quebeckers are listening to music that sounds 
a lot like the music that Anglophones throughout the world are listening to, it is not 
the same music, and Quebeckers will not have the songs playing on their radios (and 
in their heads) that play on radios in Ontario or California (2008, 155-156).   
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This assertion, that such music is unequivocally not Anglophone, is intrinsic to 
Quebec patrimoine and the implicit acceptance of popular music as a local cultural 
signifier.  While most of the artists and labels applying for early Musicaction support 
were within rock, pop, urban and other genres not definitively originating from 
Canada or Quebec, this had little impact on state support for popular music.  
Grenier argues that ADISQ and its members guided funding policy availability to their 
benefit in the late 1980s, by positing the importance of Québécois music as a 
national right.  The cultural importance of music in shared, linguistically led 
patrimoine was the argument and provide regional funding apparatuses for music 
makers and businesses, even if the companies themselves increased profit with 
activities external to sound recording itself.  This, Grenier argues, was a conceptual 
argument that reverted back to the use of patrimoine in the popular music 
businesses in Quebec.   
This reflects the music sector’s concerted effort to secure some of the ideological and 
economic foundations of the socio-musical system of which it is an offspring, namely 
the centrality of radio airplay to popular music’s commercial success.  But it did so in 
a way which, in keeping with the industry’s new profit structure, also implied the 
implicit acknowledgement of the primacy of primary and secondary ownership rights 
over record sales as the industry’s main income base. (Grenier 1996, 214).      
The new policies that occurred in the 1980s introduced a new structure for Quebec’s 
domestic music industries, one separate from the rest of Canada.  This continued to 
increase into the 1990s, as further funding programs were introduced, including a 
tax credit system in Quebec and FondsRadiostar.  Yet, such development would 
exacerbate the separation between the sector’s economic objectives and the cultural 
policies that influenced the support mechanisms in place.  
The 1990s – Federalism, New Policies and Increased Funding 
By the end of the 1980s, Quebec had a number of successful domestic music 
companies operating in a sector boasting a number of subsidization options from 
both provincial and national coffers.  However, with both subsidy structures 
operating simultaneously, a number of objectives began to clash that impacted this 
singularity within another singularity of Quebec’s national narrative within the rest of 
Canada.  These challenges, coupled with the development of the local sector and 
 197 
increased the diversification of its businesses, continued to isolate Quebec’s music 
industry while simultaneously benefitting the bottom lines of those trading within it.  
An independent star system continued to flourish and with it, the popularity of its 
musicians within popular culture.  However, these developments brought with them 
an increased boundedness, but one different to the concept Handler introduced.  
This boundedness was initiated internally, but fed on Quebec’s popular music 
sector’s relationship with both internal and external forces.  While a number of 
companies continued to prosper, the sector remained tied to national Canadian 
policies, the emergence of radio consolidation and the greater ebb and flow of the 
international music sector.  
In the early 1990s, two significant changes occurred in Quebec.  The first was the 
national rejection of The Charlottetown Accord by public referendum, which included 
a clause that attempted to define a national ‘Canadian rhetoric’ within the 
constitution.  This was done through concessions to define and legislate cultural and 
economic independence of provinces, through a proposition that attempted to 
further solidify and define the concept of being Canadian, as was iterated in The 
Broadcasting Act.  This overrides all cultural industry policy initiatives in Canada, 
both nationally and provincially.  Such debates began in 1982 when the Canadian 
Charter for Rights and Freedoms did not recognize Quebec as an autonomous 
culture, prompting rejection of its mandate from the Quebec National Assembly 
(Balthazar 1995, 40).  These debates were continued in 1985, culminating in another 
document, The Meech Lake Accord, in 1987.  The constitutional amendments were 
initiated to encourage Quebec to remain part of Canada, by guaranteeing a set of 
autonomous ‘rights’ including those recognising Quebec as a “distinct society in 
Canada” (Gall 2012).  While Quebec’s legislature ratified the accord, Manitoba and 
Newfoundland opposed it, and it failed in 1990.  As a result, The Charlottetown 
Accord, two years later, was an attempt to resolve the lack of consensus in The 
Meech Lake Accord and once again guarantee autonomy to Quebec and other 
provinces in Canada’s constitution.  Four separate commissions were set-up, two in 
Quebec and two for the rest of Canada.  This resulted in a state document, titled 
Shaping Canada’s Future Together, a telling title that laid bare the national 
government’s federalist objectives and their sensitivity towards the debate in 
Quebec.  By shaping Canada’s future together, so to speak, this asserts a theory that 
there are two protagonists in this debate who must come together for the benefit of 
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the collective.  In its introduction, it states: 
The challenge that faces us all, as Canadians, is to build a better federation for the 
21st century.  It will need to be a federation that reinforces and expresses the many-
sided character of Canada itself: a homeland of many peoples including the First   
Peoples, a land of two linguistic majorities, a land of diverse regions, a free and 
democratic society, a land which is respectful of differences, a strong economic 
union, a sharing community providing equality of opportunity and economic security 
for all its people, an important player on the international stage. Federalism is the 
only political system that will respect these characteristics, all of which are embedded 
in our history and our consciousness. Federalism has important advantages over 
alternative forms of political union or association.  In a country as vast and varied as 
Canada, it avoids the over-centralization that occurs in unitary systems. It also avoids 
the disadvantages of a looser association of states, which would be too ineffective to 
achieve effective common action or the economic redistribution that can address 
regional disparities (Department of Canadian Heritage 1991, 5). 
 
The case for federalism in the report deliberately depreciated and minimized the 
development and promotion of a recognizable, singular concept called Canadian.  
This was argued by providing more autonomy to regions to manage their affairs in 
exchange for remaining part of the confederation.  In a section titled “Shared Values: 
The Canadian Identity,” the report states:  “Whether out of genius or necessity, the 
architects of Canada provided a framework which has allowed us to build a country 
on the basis of what appear increasingly to be universal values; freedom, equality, 
compassion and community in a uniquely Canadian way” (Department of Canadian 
Heritage 1991, 8).  This “uniquely Canadian way” remained undefined in the report.  
Once again, it was asserted but not defined or promoted, but poorly qualified.  The 
concept of Canadian identity, in this report designed to promote and define 
federalism and national unity.  However, what this exactly meant was not 
introduced.  This time, the vote was decided by both provincial and national 
referendum, with the ratification of the accord failing 54% to 46% (Gall 2012).  
Quebec voted against the accord after voting in support of the previous one.  
Ultimately, no consensus was reached between the provinces on how to amend the 
constitution to support all provinces equally within Canadian federalist policies.  
In “Quebec and the Ideal of Federalism,” Louis Balthazar writes:  “Canada, as it is 
now conceived by most Canadians, does not seem compatible with an enduring 
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Quebec identity” (1995, 1).  He elaborates:     
 The modernization of Quebec institutions has reinforced this will to maintain 
 decentralization and how resistance to it has put more distance between Quebec and 
 the rest of Canada.  Instead of addressing Quebecers claims, the Trudeau 
 government squarely put forward a quasi-American concept of Canadian union.  The 
 latter has become so popular among English-speaking Canadians that recent efforts 
 to reinstate the kind of federalism that would be suitable to Quebec were in vain.  It 
 seems now that there is little hope of realizing the modern ideal dear to most 
 Quebecers: To keep alive their basic identity as well as their allegiance to Canada 
 (1995, 41).  
Balthazar wrote this after the second referendum in 1995, where a vote to secede 
lost by a 51% to 49% margin, but his sentiments are significant in understanding the 
challenges between Quebec and Canadian identity formation at the time.  The failure 
of The Charlottetown Accord, a failure that led to calls for this second referendum, 
laid bare the challenges in place between supporting federalism and Quebec’s 
national identity at the same time.  Balthazar’s comments are loaded and are to be 
taken from a separatist perspective, but his assertion that Canada had moved in the 
direction of a quasi-Americanism is significant.  Here, an opposite to Canada’s 
national narrative is asserted from the outside, where instead of being Canadian is 
synonymous with being not American, from a Quebec perspective, being Canadian is 
closer to being quasi-American.  These differences were exacerbated in the early 
1990s, leading to the provincial government calling a second referendum in 1995.  
Provincial cultural funding to support domestic content creators became as much a 
political tool to assert Quebec nationalism as one to support business development.  
However, despite these disagreements, Quebec’s popular music industries remained 
tied to Canada, both through CANCON and funding through SRDP.   
The second change in 1992 was a reforming of Quebec’s cultural policy.  This began 
in 1990 when the provincial Minister of Cultural Affairs, Lucien Robillard, 
commissioned an analysis of cultural funding in Quebec (Gattinger and Saint-Pierre 
2010, 286).  In 1991, Liza Frulla, who would eventually become Minister of Canadian 
Heritage, replaced Robillard.  She continued the study by establishing an advisory 
council, the politique culturelle du Quebec, led by then President of the Museum of 
National Civilization, Roland Arpin.  Their findings provided 113 recommendations 
that outlined the province’s responsibility concerning cultural funding and 
 200 
intervention (Gattinger and Saint-Pierre 2010, 286).  This, in December 1992, led to 
the publishing of a new state report on the “promotion of cultural identity”, titled The 
Arpin Report  (Kresl 1996, 502).  The report outlined a series of initiatives that 
recommended further devolution of Quebec cultural policy from the rest of Canada.  
Three main recommendations were made, as outlined by Mulcahy in Quebec Under 
Free Trade. 
These three recommendations are: First, stronger policies to “encourage artistic 
creation and maintain the professionalism of the cultural industries”; second, better 
arts education; and third, “assuring support for the arts and function increasingly as 
a minister d’interventione” (Mulcahy 1995, 337).  Affirming cultural support as an 
interventionist mechanism, one meant to promote specific cultural expression, 
relates The Arpin Report directly to the concept of patrimoine.  The Arpin Report 
recommended; “because of the distinct nature of Quebec society, the Quebec state 
should have control over culture, and that whatever the constitutional status of 
Quebec, the federal government should leave the cultural field completely” (Mulcahy 
1995, 361).  Liza Frulla agreed, commenting that Quebec should have “mastery 
within cultural matters over its territory” (Mulcahy 1995, 361).  Even The Economist 
concluded that, “although one of Canada’s official ten provinces, Quebec is, in 
cultural terms, a nation” (Mulcahy 1995, 341).    
There was minimal dissenting opinion and criticism within Quebec to The Arpin 
Report, and there was little acknowledgement of it by English Canadians, the English 
Canadian media or the federal government.  In Quebec, this report echoed the 
activities taken by the government since the mid 1980s.  By 1991, the Quebec 
Ministry of Culture’s total budget had increased by over $170m from a decade 
previous, totalling $288.7m compared to $108.8m (Gattinger and Saint-Pierre 2010, 
285).  Furthermore, a Provincial Arts Council was created, Conseil des arts et des 
letters du Quebec (CALQ) and SOGIC was replaced by SODEC.  This was done to 
devolve provincial funding to crown corporate entities, with private companies under 
SODEC’s jurisdiction and public institutions and artists under CALQ’s.  This process 
concluded in 1994 as Quebec entered an election, which was won by separatist Parti 
Quebecois (PQ), led by Premier Lucien Bouchard.  The PQ, according to Gattinger 
and Saint-Pierre in “The Neoliberal Turn in Provincial Cultural Policy,” continued 
investing in new cultural funding mechanisms, including a cultural investment fund – 
fonds d’investissement de la culture et des communications (FICC) - in 1997 and 
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Financière des entreprises culturelles (FIDEC) in 1999, a public/private partnership 
worth $45m (2010, 287).     
In terms of policy, the introductions of such administrations can be seen to reference 
French policies.  This influence of French policies, particularly through its Ministry of 
Culture, began in the early 1960s, as outlined by Gattinger and Saint-Pierre: 
The establishment of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs of Québec in 1961 and the desire 
of its first minister, George-émile Lapalme, to extend the bienfaits de la culture to the 
greatest number of people, were mainly inspired by the emerging French approach 
and were directly related to this liberal approach or tradition. Lapalme drew on the 
policy initiated by the French cultural minister (André Malraux), which created the 
Ministry of Cultural Affairs in France, to create a similar organization in Québec two 
years later.  The 1960s stand out as a period during which a broad range of cultural 
organizations were created, often with nationalist objectives: Office de la langue 
française in 1961, Délégation générale du Québec in Paris in 1962, Service du 
Canada français d’outre frontières in 1963, Direction générale de l’immigration in 
1966, and finally, Radio Québec in 1968. This openness of the Québec government 
to the international domain is founded on the principle elaborated by the Liberal 
minister Paul-Gérin Lajoie on the extension of provincial constitutional competencies 
into the international milieu (2010, 284). 
It was these policies, ones that began in France in the 1960s that influenced the 
expansion in funding availability for Quebec content creators alongside the political 
structures in place in Quebec at the time.  After the failure of The Charlottetown 
Accord, a political position was established, influenced by the beliefs described by 
Balthazar, that Quebec required greater cultural autonomy.  Consequently, there was 
no publicly recorded and published dissenting voice to the reforms proposed in The 
Arpin Report and the subsequent introduction of SODEC and CALQ.  The Arpin 
Report did not mention music specifically, which ADISQ flagged at the time (ADISQ 
1994), but its top down, centralized approach to managing cultural support was 
generally accepted within Quebec and ignored throughout the rest of Canada.  By 
1994, Quebec had elected a separatist regime and its administration was preparing 
for another referendum on leaving the confederation.  Analysing these developments 
proved secondary in policy debates concerning the national state and the future of 
the province of Quebec.  However, by 1995, Quebec had developed the most robust 
and expansive set of music funding structures in Canada, utilizing both domestic 
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provincial support and allocations from central government, through SRDP and other 
portfolios.  For Quebec, this intervention was a useful tool to protect and develop 
cultural heritage and patrimoine.   
The result of these developments was the creation of a dual protectionism, where 
regional state intervention in culture, coupled with pre-existing federal policy, 
simultaneously attempted to defend, protect and enrich both CANCON and Quebec 
patrimoine.  In 1995, at a time when the provincial government campaigned to leave 
the confederation, these two objectives resulted in an unresolved paradox.  As 
Quebec’s popular music businesses further developed in the province, further 
horizontal integration occurred, ultimately creating a separate music businesses 
structure to the rest of Canada.  Local companies continued to consolidate internally, 
developing large-scale businesses that encompassed a number of music industry 
sectors, from live to distribution, media and label assets.  This separated Quebec’s 
businesses from their Canadian counterparts not only through language, but also 
through infrastructure, creating a market, by and large, independent from the rest of 
Canada, but still tied to national funding policies.  Throughout the mid-to-late 1990s, 
this further developed this country within a country structure.   
Increased Market Consolidation and Insularity in Quebec 
For Quebec’s popular music businesses, domestic and national funding sources 
assisted in consolidating the market for domestic-owned companies.  SODEC offered 
low interest loans and grants for sound recording, touring and event production, 
while CALQ offered direct funding to artists.  In addition, each programme could be 
utilised alongside existing federal support such as Musicaction or, for English singing 
acts residing in Quebec – of which there are many – FACTOR.  
In an interview by Larry Leblanc in Billboard in 1994, then ADISQ President Rosaire 
Archambault summarised the state of Quebec music businesses at the time.  
Archaumbault was the CEO of retail shop Archambault, Quebec’s largest music 
retailer at the time and a subsidiary of media conglomerate Quebecor.  Here he 
answers two questions from Leblanc:    
BB:  Has there not been a rebirth of French music in Quebec in recent years? 
Archambault:  I would say it started in 1984, just after the recession of 1982.  When 
we started the distribution company [Select Distribution], it [the industry] was at rock 
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bottom.  There were no sales compared to the late 1970s.  The industry has done 
well from 1984 to today [1994] We have a better star system than Canada and the 
business is better done by independents in Quebec than the majors  (Leblanc 1994).  
The interview continues:  
BB:  Despite this rebirth, could the industry exist without the financial backing of the 
provincial and federal governments?  
Archambault:  I don’t think the industry would stand alone without the help of both 
the provincial government – for recording and videos – and the federal government, 
through Musicaction.  Even though we are, and will be, huge consumers of English 
music, through the years we still kept our star system industry going on, it is still very 
fragile (Leblanc 1994).   
Archambault reveals the supposed advantageous position in which Quebec music 
businesses were positioned in the mid-to-late 1990s.  Like English Canada, the 
market was growing and this influx of domestic funding, coupled with national 
regulatory requirements and federal public funding, continued to assist in the 
expansion of Quebec’s domestic music businesses.  As a result, a mini-major label 
with diversified business interests emerged in Quebec, specific to the province.  This 
was Quebecor, a large media corporation, who owned Archambault.  In addition, the 
company is the province’s largest broadcaster, owns Select Distribution, influential 
record label Audiogram and concert promoter Equipe Spectra, who present the 
Montreal International Jazz Festival and Les Francofolies, the largest Francophone 
music event in the province.  It also owns Sun Media newspapers, the TVA television 
channel, televised music talent show Star Academie, a large paper mill and many 
news kiosks.  
In Convergence, a paper published by Sam Houston State Professor Marc Edge, he 
describes Quebecor’s reach across the cultural industries: 
Quebecor Media’s financial fortunes also experienced a turnaround in the mid-2000s 
and it began to expand into such areas as broadband Internet and 3G wireless 
telephony.  Also, its TVA network launched a hit show called Star Academie, which 
was described as a cross between American Idol and Big Brother. It was heavily 
cross promoted in Quebecor’s French-language newspapers and helped propel 
Quebecor’s online and cable divisions. Analysts began rethinking the possibilities of 
media convergence, at least in the unique Quebec market. “If convergence can work 
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anywhere,” wrote one, “it should work in Quebec, a homogenous island of French-
speakers in the New World where Quebecor is number one in most media categories” 
(Edge 2011, 74).  
Will Straw analyses this in his paper on the Quebec music industry.  He states, “the 
various components of the music industries are more tightly integrated, in economic 
terms, in Quebec than elsewhere in Canada” (2002, 17).  Archambault, then 
President of ADISQ in 1994, presided over the introduction of this infrastructure as 
Quebec’s regional funding structure, bolstered by the implementation of The Arpin 
Report, and the enlarging of regional support structures.   
By 2000, this produced complexities for Quebec’s popular music sector’s economic 
viability.  Fewer companies controlled a growing number of outlets, ultimately 
limiting pathways for newer companies.  For example, Avalanche Productions, a 
successful Montreal-based production company, controls a label, marketing outfit, 
booking agency and showcasing festival, M for Montreal.  This is an example of a 
horizontally integrated Quebec company, successful on its own right but also 
supported in each venture through public support, from both Quebec coffers and 
federal administrations, such as FACTOR or CMF.  Very few English Canadian 
companies developed the same level of diversification while receiving funding for 
each chain of their business.  As a result, while companies were succeeding, fewer 
companies were collectively involved and a majority of this success was limited to a 
small number of companies in Quebec, supported en-masse through state 
intervention.  This impacted the artists.  Acts that sold out concerts in Gatineau, for 
example, had difficulty filling clubs in Ottawa across the river while those who won 
Star Academie were not guaranteed acclaim in English Canada, regardless of the 
language they sang in, which was most often French.  However, according to 
statistics compiled by SODEC, the sector within Quebec retained profitability.  Two-
thirds of Quebec companies turned a profit in 2002, with one-sixth claiming profits of 
over $1m (Ménard 2002b, 4).  However, this profit was only part market earned, as  
SODEC, Musicaction and other agencies offered a series of programmes that were 
consistently accessed by Quebec’s music companies.  It did not matter which parent 
company owned a subsidiary, or if the company was standalone, support was 
available for all sectors of the business, from production to dissemination and 
concert production.  For SODEC, this was increased considerably in 1999, with the 
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introduction of the SODEC tax credit on 9 March (Pelletier pers. comm).  This 
included labour costs on sound recording, copied from pre-existing film provisions.  
These tax credits were initiated in 1998 for productions where 75% of the labour 
activity occurred in Quebec (SODEC 2007, 13).  Of those expenditures, 29% are 
eligible for a tax credit, or up-to 50% of total labour costs (SODEC 2007, 16).  This, 
at times, reached up to 80% of total costs if the production was in the French 
language (SODEC 2007, 16).  Other tax credits were provided for dubbing or co-
productions, creating a significant structure to entice filmmakers to produce content 
in Quebec.  
This system was altered for the music sector, allowing Quebec music companies to 
apply for up-to 17.5% in rebates for sound recording costs and live event 
production.  In its first fiscal year, 2000-2001, SODEC provided $293,000 to 26 
sound recording projects and a further $943,000 to 56 live event productions 
(Pelletier pers. comm).  This complimented a significant increase in support through 
provincial coffers, as the share of the cultural budget in Quebec doubled from the 
1970s, to 0.8% of total expenditure (Bellavance 2012).  By 1999, Quebec’s reformed 
cultural ministry “had a budget of $423m compared to 1994 when it was $329m” 
(Bellavance 2012).  For Musicaction, its resources had significantly increased in 1997, 
with the influx of funding into SRDP.27  After receiving 376 total applications in 
1996-1997, the organisation fielded 688 in 1997-1998.  The support increased by 
$300,000 to $1,880,792 (Government of Canada 2000, C3), after hovering between 
$1.1m and $1.5m consistently between 1989 and 1996 (Government of Canada 
2000, C3).  This increased once more with the introduction of the Canada Music 
Fund in 2001, rising to $5,711,015 by 2004-2005 through Collective Initiatives (CI) 
and New Musical Works (NMW).  In less than a decade, similar to FACTOR, 
Musicaction’s budget increased substantially.  The market itself, by the end of the 
1990s, was heavily subsidized by the state, both provincial and federal.  This would 
continue to increase into the 2000s, with the introduction of FondsRadiostar 
following the commercial radio review in 1998.  
MEP, FondsRadiostar and Further Intervention:  Quebec Funding to Today 
By 2000, the history of popular music funding in Quebec had developed both 
alongside Canada’s national policies and, through Quebec’s cultural policies, 
                                                 
27 The acronym of SRDP in French is PADES.   
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independent of them.  This reinforced how state support – be it from national or 
provincial coffers – impacted the domestic sector and its relationship with the rest of 
Canada and the international community in general.  While no analysis was 
conducted to compare Quebec’s funding structures with those in place in the rest of 
Canada, one can posit a furthering of domestic isolationism as a result of these 
policies.  As Quebec’s domestic sector grew, each business portfolio was given 
access to funding, from recording support to tax credits.  However, the core 
complexities in place, including the relationship of this increased funding with the 
mandates of The Broadcasting Act and CANCON remained inconclusive.  CANCON 
supported language as well as citizenship, while policies enacted to support Quebec 
business and content development often did so with an implication that this support 
was for domestic benefit, rather than to facilitate export.  In addition, the early 
2000s saw the introduction of FondsRadiostar, a new program created after the 
1998 commercial radio review.  These developments impacted Quebec differently in 
terms of how policymakers attempted to satisfy these diverse objectives, including 
support Quebec’s cultural autonomy and the prospects of its music businesses.    
By the early 2000s, Quebec’s domestic artists sold more units per capita than artists 
from other Canadian provinces, according to ADISQ’s annual report (ADISQ 2005).  
Between 2002 and 2004, the amount of Québécois artists in the top 500 in Quebec 
domestically rose from 31.6% to 44.1%, or 136 to 177 (ADISQ 2005, 3).  In English 
Canada, as we have seen, this percentage never rose above 25%, revealing Quebec 
labels to be twice as successful as their English Canadian counterparts in domestic 
sales.  This increase coincided with further policy introductions that brought 
increased funding to Quebec companies.  This included the implementation of the 
Canada Music Fund and its Music Entrepreneurs Program (MEP), plus an incremental 
increase in tax credit support for sound recording and live production companies 
(often one and the same) through SODEC and the introduction of FondsRadiostar.  
As a result, the amount available for domestic, French and English language Quebec 
companies increased.  
In 2001, FondsRadiostar’s inaugural year, it committed $1,236,314, approving 36 of 
54 applications (FondsRadiostar 2002, 8).  FondsRadiostar has different regulations 
to RSF.  To qualify as a label, one must release three full-length albums in 36 
months, have 70% French language content and provide a minimum of $25,000 
investment per product (FondsRadiostar 2002, 7).  Unlike RSF, it funds the 
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production of live CDs or DVDs, alongside marketing and touring.  The maximum 
amount an applicant can apply for was initially $150,000 but was increased to 
$250,000 in 2004-2005 (FondsRadiostar 2005, 6), as more support became available 
through an increase of Canadian media mergers and acquisitions.  Most importantly, 
unlike RSF, there is no sales requirement to access the funding, making the support 
more accessible to Québécois acts (FondsRadiostar 2005, 15).  As consolidation of 
media companies increased across Canada, FondsRadiostar quadrupled its revenues 
between 2001 and 2005, with $501,276 dispersed in the first fiscal year of operation, 
increasing to $2,413,981 in 2005 (FondsRadiostar 2005, 10).  This, like RSF, was 
expected to conclude in 2010, but has since been continued under the administration 
of Musicaction.   
Alongside this, the Music Entrepreneurs Program (MEP) significantly benefitted 
Quebec companies.  In the first few years of the programme, the majority of 
companies that qualified for the support were from Quebec, as the regional 
infrastructure, as argued by Ménard, created more companies that met the 
requirements of the program.  This injection of funding, up-to $8m per year, further 
buttressed the amount of support available in Quebec.  While those companies who 
qualified for MEP were not permitted to apply for support through Musicaction, they 
were still eligible for SODEC and FondsRadiostar.  In its first fiscal year, 65% of 
available MEP support was allocated to Quebec companies, compared to only 19% 
from Ontario (Telefilm 2003, 35).   Of the 26 supported companies, 17 were from 
Quebec, meaning at the time, two-thirds of Canada’s most profitable record labels, if 
all revenue sources are taken into account, were based in Quebec if assessed 
through MEP.  Such profitability, however, must be questioned as this data reveals 
the substantial availability of support in Quebec at the time.  In 2002, this increased 
to 85% of applicants originating in Quebec, with $3.7m allocated to 13 Canadian 
companies: Groupe Analekta, Aquarius Records, Les Disques Audiogramme, The 
Children’s Group, Diffusion YFB, DKD, Productions Folle Avoine, Guy Cloutier 
Communications, Justin Time Records, Marquis, Nettwerk Productions, Sunshine 
Records and True North Records (Telefilm 2003).  Nine of these companies are 
Quebec-based.   
In addition, it was the controversy that emerged between MEP administrator Stein-
Sacks and a group of Quebec companies that resulted in the programme being 
relocated to PCH.  Two Quebec companies spent over $1m after MEP administrators 
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supposedly assured the companies of the financing (Brunet 2008).  The companies 
spent the money they thought they were receiving, only to lose it when MEP did not 
deliver on what was promised.  This situation ended up in litigation, eventually 
leading to Telefilm remunerating the applicants (Brunet 2008). 
The introduction of the Music Entrepreneurs Program (MEP) of the Canada Music 
Fund, the development of FondsRadiostar and the continuing work of Musicaction 
and SODEC, established the funding structure in Quebec as the most extensive in 
Canada.  As Will Straw argues, despite increased support, these two halves of a 
whole, cultural patrimoine and profit for Quebec music sectors, were unable to 
coalesce.  He states; “the success of a national cultural industry may be measured in 
the regularity with which it seeks (however cynically) to serve popular taste, not 
simply in its ability to produce a few subsidized works of distinction and high civic 
purpose” (Straw 2002, 18).  Straw argues that the best selling albums in Quebec, if 
analysed chronologically, tend to favour albums produced years before.  Straw 
argues; “Quebec music industries’ role is assigned to the music of the past.  In the 
week of 3 April 2000, three of the five best-selling Francophone recordings in the 
Quebec market were compilations of past hits, by performers whose greatest 
successes had come twenty or thirty years earlier” (Straw 2002, 18).  He argues that 
this can be likened to patrimoine, rather than stagnation: 
While this might be taken as a sign of the industry’s stagnation -- its failure to 
produce successful new titles – many embraced this public interest in the historical 
heritage of Québécois and Francophone music as evidence of the maturity of a local 
industry. The Quebec industry’s rush to find new value in its repertory of older 
materials stood as proof that the musical heritage of the recent past had been 
rehabilitated, reinvested with cultural and economic value (Straw 2002, 19-20). 
  
Effectively, domestic Québécois music – not Canadian music but Québécois music – 
was valued, regardless of when the music was produced.  Therefore, the support of 
emerging music in Quebec was only part of the support of its musical heritage or 
patrimoine.   
 
This structure is not unique to Quebec, but more reflective of wider trends and in 
general, the relationship between newness in satisfying Canadian content 
regulations.  Once again, the necessity to satisfy CANCON - in this case 65% French 
language content in Quebec – was not separated between developing new content 
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and airing catalogue content.  As a result, the satisfaction of cultural policy 
objectives in Quebec, in relation to popular music, relied on the nature and language 
of the content, rather than it being new.  This was supported through an increased 
consolidation of radio programming formats, both in Quebec and the rest of Canada 
that came with broadcasters continuing to buy and sell each other.  The most 
profitable formats, such as Top 40 and Classic Rock were favoured, offering more 
opportunities for a smaller percentage of Canadian acts.  In Quebec, this content 
satisfied the cultural obligations of the policies, in terms of furthering patrimoine.   
 
However, in Quebec, the broadcasters questioned this favouring of more established 
domestic artists, arguing that internationally successful, Top 40 artists were 
deprioritised in Quebec, due to the high quota level.  In a submission to the CRTC in 
2006, the broadcasters argued that due to the two-to-one quota of French language 
music to English, developing Quebec artists singing in English were ignored.  This 
was not due to programming choice, as it was argued in English Canada, but 
availability (Hamilton 2006).  In addition, broadcasters argued that it was isolating 
the market further, as these formats favoured a small amount of domestic artists, 
even in the French language.  Jean-Yves Blanchet, then President of ADISQ, 
disagreed, stating that "it would be a huge setback for French music.  It's not the big 
stars who would be taken off the air, it would be new artists, the next generation 
who might be stars in five years" (Hamilton 2006).  In the end the quota was 
retained at 65% for French language content, much of it being filled by historically 
successful, catalogue artists. 
 
This debate is important in measuring the structures that had emerged by the end of 
2006 in Quebec.  In Quebec, unlike the rest of Canada, the cultural objectives tied to 
CANCON, doubled with the necessity to also foster Quebec national identity and 
patrimoine, was not superseded by economic objectives.  While the support – both 
from the state and the broadcasters – increased, there was no alteration in support 
and how the provincial government and the music sector supported these objectives.  
In Quebec, cultural protectionism was not devalued in pursuit of business interests; 
economic objectives were placed within cultural policies, such as the CANCON quota 
or an increase in public funding.  However, a number of complications were not 
assessed.  How new content was to be promoted in Quebec, and its relationship with 
language, the usage of catalogue content to satisfy the quota and the role of the 
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sector in both supporting talent development and patrimoine became increasingly 
complex.  As a result, while the sector continued to produce and sell new content in 
Quebec, the split between catalogue content and emerging content varied with new 
acts experiencing difficulty garnering radio play, similarly to their Anglo-Canadian 
counterparts.  In Quebec, like the rest of Canada, the consolidation of radio formats 
reduced the amount of varied content on radio, but in Quebec this was made more 
difficult, because of the plurality of cultural policies in place.  In order to foster both 
the development of Canadian content and Quebec’s cultural autonomy and narrative, 
content was required to support this level of protectionism.  In the same article, 
Blanchet reveals ADISQ’s position and its inherent contradictions.  He states: "We 
must say, as a collectivity, we have the right and the necessity to protect our 
difference, and that happens through certain measures that allow artists to reach the 
public" (Hamilton 2006).  However, protecting one’s difference, in this case, does not 
always support artists’ ability to reach the public.  In this case, it can also inhibit such 
a practice.     
 
In 2008, only four albums received chart status from Musicaction, compared to 
eleven in 2004 (Musicaction 2009, 24).  In 2008, FondsRadiostar introduced 
minimum sales requirements, at the behest of broadcasters, to provide a greater 
return on investment for playlist additions.  In addition to this, support was scaled 
back from 2005-2006 to ensure the fund retained operating capital.  In 2008-2009, 
FondsRadiostar’s financial commitments were $1,739,910, compared with 
$1,949,849 the previous year, $3,315,015 in 2006-2007 and $3,104,566 in 2005-
2006 (FondsRadiostar 2009, 6).  While the fund received 103 applications in 2006-
2007, only 51 were submitted in both 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 (FondsRadiostar 
2009, 7).  Quebec’s relative success in its domestic top 500 remained consistent, 
with 174 albums in 2008, 181 in 2009 and 200 in 2010 (ADISQ 2010, 3), yet the 
level of sales decreased.  While ten albums sold 50,000 units in 2007, only two did in 
2010 (ADISQ 2010, 4).  This data is similar to figures from other regions, including 
the rest of Canada, the United States and France, all countries ADISQ compares its 
data to in its annual report.  However, the fragility of the sector in Quebec is made 
worse by its relative insularity and reliance on catalogue as much as new music.  
While FondsRadiostar committed 90% of its support in 2008-2009 to debut or 
sophomore albums, the amount provided decreased considerably from 2005-2006.  
As a result, while domestic Quebec music retained a greater domestic market share 
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than that of English Canadian content, its success was relative to its support, and its 
market share, however dominated by cultural policy, remained stationary.  In 
addition, the relationship between Quebec cultural policy – and the protection of 
patrimoine – in supporting the economic development of its music industries 
remained centred on domestic success in Quebec.  The focus did not encourage or 
definitively support outside expansion, whether this was to English Canada or other 
French speaking countries.  Instead, how the content was represented in Quebec 
remained the priority in terms of popular music funding.  Here, a cultural focus 
overrode economic objectives, opposite to the development of popular music funding 
in English Canada.  In essence, Quebec, in terms of how it supports its music makers 
and businesses, is its own subsidized nation, inexplicably tied to another larger, 
further subsidized nation.  
 
Conclusion 
As a result of Quebec’s funding structures, through both federal and provincial 
support, popular music funding in Quebec has developed differently to that of the 
rest of Canada.  This is not only due to language, but also has roots in Quebec’s 
relationship with Canadian nationalism.  The popular music sector in Quebec, as 
outlined by Ollivier and Grenier, was influenced by the political atmosphere within 
the province, which differed greatly from the rest of Canada.  As a result, Quebec 
developed its own popular music funding structure different to the rest of Canada 
because, in its cultural historiography, it is different to the rest of Canada, both in 
language and cultural expression.  The concept of Quebec national identity, in many 
ways more definable than the concept of Canadian identity, becomes entangled in 
the music sector, impacting both domestic artist and business development.  
Through increased interventionism and domestic business development, Quebec has 
developed the most internally profitable sector in Canada, dominated by Canadian 
companies occupying a number of sectors, from print media to music festivals, 
record labels to retail outlets.  However, such profitability is tied to a policy-led 
structure of defining and promoting cultural identity, often to a level where 
intervention evolves into entitlement and subsidy governs and dictates the activity of 
the sector as a whole.  
In its music industry sector review in 2007, the province of Saskatchewan lauded the 
interventionism in Quebec as a model for the rest of Canada.  In the introduction, its 
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author Joanne Crofford states:  “Quebec’s greatest strength lies in its funding and 
investment structure. It adopted ambitious financial models that provide investment 
tools for professionals in all of the province’s cultural industries. The value Quebec 
places on its cultural industries has resulted in an economically strong industry 
sector” (Crofford 2007, 7).  In pitching her strategy for the province, the author uses 
Quebec as an example, explaining; “The proposed structure to support the 
development of Saskatchewan’s music industry adopts the commercial focus evident 
in both models. Specifically, the proposed structure incorporates many of the 
programmatic aspects of the Manitoba model, but closely reflects the wide scope of 
Quebec’s cultural industry development model” (Crofford 2007, 7).   This is often 
how Quebec is viewed in the rest of Canada.  However, this description does not 
reveal the complexities behind Quebec’s popular music funding structure and the 
complications, as well as successes, it has developed.   
On one hand, this level of interventionism rigorously supports all cultural industries 
(including popular music).  This is seen as a trailblazer and something that other 
provinces lack at such a level.  On the other hand, the subsidy-rich system is seen as 
a magnified example of the challenges faced in Canada with popular music funding.  
Support, like in DBA at FACTOR, is often seen as an entitlement, one that leads to 
the belief that operating a music company is reason enough to be supported.  Per 
capita, Quebec provides more support than anywhere else in Canada, but it does so 
through its cultural sovereignty, which is based on the reality that its culture, 
customs and patrimoine are not represented by PCH.  However, culturally, Quebec is 
and always has been independent of the rest of Canada.  Its inhabitants laud 
separate music stars, watch different television shows and listen to different chart 
hits than their contemporaries in Canada.  And, it is this cultural duality that that has 
influenced the expansive popular music funding history in Quebec, managing to be 
both tied to Canada and independent of it.  This is contradictory, but is the manner 
in which subsidization operates in Quebec. 
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Chapter 6 
Current Affairs:  The Problems with Ownership and Media Convergence 
 
Introduction 
 
  
 The radio industry's financial success in the last decade is, in part, due to general 
 economic growth, but mainly due to regulatory changes which in 1998 allowed for
 greater concentration of ownership to enable it to withstand competition from other 
 media, regional/local businesses' continued use of radio for advertising (unlike 
 television broadcasters' reliance on national advertising) and conversion from the AM 
 to the more popular FM band.  In addition, stations are free to self-regulate with 
 respect to the number of commercial minutes they want to air per hour. (Canadian 
 Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 2010a, 207) 
 
The above quote is taken from a February 2010 CRTC report, Navigating 
Convergence: Charting Canadian Communication Change and Regulatory 
Implications. The document, herein referred to as Navigating Convergence, is one of 
the most comprehensive reports to analyse media convergence of Canada’s 
broadcasting sector and its impact on cultural policy.  In chapter 4 of the report, it 
comments on the rate of media consolidation in Canada, stating: “Consolidation can 
have the effect of reducing competition in the marketplace, resulting in monopolies 
or oligopolies. This may compromise the commission's legislated objectives to 
achieve affordable pricing, universal access and a diversity of content choices” 
(Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 2010a, 210).  The 
report continues:  
 
Rules that seek to accomplish a diversity of voices and to minimize the market's 
natural tendency toward integration are coming under increasing scrutiny by 
stakeholders in the mid-term. Questions have been raised by stakeholders with 
respect to rules underlying eligibility for a broadcasting license in support of a 
diversity of ownership entities. Where regulated entities are limited in their growth by 
those rules, they will seek unregulated alternatives to achieve scale and scope. As 
discussed earlier, movement away from the regulated system implies a loss of 
revenue supports for Canadian content. (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 2010a, 210)  
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This report is significant.  It was commissioned after the commercial radio review in 
2006 and approached criticisms lobbied at CRTC, including permitting increased 
consolidation.  This corporate consolidation – providing companies in both English 
and French Canada with up to two stations per market and format along with other 
media portfolios – was overseen differently than Canada’s cultural policy governing 
Canadian content production, promotion and protection as written in The 
Broadcasting Act.  This chapter will analyse and expand on these policy differences 
and how they have altered how CANCON relates to the nationalistic framework it 
was structure upon.  
 
This is because the focus of this relationship has altered, moving from highlighting 
programming to financial provisions, where providing more money to the music 
sector became the most widely used form of supporting Canadian content 
development.  This is best analysed by using CRTC’s 2010 study as the initial guide 
to expand on the current challenges in Canada facing the private broadcasters, the 
music businesses and the state regulators.  This includes exploring regulatory issues 
concerning Canadian ownership of licenses and its impact on programming.  This 
chapter will conclude with an analysis of Canada’s largest even media merger, one 
between BCE Inc. and Astral Media Inc., which began in 2012 and concluded in 
spring 2013.  
 
Explaining Domestic Ownership Law in Canada 
 
An analysis of fifteen years of media convergence reveals significant challenges for 
all three parties involved - the state, broadcasters and the music sector.  If Canada’s 
popular music funding structures are the result of the inception of CANCON policy, 
and CANCON is mandated through The Broadcasting Act of 1958 and 1968, one 
must evaluate if the two structures have fulfilled the initial objective of 
“safeguarding, enriching and strengthening the cultural, political, social and 
economic fabric of Canada” (Department of Justice 2012a, 3).  In a section titled 
‘Foreign Ownership’ in Navigating Convergence, the report outlines possible 
challenges:  “The Commission has asserted…that convergence makes it increasingly 
difficult to separate network elements from content” (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 2010a, 215).  However, the solution, as per the 
report’s recommendations, is that “maintaining Canadian content assets in domestic 
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hands, in the commission's view, requires that existing foreign ownership restrictions 
be maintained” (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 
2010a, 215).  Such recommendations are based on trusting the “domestic hands” 
that control “Canadian content assets” (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 2010a, 215).  This, as evidenced from the 1998 
review through to time of writing, has produced difficulties.      
 
At present, foreign companies licensing publicly owned Canadian airwaves is 
prohibited by the CRTC.28  Foreign programming can be imported and aired, as long 
as overall programming satisfies CANCON quotas.  This structure governing 
terrestrial radio predates the CRTC.  It was established by the BBG in The Fowler 
Commission, by recommending that the state eliminate CBC’s monopoly and permit 
private companies to license airwaves.  This policy was ratified in The Broadcasting 
Act in 1958 and 1968 was influenced by early recommendations outlined in The 
Massey Commission.  These were; “adequate coverage for the entire population; 
opportunities for Canadian talent and for Canadian self-expression generally; and 
successful resistance to the absorption of Canada into the cultural pattern of the 
United States” (Audley 1983, 186).  At the time, the CBC controlled all broadcast 
policy, a situation altered by the recommendations in The Fowler Commission.  When 
the CRTC began issuing licences to private companies, these three objectives 
outlined by The Massey Commission were assigned to these agreements, instilling a 
policy that only Canadian companies can operate these licenses.  As a result, 
Canadian ownership of the licences became synonymous with the overarching 
cultural mandate governing CRTC policy.  The enrichment, protection and promotion 
of Canadian cultural identity, as defined in The Broadcasting Act, was satisfied 
through ownership and administration as much as the creation and dissemination of 
the content.  A Canadian company operating the license was as important to the 
regulator, in how the policy was initially constructed, as the content that was 
disseminated on the airwaves.  This impacted how Canada’s private broadcasting 
structure developed, as described earlier in Navigating Convergence.   Forty years 
later, these three recommendations by The Massey Commission and the subsequent 
                                                 
28 This is limited to airwaves.  Foreign interests are allowed to own stakes in cable 
broadcasting, broadband and mobile licences.   From 14 March 2012, foreign entities were 
entitled to operate in markets with 10% or less of the market share.  This is mainly reserved 
to mobile phone operators.   The Investment Canada Act is aligned with The Broadcasting 
Act, prohibiting foreign ownership unless it aligns with Canadian interests (Hunter and Weber 
2012).    
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policies in Broadcasting Act - only altered slightly in 1991 and consistent in its 
nationalized license policy - lie at the core of understanding the history and current 
structure of Canadian media convergence and its impact on popular music funding.  
Two separate structures were governed together – ownership and programming - 
impacting the development, histories and structure of two independent industries, 
radio broadcasting and music.  However, ownership and programming are separate 
entities.  Combining the two has become as challenging within CANCON regulations 
as it is beneficial to those impacted by the policy.  The CRTC, in the report, called it 
a “balancing act”, arguing; “in order to survive, corporations must be allowed to 
make business decisions that enable them to remain competitive and profitable. 
However, this cannot be at the expense of Canadians who live (physically or socially) 
outside of profitable markets, or at the expense of a Canadian communications 
industry that serves local, regional and national cultural interests” (Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission 2010a, 220).   
 
Returning to Handler, Anderson and Berton in the introduction, the concept of being 
Canadian within Canadian content policy is based on a “formal universality of a 
socio-cultural concept,” which tries to posit singularity – one concept of being 
Canadian – over multiplicity, where many constructs converge simultaneously.  This 
policy, one that attempts to define a concept that has multiple possible definitions, is 
enshrined in The Broadcasting Act and the regulations in how airwaves are 
administered.  The mandate that prohibits foreign owned companies to control 
Canadian airwave licences is governed by the same policy assigning a programming 
quota.  Ownership, in its inherent value to the development of Canadian cultural 
identity, is governed identically to programming.  It can be argued that these policy 
structures have confused the original regulation in the 1968 Broadcasting Act. 
 
The case study that will be introduced later in the chapter illuminates the 
complications between Canadian cultural and economic objectives in how broadcast 
license ownership influences Canada’s national narrative.  In order to ensure that 
those broadcasting on Canadian airwaves abide by The Broadcasting Act, the CRTC 
sources concessions from both Canadian content creators and the broadcasters.  
However, in 1998, the priorities behind how this process was administered had 
changed.  In this case, the largest media merger in Canadian history, the imperatives 
of Canada’s business community and cultural policies regulations were unable to 
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coalesce.  Simply, the amount of licences one company could control was breached, 
leading to claims of media monopolization and a belief that Canadian content was 
being deprioritised on radio.  Such debates have their roots in the earliest 
discussions concerning CANCON, but were altered in 1998 when mergers and 
acquisitions were permitted by the CRTC.  In the fourteen years leading up to the 
proposed merger, Canada’s media companies had consolidated extensively, providing 
a significant return to the creative industries.  However, the diversity of 
programming on these stations was claimed to be insufficient by the CRTC.   
 
This created a situation that best illuminates the complications that had emerged in 
the history of popular music funding in Canada.  The music businesses supported the 
merger, as they were to benefit significantly from it, but the diversity of 
programming on airwaves, and the ownership of these licences to broadcast content 
was reduced as a result.   As a result, the content itself was seen as being relegated 
within CANCON policy, as the system itself assumed the role of reinforcing 
‘Canadianness’.  
 
Regulating Ownership and Programming Together 
 
In 1991, CAB issued a report on radio station ownership in Canada, titled An Action 
Plan for Radio.  This report, commissioned by the Department of Communications, 
CRTC and CAB, outlined that in 1991 “private radio experienced an unprecedented 
after-tax loss of $41m. Moreover, the report estimated that almost 60% of private 
radio stations were unprofitable in that year,” mainly due to the infiltration of 
American stations in Canada (Department of Communications 1992).  The main 
recommendation in the report, as outlined by CAB, was to loosen restrictions that 
prohibited broadcasters from owning more than one AM and FM station per market.  
Neither the report nor the CRTC response on 2 November 1992 argued that strict 
domestic ownership regulations were unsustainable in meeting the core mandates 
outlined by the CRTC (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications 
Commission 1992).  As a result, the following review in 1998 reduced these 
restrictions, but did so without loosening CANCON requirements.  Now, CAB 
members were permitted to own multiple licences, but foreign investment in 
ownership structures remained prohibited.  In addition, more support was allocated 
to develop Canadian content, through the 6% tax levied on consolidation that led to 
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the creation of RSF/FondsRadiostar and increased support to FACTOR and 
Musicaction.  For the CRTC, the Canadian broadcasting system remained “effectively 
owned and operated by Canadians” (Department of Justice 2012a, 3).  Broadcasters 
were able to expand their interests and the music businesses, in accepting greater 
consolidation, effectively received a pay-off every time Canadian media companies 
bought and sold one another.  
  
The speed and extensiveness of media consolidation in Canada did not align with the 
recommendations in The Massey Commission and subsequent policies of The 
Broadcasting Act.  It has been argued that alongside ownership consolidation, 
programming had also consolidated, further limiting opportunities available for a 
wider array of Canadian content on radio.  Jody Berland expands on this, in her 
chapter “Radio and Industrial Time: The Case of Music Formats” in the Critical 
Cultural Policies Reader.  She states: “Canadian history has long been shaped by a 
perceived affinity between the politics of radio and the possibilities of culture…there 
is a popular myth that Canadian radio is the best in the world.  But as the airwaves 
fall victim to the politics of privatization, radio is becoming progressively more 
popular” (Berland 1993, 230-231).  This comment, written in 1993 before legislation 
was passed by the CRTC, can be deconstructed through an analysis of consolidation.  
Canadian music businesses have long argued that broadcasters prioritize profitable 
content on playlists, and as consolidation increased this argument became more 
prevalent for the sector.  As a result, consolidation has influenced the development 
of structures at odds with the policies defined in The Broadcasting Act.  Whether a 
Canadian owns and operates the license has little bearing on programming choice.  
Instead, it is the attached tax on consolidation that has benefitted Canadian content 
development more than the programming on the Canadian owned and licensed 
airwaves.  
 
To best analyse this development, it is best to return to the arguments aired to 
initiate consolidation.  When the argument was first raised in 1998 during CRTC’s 
radio review hearings, CAB argued “current ownership restrictions make it difficult 
for radio to compete effectively with other forms of media for advertising revenue, 
and harm the industry's financial performance” (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 1998, 26).  Often, advertisers were working more 
with foreign competitors, especially within the television industry.  Consolidation and 
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a more horizontal cost sharing approach for the broadcasters were seen as a tactic 
to increase competitiveness.  Promoting Canadian cultural development, in this 
context, was equated to supporting Canadian industry and business as well as 
Canadian programming.  It was argued that more profitable broadcasting outfits 
would enhance Canada’s cultural autonomy (Canadian Association of Broadcasters 
2000).  It was this argument, put forward by CAB that was accepted by the CRTC in 
1998, albeit through compromises and restrictions.  In essence, cultural obligations 
were twinned with, and often masked by, economic objectives.  CAB stated that by 
internationalizing content and increasing the promotion of commercially viable music, 
Canadian content development and the nation’s national narrative would be 
enhanced.  This argument in the radio review can be seen to have influenced 
Canadian popular music policy from the introduction of the Canada Music Fund 
through RSF/FondsRadiostar.  
 
In the published decision on 30 April 1998, the CRTC understood the possible 
drawbacks of increased consolidation.  The commission states: 
 
 The radio industry operates in a competitive environment in which some of its 
 competitors in other media have been allowed to consolidate. The commission 
 acknowledges that increased consolidation of ownership will reduce the number of 
 competitors in some markets. It is the Commission’s view, however, that CAB’s 
 specific proposal for a revised common ownership policy could lead to an 
 unacceptable reduction in the number of individual broadcasters, particularly in larger 
 markets. In fact, this proposal could lead to a situation where only four markets in 
 Canada would have more than two radio stations owners operating in any one 
 language (Toronto, Vancouver, Edmonton and Winnipeg). The commission believes 
 that such a reduction in the number of radio broadcasters could also lead to an 
 unacceptable reduction in the diversity of voices and in competition (Canadian Radio-
 Television and Telecommunications Commission  1998, 36). 
        
Therefore, the CRTC understood that permitting consolidation could negatively 
impact its cultural mandate.  However, their decisions were economically focused.  
The CRTC attempted to encourage competition between the broadcasters, inasmuch 
as ensuring there was a greater number of companies competing for the licences.  
This policy, one intended to ensure that no one company monopolised broadcast 
licenses, was mandated in Canadian cultural policy.  As a result, it was prohibited for 
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any company to control more than 35% of all licences.  However, by allowing 
companies to buy and sell each other, the rate of consolidation in Canada would 
grow to challenge these policies, as fewer companies began controlling a larger 
number of station licences.   
 
The decision to retain Canadian ownership throughout consolidation was further 
enshrined in 2003 with the publishing of the Lincoln Committee on Canadian 
Broadcasting Policy by the CRTC, herein referred to as The Lincoln Report.  In its 
introduction, it makes clear its stance concerning the importance of Canadian cultural 
policy.  It states: “The Committee believes that broadcasting is an essential preserve 
of the Canadian culture and imagination.  Thus, it is opposed to increasing the level 
of foreign ownership in the industry.  In essence, the Committee holds the view that 
once Canadians give up control over what amounts to our cultural sovereignty, we 
can never get it back” (Parliament of Canada 2003).  The report continues: “Too 
much power is falling into too few hands.  It has thus asked the government to 
announce a clear policy on cross-media ownership within a year.  Until that time, the 
report calls for a moratorium on the awarding of new broadcast licences in situations 
where a cross-media ownership situation exists” (Parliament of Canada 2003).  The 
report tabled 97 recommendations, including “a mandate review of the CRTC be 
conducted with a view to establishing clear limits on its powers to supervise and 
regulate the Canadian broadcasting system,” and “that the government issue a clear 
and unequivocal policy concerning cross-media ownership” (Parliament of Canada 
2003).  As a result, it was recommended that Canadian companies retain sole 
ownership of licenses to preserve cultural autonomy, but such ownership be further 
controlled, as too much convergence had the possibility to negatively impact the 
same cultural autonomy.  Companies with ownership of radio, newspapers, television 
and other media properties increased across Canada, from BCE Inc. in English 
Canada to Quebecor in Quebec.        
 
Every provincial music industry association outside of Ontario and Quebec, acting as 
a collective lobby, voiced their “concern with [the policies concerning] new and 
emerging artists as well as the lack of variety on station playlists” (Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission 2006b, 72).  Once again, the 
argument that CANCON be focused on supporting new content was aired.  The 
music sector, in this argument, equated CANCON with the support of emerging 
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music, as if they were one and the same.  This was refuted by CAB by posting an 
argument that Canadian content is best supported through promoting more 
commercial, internationalized content.  Once again, similarly to the initiatives taken 
up in the Canada Music Fund, the development of new Canadian content versus 
more commercially successful content was placed against one another.    
 
This argument has its roots within The Broadcasting Act itself.  In section three of 
The Broadcasting Act, the legislation states that programming should “encourage the 
development of Canadian expression by providing a wide range of programming that 
reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity, by 
displaying Canadian talent in entertainment programming and by offering 
information and analysis concerning Canada and other countries from a Canadian 
point of view” (Department of Justice 2012a).  There are no quotations or emphasis 
within the act; this wording is literal, ensuring that this supposed “Canadian point of 
view” is part of policy.  As consolidation has increased in Canada’s broadcasting 
sector, the opposite has occurred, as programming diversification has become less of 
a concern to content creators, as long as financial support is allocated in exchange 
for such consolidation.  
 
The Impact of Media Consolidation on the Music Sector 
 
In 2005, one year before the 2006 CRTC radio review, the Minister of Canadian 
Heritage, Liza Frulla, endorsed a parliamentary report titled Protecting Our Cultural 
Sovereignty: Setting Priorities for the Canadian Broadcasting System.  In its 
introduction, the document states: “Our broadcasting system has provided, and must 
continue to provide, a public service essential to the maintenance and enhancement 
of our national identity and our cultural sovereignty” (Department of Canadian 
Heritage 2004d, 4).  Focusing on measuring cultural sovereignty through 
broadcasting, similarly to The Lincoln Report two years earlier, the document 
analyses the state’s approach to managing both private and public broadcasting 
licences and programming, before making a series of recommendations to either 
reinforce or reform its priorities.  The report focuses on Canadian culture and the 
importance of Canada’s national narrative, according to the state.  Using Massey-
influenced language, the document argues that “broadcasting, as a mass media, 
remains the best means to erase distance and create a common cultural experience 
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among Canadians” (Department of Canadian Heritage 2004d, 5) and “the 
government acknowledges the special role the broadcasting system has in reaching 
out to Canadian communities across the country” (Department of Canadian Heritage 
2004d, 11).  It does not discuss ownership, other than referring to The Broadcasting 
Act and its place in defining Canadian cultural policy.  However, when compared to 
the decisions rendered in the radio review in 1998, the report is contradictory.  The 
authors state that creating a “common cultural experience” is a mandate that 
Canada’s license operators must follow (Department of Canadian Heritage 2005, 5).  
However, such a common cultural experience, if supplied through a private 
organization whose responsibility is to its shareholders, can be seen to produce 
complications, as the definition of this experience once again challenges the very 
nature of Canadian identity conceptualization and the role of the state and private 
broadcasters in reinforcing it.  For broadcasters, this cultural experience must align 
with profit motives, making it not ‘common’, but focused on a particular objective.  
The report’s findings, if placed within the context of how broadcasting has been 
regulated since 1998, does not align with the legislation asserting that Canadian 
airwaves must strengthen, enrich and develop Canadian content for the benefit of all 
Canadians.   
This reaching out that is described in Protecting Our Cultural Sovereignty has 
become more focused on financial allocation than content programming, since 
consolidation was permitted in 1998.  Instead of researching and measuring such 
complications, the report endorsed by Minister of Canadian Heritage Liza Frulla 
blindly supports Canadian broadcasting ownership as a whole, rather than 
understanding the impact such consolidation has had on Canadian content makers. 
Providing flat subsidies have become as synonymous with more support of Canadian 
content as the quota regulations, a trait ignored in Protecting Our Cultural 
Sovereignty.   
The CRTC admitted, “in light of the growth in revenue and profitability that the radio 
industry has experienced since the 1998 review, an increased demand for Canadian 
music has not been demonstrated” (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 2006b, 97).  The solution, according to the 
commission’s findings, is “that additional emphasis should be placed on the 
development and promotion of Canadian talent through financial contributions by 
broadcasters to the development of audio content for broadcast” (Canadian Radio-
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Television and Telecommunications Commission 2006b, 97).   
In these debates, the concept of Canadian nationalism and the development of 
Canada’s national narrative were not thoroughly approached.  Instead, this was an 
economic decision delivered through cultural policy, one administered by a 
commission guided by the mandate of The Broadcasting Act and CANCON.  
However, an importance to protect its cultural sovereignty, as the document titled 
suggests, remained mandated by prohibiting foreign companies from controlling 
Canada’s airwave licences.  This, however, did not correlate, as the CRTC notes, in a 
greater desire for Canadians to consume more Canadian music, or at least a desire 
by CAB members to provide a more diversified offering in its programming.  Instead, 
it was Canadian media businesses that benefitted from this cultural legislation, but 
this benefit was more economic than one that supports the mandate to strengthen, 
enrich and develop Canadian content.     
As a result of the ability to consolidate, broadcaster profits increased substantially.  
According to Statistics Canada, profits increased by 37% in 2011 on 2010, to $1.6b 
per year (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News 2008a). 29  This trend has 
increased linearly since 1997.  In that year, gross profits totalled $862m, compared 
to $1.2b in 2008 (Bonin 2008, 44).  However, these statistics can be misleading, as 
outlined by Genevieve Bonin in her PhD thesis, Accountability and the CRTC: 
 
 Overall, there has been a trend of increased revenue, but with lower growth rates, 
 which leads us to describe an industry in decline rather than an industry working 
 toward further expansion with the possibilities provided by new technology, such as 
 digital radio and the Internet. Part of this can be attributed to the recent economic 
 downturn and lost advertising revenue base for radio stations as choice of advertising 
 venues has increased with the Internet and other specialty and on-demand services 
 (Bonin 2008, 45). 
CAB argued that such profit is of benefit to Canadians, especially as consumers were 
moving to Internet radio and other technologies to consume content.  This is 
itemized in a CAB memo to the CRTC in preparation for the 2006 review, under the 
title “Technology Changes Demand and Program Changes” (O’Farrell 2006).  Here, 
President Glen O’Farrell argued that CAB members “no longer have a single, 
                                                 
29 This now referred to private radio profits, not CAB members’ profits.  
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regulated system of radio services delivered over the public airwaves, free of charge 
to Canadians.  Now, we have two systems: the regulated system of the past, which 
is now in direct competition – some would say collision – with an unregulated, 
parallel system of new delivery platforms for audio content” (O’Farrell 2006).   
This global trend, one where terrestrial radio was challenged with digital music 
consumption, was utilized by CAB to defend their right to buy and sell each other 
and develop larger, more expansive business portfolios.  As consumers have turned 
to music streaming services, online radio and other non-terrestrial structures, 
O’Farrell and his members argued that this alteration in listening habits destabilized 
growth prospects, even as profits have increased (O’Farrell 2006).  Profit, in this 
sense, was in spite of technological advancements, and greater regulation to control 
their ability to expand their businesses would harm Canadian businesses.  As a 
result, CAB submitted documentation to the CRTC distancing itself from its 
programming commitments.  One such paper was titled The Making of a Commercial 
Radio Playlist in 2006.  In it, station managers were interviewed, with some revealing 
their difficulties with meeting CANCON requirements. The report argues; “for the 
most part, program directors at Canadian commercial music stations balk at 
suggestions that levels should be raised.  In fact, most would like to see measures 
introduced to mitigate the impact of current levels. Some argue that rigid rules 
regarding what counts need to be relaxed” (Gollob 2006, 8).   
This argument is significant as it reveals, at once, how the debate concerning 
Canada’s content quota and what it is aimed to support, stagnated by the late 
2000s.  While the threats to Canadian business, in this case Canada’s private 
broadcasters changed, the resulting arguments have not altered significantly 
between 1968, when The Maple Music System was launched, until 2006.  In 1968, 
the argument posited by the broadcasters claimed that there not enough suitable 
content to satisfy playlist demand.  In 2006, this argument shifted to listening habits, 
claiming that playlist content must remain primarily commercially viable for 
broadcasters to compete with new digital technologies.  Whether the challenge was 
foreign competition or Canadian consumers listening habits, the content itself was 
seen as having less worth in this context, because of its inability to compete – either 
with foreign imports, American encroachment or digital streaming.  As a result, the 
role of CANCON in supporting the development of Canadian content creators, by 
2006, has changed, even if the arguments to limit it remain much the same.  This 
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has led to a deprioritising of content within CANCON in favour of more financial 
concessions.  By shifting the focus away from playlists, CAB were able to argue that 
the development of their members’ businesses, and the requirement that all licences 
be Canadian-owned, was satisfactory to protecting Canada’s cultural sovereignty.      
Measuring one’s adherence to CANCON, other than playing a minimum quota 
requirement, was now satisfied with greater financial assistance through a tax on 
mergers and acquisitions and further financial allocations attached to license 
renewals.  Ensuring that one’s programming reflected the mandate of The 
Broadcasting Act, as it remained law in Canada, was not included in this debate.  
In the 2006 radio review submissions, each music industry body produced 
submissions concerning their view on the role of programming in satisfying CANCON.  
CIRPA argued; “there are more than 20,000 tracks released each year in Canada and 
on average radio stations add less than 70 of them. It is highly unlikely that the 
other 19,930+ of them are unfit for radio airplay” (Ferguson 2006b).  This comment 
must be placed in context, as by 2006 releasing and distributing professional grade 
content was inexpensive.  While inflated, Ferguson’s comments claim that of the 
breadth of Canadian content available, CAB members chose to feature very few 
tracks.  Such comments did not take into account the trends that had been 
developing since 2001, where those 70 tracks, in theory, were of a greater priority in 
cultural policy than the other 19,930+ and CIRPA, with other industry trade bodies, 
supported such a development.  As greater funds became available for more 
commercially viable, internationalized content, Canada’s popular music funding 
system, one designed in policy to support all 20,000 tracks, prioritized those of most 
financial worth to the sector.  Ferguson argued from a cultural perspective, one that 
ignores the trend towards focusing on economic objectives, both through state and 
RSF/FondsRadiostar funding.  In fact, those 70 tracks, and the artists that released 
them, had been enjoying more focus since the commercial radio review’s decisions in 
1998.        
For CAB, requiring stations to air more CANCON than the market demanded, while 
facing tougher competition from outside sources, was seen to negatively impact their 
business.  Instead, more financial concessions were proposed, rather than 
programming changes.  In official documentation and the CRTC review in 2006, the 
music sector agreed with this hypothesis and Ferguson’s comments were rejected. 
To both sides, more support would in turn create more music.   However, this music 
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had more restrictive outlets in terms of commercial radio for market proliferation, 
and what this music was that would receive the most support favoured commercially 
viable, potentially international content.      
In the end, it was decided that more support was to be provided to the music 
industry through a blanket tax on station revenue with CANCON maintained at 35%.  
However, the amount that stations were to pay was in favour of the broadcasters, 
with those stations earning less than $650,000 responsible for a payment of $500, 
between $650,000 and $1.25m a payment of $1000 that increased to 0.5% of total 
revenue plus $1000 if revenues exceeded $1.25m (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 2006b, 116).  Before this regulation, CAB members 
contributed $2.83m in 2004-2005 to Canadian content development (CCD).  This 
regulation hypothesised that this would increase to $4.10m (Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission 2006b, 117).  60% of these funds 
were to be directed to FACTOR and Musicaction, with the other 40% left as 
discretionary.     
However, these regulations to CCD were far less supportive than payments made 
after consolidation occurred, ones that were spread out over a seven-year period.  
$12.24m was paid out in 2004-2005, due to transfers of station ownership (Canadian 
Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 2006b, 125).  As a result, 
consolidation became the best source of revenue for both the broadcasters and the 
music industry between 1998 and 2005, even if such revenue was, by its very 
nature, unsustainable.  This set of commitments and their structures were made law 
by the CRTC in 2006.  
More Debates Concerning Ownership and Programming: 
 The potential for diversity and pluralism is obvious but the issues of who creates and 
 owns the content and the pipes that deliver it are still the same ones found in the 
 traditional media world and can be subject to the same debate and argument about 
 diversity of sources and concentration of ownership. The technology may be neutral 
 but the content and its accessibility remain the crucial issues. (McEwen 2007) 
 
The above quote comes from a study published in 2007 by the CRTC, analysing 
media ownership and consolidation practices in other developed markets in 
comparison to Canada.  The position of the paper was to promote diversity and 
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pluralism by measuring the activities in Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
New Zealand and other countries.  In it, the paper concludes CAB’s position as one 
that supports “that bigger is better; more efficient and more competitive. [CAB] will 
also argue that ownership has nothing to do with diversity and pluralism and that 
processes and regulations may be put in place that guarantees a diversity of 
viewpoints and opinion” (McEwen 2007).  There are no independent conclusions in 
the report, but it offers a number of theoretical complications made apparent in 
CRTC regulations by 2007.  In the end, the author offers a “final thought”, stating: 
 Many countries mix the diversity discussion with a cultural discussion. Ownership and 
 concentration circumstances are not just about access for different voices, opinions, 
 and ideas, they are also about a nation’s music, stories and literature and their 
 accessibility to the citizen. The national diversity discussion is not just about 
 democratic issues and viewpoints but a broad diverse cultural one as well (McEwen 
 2007). 
 
These conclusions offer similar viewpoints to those concerned with Canada’s cultural 
sovereignty and national narrative, but do not go far enough in assessing the value 
of Canadian media ownership in meeting these demands.  Instead, the CRTC 
commissioned report outlines a number of options, including both greater control, 
foreign ownership allowances and a higher quota, without concluding that a collusion 
between ownership and programming often favours economic objectives over 
cultural, despite such legislation originating in cultural protectionist policy.  
 
For the CRTC, defending the ownership rights of Canada’s media companies was 
part of Canada’s cultural policy mandate.  However, by 2007 a number of 
complications began to emerge, as more mergers and acquisitions produced larger, 
more horizontally and vertically integrated media conglomerates in both English and 
French Canada.  After the comparative analysis document published by McEwen and 
the CRTC, the CRTC held a number of hearings to debate this increased 
consolidation, titled Diversity of Voices.  The reflections, findings and 
recommendations posited in this set of hearings would challenge the notion that 
greater consolidation – and with it greater financial disbursement to Canada’s music 
companies – satisfied CANCON regulations and the mandates on The Broadcasting 
Act.  The economic focuses that controlled the commercial radio review in 1998 were 
to become further solidified in how popular music was supported in Canada by the 
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end of 2007.  
As of 2012, before the merger between BCE Inc. and Astral Media Inc., four 
conglomerates controlled 68% of broadcasting revenues in Canada – Rogers, Astral 
Media Inc., CTVglobemedia Inc (renamed BCE Inc. in 2011) and Newcap Radio 
(Bonin 2008, 54).  This was the situation discussed in Diversity of Voices.  The 
commissioned report, published on 15 Jan 2008, measured Canadian media market 
concentration.  Over 1,800 comments were collected from Canadian businesses and 
members of the public through a campaign titled the Campaign by Canadians for 
Democratic Media, and 162 written comments were filed (Canadian Radio-Television 
and Telecommunications Commission 2008a, 4).   The hearing focused on two main 
issues, “the plurality of editorial voices” and the “the diversity of programming 
choices offered to Canadians” (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications 
Commission 2008a, 6).  The ‘voices’ discussed in the report, according to the CRTC, 
were those of editors and programmers, mainly employed by larger corporations 
(Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 2008a, 7).  In its 
findings, the CRTC noted:  
 With respect to market dominance, the commission recognizes that, while this 
 concern is largely an economic issue relating to questions of competition, issues of
 dominance also have social and cultural dimensions. The gate keeping powers that 
 can result from market dominance may affect the diversity of programming within 
 the Canadian broadcasting system. What is carried, what is commissioned, what is 
 broadcast - these are all issues that intersect with the question of market dominance
 (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 2008a, 37). 
 
This statement is significant, as the findings in the review did not measure the 
complications inherent in these comments concerning market dominance.  In the 
end, it was decided, after studying 31 Canadian markets, that Canadians “currently 
have access to a reasonable plurality of commercial editorial voices in most local 
markets” (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 2008a, 
27).  However, the CRTC was “convinced that the trend towards ownership 
consolidation in the media will continue as media owners respond to continuing 
audience fragmentation” (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications 
Commission 2008a, 62), but that this consolidation was an acceptable condition to 
approaching such fragmentation, an argument posited by CAB.  The concept of 
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market plurality, according to the CRTC, could still be achieved alongside growth in 
media consolidation while still protecting CANCON and its impact on Canadian 
identity. 
Yet, this is the first time that the CRTC acknowledged, in their commission findings, 
that correlations could be argued to exist with the consolidation of ownership and its 
impact on Canadian cultural policies.  By using the term ‘dominance’ and referring it 
back to social and cultural objectives, the CRTC revealed the potential impact such 
media convergence could have on Canadian cultural policy, such as the development 
of CANCON and the funding related to it.  A number of concepts are reintroduced 
here, but not elaborated on.  For one or more companies to dominate the airwaves, 
such domination is developed by accessing more media properties across a greater 
geographic spectrum in Canada.  This trend, enshrined in Canadian cultural policy by 
a prohibition on foreign ownership of licences, can be seen to correlate such 
dominance with cultural and social plurality.  More ownership of Canadian licences by 
Canadians, in this case, satisfies cultural policy.  However, such domination, as 
outlined by the CRTC, is coordinated through economic objectives, rather than 
cultural.  When content is placed within this structure and measured against the 
mandate of CANCON and The Broadcasting Act, a number of complications arise that 
are mentioned here, but to a point where mentioning it allows the regulator to avoid 
the consequences of expanding further on its complexities.  The growing dominance 
of a limited number of companies did not correlate with a greater diversification of 
Canadian ‘voices’ or, in the case of the music sector, more varied programming 
opportunities.  Instead, CANCON was satisfied with content most suitable to support 
this dominance, or economic development.  Once again, cultural objectives collided 
with economic ones, and the end result favoured the development of Canadian 
business, rather than the diversification of Canadian ‘voices’, in this case.  
However, the CRTC noticed that increased monopolisation required greater 
administration.  Therefore, they placed further limits on ownership, capping the 
maximum amount of licences one may control at 45% (Canadian Radio-Television 
and Telecommunications Commission 2009a), with any ownership between 35-45% 
of broadcast licences being automatically referred to the Canadian Competition 
Bureau, a separate body to the CRTC.  Anything under 35%, according to the CRTC, 
was deemed not to impact on Canadian competition, corporate growth or Canadian 
cultural plurality.  
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Other than CAB’s responses, most submissions to the commission were critical of 
permitting greater consolidation. For example, Duncan McKie, then President of 
CIRPA, wrote to CRTC Chairman Robert A. Morin in their formal submission that “the 
creation of this publicly funded content is not enough if there are no exhibition 
opportunities. Artists have galleries, actors have theatres, and musicians need radio 
play to reach their audiences. In Canada, that radio play has been guaranteed 
through public policy, and both radio and Canadians have benefited from those 
policies. Canadians want to hear Canadian acts. They want Canadians to succeed 
musically both here and around the world” (McKie 2007).  McKie, focused on 
ensuring his members were provided greater access to programming opportunities, 
relied on defining Canada’s airwaves as a publicly owned resource, so his members, 
as taxpayers, were entitled to access such opportunities.  His argument that 
“Canadians want to hear Canadian acts” (McKie 2007), however, was not supported 
with statistics.  In 2008-2009, the share of Canadian content in the official charts 
remained stationary at around 20.7% of total sales (Department of Canadian 
Heritage 2009b, 4).  
 
The tabled report placed a cap at the percentage amount one broadcaster could 
control, but offered no guidance to the continued issues concerning the diversity of 
Canadian programming at the time.  In addition, three mergers that occurred in the 
eighteen months prior to the hearing, CTV and Toronto outfit CHUM, CanWest Corp 
and Alliance Entertainment and Astral Media and Standard Broadcasting, were not 
impacted by any new regulation (Zolf 2007).  Each merger, however, provided 
money to the music sector, through payments to FACTOR and Musicaction, 
RSF/FondsRadiostar and discretionary CCD funds.  What was programmed on radio 
had nothing to do with the increased subsidization the music sector received through 
each merger.  
  
These hearings reveal the complexities between how Canadian media ownership and 
Canadian programming is legislated.  Both are governed by Canadian cultural policy, 
through The Broadcasting Act, that states that Canada’s airwaves are for the benefit 
of Canadians.  As a result, ensuring that only Canadian companies are able to license 
these airwaves, this was seen as being of primary benefit to Canadians, in terms of 
enriching, protecting and promoting a diversity of content on radio.  However, while 
the CRTC investigated how media consolidation impacted this diversity, even naming 
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a hearing to focus on it, the commission did not go further in investigating if it was 
not just consolidation, but Canadian-only consolidation, that minimized opportunities 
and diversification on these nationally owned airwaves.  If this was the case, and this 
was not approached in Diversity of Voices or McEwen’s study of broadcasting 
systems, as it was not proposed formally that Canadian ownership of the airwaves 
could be seen to reduce diversification of Canadian content in programming.  The 
lobbies representing the content, including McKie from CIRPA, compounded these 
complications by arguing against consolidation, but ignoring the role of domestic-
owned conglomerates in this debate.  By prohibiting foreign investment in licences 
and mandating such limitation in Canadian cultural legislation, it was ownership and 
subsidization of content producers that grew more representative of CANCON, 
instead of the initial focus on programming.  The system itself became as Canadian 
as the content it was meant to support.  A station being Canadian-owned was of 
equal importance, in terms of commission rulings as the content programmed on it, 
as long as no company owned more than 45% of all broadcast licences.  Instead, 
benefits packages – increased subsidization – were expanded, which permitted more 
companies to purchase competitors, as long as they did not control more than 45% 
of the market.     
 
Ownership and programming were not separated in policy, leaving one to impact the 
other in how CANCON functioned within the music and broadcasting sectors.  By the 
end of 2012, this had developed into a situation where mergers and acquisitions 
were creating Canadian companies deemed too close to the threshold ascribed by 
the Canadian Competition Bureau.  This was made most evident by the proposed 
merger between BCE Inc. and Astral Media Inc. in 2012, an acquisition that was 
approved by the CRTC in June 2013.  It was initially rejected in March 2013, pending 
a series of reviews that led to its approval four months later.  This next section will 
expand on this merger as a case study to investigate the current state of the history 
of popular music funding in Canada, in relation to Canada’s media companies.  While 
the merger was approved in the end, I will not elaborate on this as it occurred after 
1 April 2013, where this thesis concludes.   
 
BCE Inc. and Astral Media Inc. Merger:  Too Big to Fail  
 
In mid 2012, BCE Inc., Canada’s largest media company, submitted a proposal to 
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purchase Canada’s fourth largest broadcaster, Astral Media Inc.  However, by 2012, 
any mergers of this size in Canada would have breached the new regulations 
introduced by Diversity of Voices, prompting immediate referral to Canada’s 
Competition Bureau.  If the acquisition were permitted, this would increase the total 
share of the combined company to owning an estimated 45% of all television 
licences in English Canada and 35% in French Canada (Beltrame 2012).  Through 
the purchase, such an acquisition was anticipated to provide $60.8m split across 
RSF, FACTOR, Musicaction, FondsRadiostar and community radio initiatives, plus an 
extra 0.5% of the spend left to the parent company as discretionary (Beltrame 
2012).   
 
In early 2013, the CRTC decided that the merger breached Canada’s competition 
bylaws.  Jean Pierre Blais, CRTC’s commissioner at the time, stated:  “This 
transaction would have resulted in an unprecedented level of concentration in the 
Canadian marketplace and we had grave concerns that BCE Inc. would be able to 
use its market power in an unfair manner and engage in uncompetitive behaviour" 
(Beltrame 2012).  Canada’s competition bureau was quoted as being “increasingly 
concerned” that BCE Inc.’s purchase of Astral Media Inc. would place too many 
assets within one broadcaster, with the watchdog saying it “could strike down the 
deal even if broadcast regulators allow it to proceed” (Ladurantaye 2012).  Blais, in 
his statement, claimed that both local programming and the promotion of emerging 
artists was inconsequential in the merger proposal, and that approving the deal 
“could not have ensured a robust Canadian broadcasting system without imposing 
extensive and intrusive safeguards, which would have been to the detriment of the 
entire industry" (Parry 2012). Canada’s cultural policymakers were placed between 
supporting Canadian ownership mandates or the diversification of Canadian 
programming.         
 
Canada’s music lobby did not formally reject the merger proceedings.  CIMA issued a 
statement, focusing on where the money could be spent, rather than commenting on 
the merger itself (Johnston 2012b).  The twenty-point letter, sent to CRTC Secretary 
General John Traversy on 7 August 2012, was concerned primarily with asset 
divestment and CCD allocation (Johnston 2012b).  There was no comment on the 
level of ownership BCE Inc. would accrue with the acquisition, nor any comments 
concerning its supposed impact on its stations’ programming.  CIMA was concerned 
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with the calculations concerning the divestment, especially due to the fact that BCE 
Inc. would accrue increased online advertising through its newly acquired channels 
without providing extra revenue for the content supplied with the advertisements 
(Johnston, pers. comm).  CIMA’s board of directors was hung in their opinion, but 
concerns were raised in terms of market penetration, access to programming and 
divestment amounts.  However, CIMA did not reject the merger; the ways the 
money was to be spent within the sector was of most primary importance.     
In the end, Blais argued that his decision favoured “consumer interests over 
corporate interests” (Ladurantaye 2012).  In the commission’s decision to refuse the 
merger, it argued “BCE Inc. did not express a vision for radio and that it made no 
firm commitments regarding local and spoken word programming, or the promotion 
of emerging Canadian artists” (Houpt 2012).  This can be argued as a realization that 
a separation had occurred between the current policy and what it was intended to 
support.  The beliefs championed by The Massey Commission and The Broadcasting 
Act, the same beliefs that were developed into Canadian content regulations, were 
ultimately challenged by the requirement that Canadian airwaves be licensed to 
Canadians.  The increased level of licence ownership by a fewer number of 
Canadians had developed into a debate where content creators began to question 
the reduction in programming opportunities made available as a result of 
consolidation.  However, these concerns were placated through divestment, as long 
as the allocation of support was conducted in a manner lobbied by the music sector. 
In the end, the headline of CRTC’s press release announcing the rejection of the 
merger stated that the “transaction is not in the interest of Canadians or Canada’s 
broadcasting system” (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications 
Commission 2012, 1).   In its broadcasting decision, the CRTC argued that “the 
commission is not convinced that the transaction would provide significant and 
unequivocal benefits to the Canadian broadcasting system and to Canadians 
sufficient to outweigh the concerns related to competition, ownership concentration 
in television and radio, vertical integration and the exercise of market power” 
(Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 2012, 1).   
The press release, affirming that the merger is not in the interest of “Canadians or 
Canada’s broadcasting system” is revealing (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission 2012, 1).  CRTC’s own decisions produced this 
framework that enabled a merger of this size.  By governing Canadian cultural 
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promotion and economic incentives through the same policies, the impact on cultural 
and economic objectives developed in opposition to each other.  The manner in 
which the CRTC regulated Canadian cultural policies encouraged fewer Canadian-
owned companies to acquire larger stakes in the market, even if this situation was 
producing complications towards promoting and enriching Canadian culture, through 
the objective of Canada’s policymakers.  The increased size of Canadian businesses 
did not translate to greater cultural plurality in the properties they controlled.  Such 
ownership, while viable for stakeholders of these enterprises, was seen by the CRTC 
to impact programming and diversification.  By referring to “Canadians and Canada’s 
broadcasting sector” as being in support of the same legislation concerning Canadian 
ownership, these policy difficulties were laid bare.  The CRTC regulated what it 
viewed as in the best interests of Canadians, while Canada’s broadcasters rightly 
pursued what was in the best interests of their stakeholders.  While these are not 
mutually exclusive, they had diverged in this situation to a point where the merger 
was refused.  What has developed to be in support of Canadians and Canadian 
content development, as decided by CRTC policy, is different to what is best for 
Canada’s broadcasters.   
A second attempt at acquiring Astral Media Inc. was approved by the CRTC.  The 
deal in June 2013, worth $3.4b, forced BCE Inc. to sell over a dozen extra services, 
leaving the corporation with 35.8% of the English language market, a percentage 
deemed acceptable by Canada’s Competition Bureau (Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation 2013).  The largest concerns debated involved pay television services, 
not commercial radio.  In the end, over $60m was divested to the music industry, 
completing the largest merger in Canadian history.  At the time of writing, Canada’s 
three largest broadcasters control 65% of all licenses administered by the CRTC 
(Winseck 2013).     
Will Straw and Richard Sutherland, in The Canadian Music Industry at a Crossroads, 
state; “as the boundaries between industries weaken or disappear, so, too, do those 
which separate the Canadian market from others in the world. Unsurprisingly, 
perhaps, Canada’s music industry has become just as integrated within a global 
market as have other industries” (2007, 142).  These comments, written six years 
before, offer a different perspective to analysing the impact of this now accepted 
merger.  In essence, such levels of consolidation are impacted by global integration, 
which encourages Canadian businesses and content creators to further 
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internationalize their content.  This objective has influenced Canadian cultural policy 
since the commercial radio review in 1998, where the most commercially viable 
content is often the most supported, through subsidized star systems or funding for 
more established labels.  This enables Canadian businesses to compete 
internationally, but it does not satisfy CANCON.  Therefore, Canada’s cultural 
policies, ones aimed to support, develop and enrich Canadian content for the benefit 
of Canadians, have altered to focus popular music funding more towards economic 
intervention than purely cultural subsidization.  While they are not – or have ever 
been – mutually exclusive, this shift has not been measured in the context of the 
development of CANCON or the mandate of The Broadcasting Act.  However, the 
consumption of music, now delivered through online streaming, satellite radio and 
other mediums, has developed a different relationship to terrestrial radio in how 
CANCON is mandated.  While the concept concerning Canadian cultural protection 
and promotion remained enshrined in Canadian law, “the borders between nations 
have become more porous and those between industries have lost their solidity as 
well” (Straw and Sutherland 2007, 161).  In Canada, the requirement that Canadian 
companies must control publicly licensed airwaves has not proven to diversify 
content programming and satisfy the mandate in The Broadcasting Act.  Such loss of 
solidarity impacted Canadian programming over Canadian ownership, leaving the 
CRTC with no publicly voiced option than to first reject Canada’s largest ever media 
consolidation, unless enough properties were sold off to permit its approval, six 
months later.   
Conclusion 
 
By mid 2013, Canada’s three largest broadcasters controlled more than half the 
market.  In addition, RSF/FondsRadiostar, meant to expire in 2010, received a 
further $30m in funding from Canada’s largest ever media merger, securing its 
future for the time being.  At the same time, the Canada Music Fund remains the 
core means of public support for FACTOR and many high-level Canadian labels, while 
funding programs continue to expand across Canada, including a $45m, three year 
Ontario Music Fund, announced in spring 2013.  However, little analysis has been 
conducted to measure the relationship of these sets of systems – Canada’s popular 
music funding structure – with the reasons funding began in the first place, from the 
development of CANCON to the initiation of FACTOR.  These funding systems have 
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assisted in the creation of an industry, one that delivers a number of successful 
artists, both commercially and critically.  However, the relationship between 
Canadian content and the policies enacted to protect, support and enrich it have 
faced a number of challenges, which were made evident in the current relationship 
between Canada’s broadcasters, music sector and government, as evidenced in the 
now accepted BCE Inc. and Astral Media Inc. merger.  The development of Canada’s 
national narrative and the influence of nationalism and nation building initiated a 
system where foreign control of Canada’s publicly owned airwaves is prohibited.  As 
a result, for Canadian businesses to operate and profit off licensing these airwaves, a 
number of concessions to support the content that is broadcast through them have 
been initiated, each meant to support both Canadian cultural plurality – Canadian 
identity as a whole – and Canadian business development.  However, by 2012, these 
two objectives were not satisfied collectively, as a disparity emerged between how 
Canada’s cultural policies supported business and social objectives.  These 
complications were never addressed in the policies themselves, leaving each 
successive administration, business owner and content creator to argue for what 
benefitted them the most; and this became most often defined through financial 
means, rather than programming or encouraging plurality.   
 
As a result, the history of funding popular music in Canada shows that some content 
is better and more suitable than other content, in terms of how the systems and 
rules are satisfied.  Major-label funded, commercially successful content, such as 
Nickelback or Bryan Adams, is of more value to commercial radio and Canada’s 
economy in general than more niche content.  However, the definition of CANCON 
and MAPL, as proposed in the early 1970s, supposes all content that qualifies to be 
equal.  Yet, the policies have developed to support more internationalized, 
commercially viable content over greater diversity, even if the policy that governs 
this states otherwise.  With CRTC mandates, certain Canadian content, whether it 
may be a film or a record, is of value to Canadians, even if such value has never 
been quantified nor proven.  However, such content that is of less value within the 
core CANCON policy, such as major label promoted pop music, is often of most value 
to private broadcasters.  If that content is supported across more platforms as media 
ownership consolidates, the original value proposition within CANCON is altered.  
Therefore, an untenable situation occurs where social life, a cultural abstract, merges 
with social policy, an absolute.  In other words, Canadian policy legislates an 
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abstraction – Canadian culture – to further legislate an absolute – Canadian business 
and economic development.   
 
This is most evidenced by enforcing a law that all airwaves must be licenced and 
operated by Canadians.  In its simplest sense, such a requirement would ensure that 
this is in the best interest of Canadians.  Yet, what is in the best interest of certain 
Canadian businesses does not always align with what is in the best interest of 
Canadians, as the policy itself posits.  As consolidation has increased, the pathways 
available for Canadian content on traditional radio have grown less open and 
CANCON has become further separated from the concept of being Canadian.  
However, at the same time, restricting these pathways has resulted in a number of 
new pathways emerging, through increased financial divestment to Canadian content 
creators and new technological tools to discover and promote content.  With the 
popularity of Spotify, Songza and Rdio, CANCON is of less importance as there is no 
mandate that these services ensure their listeners consume 35% Canadian content 
in English Canada, for example.  Yet, the CANCON debate and the relationship 
between Canada’s broadcasters, music sector and government remain integral to 
how Canada, as a whole, expresses itself, both through content creation and its 
history of subsidization. 
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Conclusion  
Making Sense of Canadian Identity 
 
Introduction 
 
In the introduction, I argued that framing my arguments through a traditional 
literature review proved challenging in the context of this thesis.  This is due to the 
amount of personal interviews and state documents I relied on for research 
purposes.  However, looking back at this work provides a clear framework to base 
this history on.  The history of popular music funding began long before FACTOR, 
with the framing of the concept of being Canadian by Massey and his commission.  
Popular music funding is an effect of this debate, with the history of Canadian 
identity formation being the cause.  In one sense, one is Canadian if they believe, 
individually, that this description applies to them.  However, this must be reinforced 
with a passport or identity card, both of which are administered by the state.  
However, national identity is both framed on an collection of individuals – I am 
Canadian if I believe myself to be - and a individual collective – If you own a 
document issued by the state prescribing you as Canadian, you are one - as Handler 
states.  For CANCON, there are strict rules to meet in order to qualify.  One must 
display citizenship or permanent residency and retain ownership of the work, either 
through music, lyrics or location. CANCON is prescribed; one can be Canadian and 
not qualify as CANCON, if their content is made with external structures.  Yet, 
CANCON, or more importantly what it represents – Canadian content – is used to 
represent and defend not only the concept of being Canadian, but also the content 
that supports Canadian nationalism.  If CANCON and the concept of being Canadian 
are intertwined, as I believe they are, one must conclude this framing by 
investigating if CANCON policy, as a tool to develop and sustain Canadian identity, 
has satisfied its objectives.  CANCON is accepted, ubiquitous and a part of 
contemporary Canadian culture.  However, it has been repositioned to satisfy more 
individualised objectives, such as station ownership or regulatory reform.  While 
setup to support an individual collective, it has been misused by collections of 
individuals, such as corporate interests.  For example, one organisation such as 
CRTC or CAB lobbies for a certain position, and if accepted, this position impacts the 
collective.  
 
At the same time, Canadian culture has been influenced by foreign or external 
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imports, such as American influence and involvement, the politics of Quebec, 
immigration and a diversification of cultural offers and technological advancement.  
In our increasingly digitised music economy, national regulations are inapplicable, as 
CANCON is not adhered to online.  
 
Therefore, if we return to Anderson, we can expand on this measuring of CANCON 
and the concept of being Canadian in relation to the history of popular music 
funding.  In the context of the popular music industry, CANCON and nationalist 
policy has made the concept of Canadian a “universally legitimate value” (Anderson 
2006, 30).  The term ‘Canadian artist’ has meaning for those both inside and outside 
of the value judgment.  However, if CANCON policy has experienced a “long, self-
conscious search for theoretical clarity” (Anderson 2006, 30), there have been a 
number of “regrettable outcomes” (Anderson 2006, 30), including a homogenisation 
of commercial playlists and a lack of institutional clarity concerning the historical 
development of the structures.  If CANCON is philosophically incoherent, as 
Anderson would argue, it has remained politically powerful, despite no agreed upon, 
universal definition of ‘Canadian music’ ever being devised.  More music has been 
created, careers supported and art disseminated through the system, despite its 
intrinsic, unavoidable confusion.  
    
While there is more money available for musical content creators in Canada than 
there ever has been, the policies that were utilised to release these funds have 
altered minimally since the 1960s.  As a result, the concept of being Canadian – in 
reference to popular music funding – has become deprioritised via its ubiquity; 
whether one thinks they are or are not Canadian in an individual sense, the systems 
in place recognise one’s right to access such funds for the purpose of enhancing 
Canada’s collective identity.  This is evident in the eventual acceptance of the BCE 
Inc. and Astral Media Inc. merger in 2013; despite the concerns voiced towards its 
impact on the relationship between diversity and Canadian content, an eventual 
acceptance emerged because this was deemed as suitable for those who define 
themselves as Canadian and accept the requirements within CANCON.  In other 
words, a larger conglomerate that owns and, in essence, standardises programming 
is still Canadian, as long as it is accepted as being Canadian within CANCON 
regulations.   
 
 240 
Therefore, in many ways, looking through this history reveals that protecting 
Canadian content is concerned with, as Berton stated, protecting one’s right to 
subsidy as much as the right to create and be recognised, in one way or another, as 
Canadian.  Whether this can be understood as being ‘not American’ or something 
separate, the history of popular music funding ends as it began.  Nationalism, in this 
case, is as much about control of resources as it is about identity and here the 
resources are the right of access to finance to create music.   
 
As a result, it is best to return to the three challenges introduced in the introduction 
to look at the system as a whole through this history.  First, I argued that if popular 
music is utilized as a tool to promote national identity it cannot be effectively 
achieved through public funding initiatives.  This is exemplified by the fact that while 
more support is available, the impact of the support on CANCON and national 
identity formation, at time of writing, is negligible, aided by the democratisation of 
music distribution through the Internet and Canadian artists’ continued focus on 
international markets.  
 
This has been impacted by the second argument that states that the quota impacts 
the distribution, promotion and identity of the music it is protecting.  In Canada, 
commercial radio has continued to standardise its playlists.  However, services not 
restricted by CANCON, such as Spotify or Rdio feature a wider array of Canadian 
content.  As a result, this has further confused understanding of the success of 
CANCON and if such terminology could ever be posited, which is my third argument.  
If a Swedish streaming service offers more Canadian content than a locally owned 
terrestrial radio station, it is satisfying the core objectives of CANCON more; 
however, by not being Canadian-owned, it is inherently restrictive in reference to 
policy, as Canadian ownership and programming are equally important in asserting 
and defending CANCON.   
 
Theorising The Value of This History 
 
More Canadians have created, produced and disseminated content than they would 
have without such support, and this content has assisted in building and reasserting 
a definition of being (and being seen to be) Canadian, despite no standalone 
definition existing.  However, the focus of financing content over airing or 
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diversifying programming opportunities, especially in the past fifteen years, requires 
rethinking.  “Currently, there are artists that have received over $900,000 in their 
careers from FACTOR alone,” states President and CEO Duncan McKie.  “I bet if you 
aired that at the initial board meeting in 1982, everyone would have thought that to 
be inconceivable.  That is four times the initial budget of FACTOR for one band 
alone” (pers. comm).   
 
Artists have received these amounts, prompting criticism from outside on how 
FACTOR’s allocations are handled.  For example, in January 2013, a blog called 
Slagging Off began publishing, often incorrectly, the amounts certain artists receive, 
prompting further criticism from some Canadian artists.  The author Paul Lawton, a 
member of Alberta act The Ketamines, comments on a blog written by Stuart 
Duncan of FACTOR-funded independent label Out of This Spark.  Duncan stated on 2 
April 2013; “unfortunately like a lot of labels of my size, people had given up on 
FACTOR a bit, and don’t pay close enough attention to it anymore” (Duncan 2013).  
Duncan stated that he received between $10-15k from FACTOR throughout his 
businesses, but his rate decreased, a result blamed on the DBA structure and the 
high success rates of those who qualify.  Lawton, through his Slagging Off blog, 
received both significant criticism and acclaim in Canada, prompting blog posts 
proclaiming he was “the most hated man in the Canadian music industry” (Cross 
2013) or that he was telling the truth, bringing light to the fact that funding relied on 
who one knew, as “of the 10 bands who took home the most FACTOR funding in the 
past decade, all 10 were either from or represented by people who lived within 17 
kilometres of the FACTOR office” (Berry 2013).  
 
In the blog, Lawton states: 
 
 One thing I keep hearing in defence of FACTOR funding is that if we eliminate the 
 funding, Canadian music will be swallowed up by our American counterparts, because 
 FACTOR allows Canadian music to stay competitive. The same argument is often 
 made about CANCON requirements. The truth is grey. Canadian music will still be 
 made and Canadian music will still get popular.  Propping a few dozen bands/labels 
 up with the majority of funding gives them a competitive advantage to ward off 
 American music, but also (and most importantly) Canadian music (Lawton 2013).  
 
Lawton returns to the same argument aired in the early 1970s by Canada’s private 
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broadcasters.  This is the argument that Stan Klees, Walt Greilas and Pierre Juneau 
rallied against.  For CAB members in the early 1970s, comments were aired claiming 
that Canadian music would still be made without subsidization.  However, the 
structure of the global music industry that Lawton and others live within is markedly 
different to the industry in the early 1970s.  With national restrictions not applicable 
to online consumption, the role of Canadian content protectionism in supporting its 
development, enrichment and promotion for the benefit of Canadians is growing 
increasingly difficult to police.  This debate, which includes the understanding and 
questioning the role of foreign ownership of Canadian airwaves, the current structure 
of Canadian content regulations and the evolution of funding administrations, is 
contained within Lawton’s arguments, but never approached critically.  As a result, 
the antagonism towards Canada’s support structures often returns to those who 
have and those who have not, and the histories they have contributed to the making 
of Canadian culture play in the current music and broadcasting sectors in Canada.   
 
By placing an economic focus – the need to internationalize one’s content and 
compete at such a level – over a series of cultural protectionist policies – a need to 
understand and communicate a sense of Canadianness through this cultural form – 
state funding of popular music and the regulations that governed these programs 
became less transparent.  To Lawton, supporting Canadian music means supporting 
a type of music, certain genres or artists.  The same can be said, over time, of the 
work of FACTOR and other administrations.  However, what this music is and why it 
is supported differs, depending on the program and political requirements set up 
with the funds themselves.  As a result, Lawton complains that some artists receive 
too much, even if those artists satisfy a number of objectives the administration 
places on them.  These objectives, in this case, do not align with this view of 
CANCON and what it is meant to represent. 
 
This representation relates back to Canada’s relationship with nationalism, its 
national identity and how its cultural policies have been crafted and manipulated by 
the state to reinforce the state’s federalist objectives.  Canada, while fragmented 
within, has been seen to develop a strong musical brand since the early 2000s, 
proving that these support structures, if seen from outside, are working.  Yet, many 
of those interacting with the programs within express difficulty and frustration, even 
if it is their content that is represented to strengthen the Canadian brand.  If 
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Canada’s brand has value, then there is a responsibility for these funding structures 
to reinforce it.  Or, does this detract from other core responsibilities, such as 
business development of applicants, or quantitative measurement of their usage of 
the funds?  For this, it is best to measure, after five decades of policy, if Canada’s 
brand adds value in this context.        
 
Does The Canada Brand Add Value? 
 
Over four decades since the introduction of Canadian content regulations, the 
Canadian music industry has incubated a number of internationally successful artists 
who have benefitted from subsidization and/or broadcasting regulations.  Artists like 
Carly-Rae Jepsen, Michael Bublé, Deadmaus and Nickelback are international stars, 
along with The Arcade Fire, Broken Social Scene, Tim Hecker, Caribou and Final 
Fantasy, but it is difficult to attribute this success directly to funding.  Furthermore, 
Canada’s private broadcasters, working within CANCON regulations since 1971 and 
mandatory CCD contributions since 2006, have become more profitable, accruing 
$6.58b in revenue on average (Canadian Association of Broadcasters 2011).  
Canada’s popular music funding programs, if all provincial support structures are 
included, is worth over $100m per year, with FACTOR and RSF/FondsRadiostar 
providing over $25m per year to applicants alone.   
 
In addition, the common argument in the 1960s and 1970s from the broadcasters 
that Canadian music is of little value compared to foreign competitors has changed.  
Canadian musicians and the systems that support them are internationally 
recognized.  On 3 November 2012, British music magazine This is Fake DIY 
published an article, titled “How Canada Values Its Music.”  It writes; “Canada, being 
swallowed up by America to the point where confusing a Canadian with an American 
isn’t even a proper joke anymore, is so keen to protect its culture, to promote its 
national identity, that it appears to go much further than the rest of the world when 
it comes to financially assisting its musicians” (Warren 2012).  This article is both in 
favour of and against the policy, interviewing artists and businesspeople, such as 
artists’ Chains of Love or Greg Ipp that had applications rejected, while also praising 
that the state invests in the popular music sector.  Alan Davey, Chief Executive 
Officer of Arts Council England writes positively about the Canadian set of structures 
in The Huffington Post.  He claims these systems are a personal influence on his 
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beliefs towards talent development, ones demonstrated in the Momentum Music 
Fund in England, a program he helped author.  “FACTOR has played a huge role in 
the success of the Canadian music scene, from launching the careers of 
internationally recognized artists such as Feist and Arcade Fire to contributing to the 
thriving local music scenes of Toronto and Montreal. This kind of investment - giving 
artists the right kind of support at the right stage of their career - can play a really 
significant role in allowing musicians to continually renew and reinvent their work” 
(Davey 2012).   
 
Both articles, published in the second half of 2012, argue the Canadian brand is one 
of a country that values its music to the point that “Canadian music”, an abstract 
description, has enough tangible meaning to be lauded as a standalone entity.  To 
these writers, Canadian music has an identity, however one prescribes such identity 
to be.  In each article in these British publications, the concept of what Canadian 
music is not identifiable.  For This is Fake DIY, the article is titled “How Canada 
Values Its Music.”  This attributes that Canada, as a whole, knows what ‘its’ music is 
and that music, as a whole, is agreeably valued.  Those conclusions, ones that 
attribute or suggest a concept of being Canadian, and how it relates to popular 
music funding in Canada, remains complex.  If the concept of being Canadian 
includes a belief that music, whatever it is, is valued, then the history of popular 
music funding in Canada has not conclusively validated such a belief.  In the case of 
popular music funding, there are no concrete, singular conclusions.  Instead, how 
Canadianness is engineered, and its relationship to the system – both institutionally 
and individually – remains inconclusive.  In some manners, the objectives that 
convinced the state to support popular music in Canada have been satisfied.  In 
other manners, these objectives have changed, leaving those objectives before it 
missed and often ignored. 
 
From The Massey Commission to when CANCON was implemented in 1962 for 
television and in 1971 for radio, both policies were attempts to introduce a concept 
of what being Canadian, culturally speaking, represented.  These questions 
incorporate the very nature of Canada as a nation-state.  The country has always 
been on a “quest for nationhood” (Edwardson 2006, 1), rather than an assertion of 
nationality through creed, religion or edict.  Canada has been defined as an 
amalgamation of regions, dialects, languages and geographies, a country that is not 
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American, what it is not, rather than what it is.  Therefore, what ‘nationhood’ 
represents in Canada, and therefore mapping the quest that implemented policies 
and structures to assert such nationhood, remains difficult to ascertain.   
 
When using popular music funding as a case study, the difficulties increase.  
Measuring the chronological impact of Canada’s policies, towards the music and 
broadcasting sectors, remains challenged by Canada’s place in the global music 
sector, both in the 1970s and 2010s.   Ascribing a formulated Canadianness as a 
variable to success is subjective, as the majority of Canadian artists who have 
achieved international success do so with foreign support, either from multinationals 
or international management firms.  Therefore, when a Canadian artist like Justin 
Bieber achieves international stardom - an artist managed by an American company 
with teams in New York, London and Los Angeles - his citizenship is what retains his 
Canadianness, although his music is internationally written, produced and marketed.  
However, when assessed by MAPL qualifications, Bieber fails to meet the criteria, 
much like Bryan Adams’ did on Cuts Like a Knife in 1992.  While Adams petitioned to 
have his CANCON qualification instated, Bieber and his team have not instituted any 
such campaign, because such criteria bears little importance to the market value of 
his music, Canadian or not.  However, such an example is as much an exception as 
the norm.  Canadian pop star Carly-Rae Jepsen can be seen to have benefitted more 
from Canadian content regulations.  Jepsen recorded for several years 
independently, financed by Vancouver-based 604 Records, a label funded by 
FACTOR (and now MEC) and co-owned by Chad Kroeger, frontman of Nickelback, a 
band that was also part-funded to produce its early recordings.  Jepsen found 
international fame through Canadian radio, when Justin Bieber heard her song, “Call 
Me Maybe”, on commercial radio. 
 
In the introduction, I quoted Eric Hobsbawm in Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, 
in his description of the term ‘nation’ as infinitely subjective.  In terms of Canada’s 
state policy concerning cultural output, and its relation to popular music, this can be 
argued to be the case here.  In his chapter, “the government perspective”, 
Hobsbawm argues that “state-run patriotism is not necessarily ineffective, since the 
very existence and functions of the modern territorial citizen-state constantly 
involves its inhabitants in its affairs, and, inevitably, provides an institutional or 
procedural ‘landscape’ which is unlike any other such landscape and is the setting for 
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their lives, which it largely determines” (1992, 86).  In essence, patriotism develops 
in a nation through the repetition of state-run services making the nation ubiquitous, 
or part of everyday life.  In Canada, this has both defined and challenged the 
concept of the Canadian nation.  For Ramsay Cook, in his introduction to Canada, 
Quebec and the Uses of Nationalism, he quotes Mavis Gallant’s Home Truths, who 
argues, “a Canadian is someone who has a logical reason to think he is one” (Cook 
1995, 8).  Therefore, whether Justin Bieber benefitted directly from Canadian 
content regulations or not, if he supposes himself a Canadian, he is one.   
 
However, such assertions conflict with the mandate of The Broadcasting Act, 
specifying the need to culturally enrich and develop domestic content for the benefit 
of all Canadians.  This is difficult to assert in the case of Justin Bieber, as his content 
is developed, produced, marketed and managed by foreigners.  Yet, his likeness and 
brand is Canadian, as so it says in his passport.  Here, Bieber and his team produced 
international content for a domestic and international audience that is simultaneously 
Canadian and not Canadian.  For Carly Rae-Jepsen, the set of structures borne out of 
Canadian content regulations supported her career development, even though 
international acclaim came through multinational involvement.  Her album is 
recorded with Canadians and was originally released on a Canadian label, albeit 
distributed through Universal Music, a multinational.  Both artists are Canadian in 
terms of citizenship, but Rae-Jepson qualifies for MAPL, while Bieber does not.  Both 
are Canadian, in some cases, and not Canadian in others.  
 
While it is difficult, in some cases, to label artists definitively Canadian across their 
entire business ecosystem, this history has shown that as a result, institutions have 
filled this gap to recognize Canadianness in some cases.  While Bryan Adams, Justin 
Bieber, Arcade Fire, Nickelback and Carly Rae-Jepson, along with a multitude of 
other Canadian commercially successful artists work with management, labels and 
other business interests outside of Canada, the foundations of Canada’s funding 
structures, from the Canada Music Fund to FACTOR, have remained stationary since 
their creation.  For example, Berton remarks in Why We Act Like Canadians, “we 
tend to build up institutions rather than individuals…here again we part company 
with American show business tradition” (1987, 107).  Here, it can be argued that the 
existence of popular music funding in Canada is more successful in asserting the 
concept of ‘being Canadian’ through the institutions that support the artists.  Despite 
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being a number of independent, often non-communicative administrations, these 
programs are seen as Canadian, a Canadian system of popular music funding.  
 
It is this set of structures that have been both a success and a failure 
simultaneously.  If one analyses the current state of popular music funding against 
the initial recommendations tabled in the late 1960s, one can see a definitive shift in 
purpose over time, as commercial radio’s diversification and programming obligations 
with CANCON have grown less important compared to the subsidization their 
business interests create for the music sector. Positively, Canada has a larger, more 
internationally successful and active set of popular music businesses now than it did 
in 1971, and seed investment from both public and private sources has been a factor 
in initiating this growth.  However, this has led, in some cases, to artists and labels 
being trapped in a culture of funding that defines their business activities as much as 
their output, often limiting opportunities as much as creating them.  Regardless, in 
this history of popular music funding, Canadian music, whatever it may mean to 
represent, has been indelibly changed through this policy interventionism.  
 
Where Is This All Heading? 
 
Canada’s music businesses are unique in that their profitability is significantly reliant 
on a secondary sector, Canada’s broadcasting sector.  Increased profitability for 
Canada’s broadcasters meant, in many cases, a significant windfall of support back 
to Canada’s music businesses, which consequently increased their reliance not only 
on the funding, but also the success of this secondary sector.  In addition, this 
windfall has resulted in a quid pro quo relationship, where the music sector makes 
allowances to broadcasters to ensure a steady stream of support, further 
complicating the make-up of why the popular music is funded in Canada.  
Throughout this history of cultural regulation, the consumption of Canadian music by 
Canadian consumers – especially English Canadian consumers - has remained 
relatively stationary.  This fact produces a number of questions, as despite four 
decades of interventionism, both through nationalistic, culturally focused and 
business minded, economic means, Canadians still listen to similar amounts of 
Canadian music since such statistics were compiled.  Never has Canadian music, 
outside of Quebec, eclipsed 25% of total market share, despite CANCON’s 35% 
requirement or licensing regulations, prohibiting foreign ownership of broadcast 
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licenses.  Instead, what has become more Canadian, in this sense, are the 
organizations and structures that govern these systems, rather than any increased 
results that prove that Canadians listen to more Canadian music, regardless of how 
much Canadian music is produced.  By prohibiting foreign ownership of broadcast 
licenses, Canada’s media spectrum has seen a number of Canadian owned and 
operated conglomerates emerge, each with extensive domestic business interests 
across media properties, including television, radio, newspapers and Internet service 
providers.  These companies, such as BCE Inc. and Rogers, have grown to be 
represented as equally Canadian as the content disseminated through their channels, 
a result influenced by the same regulations that mandated, in 1971, that a certain 
amount of Canadian content be aired on their ancestor’s properties.  Yet, while this 
ownership has consolidated and the number of properties owned by these 
companies increased, the consumption, in sales, of Canadian music has not.  In 
addition, commercial radio retains criticisms claiming it supports the bare minimum 
in reference to its CANCON diversity.    
 
However, such judgments can be seen as unimportant, as the regulations that 
defined CANCON in law did not explicitly state that chart success was the key 
method of evaluation.  Furthermore, while these statistics argue that consumption 
has remained stationary, they do not include online streaming, listenership of the 
100% CANCON CBC Radio 3 digital station, concert attendance and the usage of 
Canadian music in synchronization, gaming and library music.  CANCON, and the 
policies that initiated and govern it, are not dynamic enough to retain the same 
prevalence now than they did in 1971.  This precludes why money is now more 
important, in how policy impacts the production of Canadian content, than the policy 
itself.  Further consolidations are permitted, such as the BCE Inc. and Astral Media 
Inc. merger in June 2013, as long as the allocation delivered to the Canadian content 
production – music and other cultural forms - is protected.  Content production has 
increased steadily since FACTOR was inaugurated in 1982.  Regardless of its 
popularity, the production itself satisfies initial policy demands.  However, when 
broadcasters objectives are included, this evaluation becomes more complex, 
convoluted and unresolvable.  This story leads back to its beginnings, however 
different the music and broadcasting sectors are currently, to 1971. 
 
In this dissertation, I have tried to outline that popular music interventionism in 
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Canada is an experiment in trial and error, with each trial assuming different 
objectives, from satisfying a concept of being Canadian to ensuring the profitability 
of Canadian businesses, both domestically and internationally.  As a result, the same 
trial and error process was applied to establishing a theoretical framework to base 
this dissertation.  As a Canadian living abroad for a decade, being defined and 
perceived as Canadian perplexes me, as I am perceived to represent a tangible, 
identifiable set of cultural and nationalistic variables formed of a nation I live 4,000 
miles away from.  This is the basis of why I chose to investigate the concept and 
misuse of ‘being Canadian’ and what it means for Canada’s popular music industries 
and entwined interventionist policies.  Taking this approach has produced as many 
scholarly challenges as it has opened up methodological avenues.  As a result, 
unveiling this history has led to a number of conclusions, often in conflict with each 
other.  Providing financial support to create, develop and market art, whatever this 
art turns out to represent, positively impacts the expressive ability of citizens.  
However, the manner in which Canada has explored these situations has created a 
number of challenges that often detract from the importance of the creator.  
Ownership of a business, however profitable, does not satisfy cultural policy, that 
supposes a public right – the availability of culture - over a private one, the profit of 
an individual organization and its stakeholders.  In Canada, this has not been 
coalesced in how Canada subsidizes its popular music makers and businesses.   
 
Therefore, judging whether state intervention in Canadian popular music is good or 
bad cannot be resolved by this dissertation.  There are valid arguments on both 
sides.  By allowing more musicians to produce art, create employment opportunities, 
foster businesses and facilitate cultural exchange, such investment has produced 
tangible results.  That said, the structures in place have developed in an awkward 
manner, one that has eroded the core mandate that initiated the policies in the first 
place.  This is not only because the sector has evolved from 1971 to 2013.  Logistical 
alterations aside, supporting Canadian businesses and defining, developing and 
promoting a concept of Canadian identity are not mutually inclusive, a trait Canadian 
policymakers have ignored.  Now, it may be seen that the Canadian music industry is 
at another crossroads, one different to the situation Richie Yorke described in 1971.  
How it proceeds is to be determined, both by the current structures music makers 
and businesses see themselves in, but also how Canada, as a nation, mandates how 
it protects Canadianness, through both cultural expression and economic 
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development.  
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Appendices 
 
 
1.1 Reflexive Commentary 
 
One of the most difficult challenges in writing this dissertation was ensuring that my 
closeness to the topic did not impact the neutrality of the work.  Throughout the 
research I worked full time within Canada’s popular music funding structure, 
developing relationships with the people I quote and the programs I evaluate.  In 
this case, the complexities, ethics and structure of each interview, and its 
accompanying biases are difficult to shield from the arguments contained in my 
dissertation.  The history of Canada’s music funding system is, in its core, not a 
combined, complete or even cogent set of events.  However, the arguments and 
structure in this dissertation are, as I see them, the complete opposite of this.  I 
tried to impart structure and linearity in these disparate activities, despite the biases.  
In order to ensure that this structure is not perceived at the expense of what actually 
happened, it is best to provide further clarity into the political structure, subsequent 
relationships and industry aesthetic that I encountered when I researched and wrote 
this dissertation.   
 
In Canada, as I state early in the introduction, very few voters know that a Canadian 
funding system exists in the first place.  Most diplomats I encounter abroad are 
unaware of the system, including most of Canada’s European Ambassadors, as it was 
my job to educate them when I met them through my role at CIMA.  It is a niche 
issue with a small budget and an even smaller set of objectives.  As a result, there is 
a level of informed secrecy at play here, in such that those involved feel that if the 
state understood the size of the structure, it would give them reasons to garnish it.  
This is not the case, but it does explain why FACTOR never published their 
repayment rates, yet ensured that funding was strategized on an economic basis, 
especially since the Conservative government took over in 2006.  When interviewing 
managers and labels, very few revealed the amount they received, which to me is a 
side effect of the system itself.  Nothing is inherently straightforward and everyone 
has their independent motives – and often, interviewing those who give and receive 
money creates difficulties in measuring and accounting for such biases.  
 
This reveals the challenges within ethics and subjectivity in my interview process.  In 
“Ethics, Reflexivity and Ethically Important Moments in Research”, Guillemin and 
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Glynn from the University of Melbourne investigate this as a juxtaposition between 
reflexivity and research ethics.  They argue that there are two frameworks within 
research ethics and interviewing.  They are “procedural ethics, which usually involves 
seeking approval from a relevant ethics committee to undertake research involving 
humans and ethics in practice, the everyday ethical issues arise in the doing of 
research” (2004, 263).  For my research, it was not possible logistically to seek 
approval from an ethics committee for each qualitative interview, so my thesis was 
framed on ethics in practice and informed consent, ensuring that each interviewee 
agreed on their comments being included in the dissertation.   The challenge here 
was providing evidence for my claims, as any evidence offered would be qualitatively 
biased.  No matter what piece of primary research – state document or personal 
interview – a bias exists.  Denzin elaborates on this in “The Elephant in the Room, Or 
Extending the Conversation About the Politics of Evidence.”  He states: “The politics 
and political economy of evidence is not a question of evidence or no evidence.  It is 
rather a question of who has the power to control the definition of evidence, who 
defines the kinds of materials that count as evidence, who determines what methods 
best produce the best forms of evidence and who criteria and standards are used to 
evaluate quality evidence” (2009, 142).   
 
I want to answer the questions that Denzin poses in his analysis of ethics in evidence 
gathering through, in my case, interviewing and researching state documents.  The 
first question, focused on the power of definition, was a challenge to manage in my 
research.  Each state report was framed on the ideologies and objectives of the 
political party in office, and many schemes were introduced with secondary 
objectives, such as political manoeuvring or voter attraction.  In addition, certain 
parties in the music industry disagreed with others, and professionally I often sided 
with one over the other.  This created a structure that defined power as the party I 
agreed with, which I was acutely aware of when writing this dissertation.  As a 
result, any personal opinions were removed from the writing, except in the 
conclusion, as any concept of power was transferred to the document being analysed 
or interviewee.  The second, third and fourth points, questioning the materials used 
to define evidence and the methods and standards used to evaluate evidence, also 
posed challenges in ensuring this dissertation satisfied ethics queries.  Much of the 
material I refer to has never been compiled in such a way, so I attempted to 
separate the types of materials used to provide more guidance for the reader and 
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present evaluative methods in as simple a manner as possible, focusing on, 
economics and how they intertwined.  This is why I evaluated the system on the 
basis of its relationship to CANCON, rather than its efficacy in breaking bands or 
supporting businesses.  This is because any evidence that proclaims value 
judgements on the system is flawed.  I stated this within my dissertation, as defining 
success depended on whom you asked.  As a result, my evaluative structure was 
based on understanding the relationship with CANCON.  By taking the focus away 
from any value judgments on the system itself, I feel my relationship and position 
within the structure can be defended, as well as the methods I use in my research.   
 
In terms of subjectivity in my personal interview schedule, it is important to ensure 
that I explain the ethical challenges I experienced when conducting these interviews. 
For the most part, interviewees were supportive of either the music industry’s 
objectives or the broadcasters objectives.  Furthermore, those with positions in 
public office or higher profile industry roles tended to guard their words more 
carefully, such as former ministers or leaders of large associations.  However, in 
these interviews, a few people were more biased than others, and it is best to reveal 
and explain these individuals.  Chip Sutherland, for example, provided a number of 
frank, to the point quotes that were critical of the systems in place, because his 
position as executive director of Radio Starmaker Fund allows him the freedom to 
speak in such a way.  Duncan McKie, now President and CEO of FACTOR and one of 
the chief protagonists in this debate, had a number of biases that were made 
apparent throughout the interview process, as well as conversations I had with him 
off the record.  He was critical of FACTOR’s administration under Heather Ostertag. 
Others were less critical of Ostertag, including Brian Hetherman, who took over 
FACTOR after her, only to leave the post less than a year later.  
 
It must be stated that McKie’s opinions towards the system mirror mine.  As a result, 
I believe my perceived bias and actual relationship with McKie contributed to the fact 
that when asked to be interviewed, Heather Ostertag declined the invitation.  This 
was extended to her via email not long after she announced her retirement from 
FACTOR and at the time, my role with CIRPA/CIMA was associated with McKie, and I 
believe there may have been trepidation with some of the questions I would pose.  
This is unfortunate, as the silent witness in my research is Ostertag.  She was the 
President of FACTOR for nearly 20 years and before that, worked at CTL.  I am sure 
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her opinion and biases would have contributed expansively to my research and I do 
believe, due to my placement within the industry, she chose not to participate in this 
project.   
 
I believe the reason Ostertag declined to be interviewed is because she perceived an 
illusion of objectivity in my purpose.  This term, coined by Yale Professor David 
Armor, is analysed in an article in Harvard Business Review, written by Banaji, 
Bazerman and Chugh.  They state: 
 
 Most of us believe we are ethical and unbiased.  We imagine we’re good decision 
 makers, able to objectivity size up a job challenge or a venture deal and reach a fair 
 and rational conclusion that’s in our, and our organisation’s, best interests.  But more 
 than two decades of research confirms that, in reality, most of us fail woefully short 
 of our inflated self-perception.  We’re deluded by the ‘illusion of objectivity’, the 
 notion that we’re free of the very biases we’re so quick to recognize in others” 
 (2003).  
 
I believe that my research was challenged by such an illusion of objectivity, as there 
were instances, such as Ostertag’s decision not to be interviewed, that my 
professional standing in the industry and opinions would create bias.  The authors 
identify four challenges to objectivity.  They are “implicit forms of prejudice, bias that 
favours one’s own group, conflict of interest and a tendency to over claim credit” 
(Banaji, Bazerman and Clugh 2003).   I do believe that these challenges infiltrated 
my research, but I believe I approached such challenges and outlined any biases 
implicitly in my research.  However, I was not able to convince Ostertag that this 
illusion of objectivity would be managed and because of that, I was unable to speak 
to an important subject in this debate.  
 
Other than this, no other industry representative refused to be interviewed.  I 
attempted to speak to Richie Yorke a few times, as he is now retired and living in 
Australia, but was unavailable scheduling wise.  We did exchange a few emails 
through his assistant about my research to fact-check information concerning the 
Maple Music Junket.  In terms of conducted interviews, each one was pre-scheduled, 
on the record and formally announced.  There are no comments in my dissertation 
that were said to me off the record.   
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Furthermore, another challenge I encountered was a fear that upon the publication 
of this dissertation, the findings within it would prompt the state to rethink the 
system as a whole.  This was communicated to me on a number of occasions.  This 
has not been the case, but if such biases were aired, complications may ensue due 
to such opinions being treated as fact.  This was reiterated to all interviewees that 
this was not the intention of this research and each comment was carefully handled 
to ensure what was said was just that.  This is not a PhD of opinions, grievances or 
criticisms; this is an exploration into a hidden history that is unique to Canada and its 
popular music industry.  The risks individuals involved undertook throughout this 
history, from the creation of CANCON to the development of FACTOR, CMF and RSF 
are unique to Canada, and with such uniqueness comes independent opinions of 
what could be enhanced, improved, reduced or eliminated.  I attempted to treat 
these opinions with respect throughout the thesis and reveal opinions and biases as 
they occurred, rather than allowing them to influence the core theoretical framework 
of the thesis itself.  
 
The term ‘history’ is included in the title of my thesis, because it is chronicling a 
history that is my intention with this work.  While this PhD is submitted within the 
field of cultural studies, I believe it is equally placed within historical anthropology, as 
its structures influenced the manner in which I wrote the dissertation.  To me, as 
stated in Kalb, Marks and Tak’s analysis of historical anthropology in Focaal,  
“Anthropology here functions as a vehicle for the movement away from social history 
and historical sociology, and towards a new cultural history. The goal seems to be to 
write cultural histories of epochs, but increasingly also of groups and subgroups” 
(1996, 7).  My historical aim is of tracing a cultural journey through popular music 
funding which had not been attempted before, and I took equal guidance from the 
field of cultural studies as I did from historical anthropology.  As a result, the last 
three chapters of the thesis were more difficult to write.  This is due to the fact that 
more changes occurred in Canada’s system between 2012-2013 than did so since the 
beginning of the Canada Music Fund in 2001.  Archiving and theorising a history as it 
is occurring is counter-intuitive and inherently flawed.  One cannot chronicle a 
history as its unfolding, and this produced complications in how to treat this material 
fairly, especially when those I was close to those embroiled in the alterations to the 
system at the time (and still are).   
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This is why I combined chapters 4 and 5 and eliminated a number of pages where I 
felt I became too close to the material.  For example, when the personnel changed 
at FACTOR, it impacted my professional situation and relationship with the 
organisation.  My employer left and a new CEO of CIMA, Stuart Johnston, was 
appointed.  This brought with it policy changes, alterations and new opinions.  
Johnston became a trusted advisor and mentor who confided his opinions to me, 
despite not being able to do so publically in his role as Canada’s chief negotiator and 
lobbyist for the independent music industry. Therefore, I chose to only include 
Johnston’s published statements in this PhD, as this was the opinion of his 
professional role, which takes precedent in this debate.  This was the same for 
McKie, who was now politically neutral in his role as FACTOR’s President and CEO 
and whose opinions provided to me off the record could never be included in this 
research.     
 
I know that the challenge with this material is my closeness to it.  Much of the policy 
decisions that I write about were developed while I was working with the individuals 
involved, both actively and passively, and personal reputations and activity within the 
sector informed how one answered the questions I posed or reacted to the research 
I presented them.  I have attempted to present a balanced view of these sources 
and outlined within this study where the documentation may be skewed or politically 
motivated.  In addition, many of my interviewees often recalled circumstance by 
memory.  When and where this appears to be politically motivated, I clearly outlined.   
 
Writing this dissertation was a reflexive exercise.  Writing about my job, so to speak, 
was difficult, but I do not believe my day-to-day work infiltrated the treatment of the 
subject.  It is impossible to state that none of my personal experiences and 
relationships are not included in the work, but as a researcher separating myself 
from the topic was a constant challenge.  I believe this work stands up to facing it.  
 
1.2 Process for Informed Consent  
 
Below is the process for informed consent I abided by when conducting personal 
interviews for this dissertation. For each interview, I followed a standard practice 
that was agreed upon in full and in advance by the interviewee.  
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1. An email or phone call request was sent out informing of the research topic 
and PhD title. 
2. A date was set for an interview on Skype or via email.  There were few direct 
interviews in person that were singularly dedicated to this research.  Most 
conversations had with the interviewees outside of this research were off the 
record.  
3. Either via email or in person, each interviewee agreed to be interviewed, on 
the promise that they get to approve their quotes and comments before 
publication.  
4. After a draft of the section was written, the interviewee was emailed once 
more with the section draft, asking if they approved of the comments 
included.  
 
1.3 Sample Questions 
 
I asked different questions depending on whom I interviewed, but the objective for 
all of them was similar; to secure their opinions on what actually happened, their 
thoughts towards the material I was writing and their opinion on the history of 
popular music funding in Canada as a whole.  Sample questions included:  
 
1. Do you believe that this legislation was in the interest of the artist or the 
administration?  
2. Do you feel that Canadian identity, or the concept of being Canadian, factors 
into your beliefs towards the systems in place? 
3. What are your beliefs, biases or objectives towards X piece of legislation, 
report or document? 
4. Can you explain your actions concerning the activities pertaining to X? 
 
1.4 Organisational Map  
 
Below is a list of interviewees, when they were interviewed and their location, as well 
as notes concerning their known biases, if any.  I have included their name and title, 
importance to the PhD, location of the interviewee, method of interviewing and some 
specific information from each specific interview. 
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Bain, Brent:  
Brent was the former Head of Submissions at FACTOR until he resigned to form his 
own management company, Co Pilot, in early 2014.  He has one of the most 
extensive knowledge of FACTOR’s programs, having worked under both Heather 
Ostertag and Duncan McKie.  He was interviewed via email and he is based in 
Toronto, Ontario.   
 
Interview Schedule:  
26 August 2011  
28 September 2011  
8 February 2012 
 
Bonnetta, Jonas:  
Jonas Bonnetta is the principle songwriter and band member in Evening Hymns.  I 
worked with him on European expansion between 2010 and 2012.  I interviewed him 
for chapter four to comment on FACTOR reform structures.  He was interviewed in 
person before one of his concerts in London.  He is based in Ottawa, Ontario.  
 
Interview Times: 
4 March 2013 
 
Copps, Sheila: 
Sheila Copps is Canada’s former Minister of Canadian Heritage for the Liberal party in 
the late 1990s.  She was responsible for leading many of the changes during the 
transition from SRDP to CMF, plus introducing Trade Routes and PromART.  I 
emailed her from her website contact and we spoke over the phone once, for 40 
minutes.  She is based in Ottawa, Ontario and is now a philanthropist and political 
advisor.  
 
Interview Times:  
11 July 2012 
 
Crossman, Jeffrey:  
Jeffrey Crossman was the senior trade commissioner at the Canadian High 
Commission in London when I began working with CIRPA in 2008.  His work 
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promoting Canadian music export activities predates mine and he was the first 
person to encourage me to pursue working in music export at the time.  I spoke to 
him off the record several times throughout this research but only interviewed him 
once formally, via email.  This was to fact-check the Trade Routes and PromART 
section.  He is now based in Toronto, Ontario and has a non-music industry role at 
DFAIT.  
 
Interview Times: 
14 March 2012 
 
Davey, Alan: 
Alan Davey is the CEO of Arts Council England.  He is a keen observer of Canadian 
music policy and has used its history to initiate programs in England, including the 
Momentum Music Fund.  He was interviewed to provide more information on 
assessing Canada’s global brand in the conclusion of the dissertation.  He was 
provided a detailed draft of the dissertation and assisted in the editing of the final 
draft.   I interviewed him in person, in his office, on the date in question.  He 
remains a close friend and confidante and we had many off the record discussions 
about my research, none of which are included in the dissertation.  
 
Interview Times: 
1 April 2013 
 
Dewar, Nicki:   
Nicki Dewar was the senior trade commissioner for arts and culture for DFAIT, based 
in Winnipeg, Manitoba.  She created the Canadian Blast brand and worked with 
Jeffrey Crossman as the Canadian affiliate.  I worked with her on a number of events 
in 2009, including CMJ in New York and The Great Escape.  I interviewed her to fact 
check the Trade Routes and PromART analysis in person in Winnipeg during a visit I 
took to provide workshops for Manitoba Music.  She is now retired and still lives in 
Winnipeg.  
 
Interview Times: 
1 May 2012 
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Falk, Mike Petkau:  
 
Mike Petkau Falk is the lead singer of Les Jupes and owner of Head in the Sand, a 
studio and label based in Winnipeg, Manitoba.  I’ve worked with him over the past 
four years internationalising his roster and seen him apply for funding through both 
regional and national programs, successfully and unsuccessfully.  He is also on the 
board of Manitoba Music and an active player in the Winnipeg-based industry.  I 
interviewed him for the section focusing on artist opinions.  He still lives in Winnipeg 
and both interviews were conducted through email.  
 
Interview Times: 
 
21 April 2012 
3 November 2013 
 
Finklestein, Bernie:   
 
Bernie Finklestein is one of Canada’s most successful music managers.  He began 
working in the early 1960s managing Mandala, Kensington Market, Bruce Cockburn 
and many others.  He was one of the founders of CIRPA and played a role in 
founding FACTOR and VideoFACT.  I met him through my work at CIRPA/CIMA, 
where he was on the board of directors.  He has since retired and published a 
memoir, which I reference, titled True North.  I interviewed him for both facts and 
opinion, as is one of the longest serving members of the Canadian music industry.  
He now lives in the rural Ontario and is semi-retired but still managing Cockburn.  I 
interviewed him over the phone twice in one week in 2012 and once again in 2014 
for fact checking purposes.  
 
Interview Times: 
 
16 July 2012 
23 July 2012 
6 February 2014 
 
Grant, Jenn:   
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Jenn Grant is one of the most successful singer-songwriters from Eastern Canada.  
She has released four albums and sold over 75,000 units in Canada.  However, her 
success has yet to concretely translate to other markets.  I interviewed her once via 
email and once in person, when we met at Nova Scotia Music Week.  We have 
become friends over the years and I have tried to assist her international 
development, but have not been successful.  Jenn has applied for funding herself 
and through the labels she has been signed to, including Six Shooter Records, whose 
owner, Shauna de Cartier, is the current Chairperson of CIMA.  
 
Interview Times:  
 
2 August 2012  
3 November 2013 
 
Grenier, Line: 
 
Dr. Line Grenier, from the University of Montreal, is the foremost academic in 
analyzing the history of Quebec’s popular music industries.  I interviewed her once 
over the phone to fact check and discuss the ‘crash’ of Quebec’s music industry in 
the late 1970s and subsequent recovery – with the help of state support – in the mid 
1980s.  Her help clarified a number of issues. 
 
Interview Times:  
 
2 November 2012  
 
Hetherman, Brian:  
 
Brian Hetherman is one of the longest serving music managers in Canada.  He has 
served on the board of the Music Managers Forum and at different times in his 
career, been the executive director of both FACTOR and Radio Starmaker Fund.  In 
both instances, his stint at each funding organization did not last more than one 
year.  He has experience running funding programs and applying for them, through 
his management firm, Cerberus Artists.  We have worked together frequently in the 
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past and we have known each other since my first assignment for CIRPA/CIMA, 
PopKomm in 2008.  He lives in Toronto.  I interviewed him in person in 2011 and via 
email in 2012.  
 
Interview Times: 
 
28 September 2011 
12 July 2012 
 
Janes, Jon: 
 
Jon Janes is the frontman from Newfoundland based folk troupe, The Mountains and 
the Trees.  He and I worked together frequently for a few years, as he successfully 
toured the United Kingdom and Europe three times, each with support from regional 
music industry associations.  He has since left the music industry professionally and 
has not released a recording since 2012.  He lives in Halifax.  He was interviewed via 
email in 2012 and at Nova Scotia Music Week, the same day I interviewed Jenn 
Grant, in 2013.  
 
Interview Times:  
 
14 August 2012 
3 November 2013 
 
Jenson, Kennedy.   
 
Kennedy Jenson is the former executive director of Alberta Music.  She left her post 
in 2013 and left the music industry.  I interviewed her for fact checking purposes 
over the phone, from her home in Edmonton.  
 
Interview Times: 
 
22 April 2012 
 
Johnston, Stuart:  
 264 
 
Stuart Johnston is the President and CEO of CIMA.  He took over from Duncan McKie 
when he resigned from the post to join FACTOR.  I have worked with him in depth 
since late 2011, as his UK and EU representative.  He was interviewed for a number 
of reasons surrounding CRTC opinion pieces, submissions to government, CIMA’s 
position in policy and specific fact checking.  We speak every week, so there was a 
large amount of informal conversation concerning this research, but he was formally 
interviewed 8 times throughout this process, via phone, email and in person.   He 
lives in Toronto.    
 
Interview Times: 
 
19 March 2012  
21 April 2012 
13 May 2012 
18 July 2012 
11 May 2013 
18 July 2013 
25 July 2013 
16 September 2013 
 
Leblanc, Larry: 
 
Larry Leblanc was the chief correspondent for Billboard magazine throughout the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  Furthermore, he wrote extensively for Canadian Publisher 
Magazine, a number of broadsheets and studies for PCH.  He also authored the 
FACTOR Story, which I referenced.  He is a very outspoken person, often disagreeing 
with the actions of some music industry associations and funding organisations, 
including voicing his opposition to DBA as a concept.  I interviewed him twice over 
the phone and both conversations lasted over an hour, with topics ranging from the 
creation of FACTOR to the activities and policies within the Canada Music Fund.  I 
also interviewed him once via email.  Larry lives in Toronto and still authors a blog, 
interviewing music industry executives.  
 
Interview Times: 
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25 August 2011 
21 April 2012 
6 March 2013  
   
Mair, Al: 
 
Al Mair was the owner of Attic Records, one of the most successful Canadian labels 
of all time.  It released material from April Wine, Loverboy, Anvil and Triumph.  It 
was founded in 1974 and played a role in the creation of CIRPA, FACTOR and later, 
Radio Starmaker Fund.  Al was one of the most vocal members of the music 
industry, remaining active in all policy decisions and changes through a Chairmanship 
of CIRPA, FACTOR and Starmaker.  He voiced a number of biases towards how 
programs were coordinated, but his unwavering support of the systems, as a whole, 
is well documented.  I referenced this in an op-ed piece he wrote for the National 
Post during a renewal of CMF.  I interviewed him over the phone and spoke to him 
informally on many occasions.  He is based in Toronto.  
 
Interview Times:  
 
31 August 2011 
24 September 2011 
26 October 2011 
13 December 2011 
 
Mangan, Dan: 
 
Dan Mangan is a singer-songwriter based in Vancouver.  He has emerged as one of 
the most successful independent Canadian musicians in the past decade.  I worked 
with him in depth for two years, developing his career in Europe.  He applied for all 
funding himself for the first five years of his career, succeeding only 20% of the 
time, according to his testimony.  Now, his applications are handled by his label, 
MEC-supported Arts & Crafts.  I interviewed him in person when we were on tour 
together in Paris in 2011 and via email in 2012.  He lives in Vancouver.  
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Interview Times:  
 
27 November 2011 
4 April 2012  
 
McKie, Duncan: 
 
Duncan McKie is the President and CEO of FACTOR.  Before that, he was the 
President and CEO of CIRPA / CIMA.  He was the first person to hire me in the 
Canadian music industry, to coordinate UK and EU activities for CIRPA.  Since then, 
he has become a good friend and my mentor and we speak weekly about all sector 
issues, from CRTC to PCH, FACTOR and regional initiatives.  Admittedly, I have a 
bias of respect towards Duncan, but I tried to retain complete neutrality in our 
formal interviews.  Duncan’s biases are noted in his comments in the dissertation, 
where he wished them to be.  He fact checked all content before publication.  Each 
interview was prescribed and organized outside of work hours; a few were 
completed in person (where noted) and the rest over Skype.  Duncan lives in 
Toronto.  
 
Interview Times:  
 
21 September 2011 (in person) 
21 May 2011 (in person) 
4 February 2012 
23 April 2012 
26 July 2013 
4 March 2013 (in person) 
14 April 2013 
3 June 2013 
 
Murphy, Donna: 
 
Donna Murphy is the VP of Operations for CIMA.  She began at CIRPA as an 
executive assistant in the late 1970s and remains at the organisation at time of 
writing.  She has been responsible for all operational activities concerning our UK 
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and EU initiatives I managed, so our relationship is very close.  She was interviewed 
to fact check statements concerning CIRPA’s activities in the late 1970s.  In addition, 
Donna provided all CIRPA newsletters and archival material for research purposes, as 
it is stored at their offices.  We spoke informally many times but I only formally 
interviewed her twice, both via Skype.  Donna lives in Toronto.  
 
Interview Times:  
 
17 August 2011 
14 February 2012 
 
Muth, Gary: 
 
Gary Muth is a former executive director of CIRPA.  Before that, he worked as a 
concert promoter and label manager, working with The Rolling Stones, The Police 
and other acts in Canada.  He was one of those leading CIRPA during the developing 
and initial release of the DBA program, so I spoke to him to fact check what occurred 
during that period, to the best of his memory.  We spoke over the phone.  Muth is 
no longer working in music and lives in Toronto.  
 
Interview Times:  
 
24 August 2011 
 
Pelletier, Gilles:   
 
Gilles Pelletier is the Head of Strategic Development at SODEC.  He was interviewed 
to fact check and gain information for the Quebec chapter concerning the history of 
SODEC, access to research materials and to target other potential interviewees.  
Before the interview, I had never met him.  Our conversation over the phone lasted 
30 minutes and focused on the political structure and responsibilities of SODEC.  He 
lives in Montreal.  
 
Interview Times:  
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18 May 2011 
 
Roman, Duff:  
 
Duff Roman is one of the most active and important protagonists in the history of 
Canadian popular music funding.  He began as a radio broadcaster with CHUM and 
was instrumental, from a broadcasting perspective, to initiate FACTOR.  It was his 
lobbying (along with a number of other individuals) that launched the organization, 
convinced broadcasters in Quebec to launch Musicaction and later, merge it with the 
Department of Communications.  He was interviewed over the phone three times, 
each for more than 30 minutes, to discuss the challenges and structures in place at 
the time when FACTOR was being developed.  He is a staunch supporter of the 
organization and made that bias known during our interviews.  Duff is now retired 
and lives in Toronto.   
 
Interview Times: 
 
5 September 2011 
8 February 2012 
4 March 2013 
 
Rosen Earl: 
 
Earl Rosen is one of Canada’s oldest and most well known music managers and label 
owners.  His label, Marquis Classics, was co-founded with his wife, Dinah Hoyle, who 
worked at the Department for the Secretary of State in the late 1970s.  They met 
during the lobbying process that led to FACTOR.  Rosen is a former executive 
director of CIRPA and FACTOR and worked with Duff Roman, on the music industry 
side, to initiate FACTOR.  I interviewed him over the phone twice and once in person 
at MIDEM, exploring a number of issues in my dissertation from the founding of 
CIRPA to FACTOR, CTL and later, Starmaker.  Marquis Classics is still in operation 
and Earl lives in Toronto.  
 
Interview Times: 
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21 May 2011 (phone) 
14 September 2011 
30 January 2012 (MIDEM) 
 
Saxberg, Catherine: 
 
Catherine Saxberg is the current executive director of the Canadian Music Publishers 
Association.  Before that, she was an interim director of Radio Starmaker Fund, in its 
initial stages.  I interviewed her once over the phone to discuss and fact check how 
the fund was created and developed in its first few years.   
 
Interview Times: 
 
6 January 2012 
 
Stasiuk, Sara:  
 
Sara is the former executive director of Manitoba Music and the head of the National 
Advisory Board (NAB) at FACTOR.  I interviewed her to fact check comments made 
by Duncan McKie in discussing the reforms made at FACTOR in 2012 and 2013.  She 
was interviewed over Skype from her home in Winnipeg.  She is now the Director of 
Operations at Six Shooter Records.  
 
Interview Times:  
22 April 2012 
 
Sutherland, Chip: 
 
Chip Sutherland is the current executive director of Radio Starmaker Fund.  He took 
over in 2001, after serving as its legal counsel.  In addition, he manages a number of 
artists, including Feist.  He is an outspoken critic of Canada’s music funding strategy 
and was open about this in our interviews, each conducted over the phone.  He 
acknowledged the temporality of the fund and its ability to impact artists positively 
and negatively.  He was also a critic of FACTOR’s administration under Heather 
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Ostertag and championed Duncan McKie as her replacement.  He lives in Halifax and 
manages the fund remotely.  
 
Interview Times: 
 
6 January 2012 
10 April 2012 
24 September 2012 
 
Sutherland, Richard: 
 
Richard Sutherland is a professor at Mount Royal University in Calgary.  Before his 
professorship, he completed a PhD thesis providing the most extensive detailing of 
the Canadian popular music funding structure, written from the perspective of 
copyright maintenance.  I borrowed a significant amount of research from Richard, 
who completed his theoretical framework as a research clerk at CIRPA in 2007.  I 
interviewed him twice formally and spoke to him informally on a number of 
occasions, mainly to fact check dates, times and key individuals.  
 
Interview Times: 
 
24 August 2011 
18 July 2012 
 
Straw, Will: 
 
Professor Will Straw of McGill University is one of the foremost music industry 
academics in Canada.  He is one of the rare individuals who writes theoretically and 
scholarly about Canada’s music industries, and I utilized a number of his articles and 
theories in my dissertation, especially in investigating Canadian identity and its 
relationship to popular music.  I interviewed him twice over the phone in one week, 
to discuss his articles, personal thoughts and my research at the time.  
 
Interview Times: 
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3 March 2013 
7 March 2013 
 
Wanagas, Larry: 
 
Larry Wanagas is one of Canada’s most respected managers.  His company, 
Bumstead Group, has managed some of Canada’s most famous artists, including The 
Trews, the 2nd most funded band in Canadian history, according to my calculations.  
He founded the Music Managers Forum in Canada and served as the boards of CIRPA 
and RSF.  I interviewed him over the phone to discuss the reforms at FACTOR in 
2012.  
 
Interview Times: 
 
18 July 2012 
 
Van Breeman, Edo:  
  
Edo van Breeman is the lead singer of Brasstronaut and co-founder of now defunct 
indie label, Unfamiliar Records.  He has a troubled history with FACTOR, having 
many applications rejected (and some approved) over a five-year period.  I have also 
worked with his band in their UK and EU development.  I interviewed him over Skype 
to discuss his applications, which were ongoing at the time.  He made clear his 
oppositions to some of FACTOR’s policies, including DBA (which existed at the time).  
He lives in Vancouver.   
 
Interview Times: 
22 April 2012. 
3 November 2013 
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